Chapter 24

Surveillance or Privacy?

Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficient...
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding.
– Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis

Those that would give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.
– Benjamin Franklin

Al-Qaida spent $500,000 on the event, while America, in the incident and its aftermath, lost – according to the lowest estimate – more than $500 billion.
– Osama bin Laden

24.1 Introduction

Governments have ever more interests online, ranging from surveillance to censorship and from privacy to safety and competition. Their goals are often in tension with the reality of a globalised online world, and with each other too. They crystallise around a number of specific policy concerns, from terrorism and counterinsurgency, through national strategic and economic advantage, to the suppression of harmful or unpopular content and the maintenance of human rights, which among other things means respect for privacy. In this chapter we explore the nexus of surveillance, censorship, forensics and privacy.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, on New York and Washington had a huge impact on the security and privacy ecosystem, deepened by the later attacks on Madrid, London, Paris, Berlin and elsewhere. As the quote from Osama bin Laden bluntly spells out, modern terrorism works largely by provoking overreaction. The Arab Spring of 2011 also provoked a reaction; while Tunisia escaped to democracy, most other countries in the region have become more authoritarian, with tired old rulers replaced by more vigorous and brutal successors. Heads
of government in China, Russia and elsewhere have tweaked their constitutions to become rulers for life.

So it has been a boom time for surveillance. It’s not just the NSA capabilities revealed in 2013 by Ed Snowden; competitors like Russia and China also have serious capabilities, while there are more primitive but still effective systems in less developed countries like Syria.

The past decade has also seen growing cyber conflict and disruption with states interfering covertly in other states’ affairs. The USA and Israel used the Stuxnet malware to damage and delay Iran’s push to acquire nuclear weapons, which caused a rush by other states to acquire cyber-weapons of various kinds. Since the Russian interference in the 2016 US election, legislators in a number of countries want to regulate social media: a lot of politicians have stopped ignoring technology once they realised their jobs were on the line.

There are many thorny issues. First, are open societies with democracy and a free press more vulnerable, because we’re easier to exploit? And if so what can we do about it? We face real challenges to our core values – expressed in the USA as the Constitution, and in Europe as the Convention on Human Rights. Since 9/11 we’ve seen one authoritarian measure after another, ranging from fingerprinting at airports through large-scale surveillance of communications to detention without trial and even torture. Many of these measures were not just illegal and immoral but ineffective or even counterproductive: torturing Iraqi secret policemen alongside al-Qaida terrorists in the Abu Ghraib prison was what forged them into the core of Islamic State. Can’t we find better ways to defend freedom? And how can we reassert and defend our core values?

Second, there’s the political economy of security. President Eisenhower warned in his valedictory speech that ‘we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist’. Since 9/11, we’ve seen a security-industrial complex capturing policy in the same ways that the defense industry did at the start of the Cold War.

It’s often security technology arguments that are used to bamboozle legislators. For example, all through the Irish republican terrorist campaign in the 1970s through 1990s, the British police had to charge arrested terrorist suspects within four days. But after 9/11, this was quickly raised to 28 days; then the government said it needed 90 days, claiming they might have difficulty decrypting data on PCs seized from suspects. The real problem was police inefficiency at managing forensics. Now if the police had just said ‘we need to hold suspects for 90 days because we don’t have enough Somali interpreters’ then common sense could have kicked in; Parliament might well have told them to use staff from commercial translation agencies. But talk of decryption seems a good way to turn legislators’ brains to mush. People who understand decryption have a duty to speak out.

The focus on terrorism starves the rest of law enforcement. About half of all crime is now online, and yet the resources devoted to fighting it are tiny. Many scammers operate with almost complete impunity.

There are further problems around censorship. Concerns about online abuse
are real, but this is a difficult area for many reasons. There is abuse of a wide range of seriousness, from child sex abuse images to murder videos at the top end, to hate speech, rape threats and fake news which might not individually meet the bar for prosecution but which, at scale, can be really toxic. There are political incentives to focus on a small subset of it. Countries are starting to pass laws requiring firms like Facebook to do the censorship for them, which causes many tensions. The companies don’t like the extra costs, and activists don’t like the idea of censorship being in the hands of private monopolies. There’s an incentive on the firms to redesign their systems so that they’re harder to abuse; Facebook, for example, claims to be rebuilding its systems to focus more on groups, which are harder for extremists to game.

Another role of governments is in regulating privacy. U.S. laws are fragmented, with federal laws on specific topics such as health data and video rentals and the FDA punishing firms that violate their published privacy policies, while state laws drive security breach disclosure. Europe is very different; the General Data Protection Regulation provides a comprehensive framework, backed up by human-rights law that has been used to strike down laws on surveillance. The overall effect, from the viewpoint of the IT industry, is that Europe is becoming the world’s privacy regulator; Washington doesn’t care, and nobody else is big enough to matter. (There are strong signs that this regulatory power will be extended steadily to safety as well, although we’ll leave that to the chapter on evaluation and assurance.)

In this chapter, I’m going to discuss the evolution of surveillance, then look at terrorism before discussing censorship and privacy regulation, and finally trying to put the whole thing in context.

### 24.2 Surveillance

The last decade has seen a huge increase in technical surveillance, not just by governments but also by commercial firms monitoring our clickstream and location history in order to target ads better – famously described by Shoshana Zuboff as ‘Surveillance Capitalism’ [1471]. The two interact in various ways. In some countries, like the USA, law enforcement and intelligence agencies don’t just get information from their own technical systems but use warrants to get it from firms like Google and Facebook too. In others, like China, these firms are banned because they refused to give complete access to the authorities; in others, like Iran and Syria, the police agencies just beat people’s passwords out of them, or phish their friends, or hack their phones.

This is a huge subject, and all I can reasonably provide is a helicopter tour: to place surveillance in its historical context, sketch what’s going on, and provide pointers to primary sources.

#### 24.2.1 The history of government wiretapping

Rulers have always tried to control communications. In classical times, couriers were checked at customs posts, and from the Middle Ages, many kings either
operated a postal monopoly or granted it to a crony. The letter-opening and
codebreaking facilities of early modern states, the so-called Black Chambers, are
described in David Kahn’s history, ‘The Code breakers’ [723].

When electronic communications came along, kings wanted to keep control.
In most of Europe, the telegraph service was set up as part of the Post Office
and was always owned by the government; in Britain, the telegraph industry was
nationalized by Gladstone in 1869. A profusion of national rules so exasperated
everyone that the International Telegraph Union (ITU) was set up in 1865 to
standardise things [1293]. In the USA, Western Union was the first nationwide
industrial monopoly and dominated the market through the nineteenth century.
Union and Confederate soldiers tapped each others’ telegraph lines, and the
New York Police Department started wiretapping operations in 1895.

The invention of the telephone led to tussles over privacy. In the USA, the
Supreme Court ruled in 1928 in Olmstead vs United States that wiretapping
didn’t violate the fourth amendment provisions on search and seizure as there
was no physical breach of a dwelling; Associate Justice Brandeis famously dis-
sented. In 1967, the Court reversed itself in Katz vs United States, ruling that
the amendment protects people, not places. The following year, Congress legal-
ized Federal wiretapping (in ‘title III’ of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act) following testimony on the scale of organized crime. In 1978, follow-
ing an investigation into the Nixon administration’s abuses, Congress passed the
Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which controls wiretapping for na-
tional security. In 1986, the Electronic Communications Protection Act (ECPA)
relaxed the Title III warrant provisions. By the early 1990s, the spread of dereg-
ulated services from mobile phones to call forwarding had started to undermine
the authorities’ ability to implement wiretaps, as did technical developments
such as adaptive echo cancellation in modems.

So the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)
required all communications companies to make their networks tappable in ways
approved by the FBI. By 1999, over 2,450,000 telephone conversations were
legally tapped following 1,350 court orders [456, 911]; by 2017 the number of
wiretap orders had almost tripled to 3,813, but 94% were against portable de-

cels such as cellphones [1360].

Even before 9/11, some analysts believed that there were at least as many
unauthorized wiretaps as authorized ones [413]. First, there’s phone company
collusion: while a phone company must give the police access if they present a
warrant, in many countries they are also allowed to help – and there have been
many reports over the years of phone companies being cosy with the government.
Second, there’s intelligence-agency arbitrage: if the NSA wants to wiretap an
American citizen without a warrant they can get an ally to do it, and return the
favour later; it was said, for example, that Margaret Thatcher used the Canadian
intelligence services to wiretap ministers suspected of disloyalty [521]. This sort
of practice was denied by the agencies for years but the Snowden leaks showed
it to be a reality. Third, in some countries, wiretapping is uncontrolled if one of
the subscribers consents – so calls from phone boxes are free to tap (the owner
of the phone box is the legal subscriber). Companies may wiretap their staff

1The relevant law is 18 USC (US Code) 2510–2521, while FISA’s regulation of foreign
intelligence gathering is now codified in US law as 50 USC 1801–1811.
to detect fraud and voluntarily pass the product to the police or to security agencies (there was a scandal in the UK when it emerged that the security services were involved in a clandestine scheme to blacklist construction industry staff who had tried to organise unions [472]). Finally, in many countries, the police get hold of email and other stored communications by subpoena rather than warrant (they did this in America too before a court stopped the practice in 2007 [850]. Despite this, bounty hunters and bail agents have been able to buy phones’ location histories from data aggregators [356]).

But even if the official figures have to be doubled or tripled, democratic regimes use wiretapping very much less than authoritarian ones. The surveillance leader now is China, which uses not only pervasive technical monitoring in regions with dissident minority populations such as Xinjiang and Tibet, with surveillance cameras mounted over street corners, mosques and schools hooked up via face-recognition software to databases recording who was seen where and when. There are also intrusive physical measures ranging from frequent street checkpoints, through billeting party members in the homes of minority families, to mass incarceration in labour camps [809].

The incidence of wiretapping has also been highly variable within and between democracies. In the USA, for example, only about half the states use it, and for much of the 20th century most taps were in the ‘Mafia’ states of New York, New Jersey and Florida (though Nevada and California have now caught up) [1360]. There is similar variation in Europe. Wiretaps are very common in the Netherlands: they have up to 1,000 taps on the go at once with a tenth of America’s population [270]. In a homicide investigation, for example, it’s routine to tap everyone in the victim’s address book for a week to monitor how they react to the news of the death. The developed country with the most wiretaps is Italy, thanks to its history of organised crime [849]. In the UK, wiretaps are supposed to need a ministerial warrant, and cannot be used in evidence; but police use room bugs and similar techniques (including computer exploits) in serious cases. To some extent, the technologies are interchangeable: if you can root a gangster’s phone or laptop you can record, and mail home, everything said nearby, whether it’s said to someone in the same room, or on a call.

Automation is shifting the costs of wiretapping from per-call labour costs to one-off capital costs. Before CALEA was introduced, in 1993, US police agencies spent only $51.7 million on wiretaps – perhaps a good estimate of their value before the issue became politicised [621]. The implementation of CALEA cost over $500m, and that was before it was extended to VOIP in 2007. VOIP was harder: “The paradigm of VoIP intercept difficulty is a call between two road warriors who constantly change locations and who, for example, may call from a cafe in Boston to a hotel room in Paris and an hour later from an office in Cambridge to a giftshop at the Louvre’ [169]. In recent years this has become harder still as people have moved from physical platforms, such as their cellphone, to virtual platforms such as Facebook or Skype or Signal. So the trend for policymakers has been to make capital investments in both technology and law that cut the marginal costs of access. For example, ten years ago, if the UK police were investigating three similar bank robberies, they might have had to pay the phone companies thousands of pounds to assemble cellsite dumps so they could look for any mobile phones that were present at all three
locations. Now, after spending hundreds of millions and getting several laws passed, they have access to databases of mobile phone locations, and all it takes is a database query. This skews the incentives and changes the nature of both police and intelligence work.

