Theory Needham_Schroeder_No_Attacker_Example

theory Needham_Schroeder_No_Attacker_Example
imports Needham_Schroeder_Base
begin

inductive_set ns_public :: "event list set"
  where
         (*Initial trace is empty*)
   Nil:  "[]  ns_public"
         (*Alice initiates a protocol run, sending a nonce to Bob*)
 | NS1:  "evs1  ns_public;  Nonce NA  used evs1
           Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) Nonce NA, Agent A)
                # evs1    ns_public"
         (*Bob responds to Alice's message with a further nonce*)
 | NS2:  "evs2  ns_public;  Nonce NB  used evs2;
           Says A' B (Crypt (pubEK B) Nonce NA, Agent A)  set evs2
           Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) Nonce NA, Nonce NB)
                # evs2    ns_public"

         (*Alice proves her existence by sending NB back to Bob.*)
 | NS3:  "evs3  ns_public;
           Says A  B (Crypt (pubEK B) Nonce NA, Agent A)  set evs3;
           Says B' A (Crypt (pubEK A) Nonce NA, Nonce NB)  set evs3
           Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) # evs3  ns_public"

code_pred [skip_proof] ns_publicp .
thm ns_publicp.equation

code_pred [generator_cps] ns_publicp .
thm ns_publicp.generator_cps_equation

lemma "ns_publicp evs ==> ¬ (Says Alice Bob (Crypt (pubEK Bob) (Nonce NB))) : set evs"
(*quickcheck[random, iterations = 1000000, size = 20, timeout = 3600, verbose]
quickcheck[exhaustive, size = 8, timeout = 3600, verbose]
quickcheck[narrowing, size = 7, timeout = 3600, verbose]*)
quickcheck[smart_exhaustive, depth = 5, timeout = 30, expect = counterexample]
oops

lemma
  "ns_publicp evs            
        Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) Nonce NA, Nonce NB) : set evs
        A  Spy  B  Spy  A  B 
            Nonce NB  analz (spies evs)"
quickcheck[smart_exhaustive, depth = 6, timeout = 30]
quickcheck[narrowing, size = 6, timeout = 30, verbose]
oops

end