Phishing Panel

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Why does phishing work?

- Con artists are really, really good at persuading people to do dumb things.
- Almost no context to an email, or a website; so you no longer need an Intaglio-capable printing press to produce plausible props.
- The underlying protocols and procedures are pretty rubbish...

Authentication(?) protocols

• Password (or 1-time password, or SecurID) $A \rightarrow B$: A, S_n

& hence Man-In-The-Middle attack

 $A \rightarrow P: \qquad A, S_n$ $P \rightarrow B: \qquad A, S_n$

• Even if Alice proves her identity (& liveness) in every message there is no binding of that to the type of transaction (or the amount)

Surely, we can fix it with Crypto?

A \rightarrow B: {A, B, nonce, Transaction_n} K_A^{-1}

This is fine if Alice trusts the program she is using to do the crypto. So what if the phisher invites her to download a new improved version from www.bankname.newsoftware.com? note that bankname doesn't see this being registered! So policing the DNS won't help

What about Client Certificates ?

- Client Certificates fix Man-in-the-Middle
 - also kills off account aggregation, and stops you doing your banking from a cybercafe...
- and if phishers now offer you an updated Client Certificate ("and please email back the previous copies for secure destruction")

– or if the next virus targets Certificates ?

– exactly what is the binding to the Certificate ?

What about browser pop-ups?

- Phishers already overwrite padlocks, the URL being visited and the URL asked for...
 - with current browser "security" models you cannot really rely on *anything* on the screen being in the least bit valid
 - it is not credible to insist consumers check for the browser patches every day and also turn off Java, JavaScript, ActiveX and Flash...

...besides, the banking site probably needs them!

So what will work?

- Lots of small improvements are possible
 - One-time passwords
 - Client Certificates
 - Real-time browser checks on websites
 - Validation of incoming IP address
 - Multiple levels of authentication by the bank
 - etc etc
- All can be overcome one-by-one, but if introduced all at once they may be daunting!



Who'd climb Kilimanjaro just to go phishing ?