The USA also changed its laws to facilitate bulk surveillance. 43 days after the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the Patriot Act, which allowed increased access by law enforcement to stored records (including financial, medical and government records), ‘sneak-and-peek’ searches of homes and businesses without the owner’s knowledge, and the use by the FBI of National Security Letters to get access to financial, email and telephone records.

But this was not enough for the agencies. In December 2005, the New York Times revealed that the NSA had covertly obtained full call-data records for the 200m customers of AT&T, Verizon and BellSouth, the nation’s three biggest phone companies. The program started just after 9/11. Qwest did not cooperate, because its CEO at the time, Joe Nacchio, did not believe the NSA’s claim that Qwest didn’t need a court order. The NSA put pressure on Qwest by threatening to withhold classified contracts, so Qwest’s lawyers asked NSA to take its proposal to the FISA court. The NSA refused, saying the court might not agree with them. It’s since emerged that the NSA had put pressure on Qwest to hand over data even before 9/11 [557]. In October 2007, Verizon admitted to senators that it had given the FBI second-generation call data on its customers against national security letters on 720 occasions since 2005 [987]; and in November 2007, the Washington Post revealed that the NSA had tapped a lot of purely domestic phone calls and traffic data, and had also tapped AT&T’s peering centre in San Francisco to get access to Internet traffic as well [988]. After two years of debate, Congress amended FISA to grant retrospective immunity to phone companies who cooperated with unlawful wiretapping, and to change the law so that the NSA no longer needs even a FISA warrant to tap a call if one party’s believed to be outside the USA or a non-US person. (This split both parties, with Senators Obama and Feinstein supporting the amendment while Senators McCain, Biden, Reid, Leahy and Clinton opposed it.)

24.2.2 Call data records (CDRs)

Historically, more police communications intelligence has come from the analysis of telephone call data records and other metadata rather than wiretaps. We discussed in the chapter on telecomms security how the police use such data to trace networks of criminal contacts, and how criminals respond by burying their signals in innocuous traffic using techniques such as pre-paid mobile phones and PBX hacking.

Again, this is nothing new. Rulers have long used their control over postal services to track the correspondents of suspects, even when the letters weren’t opened. The introduction of postage stamps in 1840 was an advance for privacy as it made it much easier to send a letter anonymously. Some countries got so worried about the threat of sedition that they passed laws requiring a return address to be written on the back of the envelope. The development of the telegraph, on the other hand, was an advance for surveillance; as messages were
logged by sender, receiver and word count, traffic totals could be compiled and were found to be an effective indicator of economic activity [1293]. The First World War taught the combatants how much intelligence could be gleaned from measuring the volume of enemy radio traffic, even when it couldn’t conveniently be deciphered [723, 984]. Later twentieth-century conflicts reinforced this.

When I wrote the first edition of this book, I noted that the USA had 1,329 wiretap applications approved in 1998, while there were 4,886 subpoenas (plus 4,621 extensions) for pen registers (devices which record all the numbers dialed from a target phone line) and 2,437 subpoenas (plus 2,770 extensions) for trap-and-trace devices (which record the calling line ID of incoming calls, even if the caller tries to block it). Law-enforcement agencies were also starting to switch in the 1990s to using subpoenas for the call-detail records in the phone companies’ databases. Bell Atlantic, for example, responded to 25,453 subpoenas or court orders for toll billing records of 213,821 of its customers in 1989–92, while NYNEX processed 25,510 subpoenas covering an unrecorded number of customers in 1992 alone [7?]. Scaled up across the seven Baby Bells, this suggests that perhaps half a million customers were having their records seized every year in the 1990s, and that traffic data were collected on perhaps a hundred times as many people as were subjected to wiretapping.

Statistics went dark after 9/11, during the period of unlawful collection, although the NSA did reveal in 2006 that it wanted “to create a database of every call ever made within the nation’s borders” so it could map the entire US social network for the War on Terror [299]. After Snowden revealed in 2013 that it had built databases of pretty well all traffic data for all communications worldwide, Congress passed the Freedom Act in 2015 and we started to get an annual Statistical Transparency Report from the Director of National Intelligence. The April 2018 report gives some figures for 2017; these relate only to national-security matters, but give some feel for the balance between content and traffic data. Wiretap warrants are stable at about 1,500 per year in the USA (targeting about 300 US US persons and 1,000 others), as well as a rising number of targets overseas – 106,469 in 2016 and 129,080 in 2017. In addition, there were 7,512 US residents whose communications content was retrieved (e.g. subpoenas for email) while 16,924 residents had non-content (such as traffic data) retrieved, along with 56,064 non-residents. There were also 87,834 collected business records, which might include records of which subscriber was using which IP address [1050].

Now the intelligence community only considers a communication to be ‘intercepted’ when a human analyst looks at it; analysis by software doesn’t count. As I described in Section 19.3.1, the usual procedure when hunting for suspects is contact chaining, also known as a ‘snowball search’. If someone blows themselves up in a terror attack, analysts will use software that looks at all the people they communicated with, and then everyone these direct contacts communicated with, and exceptionally even out to a third degree of separation. The standard depth-two search typically gives some tens of thousands of indirect contacts. These contacts are then compared against millions of names on various suspect lists – religious extremists, right-wing hate groups, organised crime – and the analysts then home in on the links with any known suspects. (The analogy is rolling a snowball downhill then melting it and seeing what dirt you find in the
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bottom of the bucket.) So the analyst may look at only half a dozen people who were in contact with the dead terrorist and also with members of some religious group, but tens of thousands of innocent people had their call detail records looked at by the software. The DNI report estimates that in 2017, 534,396,285 call detail records were examined automatically in this way – a large increase from 151,230,968 in 2016.

For this reason, it may seem somewhat surprising to hear that Congress may sunset Section 215 of the Patriot Act (as amended by FISA), which allows the bulk collection of CDRs [311]; the NSA has said explicitly that it doesn’t want it. The bulk collection of communications data was one of the matters highlighted by Ed Snowden that sparked the most controversy. On June 8th 2013, the press disclosed Boundless Informant, an NSA visualisation tool that shows a heat map of where metadata are collected for both voice and computer communications; in a 30 day period ending in March 2013, 3 billion records were collected from 504 sources (or SIGADs). Although the most intensive collection was in the Middle East, Snowden said that more records were collected on Americans in America than on Russians in Russia [546]. On another reading of the material, Boundless Informant collected 3 billion phone records via US telecommunications providers, plus a further 97 billion emails and 124 billion phone calls round the world [592, p. 92]; overall, 20 billion events a day are collected [592, p. 98]. Either way, the DNI figures look low, and the idea that the intelligence community will abandon this resource entirely is surprising. However what appears to be happening is that since 2015 the intelligence community has been able to get call detail records under other authorities from the phone companies and don’t need to maintain their own cache any more. Furthermore, the action is shifting from the plain old telephone system to messaging systems.

The intelligence and law-enforcement agencies of other countries also use communications data very widely and have done for years. Most countries impose little or no restrictions on the police use of such data. In the USA, no paperwork was required until ECPA. Even after that, traffic data has been easy to get: under 18 USC 3123 [1358], the investigative officer merely has to certify to a magistrate ‘that the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation’. This can be any crime – felony or misdemeanour – and under either Federal or State law. Since CALEA, warrants are still required for such communications data as the addresses to which a subscriber has sent e-mail messages, but basic toll records can be obtained under subpoena – the subscriber need not be notified, and there is no court supervision once the order has been made. The US Department of Justice is required by law to publish statistics for its non-national-security law-enforcement activities but appears reluctant to do so; the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) extracted figures for 2011–12 only after freedom-of-information (FOI) litigation, which revealed that the combined number of original orders for pen registers and trap and trace devices used to spy on phones increased by 60%, from 23,535 in 2009 to 37,616 in 2011 [555]. I’ve been unable to find anything more recent.

Bulk access to traffic data has been even more controversial in Europe. The UK pushed through a Data Retention Directive in the European Union in 2006, under which member states had to store telecommunications data – including IP
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address and timing of every email, phone call and text message sent or received – for between 6 months and 24 months, and make all this available to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The Directive was struck down in 2014 by the European Court of Justice after Digital Rights Ireland brought a lawsuit arguing that blanket data collection violated the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

In Britain, access to communications data requires only a notice from a senior police officer to the phone company or ISP, not a warrant; and data can be provided to a wide range of public-sector bodies, just as in the USA. Following the Data Retention Directive, the Blair government wanted to centralise things; it argued that the police needed a ‘communications database’ and were pushed a law to establish it. Fate intervened when some wicked person stole a copy of all the expenses claims filed by members of parliament and sold it to the Daily Telegraph. It turned out that numerous ministers and others had been making embarrassing claims; several honourable members went to jail, and most of the well-known politicians in Britain had to make repayments. The Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, had been selling the communications database using the slogan ‘If you’ve nothing to hide, you’ve nothing to fear.’ She may not have had anything to hide, but her husband did: it turned out he’d been watching porn movies, and charging it to her parliamentary expenses. We heard nothing more of the communications database until Ed Snowden told us in 2013 that they’d just built it anyway, even without parliamentary approval; as for the Home Secretary, she lost her seat at the 2010 election.

After the European Court struck down data retention, and Snowden revealed some highly objectionable activities by GCHQ, the UK government passed the 2014 DRIP Act to assert that what GCHQ had been doing was legal after all. It was clear that the European Court would object eventually, but some breathing space was needed and the Act gave this (it had a two-year sunset clause; Prime Minister Cameron’s liberal coalition partners wouldn’t give him any more). Eventually, in the wake of the Brexit vote, Parliament passed the Investigatory Powers Act, which pretty well enables GCHQ to do as it pleases and compel any company in the jurisdiction to assist it. The interesting action in the future will be, first, the extent to which the large US firms will help, and second, the line to be taken by the European Court of Human Rights. I’ll return to these issues later.

24.2.3 Search terms and location data

It has become ever clearer over the past 20 years that the regulation of surveillance that evolved in the phone-company era is not really fit for purpose in the era of the Internet. Back then, you got either a full wiretap and recorded the content, or made do with traffic data from call detail records. But as things moved online, communications data and content got all mixed up, as what’s con-

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2 Ed Snowden told us three years later that she did indeed have something to hide; the government she served had built the communications database anyway without parliamentary approval.

3 Britain’s departure from the EU will let it escape the European Court of Justice, which is an EU institution, but not the Court of Human Rights, as this is an institution of the Council of Europe.
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tent at one level of abstraction is often communications data at the next. Some people might think of a URL as just the address of a page to be fetched, but a URL such as http://www.google.com/search?q=marijuana+cultivation+UK contains the terms entered into a search engine as well as the search engine’s name. Clearly, some policemen would like a list of everyone who submitted such an enquiry. This actually came up in 1999, when the UK government modernised its surveillance law; an amendment that NGOs and industry got in the resulting Regulatory Powers Act of 2000 was that for URLs, the traffic data consisted of everything up to the first slash (technically, the information necessary to identify the machine you’re communicating with).

In the USA, the Department of Justice issued a subpoena to a number of search engines to hand over two full months’ worth of search queries, as well as all the URLs in their index, claiming it needed the data to bolster its claims that the Child Online Protection Act did not violate the constitution and that filtering could be effective against child pornography. (Recall we discussed in section 9.3.1 how when AOL released some search histories, a number of them were easily identifiable to individuals.) AOL, Microsoft and Yahoo quietly complied, but Google resisted. A judge finally ruled in 2006 that the Department would get no search queries, and only a random sample of 50,000 of the URLs it had originally sought [1444].

