Privacy/Proxy/Perfidy

what criminals (& others) put in domain Whois

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Normal Whois Data

- When a domain name is registered the registrant supplies their name and contact details (street address, perhaps phone & email)

- Other fields give admin/billing/technical/etc. contacts
  - one can often learn registrant phone numbers if the registrant is also admin/billing/etc.

- This data is public
  - and available on the port 43 whois service
  - also sometimes on the web as well

- Whois allows problems to be addressed promptly
  - but some people are shocked by the lack of privacy
Privacy and Proxy Services

- **Privacy Service**
  - registrant name is provided, but contact details are generic (although sometimes the local part of the email address is specific to the registrant – to allow automated forwarding of email)

- **Proxy Service**
  - domain is registered in the name of the proxy service and all contact details are generic (although sometimes the local part of the email address is specific to the registrant – to allow automated forwarding of email)

- **Note that for “.UK” Whois data may be hidden by individual choice (but not by traders or companies)**
  - but .UK isn’t one of the domains ICANN looks after
Example Proxy Registration

Domain Name: DOOMZONE.NET
Registrant:
PrivacyProtect.org
Domain Admin (contact@privacyprotect.org)
ID#10760, PO Box 16
Note - All Postal Mails Rejected, visit Privacyprotect.org
Nobby Beach
null, QLD 4218
AU
Tel. +45.36946676

Creation Date: 07-Feb-2012
Expiration Date: 07-Feb-2013
ICANN Whois Studies

- ICANN doing a number of studies on the domain whois system:
  - NORC [in Chicago] has examined validity of whois details (most have some detail wrong!); the overall usage of privacy and proxy services (20%) and classifications of registrants
  - Carnegie Mellon University is investigating the extent to which Whois contact details are being misused
  - Interisle Consulting Group assessed feasibility of studying message relay and identity reveal by privacy/proxy services
  - Whois Service Requirements Survey by a GNSO Working Group
  - The present study by NPL into usage of privacy and proxy services when domains are maliciously registered

- Full (and more precise) details at
  - http://gnso.icann.org/en/group-activities/other/whois/studies
This Study

- National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in the UK commissioned to do a study into use of privacy and proxy services when domains are registered for harmful or illegal Internet activities
  - **Main Author**
    - Dr Richard Clayton (University of Cambridge)
  - **Project Team**
    - Prof. Tyler Moore (SMU) - typosquatting data
    - Dr Nicolas Christin (CMU) - fake pharmacy data
    - Dr Tony Mansfield (NPL) - experimental design
    - David Hindley (NPL) - project management

- Contract started: April 2012
- Draft report issued: 24 Sep 2013
- Public comment period ended: 22 Oct 2013
- Final version: Real Soon Now
Summary of Methodology for Study

• Basic approach:
  ▪ obtain various lists of criminal URLs
  ▪ pick out domains being used
  ▪ fetch Whois data for the biz/com/info/net/org domains
  ▪ assess whether registrant is using privacy or proxy service
  ▪ OR look for contact phone number of registrant

• Precise stats for privacy/proxy/no phone number

• Random sample of registrants with phone number
  ▪ phone call made; if answered then one question survey (in registrant’s native language)
    - “did you register example.com”
  ▪ if not answered then retried on different days/times
Phone Results

- Phone number had to be “apparently valid” (i.e. have enough digits, not be 9999999 or 0000000, or have an invalid North American area code)
  - BUT could turn out to be invalid when we dialled it
  - OR the number was valid but just rang and rang
  - OR we reached voicemail, or someone answered who could not help us reach the registrant, or registrant wasn’t ever available
  - OR phone answered and knowledge of domain denied
  - OR we spoke to the registrant (or someone speaking for a company) and they agreed they had registered the domain
Phone Results

**NOPHONE unless “apparently valid”**

- BUT could turn out to be a failure when we dialled it
- OR the number was valid but just didn’t ring
- OR we reached voicemail, or someone answered who could not help us reach the registrant, or registrant wasn’t ever available
- OR phone answered and knowledge of domain denied
- OR we spoke to the registrant (or someone speaking for a company) but they agreed they had registered the domain
Phishing (the report in a nutshell)

• Phishing (i.e. email enticing to web page...)

