Theory NS_Public

(*  Title:      HOL/Auth/NS_Public.thy
    Author:     Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
    Copyright   1996  University of Cambridge
*)

section‹The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol›

text ‹Flawed version, vulnerable to Lowe's attack.
From Burrows, Abadi and Needham.  A Logic of Authentication.
  Proc. Royal Soc. 426 (1989), p. 260›

theory NS_Public imports Public begin

inductive_set ns_public :: "event list set"
  where
   Nil:  "[] ∈ ns_public"
   ― ‹Initial trace is empty›
 | Fake: "⟦evsf ∈ ns_public;  X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf))⟧
          ⟹ Says Spy B X  # evsf ∈ ns_public"
   ― ‹The spy can say almost anything.›
 | NS1:  "⟦evs1 ∈ ns_public;  Nonce NA ∉ used evs1⟧
          ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄)
                # evs1  ∈  ns_public"
   ― ‹Alice initiates a protocol run, sending a nonce to Bob›
 | NS2:  "⟦evs2 ∈ ns_public;  Nonce NB ∉ used evs2;
           Says A' B (Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄) ∈ set evs2⟧
          ⟹ Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) ⦃Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B⦄)
                # evs2  ∈  ns_public"
   ― ‹Bob responds to Alice's message with a further nonce›
 | NS3:  "⟦evs3 ∈ ns_public;
           Says A  B (Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄) ∈ set evs3;
           Says B' A (Crypt (pubEK A) ⦃Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B⦄) ∈ set evs3⟧
          ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) # evs3 ∈ ns_public"
   ― ‹Alice proves her existence by sending @{term NB} back to Bob.›

declare knows_Spy_partsEs [elim]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]

text ‹A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end›
lemma "∃NB. ∃evs ∈ ns_public. Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs"
  apply (intro exI bexI)
   apply (rule_tac [2] ns_public.Nil [THEN ns_public.NS1, THEN ns_public.NS2, THEN ns_public.NS3])
  by possibility


subsection ‹Inductive proofs about @{term ns_public}›

(** Theorems of the form X ∉ parts (spies evs) imply that NOBODY
    sends messages containing X! **)

text ‹Spy never sees another agent's private key! (unless it's bad at start)›
lemma Spy_see_priEK [simp]:
  "evs ∈ ns_public ⟹ (Key (priEK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
  by (erule ns_public.induct, auto)

lemma Spy_analz_priEK [simp]:
  "evs ∈ ns_public ⟹ (Key (priEK A) ∈ analz (spies evs)) = (A ∈ bad)"
  by auto


subsection ‹Authenticity properties obtained from {term NS1}›

text ‹It is impossible to re-use a nonce in both {term NS1} and {term NS2}, provided the nonce
  is secret.  (Honest users generate fresh nonces.)›
lemma no_nonce_NS1_NS2: 
      "⟦evs ∈ ns_public;
        Crypt (pubEK C) ⦃NA', Nonce NA, Agent D⦄ ∈ parts (spies evs);
        Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄ ∈ parts (spies evs)⟧  
       ⟹ Nonce NA ∈ analz (spies evs)"
  by (induct rule: ns_public.induct) (auto intro: analz_insertI)


text ‹Unicity for {term NS1}: nonce {term NA} identifies agents {term A} and {term B}›
lemma unique_NA:
  assumes NA: "Crypt(pubEK B)  ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A ⦄ ∈ parts(spies evs)"
              "Crypt(pubEK B') ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A'⦄ ∈ parts(spies evs)"
              "Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs)"
    and evs: "evs ∈ ns_public"
  shows "A=A' ∧ B=B'"
  using evs NA
  by (induction rule: ns_public.induct) (auto intro!: analz_insertI split: if_split_asm)


text ‹Secrecy: Spy does not see the nonce sent in msg {term NS1} if {term A} and {term B} are secure
  The major premise "Says A B ..." makes it a dest-rule, hence the given assumption order. ›
theorem Spy_not_see_NA:
  assumes NA: "Says A B (Crypt(pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄) ∈ set evs"
              "A ∉ bad" "B ∉ bad"
    and evs: "evs ∈ ns_public"
  shows "Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs)"
  using evs NA
proof (induction rule: ns_public.induct)
  case (Fake evsf X B)
  then show ?case
    by spy_analz
next
  case (NS2 evs2 NB A' B NA A)
  then show ?case
    by simp (metis Says_imp_analz_Spy analz_into_parts parts.simps unique_NA usedI)
next
  case (NS3 evs3 A B NA B' NB)
  then show ?case
    by simp (meson Says_imp_analz_Spy analz_into_parts no_nonce_NS1_NS2)
qed auto