The next issue was mobile-phone location data, which ended up being treated differently in different jurisdictions. In Britain, all information about the location of mobile phones counts as traffic data, and officials get it easily; but in the USA, the Court of Appeals ruled in 2000 that when the police get a warrant for the location of a mobile, the cell in which it is active is sufficient, and that to require triangulation on the device (an interpretation the police had wanted) would invade privacy [1359]. Also, even cell-granularity location information would not be available under the lower standards applied to pen-register subpoenas. Yet despite these rules, there were massive leaks of information. It emerged in 2019 that AT&T and Sprint had both been selling their customers’ location information to data brokers for years, including not just cellsite data but GPS; and this had routinely been bought by bounty hunters and bail agents to track defaulters [356].

24.2.4 Algorithmic processing

The analysis of call data is only one aspect of a much wider issue: law-enforcement matching of bulk datasets. The earliest serious use of multiple-source data appears to have been in Germany in the late 1970s to track down safe houses used by the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group. Investigators looked for rented apartments with irregular peaks in utility usage, and for which the rent and electricity bills were paid by remote credit transfer from a series of different locations. This worked: it yielded a list of several hundred apartments among which were several safe houses. The tools to do this kind of analysis are now shipped with a number of the products used for traffic analysis and for managing major police investigations. The extent to which they’re used depends on the local regulatory climate; there have been rows in the UK over police access to databases of the prescriptions filled by pharmacists, while in the USA doctors are alarmed at the
frequency with which personal health information is subpoenaed from health insurance companies by investigators. There are also practical limits imposed by the cost of understanding the many proprietary data formats used by commercial and government data processors. But it’s common for police to have access at least to utility data, such as electricity bills which get trawled to find marijuana growers, and there’s little to stop them using commercially available data such as feeds from credit reference agencies.

Since AlphaGo beat Lee Sedol in 2016, there’s been a host of machine-learning startups, and quite a few aim to make law enforcement easier one way or another. But it’s not as easy as it looks. Terrorists are so rare as a percentage of the population that any tests you use to ‘detect’ them would require extraordinary specificity if you’re not to drown in false positives. Combining multiple sensors is hard, and if you’re looking for a needle in a haystack, it’s not always smart to build a bigger haystack. As Jeff Jonas, the chief scientist at IBM’s data-mining operation, put it, “techniques that look at people’s behavior to predict terrorist intent are so far from reaching the level of accuracy that’s necessary that I see them as nothing but civil liberty infringement engines” [547].

24.2.5 ISPs and CSPs

The 2000s saw rapid growth of intrusive surveillance at Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Tapping data traffic is harder than voice used to be; there are many obstacles, such as transient IP addresses given to most customers and the increasingly distributed nature of traffic. In the old days (say 2002), an ISP might have had modem racks, and a LAN where a wiretap device could be located; nowadays many customers come in via DSL, and providers use switched networks that often don’t have any obvious place to put a tap. The ISP simply became the natural control point.

Many countries now have laws requiring ISPs to help, and the usual way to do it at a large ISP is to have equipment already installed that will send copies of packets of interest (or NetFlow records) to a separate classified network. The FBI’s system, DCSNet, is very slick – allowing agents point-and-click access to traffic and content from participating phone companies [1256]. (Information about which companies have been brought onboard is closely held, but smart bad guys use small ISPs.) And things often go wrong because the police don’t understand ISPs; they subpoena the wrong things, or provide inaccurate timestamps so that the wrong user is associated with an IP address. For an analysis of failure modes, see Clayton [327].

The smartphone revolution has changed the natural control point from the ISP to the CSP. A modern criminal might get up, check his messages on Gmail or WhatsApp using his home wifi, then get on a bus into town and do the same using his 3g or 4g data connection, then perhaps use wifi at a Starbucks or a public library ... and in none of these cases does a wiretap at the ISP tell anything much beyond the fact that a particular service has been used. As the traffic to that communications service is encrypted, the police have to serve paperwork on the service to get anywhere. This is what led the FBI to set up the Prism system, whereby intelligence agencies can get customer data from Google, Yahoo, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook and others at the press of a button.
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It is also what led the UK government, in its 2016 Investigatory Powers Act, to grant itself the power to order any company to do anything it physically can in order to assist law-enforcement of intelligence investigations. More and more countries are passing such laws, and they put the service providers in a difficult position. As a senior Google executive told me, ‘If a family court in India orders you to hand over the Gmail of someone who lives in Canada and imposes a lifelong secrecy order, how do you simultaneously employ people in India, and give believable assurances of privacy to people in Canada?’

Finally, there are lots of issues around the much richer data available from CSPs like Facebook, which not only collect highly sensitive data at scale but enable sensitive facts to be deduced from traffic data in ways that were not previously possible. Famously, Michal Kosinski and colleagues figured out that he could tell whether someone was straight or gay from four Facebook likes [789]. This led some of his colleagues to collect Facebook data on an industrial scale and weaponise it not just for marketing but for political campaigning, leading to the Cambridge Analytica scandal. We will discuss this later but note here that some thought needs to be given to what sort of controls there should be on the use of such methods by law-enforcement and intelligence agencies.

24.2.6 The Five Eyes’ system of systems

We discussed the technical meat of the Snowden revelations in 2.2.1. These did not come entirely from the blue, though; there had been many previous disclosures of about signals intelligence gathering at scale. David Kahn’s influential history of cryptography sets the scene by describing what happened up till the start of World War Two [723]. An anonymous former NSA analyst, later identified as Perry Fellwock, revealed the scale of NSA operations in 1972 [485]. "Information gathering by NSA is complete," he wrote. “It covers what foreign governments are doing, planning to do, have done in the past: what armies are moving where and against whom; what air forces are moving where, and what their capabilities are. There really aren’t any limits on NSA. Its mission goes all the way from calling in the B-52s in Vietnam to monitoring every aspect of the Soviet space program.”

While Fellwock’s motive was opposition to Vietnam, the next major whistleblower was a British wartime codebreaker, Frederick Winterbotham, who wanted to write a memoir of his wartime achievements and, as he was dying, was not bothered about prosecution. In 1974, he revealed the Allies’ success in breaking German and Japanese cipher systems during that war [1441], which led to many further books on World War 2 signals intelligence (Sigint) [323, 724, 1425]. Thereafter there was a slow drip of revelations by investigative journalists, quite a few of whose sources were concerned about corruption or abuse of the facilities by officials monitoring targets they should not have, such as domestic political groups. For example, whistleblower Peg Newsham revealed that the NSA had illegally tapped a phone call made by Senator Strom Thurmond [281, 282]. James Bamford pieced together a lot of information on the NSA from open sources and by talking to former employees [122], while New Zealand journalist Nicky Hager [614] dug up a lot of information following the New Zealand intelligence community’s failure to obey an order from their Prime Minister to
downgrade intelligence cooperation with the USA.

The first high-profile exposé of US economic espionage was made in a 1999 report to the European parliament [465], which was concerned that after the collapse of the USSR, European Union member nations were becoming the NSA’s main targets [285]. By then, people who paid attention were aware that data, faxes and phone calls get collected at a large number of nodes ranging from where international communications cables land in friendly countries (or are tapped clandestinely underwater), through observation of traffic to and from commercial communications satellites and special sigint satellites that collect traffic over hostile countries, to listening posts in member states’ embassies [465].

During the Cold War, much of the effort was military, aimed at understanding Soviet radar and communications, and at gaining a decisive advantage in location, jamming and deception. Without an ability to conduct electronic warfare, a modern state is not competitive in air or naval warfare or in tank battles on the ground. Most of the personnel at NSA were military, and its director has always been a serving general. There is still a lot of effort put into understanding the signals of potential adversaries.

A question asked at various times since then is whether this huge worldwide system of systems still gives value for money. Politicians have justified its budgets since 9/11 in terms of terrorism, and there have indeed been some successes against terrorists – notably the arrest of the alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed after he used a mobile phone SIM from a batch bought by a known terrorist in Switzerland. But electronic warfare against insurgents in Iraq has proved to be unproductive, as I discussed in Chapter 19. And it’s long been clear that much more effort should have been put into human intelligence. In an article published just before 9/11, an analyst wrote “The CIA probably doesn’t have a single truly qualified Arabic-speaking officer of Middle Eastern background who can play a believable Muslim fundamentalist who would volunteer to spend years of his life with shitty food and no women in the mountains of Afghanistan. For Christ’s sake, most case officers live in the suburbs of Virginia. We don’t do that kind of thing.” Another put it even more bluntly: “Operations that include diarrhea as a way of life don’t happen” [550]. Even years after the start of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan we haven’t trained enough soldiers to carry a basic conversation in Arabic, Dari or Pushutu.

Although other countries may complain about US sigint collection, for them to moralize about it is hypocritical. Other countries also run intelligence operations, and are often much more aggressive in conducting economic and other non-military espionage. The real difference between the five eyes countries and the others is that no-one else has built the ‘system-of-systems’. Indeed, there may be network effects at work in sigint as elsewhere: while non-aligned countries like India were happy to buy their warplanes from the old Soviet Union, they nowadays tend to share intelligence with the USA, as it has a much bigger network than the Russians or the Chinese [86]. The Snowden documents reveal NSA information sharing with over 60 other countries.

My own view is that, like the armed forces of which they are often a part, signals intelligence agencies are both necessary but potentially dangerous. An army can be a good servant but is likely to be an intolerable master. The issue

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is not whether such resources should exist, but how they are held accountable. In the USA, hearings by Senator Church in 1975 detailed a number of abuses such as the illegal monitoring of US citizens [318]; this led to FISA. The Snowden revelations in turn led to action by all three arms of the US government, albeit of limited effect\(^4\). The structural problems remain, though. The NSA is responsible for both attack and defense, and the defense almost always plays second fiddle. Imagine that you’re the Director of the NSA, and one of your engineers comes to you with a cool new zero-day exploit of Windows. Do you tell Microsoft, thereby protecting 300m Americans, or do you keep it secret, so you can attack 1.2bn Chinese? Stated in those terms, the answer is obvious. This ‘equities issue’, by the way, is the one issue on which President Obama declined to follow the advice of the NSA review group, which was to fix vulnerabilities; the NSA preferred to stockpile them instead.

In some countries things are done better; in both France and Germany, there are separate agencies responsible for attack and defence. And in most countries, the oversight of intelligence isn’t even discussed. Even in the UK, it’s only the European courts that have forced the government to admit to the scale of surveillance, and to legislate some controls on it. Even so, new cases continually highlight excessive collection, by both electronic and human intelligence methods. In 2019, for example, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the UK police to delete from its ‘extremism’ database the records they had kept of some 60 demonstrations attended by John Catt, a 94-year-old protester with no criminal record – a decision applauded even in the conservative press [1436].

That is the high-level picture of how surveillance has evolved over the past few decades. There is one specific aspect that’s worth describing in more detail, though, as it was a formative experience for many governments (as well as for industry and civil society) on issues of surveillance and technology policy. It is the tussle to control cryptography.

### 24.2.7 The crypto wars

Technology policy during the 1990s was dominated by acrimonious debates about *key escrow* – the doctrine that anyone who encrypted data should give the government a copy of the key, so that the civilian use of cryptography would not interfere with intelligence gathering by the NSA and others.

I was involved in all this as one of the academics whose research and teaching was under threat from the proposed controls, and in 1998 I was one of the people who set up the Foundation for Information Policy Research, a UK Internet-policy think-tank, which wrestled with crypto policy, export policy, copyright and related issues. In the next few sections I’ll lay out a brief background to the crypto wars, and then describe what we can learn about the way governments have failed to get to grips with the Internet.

\(^4\)President Obama set up the NSA review group and accepted most of its recommendations, but his positive work was undone by President Trump. Congress passed the USA Freedom Act which imposed some limits on the bulk collection of communications data on US residents by US agencies. Chief Justice Roberts made some changes to the FISA court.
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24.2.7.1 The back story to crypto policy

Many countries made laws in the mid-19th century banning the use of cryptography in telegraph messages, and some even forbade the use of languages other than those on an approved list. Prussia went as far as to require telegraph operators to keep copies of the plaintext of all messages [1293]. Sometimes the excuse was law enforcement – preventing people obtaining horse race results or stock prices in advance of the ‘official’ transmissions – but the real concern was national security. This pattern was to repeat itself again in the twentieth century.

