

13th February 2002

Richard Clayton

These lecture notes were specially prepared for the Cambridge University Computer Science "Security" course, Lent Term 2002.

© Richard Clayton 2002

richard.clayton@cl.cam.ac.uk



The slides give the broad outline of the lectures and the notes ensure that the details are properly recorded, lest they be skipped over on the day. However, it is at least arguable that it will be far more interesting to take notice of what I say off-the-cuff rather than relying on this document as an accurate rendition of what the lecture was really about!

Also, please note that "IANAL" (I am not a lawyer). Consult a professional if you wish to receive accurate advice about the law!





★ The 1968 Civil Evidence Act removed any possibility of computer evidence being labelled as "hearsay". It has since been amended by the Civil Evidence Act 1995, which clarified what a document was to cover maps, plans, films and even computer databases. In general, authenticity is not an issue in civil trials because of the discovery process. But, if the correctness of the document is disputed then evidence of authenticity will be required.

* PACE 1984 required (expert) evidence that a machine was working properly. This caused practical problems and some strange decisions for a while (as in *DPP v McKeown* where a faulty clock on a breathalyser caused considerable confusion in lower courts; in 1997 the House of Lords eventually decided it was irrelevant to the operation of the device.)

★ PACE s69 was repealed by the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. No special conditions are now necessary for the production of "hearsay evidence" produced by a computer. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the courts will presume that the system was working properly. If there is evidence to the contrary, then the party seeking to rely on the evidence will need to prove that it was working.

* The Munden miscarriage of justice shows that system design must allow for "hostile" inspection (see: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/18.25.html#subj5)



★ The Data Protection Act 1998 is now fully in force. The text of the Act is online at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980029.htm and there is a wealth of advice on the Information Commissioner's site at:

http://www.dataprotection.gov.uk/

* The act has specific requirements with regard to Principle 7:

```
Schedule I, Part II:
s(9) Having regard to the state of technological development
and the cost of implementing any measures, the measures must
ensure a level of security appropriate to-
```

(a) the harm that might result from such unauthorised or unlawful processing or accidental loss, destruction or damage as are mentioned in the seventh principle, and

(b) the nature of the data to be protected.

s(10) The data controller must take reasonable steps to ensure the reliability of any employees of his who have access to the personal data.



★ For a racy account of hacking in the 1980s see:

http://www.ladysharrow.ndirect.co.uk/library/Books/ appzero/approaching_zero%20chapter%202.htm



★ The Act can be found online at:

http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1990/Ukpga_19900018_en_1.htm



* A typical warning, that could assist in bringing CMA prosecutions,

would be: This machine is the property of xxx Ltd. Only authorised users are entitled to connect to and/or log in to this computing system. If you are unsure whether you are authorised, then you are not and should disconnect immediately.

★ For a review of cases brought under the CMA 1990-1995 see: http://csrc.lse.ac.uk/people/kelmana/CMA_AppendixA.htm

* *R. v. Bedworth 1991* It was alleged that Bedworth & two others modified code at the Financial Times share index, and disrupted research work at a European Cancer foundation. Two pleaded guilty. Bedworth argued that he had developed an addiction to computer use, and as a result was unable to form the intent which has to be proven under the statute. The jury acquitted.

★ *R. v. Pile 1995* Christopher Pile (aka the 'Black Baron') got 18 months under CMA s3. Pile pleaded guilty to five charges of gaining unauthorised access to computers, five of making unauthorised modifications and one of inciting others to spread the viruses he had written. Pile has created "two vicious and very dangerous computer viruses named 'Pathogen' and 'Queeg'".

* R. v. Bow Street Magistrates Court and Allison: Ex Parte Government of the United States 1999 Allison was to be extradited to the USA for accessing American Express information about credit cards (used to steal \$1million from ATMs). The House of Lords held that although Allison was authorised to access some information, he did not have authorisation to access the relevant information. This effectively overturned the decision in *R.v.Bignell 1997* where access to data on the Police National Computer (about who was parked outside an ex-wife's house) was held not to be unlawful, because the police officers involved were authorised to access the system.



- Part I Licensing regime
 - for "cryptographic support service" providers
 - entirely voluntary
 - sunset clause if not activated before May 2005
- Part II Electronic Signatures
 - electronic signatures "shall be admissible in evidence"
 - creates power to modify legislation for the purposes of authorising or facilitating the use of electronic communications or electronic storage
- s14 Prohibits key escrow

13th February 2002

Security : UK Legislation

 The Electronic Communications Act 2000 is online at: http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000007.htm

★ The voluntary licensing scheme is the last vestige of the "key escrow" proposals of the mid 1990s when the NSA (and others) tried to grab the world's keys to mitigate the effects of the use of encryption upon their snooping activities. The DTI hopes that the industry initiative called tScheme (http://www.tscheme.org/) will succeed and there will be no need for the DTI to create an approvals body. s14 is present to ensure that everyone understands that the old policies are dead.

★ Electronic signatures were probably effective (certainly in England & Wales) before this Act was passed. However, there's now no doubt that courts can look at them and weigh them as evidence.

★ The Government decided against a global approach to amending legislation (anywhere it says writing then email is OK) but is instead tackling topics one at a time. Perhaps the most visible change so far is the option to take delivery of company annual reports by email. There are also significant changes at HM Land Registry, where electronic conveyancing of land is on the horizon.



 "Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures" is at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1999/en_399L0093.html

```
    2(2) "advanced electronic signature" means an electronic signature which meets the following requirements:

            (a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory;
            (b) it is capable of identifying the signatory;
            (c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control; and
            (d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is detectable;
```

★ Consultation on transposition (rather late) into UK Law is at: http://www.dti.gov.uk/cii/datasecurity/electronicsignatures/signatures.shtml

deadline for comments was 12th Feb !

