Department of Computer Science and Technology

Technical reports

An open architecture for secure interworking services

Richard Hayton

June 1996, 102 pages

This technical report is based on a dissertation submitted March 1996 by the author for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the University of Cambridge, Fitzwilliam College.

DOI: 10.48456/tr-399


An emerging requirement is for applications and distributed services to cooperate or inter-operate. Mechanisms have been devised to hide the heterogeneity of the host operating systems and abstract the issues of distribution and object location. However, in order for systems to inter-operate securely there must also be mechanisms to hide differences in security policy, or at least negotiate between them.

This would suggest that a uniform model of access control is required. Such a model must be extremely flexible with respect to the specification of policy, as different applications have radically different needs. In a widely distributed environment this situation is exacerbated by the differing requirements of different organisations, and in an open environment there is a need to interwork with organisations using alternative security mechanisms.

Other proposals for the interworking of security mechanisms have concentrated on the enforcement of access policy, and neglected the concerns of freedom of expression of this policy. For example it is common to associate each request with a user identity, and to use this as the only parameter when performing access control. This work describes an architectural approach to security. By reconsidering the role of the client and the server, we may reformulate access control issues in terms of client naming.

We think of a client as obtaining a name issued by a service; either based on credentials already held by the client, or by delegation from another client. A grammar has been devised that allows the conditions under which a client may assume a name to be specified, and the conditions under which use of the name will be revoked. This allows complex security policies to be specified that define how clients of a service may interact with each other (through election, delegation and revocation), how clients interact with a service (by invoking operations or receiving events) and how clients and services may inter-operate. (For example, a client of a Login service may become a client of a file service.)

This approach allows great flexibility when integrating a number of services, and reduces the mismatch of policies common in heterogeneous systems. A flexible security definition is meaningless if not backed by a robust and efficient implementation. In this thesis we present a systems architecture that can be implemented efficiently, but that allows individual services to ‘fine tune’ the trade-offs between security, efficiency and freedom of policy expression. The architecture is inherently distributed and scalable, and includes mechanisms for rapid and selective revocation of privileges which may cascade between services and organisations.

Full text

PDF (0.9 MB)

BibTeX record

  author =	 {Hayton, Richard},
  title = 	 {{OASIS: An open architecture for secure interworking
  year = 	 1996,
  month = 	 jun,
  url = 	 {},
  institution =  {University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory},
  doi = 	 {10.48456/tr-399},
  number = 	 {UCAM-CL-TR-399}