After the immense success that the Allies had during World War 2 with signals intelligence, the UK and US governments agreed in 1957 to continue intelligence cooperation. This ‘UKUSA agreement’ was quickly joined by Canada, Australia and New Zealand, giving the ‘five eyes’. The member nations decided to prevent the proliferation of cryptographic equipment and know-how. Until the 1980s, about the only makers of cryptographic equipment were companies selling into government markets, who could mostly be trusted not to sell anything overseas which would upset their major customers at home. This was reinforced by export controls that were operated “in as covert a way as possible, with the minimum of open guidance to anyone wanting, for example, an export licence. Most things were done in behind-the-scenes negotiation between the officials and a trusted representative of the would-be exporter.” [155]

In these negotiations, the authorities would try to steer applicants towards using weak cryptography where possible, and where confronted with a more sophisticated user would try to see to it that systems had a ‘back door’ (known in the trade as a red thread) which would give access to traffic. Anyone who tried to sell decent crypto domestically could be dissuaded by various means. If they were a large company, they would be threatened with loss of government contracts; if a small one, they could be strangled with red tape as they tried to get telecomms and other product approvals. The upshot was that most governments used weak crypto, and the NSA could break it with ease. But it wasn’t just export control, as we learned in the Bühler case.

Hans Bühler worked as a salesman for the Swiss firm Crypto AG, which was a leading supplier of cryptographic equipment to governments without the technical capability to build their own. He was arrested in 1992 in Iran and the authorities figured out that the Iraqis had been reading their traffic during the Iran-Iraq war, and accused him of selling them cipher machines which had been tampered with so that the NSA could get at the plaintext. After he had spent some time in prison, Crypto AG paid 1.44 billion Rials – about a million US dollars – to bail him, but then fired him once he got back to Switzerland. Bühler then alleged on Swiss radio and TV that the firm was secretly controlled by the German intelligence services and that it had been involved in intelligence work for years [260]. One story was that when the founder of Crypto AG, Boris Hagelin, decided to retire, he contacted William Friedman, the NSA’s chief scientist; Friedman was a friend, and the US government had been a big customer, buying Hagelin machines during World War 2. Hagelin sold his company secretly to the NSA, which had it secretly controlled by German nominees. The equipment it sold was routinely red threaded [879]. Crypto AG’s line was that
these allegations were concocted by the NSA to undermine the company, as it was one of the third world’s few sources of cryptographic equipment. Bühler’s story is told in a book by Res Strehle [1308].

24.2.7.2 DES and crypto research

Despite the poor quality of early banking cryptosystems, the NSA still worried in the seventies that the banking sector might evolve good algorithms that would escape into the wild. Many countries were still using rotor machines or other equipment that could be broken using the techniques developed in World War 2. How could the banking industry’s thirst for a respectable cipher be slaked, not just in the US but overseas, without this cipher being adopted by foreign governments and driving up the costs of intelligence collection?

The solution was the Data Encryption Standard (DES). At the time, as I mentioned in section 6.4.3.2, there was controversy about whether 56 bits were enough. We now know that this was deliberate. The NSA did not at the time have the machinery to do DES keysearch; that came later. But by giving the impression that they did, they managed to stop most foreign governments adopting it. Their rotor machines continued in service, in many cases reimplemented using microcontrollers; Crypto AG and other biddable vendors continued to thrive; and the traffic continued to be harvested. Foreigners who encrypted their important data with such ciphers merely helped the NSA figure out which traffic was worth collecting.

A second initiative was to undermine academic research in cryptology. In the 1970s this was done directly by harassing the people involved; by the 1980s it had evolved into a subtler strategy. While the Pentagon funded research into computer security, it tried to divert crypto research into theoretical channels and claimed that more practical published research work was all old hat: ‘we did all that stuff thirty years ago; why should the taxpayer pay for it twice?’ The insinuation that DES may have had a ‘trapdoor’ inserted into it fitted well with this play. A side effect we still live with is that the crypto and computer security communities got separated from each other in the early 1980s as the NSA worked to suppress one and build up the other.

By the mid 1990s this line had become exhausted. Agency blunders in the design of various key escrow systems debunked their story that they were way ahead of the open research community in cryptology, and in any case the fight moved to a different battlefield.

24.2.7.3 Crypto War 1 – the Clipper chip

Crypto policy went mainstream in 1993 with the launch of the Clipper chip. After AT&T proposed the introduction to the US domestic market of an encrypting telephone that would have used Diffie-Hellman key exchange and triple-DES to protect traffic, the NSA persuaded the Clinton administration to promote a different standard. This would use a classified block cipher, Skipjack, implemented in a tamper-resistant chip and with a protocol that made a spare (‘escrowed’) key available to the agencies to decrypt traffic. This ‘Escrowed Encryption Stan-
standard’ led to a public outcry; an AT&T computer scientist, Matt Blaze, found a protocol vulnerability in Clipper that defeated the escrow mechanism [197] and the proposal was withdrawn.

Several more attempts were made through the 1990s to promote the use of cryptography with government access to keys. Key escrow acquired various new names, such as key recovery, certification authorities which kept copies of their clients’ private decryption keys became known as Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) – somewhat emphasizing the NSA definition of a trusted component as one which can break security. In the UK, a key escrow protocol was introduced for the public sector, and this was used to try to get the private sector to adopt it as well; but a number of vulnerabilities were found in it too [85].

The pro-escrow people said that as crypto provided confidentiality, and confidentiality could help criminals, there needed to be some way to defeat it. The anti-escrow lobby started out by arguing that since crypto was necessary for privacy, there must not be a way to defeat it. I argued that reality was more complex [40]. Most crypto applications are about authentication rather than confidentiality, so help the police rather than hindering them. As for criminals, they mainly require unobtrusive communications – and back in the 1990s, encrypting a phone call was a good way to bring attention to yourself. If you wanted to be unobtrusive, it was better to steal someone else’s mobile phone credentials and make calls that seemed to come from their phone. As for privacy, most violations result from abuse of authorized access by insiders. Finally, a much more severe problem for policemen investigating electronic crimes is to find acceptable evidence, for which decent authentication can also be helpful.

The debate got rapidly tangled up with export controls on weapons, the means by which cryptography was traditionally controlled. US software firms were not allowed to export products containing cryptography which was too hard to break. A US software author, Phil Zimmermann, was hauled up before a grand jury for arms trafficking after a program he wrote – PGP – ‘escaped’ on to the Internet. He became a folk hero and made a fortune as his product grabbed market leadership. The conflict became international: the US State Department tried hard to persuade other countries to control cryptography too (I’ll go into more detail in Section 24.2.9 on export control below). Imposing American policy worldwide became one of the missions of Vice-President Gore (a reason why many in Redmond and Silicon Valley contributed to the Bush campaign in 2000).

The apparent resolution of Crypto War 1 came in two phases. In 1999, the European Union’s Commissioner for the Single Market, Martin Bangemann, pushed through the Electronic Signature Directive, a law that gave a presumption of validity to electronic signatures provided that the signing key had never been in the possession of a third party. This undermined the demand from the NSA and GCHQ that all private signing keys should be escrowed – not just decryption keys, but also signature verification keys. The Germans objected that escrowing signature keys would let the agencies not just read messages, but forge them too, undermining trust in electronic commerce and authentication generally. When the EU followed the German line rather than the British one, it followed that individuals could either either use their signature keypairs for encryption, or to authenticate Diffie-Hellman keys and use those for encryption.
European officials mollified the US administration by passing an export control regulation that extended EU export controls from physical goods to intangibles such as software, so that European firms faced the same export controls on cryptographic software as US firms [470].

Second, in 2000 when Al Gore was running for president and wanted to get Silicon Valley onside, the administration decided to call a halt. Meetings were held at the FBI offices in Quantico between the agencies and the tech majors, and the agreement was that the agencies would no longer push for vulnerabilities to be inserted into products and systems. Instead, the agencies would exploit the many naturally-occurring vulnerabilities, and the NSA inveigled itself into the patching cycle. When a software vulnerability is reported to the CERT ecosystem, it finds its way to CERT at SEI in Pittsburgh, which shares it with the NSA and also reports it to the vendor for fixing. The patch cycle typically takes a month or two – sometimes more, if coordinating vulnerability disclosure and testing products is hard – giving a window for the NSA to exploit the bug.

Those of us who were active in digital rights in Europe were generally pleased at the e-signature directive but appalled at intangible export controls; we set up European Digital Rights (EDRi) in 2003 to create a lobbying presence in Brussels, backed by dozens of individual NGOs in European countries. We thought that the surveillance issue had been largely settled and that future fight would be over issues like software copyright and data protection. In 2013, Ed Snowden showed us how wrong we’d been; the NSA and the other agencies had simply gone underground, and had been running a covert program called Bullrun with a budget of $100m a year to undermine commercial cryptography in numerous ways, interfering with standards, implementations, supply chains and much else. But that came later.

One of the engineering lessons from Crypto War 1 is that doing key escrow properly is hard. Making two-party security protocols into three-party protocols increases the complexity and the risk of serious design errors, and centralizing the escrow databases creates huge targets; I discussed this in a paper ‘The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party Encryption’ that I wrote with ten other cryptographers and that became the most highly-cited reference on the subject [4]. Where escrow is required it’s usually better done with simple local mechanisms. In one army, every officer must write down his passphrase on a piece of paper, put it in an envelope, stamp it ‘Secret’ and hand it to his commanding officer, who puts it in his office safe. That way the keys are kept in the same place as the documents whose electronic versions they protect, and there’s no central database for an airplane to bomb or a spy to steal. But trying to automate this and scale it up leads to trouble. The UK government idea was that everyone’s private key would be generated from their email address using a super-secret master key generated by GCHQ and kept in equipment controlled by their departmental security officer, so that both the department and GCHQ could decrypt traffic if they had to. The result was a clunky system that couldn’t easily deal with the frequent changes of name as government departments were reorganised and renamed. The demand for customised central control leads to vast IT projects that run years late and millions over budget, or just never work at all. Problems providing officials with working email systems led to them using private accounts instead, and eventually the Cameron government more
or less gave up; routine email in the Cabinet Office (the stuff below Top Secret) is now done using a branded version of G Suite, the paid-for version of Gmail.

Crypto War 1 did however leave a significant legacy, with both technical and political aspects. On the technical front, the widespread use of weak cryptography made DVDs easy to rip, made cars easier to steal, and means that millions of building locks are easy to break because they use Mifare Classic’s 48-bit crypto, including the building where I work. The business models of firms selling hotel door locks have been undermined as they can no longer lock in their customers to buying their proprietary card stock. As for policy, authoritarian governments such as Russia’s passed harsh crypto control laws; Britain went from a liberal, laissez-faire policy under John Major in the mid 1990s to Tony Blair’s Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act of 2000 which enables the police to demand that I hand over a key or password in my possession, and the Export Control Act of 2002 instructs me to get an export license if I send any cryptographic software outside Europe that uses keys longer than 56 bits\footnote{Thankfully, the person who does the exporting is the person who clicks on the link – so if you’re in Iran, you would be a very bad person if you clicked on the link on my website to download the Serpent block cipher. You have been warned!}. I’ll return to export control later.

24.2.8 Crypto War 2 – Going spotty

The 2013 disclosures by Edward Snowden have led to a resumption, after a fashion, of the crypto wars. In fact, the NSA never stopped, but just took its ‘crypto enabling’ activities underground; Snowden’s papers told of the NSA’s Bullrun program and GCHQ’s Edgehill, which together spend over $100m a year on subverting commercial cryptography. The key goal of the intelligence community in the 1990s, we now know, was to minimise the number of systems that used crypto by default; as systems were built rapidly during the dotcom boom, the NSA knew that if crypto wasn’t built in at the start, it would be expensive to retrofit it later; so the longer they held the line on crypto controls, the more systems would be accessible in the future. The policy was successful—only it gave access to hostile nations too. At the same time, NGOs such as EFF, EPIC and EDRi lobbied for privacy and transparency, while tech activists ran projects like Tor, Tails and Signal which made privacy tools available globally for free, outside the boundaries imposed on commercial firms by export controls and government contracts.