★ The proposed UK law will make the issuers of qualified certificates liable for damages regarding the accuracy of the information in their certificates, the sole ownership of the private keys and the timely existence of revocation information. The burden of proof will be on the issuer to prove they were not negligent.



- The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2001 can be found online at: http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000023.htm
- ★ A history of interception in the UK (from 1663 onwards) can be found at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/oicd/intera.htm#Chapter%202

The judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in *Malone* made legislation necessary and the Interception of Communications Act 1985 (IOCA) was the result. The 1997 *Halford* decision (relating to interception on private networks) showed that the law needed revision.

★ Access to communications data was previously done using the exemptions provided by s28 of DPA 1984 (s29 in DPA 1998). The form used in the ISP industry can be seen at:

http://www.linx.net/misc/dpa28-3form.html

★ Surveillance, bugging and the use of informers needed to be formally regulated so that these activities did under infringe Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("right to privacy").

★ The Government proposed numerous policies through the late 1990s which were intended to address the problems caused by the use of encryption by criminals. Eventually compulsory "key escrow" was dropped and we have ended up with the requirement to "put into an intelligible form" along with some GAK (Government Access to Keys).

RIP Act 2001 - Interception

- Tapping a telephone (or copying an email) is "interception". It must be authorised by a warrant signed by the Secretary of State
 - SoS means the Home Secretary (or similar). Power can only be delegated very temporarily
 - Product is not admissible in court
- Some sensible exceptions exist
 - delivered data
 - stored data that can be accessed by production order
 - techies running a network
 - "lawful business practice"

13th February 2002

Security : UK Legislation

* s2(2) ...a person intercepts a communication in the course of its transmission by means of a telecommunication system if, and only if, he-

- (a) so modifies or interferes with the system, or its operation,
- (b) so monitors transmissions made by means of the system, or
- (c) so monitors transmissions made by wireless telegraphy to or from apparatus comprised in the system,

as to make some or all of the contents of the communication available, while being transmitted, to a person other than the sender or intended recipient of the communication.

★ Note that once the data has reached its destination then it's no longer interception. However, storage so that the recipient can collect it or have access to it doesn't count as the destination. So it's interception to look at maildrops or undelivered SMS messages.

★ Interception is lawful if both the sender and recipient has given permission s3(1) or s3(2) if the recipient has and the police have a Part II warrant (this is the "tap the kidnapper's call" scenario).

★ Techies working for the communications service provider can lawfully intercept [s3(3)] if what they're doing is required for the provision or operation of the service. This means that filtering for viruses is lawful, as is sniffing network traffic for diagnostic purposes.



 Statutory Instrument 2000 No. 2699 : The Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) (Interception of Communications) Regulations 2000 http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2000/20002699.htm

★ The Information Commissioner has a draft Code of Practice on employer/employee issues regarding data protection. It has proved to be somewhat controversial and nothing further has appeared since a consultation period ended in Jan 2001

http://www.dataprotection.gov.uk/dpr/dpdoc.nsf



★ Part III is not yet in force, and there is not yet a draft for the Code of Practice which will (possibly) answer a whole lot of practical questions about how this part of the Act will operate.

★ Details about the notice that is served are given in s49. You will get a reasonable time to comply and access to your keys. You can provide the key instead of the data - which might be a sensible thing to do where a message is being sought and the "session key" can be provided. If you only have a partial key then you must hand that over, or if you don't have the key but know where it can be located then you must report where it can be found.

★ In "special circumstances" you can be required to hand over a key. The notice has to be signed by a Chief Constable (or customs/military/security services equivalent) and the circumstances must be reported to the Chief Surveillance Commissioner (or in some cases the Intelligence Services Commissioner). If such a notice is served on someone for a key that "belongs to the company" then it has to be served at board level.

These safeguards were added as the RIP Bill went through Parliament because there was considerable concern expressed by industry that the UK would not be a safe place to keep encryption keys. It has yet to be seen whether industry will move systems abroad to meet a perceived GAK threat.



 Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988 is online at: http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1988/Ukpga_19880048_en_1.htm

s 296(2) The person issuing the copies to the public has the same rights against a person who, knowing or having reason to believe that it will be used to make infringing copies-

- (a) makes, imports, sells or lets for hire, offers or exposes for sale or hire, or advertises for sale or hire, any device or means specifically designed or adapted to circumvent the form of copy-protection employed, or
- (b) publishes information intended to enable or assist persons to circumvent that form of copy-protection,

```
as a copyright owner has in respect of an infringement of copyright.
```

Basically a civil issue, and there's been very little case law until recently.

★ Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 1998 on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access:

http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1998/en_398L0084.html was transposed into UK Law as Statutory Instrument 2000 No. 1175 The Conditional Access (Unauthorised Decoders) Regulations 2000

http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2000/20001175.htm

it extended existing criminal offences of importing, advertising, selling or hiring unauthorised decoders to also include possession, installation or maintenance.



The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 is online at: http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm

It contains a little of everything (eg s47(1)(a) makes it an offence to knowingly cause a nuclear weapon explosion). Part 11 provides the framework for a Code of Practice for the retention of logging data. If your system provides communication services then you may well be expected to comply. However, the CoP will be voluntary unless the Secretary of State decides that it is not working.

★ Convention on Cybercrime

http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm

once ratified may require a Computer Misuse Act v2.0



Ignorance of the law excuses no man; not that all men know the law; but because 'tis an excuse every man will plead, and no man can tell how to confute him.

John Selden (1584-1654)