Talk 1
The Designer's Dilemma: Approaches to the Free-Rider Problem in Knowledge Sharing Systems
John McCarthy
Knowledge sharing systems pose a social dilemma, as users do not realise a
gain from contribution but benefit from consumption of the non-rival good.
We introduce several existing incentive schemes (e.g. token economies) that
have been developed to overcome this dilemma and discuss their limitations.
We propose 'identification' (i.e. authorship and personal visibility) and
'automation' (i.e. reducing the users' overhead for sharing through
interface improvements) as important factors to increase cooperation between
users. However, leveraging both can the lead to privacy concerns that need
to be addressed by identity management or protection through pseudonymity.
Talk 2
The Mechanics of Trust: Signals and Incentives for Trustworthy Behaviour
Jens Riegelsberger
With an increasing number of technologies supporting transactions over
distance and replacing traditional forms of interaction, user trust has
become a core concern for researchers in both HCI and CMC. This research is
often based on users' introspection and the resulting models are bound to
specific domains. The trust signals identified can lose their significance
once transferred to other contexts and are vulnerable to misuse.
In our approach we aim to identify contextual and personal properties that
give incentives for trustworthy behaviour. In a second step, we analyze how
their presence can be signalled to allow the formation of well-placed trust.
The key contextual properties that warrant trust are temporal, social, and
institutional embeddedness.
To increase the level of well-placed trust, researchers and designers need
to identify signals for the presence of such trust-warranting properties
that are reliable and easy to interpret. At the same time, they must be
cheap to emit for actors whose actions are governed by them but costly to
mimic for untrustworthy actors.
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