The disclosures were a sobering reality check. The NSA and its partners were not only harvesting everyone’s SMSes and email from the backbone, as we knew, and getting content from major service providers using warrants. They were hacking allies, as when GCHQ hacked Belgacom \footnote{An amazing story about how one EU member state attacked the critical infrastructure of another, and did so in order to wiretap the European Commission. Another example was New Zealand’s contribution to the Five Eyes which includes spying on small neighbours such as Samoa, Tonga and French Polynesia \cite{515}. They had lied to Congress, for example about collecting call data records on US citizens. They were bypassing legal controls, in that the GCHQ could get my gmail from Google using Prism, as I’m not a US resident; we’d always suspected this, but it had been a secret.}; an amazing story about how one EU member state attacked the critical infrastructure of another, and did so in order to wiretap the European Commission. Another example was New Zealand’s contribution to the Five Eyes which includes spying on small neighbours such as Samoa, Tonga and French Polynesia \cite{615}. They had lied to Congress, for example about collecting call data records on US citizens. They were bypassing legal controls, in that the GCHQ could get my gmail from Google using Prism, as I’m not a US resident; we’d always suspected this, but it had been a secret.}
always been denied. They were also getting it from major services by covert means – by tapping the communications between Google’s data centres. Almost two years later, in 2015, a UK court ruled that the regime whereby the UK obtained mass surveillance data on UK residents via the USA had been unlawful, because it contravened the European Convention on Human Rights [234].

All this had an immediate effect on behaviour. First, the service providers cleaned up their act; Google encrypted its internal network to ensure that the only way to get their users’ data was through the front door, by a warrant. Second, most messaging systems offered end-to-end encryption to reassure users (and also to save system operators the cost of complying with warrants). Third, the policy conversation started tackling more realistic problems, such as that of jurisdiction; given that most of the material of interest to the world’s police forces is kept on servers belonging to US companies, who will get access to it, and on what terms? While countries like the UK worked at getting faster access to US data, others went for localisation. India had already insisted that all private Blackberry users keep their messages on servers in India; China banned Facebook and Google to ensure its residents used Chinese systems instead; and many countries have passed data-localisation laws to ensure that some kinds of personal data are kept within the jurisdiction. Most countries in Africa, for example, require financial data to be kept locally; I’ll discuss the European Union’s data-protection regulation and its interaction with US firms later.

Although the agencies no longer ask for access to all keys, the escrow arguments have come back in new forms. First, the FBI argued that they needed Apple to produce an operating system ‘upgrade’ for the iPhone that would unlock it, using as their test case a locked iPhone that had been used in a terrorist attack in Bakersfield. Apple’s Tim Cook had resisted pressure to install back doors before, and saw the Bakersfield case as a serious threat to Apple users’ privacy and to the Apple brand; he resisted in court [312]. FBI Director James Comey testified that the agency would not be able to get at such vital information without assistance from Apple. The case divided American opinion, with Republicans supporting the FBI (and then candidate Trump calling for a boycott of Apple) while most democrats, and the tech industry, supported Tim Cook. One of my colleagues, Sergei Skorobogatov, worked out how to defeat the iPhone PIN retry counter [1267], as I discussed in 3.4.8.3. As for the FBI, they bought a commercial iPhone break from an Israeli firm, Cellebrite, and dropped the case.

Second, GCHQ, along with the FBI, started to argue that providers of messaging services such as WhatsApp and FaceTime should be compelled to build in a facility whereby law enforcement can be added as a silent conference-call party (so-called ‘ghost users’) when they get a warrant. James Comey led the charge along with GCHQ Director Robert Hannigan, who accused Facebook in 2014 of helping terrorism [1128] by requiring him to go through the procedures of the UK/USA Mutual legal Assistance Treaty to get information. Facebook’s response was that they simply obeying US and EU law; and as the relevant service centre was in Ireland, Hannigan couldn’t simply compel them to help.

My cryptographer colleagues and I reconvened to write an update of our analysis, ‘Keys Under Doormats’, which explains how many of the problems with 1990s key escrow proposals simply come back in a new form if you mandate...
government access to data instead [5]. The effects if anything are likely to be worse, as we are now much more dependent on the Internet than twenty years ago. It would be a bad thing if the access mechanisms that governments demand were to force designers to abandon security mechanisms such as forward secrecy, authenticated encryption and strict transport security that have become widespread in the meantime; and because of the many interactions between systems that have been secured in different ways and by different principals, the risk of mandated vulnerabilities having serious and unanticipated side-effects is now much greater. Building in exceptional access also creates huge targets in the wiretapping systems themselves, and extra complexity that can lead to further security failures. Indeed, the 2010 Chinese hack of Google’s wiretapping system suggests that even the best-run companies cannot keep out state actors all the time – and that hack was aimed at the systems Google built to service wiretaps. The Chinese must have wanted to know which of their agents in the USA was under suspicion. There are huge problems around jurisdiction; if Facebook carries a WhatsApp message from a user in France to a user in Argentina, do only these two governments get access, or does the NSA demand it too? Since Snowden, everyone knows they will, and nobody believes they could keep such a capability under control. Any demand for such systems raises a whole lot of questions of both law and engineering, some of which we spelled out in our analysis [5].

The UK parliament still passed an Investigatory Powers Act in 2016 (in the chaos following the Brexit referendum) that grants it the power to order any company to do anything physically possible to facilitate signals intelligence collection, and to keep quiet about it forever. In 2018, two senior GCHQ mathematicians, Ian Levy and Crispin Robinson, came up with suggested principles for how government access to messaging services might work [842]; their idea was that when GCHQ presented Facebook with a warrant, they would add a GCHQ public key quietly to the target’s keyring, so that they’d become a silent conference party to all his calls. My colleague Bruce Schneier responded in detail [1211]: the fact that such an approach would work with some systems (it would with WhatsApp but not with Signal) is actually a bug that’s being fixed by better transparency mechanisms, and mandating it would prevent the bugfix. In any case, such an access power is excessive; intelligence agencies should not have it because of their history of abusing such access.

The latest twist may be the announcement by Mark Zuckerberg that Facebook will shift its emphasis from public posts to ephemeral, end-to-end encrypted messaging by unifying WhatsApp with Instagram and Messenger [1033]. Some cynics suggested that this was make it easier to hide fake news and hate speech from both the media and the law, and cut the costs of moderation as well as the PR damage from scandals; others that it was to prevent either the EU or the US government from ordering the breakup of the company [1350, 1363]. Time will tell; we’ll consider moderation and other forms of censorship below.

24.2.9 Export control

One spillover from the crypto wars was the imposition of more uniform export controls than before, particularly in Europe; here’s a quick summary. Interna-
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tional arms control agreements (COCOM and Wassenaar) bind most governments to implement export controls on cryptographic equipment, and the latter is implemented in the European Union by an EU regulation compelling Member States to control and license the export of dual-use goods – goods which have both civilian and military uses. Cryptanalytic products fall under the military regime, whereas software that just uses cryptography for protection falls under dual-use.

National policy used to vary more, and during the 1990s European researchers like me could write crypto software and publish it on our web pages, while our US colleagues were prevented from doing that by the US International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR). US firms complained and in 1997, Vice-President Al Gore persuaded the incoming British Prime Minister Tony Blair to extend export control to intangibles. He initially tried to sell this to the UK parliament, but the relevant committees weren’t keen, so Blair had it pushed through as an EU regulation and his ministers then happily told us “Our hands are tied – we have to do this as it’s EU law”. (Such policy laundering, as it’s called, has been endemic in Europe and is one of the factors that fuelled the movement to get Britain to leave the EU).

Now (2019), tens of thousands of academics and small software companies are breaking the law without knowing it by exporting products (or even by giving away software) containing crypto with keys longer than 56 bits. There are open general export licenses (OGELs) that one can use, but you have to understand the mechanisms and file the paperwork. And it’s not just cryptography. For example, in our hardware tamper-resistance research we use an ion beam workstation, which is like an electron microscope only it fires metal ions at the target rather than electrons, so you can modify a chip by cutting tracks and adding new ones. Like cryptography, this is on the dual-use list. In the old days, we had to get an export license when we bought one, and another seven years later when we threw it in a skip. Now, we’re in theory supposed to get a license whenever we share a script we’ve written for the machine with someone who isn’t an EU citizen or resident. The practical outcome is that tens of thousands of scientists happily break the law – which can make them vulnerable to pressure from the agencies. How I deal with which issues personally is to be very careful that all such software and scripts are on my website, which enables me to use a public-domain exemption, and rely on the fact that it’s the person who clicks on the link who performs the export.

The civil war in Syria exposed the dark side of export control in 2012. People from several digital rights NGOs lobbied the UK government, asking it to use export control law to prevent a UK company selling bulk surveillance equipment to the Assad government. We argued that mass surveillance equipment should not just be on the dual-use list but the military list, that the intelligence community includes bulk collection in ‘cryptanalysis’ which is military; and its sale to a government involved in wholesale abuses was against human-rights law. The lady from GCHQ fought this tooth and nail; the sales were going through an arms dealer in Dubai so how could the vendor be sure of the destination; they came from a German subsidiary so it was the Germans’ problem; Wassenaar was a form for military issues rather than human rights ones; and even that mass surveillance is also used for marketing. The real issue was that
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GCHQ feared that UK troops would end up in Syria and they were determined that if President Assad was going to have black boxes on his network, they should be British black boxes rather than Ukrainian ones. Eventually the German chancellor Angela Merkel admitted in public that she had decided to allow surveillance equipment to be sold to Syria, and that it was one of the hardest decisions she'd taken. In August 2013, the UK Parliament voted against authorising military action in Syria, and President Obama decided not to go it alone. In due course, the export control issue was referred to European agencies and quietly forgotten.

24.3 Terrorism

Talk about terrorism has driven a lot of policy around surveillance and privacy, especially since 9/11. The tide is starting to recede, but it’s still a card that politicians play when they want to get something they shouldn’t, and the media often play along. There has been much talk of cyber-terrorism; that basically hasn’t happened, but there are more substantial concerns about encrypted chat services and social media being used to groom and recruit young people to criminal organisations ranging from right-wing hate groups to Islamic State. So what can we say about terrorism?

Political violence is nothing new; anthropologists have found that tribal warfare was endemic among early humans, as indeed it is among chimpanzees [831]. Terror has long been used to cow subject populations – by the Maya, by the Inca, by William the Conqueror. Terrorism of the ‘modern’ sort goes back centuries: Guy Fawkes tried to blow up Britain’s Houses of Parliament in 1605; his successors, the Irish Republican Army, ran a number of campaigns against the UK. In the latest, from 1970–94, some three thousand people died, and the IRA even blew up a hotel where Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was staying for a party conference, killing several of her colleagues. During the Cold War, the Russians supported not just the IRA but the Baader Meinhof Gang in Germany and many others; the West armed and supported jihadists fighting the Russians in Afghanistan. Some terrorists, like Baader and Meinhof, ended up in jail, while others – such as the IRA leaders Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, the Irgun leader Menachim Begin, the French resistance leader Charles de Gaulle and the African anti-colonial leaders Jomo Kenyatta, Robert Mugabe and Nelson Mandela – ended up in office.

What general lessons can be drawn from this history? Well, there’s good news and bad news.