• Source data was 32 806 URLs (one week’s worth), using 5 105 domains – 57% in biz/com/info/net/org/

• Used specialist knowledge to split these into three groups:
  - compromised machines (i.e. criminal added phishing pages)
    - 2121 domains
  - third parties (free webhosting domains, cloud services, etc.)
    - 263 domains (plus 1 had no Whois available, so ignored)
  - maliciously registered domain names
    - 449 domains (plus 5 had no Whois data available)
Phishing Analysis Results

- Privacy and proxy usage
  - third parties: 14% (low)
  - compromised machines: 25% (average)
  - maliciously registered domains: 31% (high)

- Able to reach registrant by phone
  - third parties: 32%
  - compromised machines: 24%
  - maliciously registered domains: 2%

- No hope of reaching registrant by phone
  - third parties: 50%
  - compromised machines: 62%
  - maliciously registered domains: 92%
Other Types of Malicious Registration

- WP2: Data from aa419.org (Advanced Fee Fraud &c)
  - 46% of registrants using privacy/proxy services
  - 89% impossible, a priori, to contact by phone
- WP3: Unlicensed pharmacies
  - 55% of registrants using privacy/proxy services
  - 92% impossible, a priori, to contact by phone
- WP5: Child sexual abuse image websites
  - 29% of registrants using privacy/proxy services
  - it is believed that 100% are impossible to contact by phone
- So a range of rates of usage of privacy/proxy services, but criminals seldom contactable by phone
## Legal and Harmless Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Privacy/proxy usage</th>
<th>impossible to reach by phone</th>
<th>Did reach by phone [*]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal pharmacies</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law firms</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive search consultants</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexa top 3500 (being typo-squatted)</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult websites</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* CAVEAT: small samples mean quite large error bounds for this column
The Story So Far...

- Average usage of privacy/proxy services:
  - 20% NORC measurement across all domains
  - 25% our measure of compromised websites
- Criminals use these services more than average
  - ranges from 29% to 55%
  - BUT some harmless activities also above average too
  - banks 28%, adult websites 44%
- Criminals don’t reveal contact phone numbers. So consider the *a priori* “impossible to contact” rates
  - ie usage privacy/proxy or bad/missing phone number rates
  - criminal activities: 88% – 92% (perhaps 100%)
  - legal and harmless: 24% – 62%
More Complex Datasets

• WP8: StopBadware (malware related domains)
  ▪ Mainly compromised sites, but some malicious registrations
  ▪ 20% of registrants use privacy/proxy services
  ▪ But 51% not possible to reach by phone

• WP8: SURBL (domains indicating email is spammy)
  ▪ Mainly maliciously registered, but by no means all
  ▪ 44% of registrants use privacy/proxy services
  ▪ but only 59% not possible to reach by phone
  ▪ CAUTION: high error bounds with this dataset because many domains had the same contact phone number
  ▪ ALSO: some evidence of report inflation, i.e. all possible domains listed when multiple domains can be resolved to same location
Typosquatting

- Already mentioned “typosquatted domains” : Alexa 3500 sites where small variants of domain name exist hoping to be visited by sloppy tpyers

- WP4: typoquatting domains
  - privacy/proxy services used by 48% of registrants
  - 11% reached by phone (c.f. adult websites 6%)
    - BUT very high error bounds (small number of people involved)

- Clearly some typosquatters are attempting to avoid being identified, whereas others are more laid back
  - NB this isn’t criminal – but civil action is more likely if the brand owner can identify “economies of scale”
UDRP

• Uniform Domain-name Dispute Resolution Policy
• Actions mainly related to typo-squatting

WP9: domains subject to UDRP (many “similar” names occur)
  ▪ privacy/proxy services used by 40% of registrants
  ▪ no phone calls made because data was old (and many domains change hands in the process, so there was the possibility of a “difficult” conversation)
Statistical Significance

- Measurements of privacy/proxy services are exact and for many work packages the samples are large – so expectation is that the results are robust.