text ‹Authentication for {term A}: if she receives message 2 and has used {term NA}
  to start a run, then {term B} has sent message 2.›
lemma A_trusts_NS2_lemma: 
    "⟦evs ∈ ns_public;            
      Crypt (pubEK A) ⦃Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B⦄ ∈ parts (spies evs);
      Says A B (Crypt(pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄) ∈ set evs;
      A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad⟧
     ⟹ Says B A (Crypt(pubEK A) ⦃Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B⦄) ∈ set evs"
  by (induct rule: ns_public.induct) (auto dest: Spy_not_see_NA unique_NA)

theorem A_trusts_NS2:
     "⟦Says A  B (Crypt(pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄) ∈ set evs;
       Says B' A (Crypt(pubEK A) ⦃Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B⦄) ∈ set evs;
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_public⟧
      ⟹ Says B A (Crypt(pubEK A) ⦃Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B⦄) ∈ set evs"
  by (blast intro: A_trusts_NS2_lemma)


text ‹If the encrypted message appears then it originated with Alice in {term NS1}›
lemma B_trusts_NS1:
     "⟦evs ∈ ns_public;                                     
       Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄ ∈ parts (spies evs);
       Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs)⟧
      ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄) ∈ set evs"
  by (induct evs rule: ns_public.induct) (use analz_insertI in ‹auto split: if_split_asm›)


subsection ‹Authenticity properties obtained from {term NS2}›

text ‹Unicity for {term NS2}: nonce {term NB} identifies nonce {term NA} and agent {term A} 
  [proof closely follows that for @{thm [source] unique_NA}]›

lemma unique_NB [dest]:
  assumes NB: "Crypt(pubEK A) ⦃Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B⦄ ∈ parts(spies evs)"
              "Crypt(pubEK A') ⦃Nonce NA', Nonce NB, Agent B'⦄ ∈ parts(spies evs)"
              "Nonce NB ∉ analz (spies evs)"
    and evs: "evs ∈ ns_public"
  shows "A=A' ∧ NA=NA' ∧ B=B'"
  using evs NB
  by (induction rule: ns_public.induct) (auto intro!: analz_insertI split: if_split_asm)


text ‹{term NB} remains secret›
theorem Spy_not_see_NB [dest]:
  assumes NB: "Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) ⦃Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B⦄) ∈ set evs"
              "A ∉ bad" "B ∉ bad"
    and evs: "evs ∈ ns_public"
  shows "Nonce NB ∉ analz (spies evs)"
  using evs NB evs
proof (induction rule: ns_public.induct)
  case Fake
  then show ?case by spy_analz
next
  case NS2
  then show ?case
    by (auto intro!: no_nonce_NS1_NS2)
qed auto


text ‹Authentication for {term B}: if he receives message 3 and has used {term NB}
  in message 2, then {term A} has sent message 3.›
lemma B_trusts_NS3_lemma:
     "⟦evs ∈ ns_public;
       Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (spies evs);
       Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) ⦃Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B⦄) ∈ set evs;
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad⟧
      ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs"
proof (induction rule: ns_public.induct)
  case (NS3 evs3 A B NA B' NB)
  then show ?case
    by simp (blast intro: no_nonce_NS1_NS2)
qed auto

theorem B_trusts_NS3:
     "⟦Says B A  (Crypt (pubEK A) ⦃Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B⦄) ∈ set evs;
       Says A' B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs;
       A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_public⟧
      ⟹ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs"
  by (blast intro: B_trusts_NS3_lemma)


subsection‹Overall guarantee for {term B}›

text ‹If NS3 has been sent and the nonce NB agrees with the nonce B joined with
  NA, then A initiated the run using NA.›
theorem B_trusts_protocol:
     "⟦A ∉ bad;  B ∉ bad;  evs ∈ ns_public⟧ ⟹
      Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (spies evs) ⟶
      Says B A  (Crypt (pubEK A) ⦃Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B⦄) ∈ set evs ⟶
      Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄) ∈ set evs"
by (erule ns_public.induct, auto)

end