24.3.1 Causes of political violence

The biggest piece of good news is that the trend in terrorist violence has been steadily downward [971]. There were many insurgencies in the 1960s and 70s, some ethnic, some anti-colonial, and some ideological. Many were financed by the Soviet Union or its allies as proxy conflicts in the Cold War, although a handful (notably the Nicaraguan Contras and the resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan) were financed by the West. The end of the Cold War removed the
24.3. TERRORISM

motive and the money.

The second (and related) point is that the causes of civil conflict are mostly economic. An influential study by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler for the World Bank looked at wars from 1960-1999 to see whether they were caused largely by grievances (such as high inequality, a lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions), or by greed (some rebellions are more economically viable than others) [342]. The world has plenty grievances, but the data show convincingly the incidence of rebellion was largely determined by whether it could be sustained. (Indeed, Cicero said two thousand years ago that “Endless money forms the sinews of war.”) Thus the IRA campaign continued largely because of support from the Soviet bloc and from Irish-Americans; when the former vanished and the latter decided that terror was no longer acceptable, the guns were put beyond use. Similarly, the Tamil revolt in Sri Lanka was sustained by funds from ethnic Tamils in the USA and India, and Al-Qaida was financed by rich donors in the Gulf states. So we know how to deal with an insurgency: cut off their money supply.

24.3.2 The psychology of political violence

Less encouraging findings come from scholars of psychology, politics and the media. Prejudices can be overt. A study by the University of Alabama of over 200,000 articles on the 136 different attacks in the USA between 2005 and 2016 showed that attacks by Muslims get 357% more news coverage than other terrorist attacks [747]. Islamic extremists were labelled terrorists 78.4% of the time, whereas far-right extremists were only identified as terrorists only 23.6% of the time, and political leadership does matter; the Christchurch shooting was described as terrorism by New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, while the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting was described as a ‘wicked act of mass murder’ by President Trump; the media followed [962].

Psychology gives a lot of insight into the underlying mechanisms. I mentioned the affect heuristic in Section 3.2.5: where people rely on affect, or emotion, calculations of probability tend to be disregarded. The prospect of a happy event, such as winning the lottery, will blind most people to the long odds and the low expected return; similarly, a dreadful event, such as a terrorist attack, will make most people disregard the fact that such events are exceedingly rare [1269]. Most of the Americans who died as a result of 9/11 did so since then in car crashes, after deciding to drive rather than fly.

There are other effects at the border between psychology and culture. A study of the psychology of terror by Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon and Jeff Greenberg looked at how people cope with the fear of death [1127]. They got 22 municipal court judges in Tucson, Arizona, to participate in an experiment in which they were asked to set bail for a drug-addicted prostitute. They were all given a personality questionnaire first, in which half were asked questions such as “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you” to remind them that we all die one day. The judges for whom mortality had been made salient set an average bail of $455 while the control group set an average bond of $50 – a huge effect for such an experiment. Further experiments showed that the mortality-salience group had not just become mean: they were
24.3. TERRORISM

also prepared to give larger rewards to citizens who performed some public act. It turns out that when you remind people of death, it makes them adhere more strongly to their cultural norms and defend their worldview more vigorously. This, I believe, is why cyber-terrorism just hasn’t happened. Hacking a couple of substations and turning off a town’s electricity can be mighty inconvenient, but it just doesn’t have the same emotional effect as a bleeding child. The media analysis confirms this; coverage is strongly correlated with fatalities, and increases by 46% for each extra dead body [747].

But there’s more. Generations of philosophers have theorised about how people cope with mortality, from the medieval ‘memento mori’ through psychoanalysis to Sartre on existential anxiety. Pyszczynski and his colleagues now provide an experimental methodology to study the effects; it turns out, for example, that mortality salience intensifies altruism and the need for heroes. The 9/11 attacks brought mortality to the forefront of people’s minds, and were also an assault on symbols of national and cultural pride. It was natural that the response included religion (the highest level of church attendance since the 1950s), patriotism (in the form of a high approval rating for the President), and for some people bigotry too. It was natural that, as the memory of the attacks receded, society would repolarise because of divergent core values. It turns out that, when they’re reminded that they’ll die one day, both conservatives and liberals take a more polarised view of an anti-American essay written by a foreign student – except in experiments where they are first reminded of the Constitution, in which case conservatives defend the student’s right to free speech even more vigorously than liberals [1127].

So a national leader trying to keep a country together following an attack should constantly remind people what they’re fighting for, this is exactly what capable leaders do, from Churchill’s radio broadcasts to Roosevelt’s fireside chats. In more recent years, some countries have taken a bipartisan approach to terrorism – as when Germany faced the Baader-Meinhof Gang, and Britain the IRA. In others, politicians have given in to the temptation to use fearmongering to get re-elected. What are the dynamics here, and which approaches work best?

24.3.3 The role of institutions

There’s a whole academic subject – public-choice economics – devoted to explaining why governments act the way they do, and for which its founder James Buchanan won the Nobel Prize in 1986. As he put it in his prize lecture, “Economists should cease proffering policy advice as if they were employed by a benevolent despot, and they should look to the structure within which political decisions are made.” Much government behaviour is explained by the incentives facing individual public-sector decision makers. It’s natural for officials to build empires as they are ranked by their span of control rather than, as in industry, by the profits they generate. Similarly, politicians maximise their chances of reelection rather than the abstract welfare of the public. Understanding their decisions requires methodological individualism – considering the incentives facing individual presidents, congressmen, generals, police chiefs and newspaper editors, rather than the potential gains or losses of a nation.
24.3. **TERRORISM**

We know it’s prudent to design institutions so that their leaders’ incentives are aligned with its goals – we give company managers stock options to make them act like shareholders. But this is harder in a polity. How is the national interest to be defined?

Public-choice scholars argue that both markets and politics are instruments of exchange. In the former we seek to optimise our utility individually, while in the latter we do the same but using collective actions to achieve goals that we cannot attain in markets because of externalities or other failures. The political process in turn is thus prone to specific types of failure, such as deficit financing. Intergenerational bargaining is hard: it’s easy for politicians to borrow money to buy votes now, and leave the bill with the next generation, who can’t vote yet. But then why do some countries have much worse public debt than others? The short answer is that institutions matter. Political results depend critically on the rules that constrain political action.

Although public-choice economics emerged in response to problems in public finance in the 1960s, it has some clear lessons. Constitutions matter, as they set the ground rules of the political game. So do administrative structures, as officials are self-interested agents too. In the UK, for example, the initial response to 9/11 was to increase the budget for the security service; but this hundred million dollars or so didn’t offer real pork to the security-industrial complex. So all the pet projects got dusted off, and the political beauty contest was won by a national ID card, a grandiose project that in its original form would have cost £20 billion [863]. Washington insiders remarked that a similar dynamic was involved in the decision to invade Iraq: although the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan had been successful, it had not given much of a role to the Pentagon barons who’d spent careers assembling fleets of tanks, capital ships and fighter-bombers, or much of a payoff to the defense industry either. Indeed, USAF Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski retired at the start of the Iraq war, described how intelligence assessments were politically manipulated for ideological purposes, and later ran for Congress [812]. Similar things were said in the aftermath of World War I, which was blamed on the ‘merchants of death’. I suppose we will have to wait for the verdict of the historians.

An institution of particular concern must be the media, whether the old-fashioned press or the social media that are taking over some of their functions. ‘If it bleeds, it leads’, as the saying goes; bad news sells more papers than good. The self-interest of media owners combines with that of politicians who want to get re-elected, officials who want to build empires, and vendors who want to sell security stuff. They pick up on, and amplify, the temporary blip in patriotism and the need for heroes that terrorist attacks naturally instil. Fearmongering gets politicians on the front page and helps them control the agenda.

24.3.4 The democratic response

Yet people learn over time. The worldwide reaction to 9/11 was sharp; it was more muted four years later, in July 2005, when four suicide bombers killed 52 people on London’s public transport and injured about 700. The initial response of the public was one of gritty resignation: ‘Oh, well, we knew something like
24.4. CENSORSHIP

this was going to happen – bad luck if you were there, but life goes on.\textsuperscript{6}

And as populations learn, so do political elites. John Mueller has written a history of the attitudes to terrorism of successive US administrations [971]. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford ignored terrorism. President Carter made a big deal of the Iran hostage crisis, and like 9/11 it gave him a huge boost in the polls at the beginning, but later it ended his presidency. His Secretary of State Cyrus Vance later admitted they should have played down the crisis rather than giving undeserved credibility to the Iranian ‘students’ who’d kidnapped US diplomats. President Reagan mostly ignored provocations, but succumbed to temptation over the Lebanese hostages and shipped arms to Iran to secure their release. However, once he’d distanced himself from this error, his ratings recovered quickly. In America, people got fed up with President Bush’s fear-based policies and elected President Obama whose line was “9/11 is not a way to scare up votes but a challenge that should unite America and the world against the common threats of the 21st century”. Much the same happened in the UK, where Tony Blair’s departure from office was met with a sigh of relief; his successor Gordon Brown forbade ministers from using the phrase ‘war on terror’, and David Cameron’s government continued that. Mature voters prefer politicians who stand up to terrorists rather than playing along with the fear game.

24.4 Censorship

I wrote in the first edition that “the 1990s debate on crypto policy is likely to be a test run for an even bigger battle, which will be over anonymity, censorship and copyright.” By the second edition, I noted that “copyright law has largely stabilised”, and it was during 2008 that power over content distribution shifted from the music majors and Hollywood to tech firms like Apple and Amazon. I also noted that “censorship has become a much bigger issue over the past few years”. Now, a decade later, it’s even bigger, but its nature has changed. Once, speech was scarce, and the censor tried to silence the speaker; now it’s the listener’s attention that’s scarce, and so an inconvenient speaker can be drowned out. The underlying policy problem remains: it’s not easy to ban bad things, when people do not agree on what things are bad.

Rulers have long censored books, although the invention of the printing press made their job a whole lot harder. When John Wycliffe translated the Bible into English in 1380–1, the Lollard movement he started was suppressed along with the Peasants’ Revolt. But when William Tyndale had another go in 1524–5, printing let him spread the word so widely that the princes and bishops could not suppress it. They had him burned at the stake, but by then over 50,000 copies of the New Testament had been printed, and the Reformation was under way. After that upset, printers were closely licensed and controlled; things only eased up in the eighteenth century.

Censorship nowadays is done for a variety of motives. Most countries block

\textsuperscript{6}\textsuperscript{6}The press went along with this for a couple of days: then there was an explosion of fearmongering. It seems that ministers needed a day or two of meetings to sort out their shopping lists and decide what they would try to shake out of Parliament.
images of child sex abuse; during the 1990s, as the dotcom boom got underway, governments started looking for some handle on the Internet, and a view arose that images of child sex abuse were about the one thing that all states could agree should be banned. In due course the 2004 Cybercrime Convention obliged signatory states to ban sexual images of under-18s. Most governments go further and block some kinds of hate speech. Britain bans websites that ‘radicalise’ young people by glorifying terrorism. Finally, censorship is sometimes imposed by the courts.

The invention of the Internet has made the censors’ job easier in some ways and harder in others. It’s easier for the authorities to order changes in material that not many people care about: for example, courts that find a newspaper guilty of libel order the offending material to be removed. Changing the historical record wasn’t possible when it consisted of physical copies in libraries, and the centralisation of human knowledge in the servers of a small number of firms – from Amazon’s e-book system to the servers of the major news organisations – takes us, in some sense, back to the 15th century. It’s also easier for the authorities to observe the transmission of disapproved material, as they can monitor the content of electronic communications much more easily than physical packages. On the other hand, nowadays everyone can be a publisher; much of the really unpleasant material online comes from millions of individuals posting sort-of anonymously to social media, to the comment pages of newspapers, and to individuals whom they wish to harass and intimidate. Censors have learned to harness this. While a decade ago China had tens of thousands of people who took down dissident speech, now they have millions of citizen volunteers who drown it out.

To tease out the issues, let’s look at some contexts.

