Technical reports
Fragment-template power-analysis attacks against microcontroller implementations of the 32-bit stream cipher ChaCha
Henry Batchelor
July 2024, 59 pages
This technical report is based on a dissertation submitted May 2024 by the author for the degree of Master of Engineering (Computer Science Tripos) to the University of Cambridge, Selwyn College.
DOI | https://doi.org/10.48456/tr-995 |
Abstract
ChaCha is a widely adopted stream cipher, used for both random number generation and encryption. I propose a factor graph of ChaCha to improve the success rate of side-channel attacks that provide leakages throughout the entire execution of the algorithm. I also assess (fragment) template attacks against several implementations of ChaCha to demonstrate that the factor graph is helpful when working with actual side-channel attacks.
These attacks could fully recover the correct key from an 8-bit implementation. In contrast, a 32-bit implementation, with most of the state held in registers, was significantly more challenging to attack. An adversary with access to 10 power traces and an incremented counter could achieve a success rate of 14.6%. For a 32-bit implementation, with lots of SRAM activity, an attacker could successfully recover the key in 2.6% of cases from a single trace.
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BibTeX record
@TechReport{UCAM-CL-TR-995, author = {Batchelor, Henry}, title = {{Fragment-template power-analysis attacks against microcontroller implementations of the 32-bit stream cipher ChaCha}}, year = 2024, month = jul, url = {https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-995.pdf}, institution = {University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory}, doi = {10.48456/tr-995}, number = {UCAM-CL-TR-995} }