- Most variations >3% are statistically significant at 90% or better (see report for full details)

- Phone calls to registrants were done on a sampled basis
  - selection was random, but we avoided calling the same number more than once, so see report for (complex) statistical analysis
  - some small sample sizes and presence of large groups of domains with same contact number means that error bounds on the various categories of call outcome are sometimes quite large (>10%)

- Figures for “it is impossible to consider making a phone call to this registrant” have low error bounds and are a clear indication of how criminals choose different methods to stay hidden
## Summary of Numerical Results of Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work package</th>
<th>Privacy or proxy usage</th>
<th>Not possible to call registrant</th>
<th>Maliciously registered?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal pharmacies</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law firms</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive search consultants</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typosquatted domains</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phishing: third parties</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StopBadware domains</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult websites</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURBL domains</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>mostly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phishing: compromised sites</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typosquatting</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Fee Fraud</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>88.9%</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlicensed pharmacies</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>91.8%</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phishing: malicious registration</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the study I developed a new way of processing Whois information. This information is basically formatted output from a database. Traditionally one processes this with hundreds (literally) of regular expressions that extract the raw material and this gets very messy, and is very hard to maintain.

New approach is to provide a template for each registrar with placeholders for variable information.

Whois results are then parsed against these templates and the information extracted.

This is being alpha tested (it will be released as open source) and it is hoped to build a community to maintain the templates.

- ICANN have recently been trying to standardise Whois output, but with somewhat variable success!
Simple Template

Domain Name : <DOMAIN>
::Registrant::
Name : <OWNER: name>
Email : <OWNER: email>
Address : <OWNER: addr>
Zipcode : <OWNER: zip>
Nation : <OWNER: cc>
Tel : <OWNER: phone>
Fax : <OWNER: fax>
::Administrative Contact::
Name : <ADMIN: name>
Email : <ADMIN: email>
Address : <ADMIN: addr>
Zipcode : <ADMIN: zip>
Nation : <ADMIN: cc>
Tel : <ADMIN: phone>
Fax : <ADMIN: fax>
Some Complexities

- `<*REPEATLINE>`
  - next line is repeated whilst matches

- `<*OPTIONAL>`
  - Next line may or may not be present

- `<*OPTBLOCK> ... <*ENDBLOCK>`
  - Next block may or may not be present

- `<*ALTBLOCK> ... <*ENDBLOCK><*ALTBLOCK>...`
  - One of these alternatives will be present

- and handling for blocks of info referenced by identifier:

  `<*COUNTER>
  `<*REPEAT>`
  nic-hdl-br: `<%INDIRECT>
  person: `<%INDIRECT: name>`
Summary of Findings

• Criminals DO use privacy/proxy services > average
• BUT so do some legal and harmless activities as well
• When criminals don’t use privacy/proxy services then they don’t provide valid contact numbers – so overall the effect is that at least 9/10 can’t be reached
• BUT many lawful and harmless activities fail to provide valid contact numbers either, with anything between a quarter and two third of them being inherently unreachable
• BUT the Whois phone number is not the only way to reach legitimate registrants...
Policy Conundrums

• Study shows (recall the typosquatting, the adult websites and the banks) that the reasons for using privacy and proxy services are many and various...

• Some people believe that privacy / proxy services are so abused that they should be forbidden
  ▪ BUT many legitimate businesses & individuals are using them
  ▪ clearly criminals will just fail to provide valid contact details

• Some people want compulsion to provide valid contact details (and these should be checked)
  ▪ BUT between a quarter and two thirds of existing legitimate domain registrations don’t provide valid contact details so hard to get there from here!
Privacy/Proxy/Perfidy

what criminals (& others) put in domain Whois

http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org