24.4.1 Censorship by authoritarian regimes

When I wrote the second edition of this book, I was cautiously optimistic that the government of China would fail in its attempts to censor all online content. By 2006, observers noted that online discussion of local news events had led to the emergence of ‘public opinion’ that for the first time was not in thrall to media managers [1053]. China had 137 million Internet users then, including a quarter of the population in the big cities, and ‘the Great Firewall of China’ was already a complex system of controls giving defence in depth against a range of material, from pornography to religious material to political dissent [1052]. The defences work at three levels.

First, there are the perimeter defences. China’s border routers filter on IP addresses to block access to known ‘bad’ sites like the Voice of America and the BBC; they also use DNS cache poisoning. Deep packet inspection at the TCP level is used to identify emails and web pages containing forbidden words such as ‘Falun Gong’; such connections are torn down. Ten years ago, much of the work was done at this level. Nowadays, since most traffic is encrypted, that’s not so easy. That much we could have foreseen.

Second, there are application-level defences, which now do much of the work. Nowadays some services are blocked and some aren’t, depending on whether the
service provider is prepared to help the regime with both surveillance and censorship. Google and Facebook are largely blocked, and China has promoted local firms such as Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu instead. Now that the borders that matter most are those of firms rather than of nations, the Chinese government has aligned its industrial policy with its politics. This is the big change; we never believed ten years ago that China would build an entire ecosystem of Chinese-owned online service providers to keep western influence at bay. Language provides one barrier, but there are strong technical barriers too: the perimeter defences now focus on blocking Tor and VPNs that could be used by Chinese residents to use non-approved services.

Third, there are social defences. There were already range 30,000 online police a decade ago; now millions more have been engaged in the process, and rather than trying to block all dissident speech the strategy is to swamp it. Loyal citizens are expected to post lots of pro-regime comments and to flame anybody who criticises authority, whether local or national. A social credit system gives people positive points for such pro-social behaviour, while they can lose points for anything considered antisocial. Online monitoring is being integrated with the monitoring of physical space, such as by CCTV cameras with face recognition – and this is particularly aggressive in areas with rebellious minority populations, such as the Tibetans and Uighurs.

So China appears to be winning the censorship battle, using populist but authoritarian techniques. Russia’s Internet is fairly open, and although the government had an ally take over the main social network, and has organised armies of trolls to shout down its opponents, the opposition politician Alexei Navalny has his own YouTube channel with millions of viewers, and attempts to censor Telegram have been met with street protests. Putin has fought back with a ‘digital sovereignty’ law enabling him to order ISPs to install surveillance equipment.

The Arab Spring has also been significant. This series of uprisings started in Tunisia in December 2010 after a street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire after an official confiscated his wares and humiliated him. Protests were organised using Facebook and other social media, leading to the downfall of the government, and spreading to neighbouring countries too; the government of Egypt also fell, along with those of Libya and the Yemen. The government of Syria almost fell, but fought back in a civil war that killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions. A number of other Arab countries, such as Bahrain, suffered significant unrest and cracked down. As I write in 2019, only Tunisia has managed the transition to democracy. In Egypt, one military dictator has been replaced by another; Libya is in chaos, and Yemen, like Syria, is racked by war. The lesson drawn by the world’s autocrats is that, to stay in power, they’d better study the methods used by China. Arab countries do censor the Internet (as do most of the less-developed countries) but their infrastructure is still fairly easily defeated using VPNs or Tor. They also buy in kit for both bulk surveillance and targeted work; for a description of how the UAE hired US mercenaries to set up an equivalent of the NSA, see Bing and Schectman [186].

To what extent was the Arab Spring a function of technology, and to what extent was this just marketing hype put out in 2011 by companies like Facebook and Google while things seemed to be going well? It is true that some of the
populations that rose up made little use of the Internet, particularly Libya and the Yemen; but then, a revolt in Burma in 2007 was catalysed by the Internet, even though only about 1% of the population had access [1054]. Or it may be that Al-Jazeera spread the word by showing news videos of uprisings elsewhere in the region. Historians will have to figure it out.

24.4.2 Hate speech and radicalisation

Among democracies, there are quite variable laws on hate speech. At one end, the USA has constitutional protection for free speech; at the other, France and Germany both prohibit the sale of Nazi memorabilia. If you start clicking on right-wing material on YouTube from a US or UK IP address, you’ll quickly come across swastikas and outspoken antisemitism; from a German IP address, this doesn’t happen. Hate speech (‘Volksverhetzung’) has been a specific crime in Germany for decades, and in January 2018 the authorities started enforcing it against online service providers, with the threat of a fine of €50m if any service provider with more than 2m customers doesn’t take down any such material within 24 hours. Whatever the service companies say about the cost of taking down bad stuff, the German example shows that they can do it when they have to. But the costs are not just financial, but human; since the service providers have had to scale up content moderation, we’ve seen an increasing number of news articles about the psychological toll on staff who have to spend all day looking at videos of gang murders and terrorist beheadings, animal cruelty, child abuse, and all sorts of other unpleasantness [1032].

When making laws to restrict speech, it’s a good idea to stop and think about the context. Clickbait was not invented in 2016, but goes back a very long way. Tim Wu’s ‘The attention merchants’ [1455] is a history of propaganda since the 1830s when the first mass-market newspapers appeared, stuffed with grisly crime reports and adverts for patent medicines; this gave politicians their first industrial mass-market channel. Radio followed, and was used skilfully by Hitler. TV was next, and its nature was shaped by advertising; people invented quiz shows, soaps and much else to grab the eyeballs. A second useful perspective is Yochai Benkler’s ‘Network propaganda’ which analyses the 2016 US election campaign. He traces the history of political polarisation argues that the outcome wasn’t a matter of technology or of Russian interference so much as of the asymmetric media systems of right and left that have developed over the past 20 years; the left and centre-right are fact-based while the right is a propaganda feedback loop [175]. A proper understanding of Islamist propaganda maybe needs to collect appropriate data and apply similar analyses, as well as the psychology of terrorism we discussed above and the mechanics of ad auctions we discussed in chapter on economics.

The current reactions of governments are much cruder. We now have specific laws in Britain against radicalisation, As a university guy I’m supposed to report students who seem at risk of being radicalised, and have procedures to figure out whether seminars or other talks could radicalise them; there are also laws against online material that might lead them astray. If such an approach were applied consistently it might lead to banning much of the literature produced or funded by religious institutions from Saudi Arabia [917], and action against
our largest arms export customer isn’t going to happen anytime soon. White supremacists are at least as much of a threat, having murdered a member of the UK parliament during the Brexit campaign; but our government is much less keen on cracking down on them. Internet censorship lets the government claim it’s doing something, but at the cost of undermining whatever our diplomats might say about freedom of speech to the world’s despots. I’d prefer to leave this material in the open, let the police monitor the traffic to the worst of the sites, and train them to use the existing laws better [463]. As for stigmatising Muslim students, this runs directly against the criminological evidence. The few students who’ve signed up to extremist organisations have been those who experienced lack of respect socially, perhaps being rejected by their peers, were searching for identity but couldn’t find it in the religion of their parents – then fell in with small groups of other disaffected youngsters and came under the influence of radical preachers, who offered ideals, community, kinship, caring and brotherhood. The radicalisation of white boys into white supremacist groups is not hugely different. The best approach is to have an environment that doesn’t exclude people – one in which students get to know others from different backgrounds on the staircase in their residence, in small teaching groups, in project groups, in sports and in student societies. That’s how great universities have always worked anyway.

24.5 Forensics and Rules of Evidence

Our last main policing topic is how information can be recovered from computers, mobile phones and other electronic devices for use in evidence. This has been getting more problematic over the past twenty years because of first, the sheer volumes of data; and second, the fact that while much of it is seized from platforms such as mobile phones and laptops, more and more of it is held on cloud services that require paperwork and often quite substantial delays. The rising costs and operational difficulties lead to more selective law enforcement, with whole categories of online harms where states rarely intervene. As a result, many bad people, from cybercriminals to creeps, bullies and extremists, operate with near-total impunity.

24.5.1 Forensics

Computer forensics has been a growing problem for the police since at least the 1980s; by the early 2000s both the facilities and the staff training were hopelessly behind. The move of everything online during the 2010s has made matters still worse. When the police raid even a small-time drug dealer nowadays, they can get half-a-dozen mobile phones, several laptops, and gadgets such as a navigator or a fitbit that hold his location history. The suspect may also have dozens of accounts for webmail, social-networking sites and other services. We have all sorts of clever ways of extracting information from the data – for example, you can identify which camera took a picture from the pattern noise of the CCD array [872], and even use this to figure out which parts of a photo might have been tampered with.
The use of digital material in evidence depends, however, on both law and economics. Material has to be lawfully collected, whether with a search warrant or equivalent powers; and the forensic officer has to maintain a chain of custody, which means being able to satisfy a court that evidence wasn’t tampered with afterwards. That means using trustworthy tools to make evidential copies of data; to document everything that’s done; and to have means of dealing appropriately with any private material that’s found (such as privileged attorney-client emails, or the trade secrets of a suspect’s employer). The traditional approach to computer forensics is described in standard textbooks such as Sammes and Jenkinson [1179].

Since the world moved to smartphones and cloud services, the centre of gravity has shifted to a handful of companies that sell mobile forensics tools to police and intelligence agencies. They supply kiosks to police forces that enable unskilled officers to download mobile-phone contents, and to use the tokens on them to download data from suspects’ accounts in the cloud. Some police forces are working hard to get the legal issues sorted out (such as Police Scotland, who don’t use ‘cloud forensics’ without a warrant) but many just grab and keep all the data.

At the more sophisticated end of the trade, there’s an arms race between forensics and countermeasures. Police forces used to always turn PCs off, so that hard disks could be copied for prosecution and defence lawyers. Phishing gangs exploited this by making their phishing software memory-resident, so that the evidence would self-destruct. And since laptops started to ship with decent encryption, the risk is multiplied. By 2013, when the FBI arrested Ross Ulbricht – the creator of the Silk Road underground drugs market – one agent’s mission was to put his hand in the laptop to stop Ulbricht closing it, and already had the right kind of power cord to plug it in [357].

In the old days, people – and small businesses – who got caught up in a police investigation and had their computers seized could wait years to get them back, even if they were just a bystander, or if were charged but eventually acquitted. Nowadays, people have seizure-proof offsite backup, and cloud services provide this easily. But cloud services can make life harder for the police, especially where suspects have material on servers overseas. The fight between Facebook and GCHQ I referred to in Section 24.2.8 arose when two terrorists murdered a British soldier, Lee Rigby, near Woolwich barracks in March 2013 by running him over with a car and then stabbing him. While they were at the crime scene, facing off against the police, Facebook fed the police and security services data instantly, but once the two had been shot and were in custody in hospital, requests had to go through the UK/US mutual legal assistance treaty. This involves the police filing forms at the US Embassy in London that are then considered at length in the Department of Justice in Washington. The forms are often filled out wrong and sent back as UK police staff don’t understand US law. Even where everything goes right, it can take six weeks for the FBI to serve the paperwork on Facebook in Menlo Park, California, and collect the data. So we found we’d gone from a world in which, after a raid, the police would have your data and you wouldn’t, to one in which you still have your data but the police don’t – unless you cooperate, or unless you’re a serious enough bad guy to be worth the time and attention of diplomats.
Since about 2017, there’s been a third option: cloud forensics. What this means in practice is that your phone is hacked by the police’s forensic kiosk and gives up access tokens to your email, your photos, your Facebook and your other cloud services. Some UK police forces think this is wonderful; they treat the downloaded data as ‘data at rest’ as if it had been found on the phone itself and keep it forever. Others consider that it can only be obtained by consent or with a further warrant. The incentives to grab cloud data are strong, but the mechanisms involved (phone hacking followed by impersonation of the user) are likely to strike most citizens as unfair. And ever more devices are now acquiring an attached cloud service and an app. Will the police investigate traffic offences in future by seizing the driver’s phone and using it to download the car’s logs from the manufacturer’s server? Both courts and legislators are likely to get involved in figuring all this out. As it happens, courts already have some rules about what evidence can be used.

