Purposes of Data Retention

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Scrambling for Safety Six 14 May 2003
Different types of policing

• Data is retained so that it can be accessed
• “Normal policing” needs recent data
  – who did you plan to meet on the fatal night?
  – who rang the bar to check you were in there?
  – who do you ring regularly for supplies?
  – who was the gas fitter, we’ve got his number?
• But some investigators wish to look back to the crime planning stage… hence retention
How much access is there?

• Customs & Excise: Jan-Mar 2000
  – 18940 requests 3.0% (568) billing
    (mainly subscribers) 0.3% (57) “other”
    ~1515 requests per major operation

• Metropolitan Police: 2001
  – 127,000 requests

• Recently more data for “other authorities”
  – it’s hidden (!) on the Home Office website
Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency

• 2001  73 criminal enterprises “disrupted”
  174 arrests by 160 officers

• 54,000 “subscriber data”
  ie:  740 per network
  &  300 “itemised call records”
  ie:  4 per network
  & 1000 “traffic data”

• PS: the SDEA is not just about drugs
They’re finding patterns!

Pattern Tracer Telephone Call Analysis (i2 Ltd)
Other “conspiracy” investigators

- Financial Services Authority
  - 66 relevant enquiries, 100 uses of comms data
- DTI Companies Investigations Branch & Legal Services Directorate
  - ~100 enquiries, 200 uses of comms data
- Radiocommunications Agency
  - ~25 enquiries, 400 uses of comms data
Conspiracy (continued)

• Home Office Immigration Service
  – 24 investigations of organised crime
  – ~1200 requests (~50 per investigation)

• Information Commissioner
  – 109 investigations
  – 52 subscriber checks, 36 itemised records

• Serious Fraud Office
  – 40 accesses per annum
999 calls

• Interrupted calls (or caller is just lost)
  – NB: over half of 999 calls now from mobiles
  – coastguard says 112 per annum

• Hoax calls
  – ambulance work with police (no figures)
  – fire 75,000 hoaxes (~85 prosecuted)
    also 4400 arson investigations
  – coastguard 206 hoaxes investigated
And more...

- Medical Devices Agency
  - 20 per annum
- NI Counter Fraud Unit (fraud & misuse)
  - 10 per annum
- DEFRA
  - 12 per annum (and operate with police anyway)
- Gaming Board
  - have no idea!
Some obvious conclusions

• Some organisations are such low volume they will never acquire any expertise
• Working with the police looks sensible for many authorities (and they do this already)
  – although RIP prohibits data sharing per se
• Some conspiracy investigators need to learn about the tools (or maybe the tools are overhyped and useless?)
A common theme appears...

- Police not interested in trivia
- Telcos not interested in small fry
  - telcos exercising their DPA discretion
  - and no-one coming back with a court order
- There’s public interest issues to consider as to how effective our regulators and enforcement agencies are – which go way beyond communications data
And finally…

• We need to decide who enforces our laws
• We need to distinguish between different types of policing (strategic and reactive)
• *Interrupted* 999 calls are a special case
• We need a lot more figures to understand what is going on – and communications data is only the start of that process….
The raw information on which this talk was based can be found (until they move it again without telling anyone) at:

http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crimpol/crimreduc/regulation/part1/pas.html