24.5.2 Admissibility of evidence

When courts were first confronted with computer evidence in the 1960s there were many concerns about its reliability. There was not just the engineering issue of whether the data were accurate, but the legal issue of whether computer-generated data were inadmissible as hearsay. Different legislatures tackled this differently. In the US, most of the law is found in the Federal Rules of Evidence where 803(6) allows computer data to be introduced as records ‘made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity... unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.’ The UK is similar, and the rules of electronic evidence in the common-law countries (including Canada, Australia, South Africa and Singapore) are analysed by Stephen Mason [897].

The definition of ‘writing’ and ‘signature’ is of interest, and varies by jurisdiction. In Britain, courts took the view that an email is writing just as a letter is: the essence of a signature is the signer’s intent. For example, a farm worker who was crushed to death by a tractor and had managed to scrawl ‘all to mum’ on the tyre was held to have made a legal will [1449, 1450].

The US approach was similarly pragmatic. In 2000, Congress enacted the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce (‘ESIGN’) Act, which gives legal force to any ‘sound, symbol, or process’ by which a consumer assents to something. So pressing a telephone keypad (‘press 0 to agree or 9 to terminate this transaction’), clicking a hyper-link to enter a web site, or clicking ‘continue’ on a software installer, the consumer consents to be bound to a contract [480]. This makes click-wrap licenses perfectly valid in America. Nonetheless, Docusign has managed to build a business offering digital signatures as a service for firms who want something a bit more showy.

In Europe legislators got it wrong. The Electronic Signature Directive, which came into force in 2000, gave special force to an advanced electronic signature, which basically means a digital signature generated with a smartcard. Europe’s smartcard industry thought this would earn them lots of money. However, it backfired. In most countries, the risk that a paper check will be forged is borne...
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by the relying party: if someone forges a check on my account, then it’s not
my signature, and I have not given the bank my mandate to debit my account;
so if they negligently rely on a forged signature and do so, that’s their lookout.
However, if I were foolish enough to ever accept an advanced electronic signature
device, then the risk shifts from the bank to me. I become liable to anyone in
the world for any signature that appears to have been made by this device,
regardless of whether or not I actually made it! This, coupled with the facts
that smartcards don’t have a trusted user interface and that the PCs which
most people would use to provide this interface are easily subverted, made such
electronic signatures unattractive except in specialised applications.

24.5.3 What goes wrong

Many things can go wrong with police investigations, and the computerised kind
are no different. An old pitfall is relying on evidence extracted from the systems
of one party to a dispute, without applying enough scepticism about claims
made for its dependability. Recall the Munden case described in Section 10.4.3.
A man was falsely accused and wrongly convicted of attempted fraud after he
complained of unauthorized withdrawals from his bank account. On appeal, his
defence team got an order from the court that the bank open its systems to the
defence expert as it had done to the prosecution. The bank refused, the bank
statements were ruled inadmissible and the case collapsed.

The same has happened multiple times since then, including two terror cases.
Four Somali men were suspected of terrorism and subjected to court orders in the
UK that required them to wear ankle bracelets with GPS positioning equipment,
so they could be tracked. After about six months, their bracelets broke off, and
they were jailed on suspicion of tampering with them. Their lawyers challenged
this and demanded that their expert get access to the equipment to test it. The
vendors refused, the case collapsed, and the four men were released. One of
them later evaded surveillance by donning a niqab in a London mosque and
leaving as a woman. When a fifth case came up, the government contested
it, but when the defence eventually got samples and we got them to our lab,
we discovered that the lugs attaching the GPS units to the ankle straps were
made of a polycarbonate material that was vulnerable to fatigue fractures. The
fifth man was eventually freed by the court. So it’s worthwhile when relying on
forensic evidence to think in advance about whether it will have to withstand
examination by hostile experts.

The worst failure of computer evidence of which I’m aware was Operation
Ore. After the US Postal Service raided a porn site in Texas, they discovered
hundreds of thousands of credit card numbers that they thought had been used
to buy child sex abuse images, and some eight thousand of these were from UK
cardholders. Some 3,000 homes got raided in the early 2000s, until the police
finally realised that most of the cardholders were probably victims of card fraud.
The vice squad used unskilled staff in their initial analysis of the seized material,
and were slow to learn – because they were fixated on getting porn convictions,
because they didn’t have the forensic capacity to process all the seized computers
quickly, because they didn’t understand card fraud (they preferred to leave
that to the banks) and because of politics (Prime Minister Tony Blair himself
had ordered the raids). So several thousand men had their lives disrupted for months or even years, and the sad story of police bungling and cover-up is told by Duncan Campbell in [283, 284]. For some, the revelation that the police had screwed up came too late; over thirty men, faced with prosecution, killed themselves. At least one, Commodore David White, commander of British forces in Gibraltar, appears to have been innocent [634]. The gangsters in Indonesia and Brazil who organised and photographed the child abuse do not seem to have been seriously pursued. America handled this case much better. Some 300,000 US credit card numbers were found on the same servers, but US police forces used the data for intelligence rather than evidence, identifying suspects of concern – such as people working with children – and quietly investigating them. Over a hundred convictions for actual child abuse followed.

Sometimes systems are deliberately designed to not provide evidence; an example is the policy adopted by Microsoft after their antitrust battles with the US government, at which embarrassing emails came out. The firm reacted with a policy that all emails should be discarded after a fixed period of time unless someone took positive action to save them. A more pervasive example, on which we already touched, is the move by service firms in the mid-2010s to adopt end-to-end encryption, as this means they just don’t have access to customer data and so don’t have to employ hundreds of lawyers to deal with requests for it.

The biggest problem with computer forensics, though, has always been sheer lack of money. Despite all the cool tricks that intelligence agencies can use to extract information from computer systems, a county drugs squad often won’t have the budget to do even basic computer forensics except for occasional big cases. They can’t even afford to send every wrap of white powder off to the lab to see if it’s illegal or not. In normal cases, they were only able to use digital material that was easily available, such as copies of messages on the phones of cooperative witnesses, until mobile-phone forensic kiosks came along around 2016–8 and made masses of data available from seized handsets at low marginal costs. Hence the huge pressure to use the kiosks, even before robust legal procedures could be developed. And, of course, the use of forensic tools by regular police officers with no specialist training raises the risk of future miscarriages of justice.

24.6 Privacy and Data Protection

Privacy and data protection are one subject on which the USA and Europe have taken separate paths. The growing gulf was highlighted powerfully in early May 2014 when, in the USA, the Presidential Council of Advisers on Science and Technology (PCAST) published a report on Big Data: A Technological Perspective [1114]. This report, whose authors included Google’s Eric Schmidt and Microsoft’s Craig Mundie, painted a picture of a world full of smart objects connected to cloud servers, with an ecology in which sensors reported to cloud analytics which in turn provided information to users, such as advertisers. PCAST warned that the spread of voice and gesture interfaces meant that pretty soon, every inhabited space on the planet would have microphones and cameras...
in it, whose output would be processed centrally for energy efficiency. They argued that privacy controls could not be imposed on the sensors, as they’d be too numerous; that they should not be imposed on the central service aggregators; and that the controls would therefore have to fall on how the information was used.

Less than two weeks later, the European Court disagreed. A Spanish lawyer, Mario Costeja González, had complained that searches for his name brought up two ancient press reports of an auction sale of his repossessed house. He asked the Spanish data protection authorities to order Google to stop serving these results as they were out of date and no longer relevant. Google argued that it was just reporting the contents of a newspaper. The case went to the ECJ, which found in González’ favour, creating a ‘right to be forgotten’, which was later codified into Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation which came into force in 2018. Meanwhile, Google and other online service providers had to set up mechanisms whereby people could complain about search results that are ‘inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes for which they were processed’ and have them removed. The mechanisms are still contentious; for example, González’ results are removed from Google searches in Spain, but European regulators want them removed globally. Google’s supporters claim that this would interfere with its right to free speech in the USA.

How did this rift come about?

24.6.1 European data protection

Fear of technology undermining privacy isn’t a recent development. As early as 1890, Justices Warren and Brandeis warned of the threat to privacy posed by ‘recent inventions and business methods’ – specifically photography and investigative journalism [1409]. After banks, tax collectors and welfare agencies started using computers in the early 1960s, people started to worry about the privacy implications if all our transactions could be collated and analyzed. In Europe, business argued that only government could afford enough computers to be a serious privacy threat. This became a human rights issue – given the recent memory of the Gestapo in most European countries.

A patchwork of data protection laws started to appear starting with the German state of Hessen in 1969. Because of the rate at which technology changes, the successful laws have been technology neutral. Their common theme was a regulator (whether at national or state level) to whom users of personal data had to report and who could instruct them to cease and desist from inappropriate processing. The practical effect was usually that the general law became expressed through a plethora of domain-specific codes of practice.

Over time, processing by multinational businesses became an issue too, and people realised that purely local or national initiatives were likely to be ineffec-

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7In Germany, privacy is entrenched in the constitution, and trumps even the ‘war on terror’: the highest court found unconstitutional a 2001 police action to create a file on over 30,000 male students or former students from Muslim-majority countries – even though no-one was arrested as a result. It decided that such exercises could be performed only in response to concrete threats, not as a precautionary measure [260].
24.6. PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION

tive against them. Following a voluntary code of conduct promulgated by the OECD in 1980 [1060], data protection was entrenched by a Council of Europe convention in January 1981, which entered into force in October 1985 [354]. Although strictly speaking this convention was voluntary, many states signed up to it for fear of losing access to data-processing markets. It required certain minimum safeguards for personal information, which generally means any data kept on an identifiable human being, or data subject, such as bank account details and credit card purchasing patterns. Data subjects have the right to inspect personal data held on them, have records changed if inaccurate, understand how they're processed, and in many cases prevent them being passed on to other organizations without their consent. Almost all commercial data are covered. There are exemptions for national security, but they are not as complete as the spooks would like: there was a big row when it turned out that data from SWIFT, which processes interbank payments, were being copied to the Department of Homeland Security without the knowledge of data subjects; SWIFT eventually agreed to stop processing European data in the USA [1066, 1067].

The quality of implementation varied widely. In the UK, for example, Margaret Thatcher unashamedly did the least possible to comply: a data protection body was established but starved of funds and technical expertise, and many exemptions were provided for both government and industry8. In Germany, which had written a right to privacy into its post-war constitution, the data protection bodies became proper law-enforcement agencies. Many other countries, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland passed comparable privacy laws in the 1980s and early 1990s: some, like Switzerland, went for the German model while others, like Iceland and Ireland, followed the British one.

By the early 1990s the difference between national laws was creating barriers to trade. Many businesses avoided controls altogether by moving their data processing to the USA. So data protection was finally elevated to the status of European Union law in 1995 with a Data Protection Directive [466]. This set higher minimum standards than before, with particularly stringent controls on highly sensitive data such as health, religion, race and political affiliation. It also set out to prevent personal information being shipped to ‘data havens’ such as the USA unless there are comparable controls enforced by contract or treaty.

The British implementation was once more minimal, falling short of European requirements on many points [430]. For example, data controllers could pretend that lightly-anonymised information was no longer personal information, just so long as they themselves did not possess the auxiliary data needed to re-identify it. Ireland’s enforcement was even weaker – its industrial strategy for the past 50 years has been to attract US firms’ European headquarters, so in addition to having low corporate taxes, the Dublin government located its data protection office in Portarlington, a town of less than 10,000 people, gave it only 30 staff, and did not allow it to publicise the results of investigations. Eventually, after Snowden and GDPR, it was allowed to open a modest office in Dublin and increase its headcount into three figures.

This arbitrage so annoyed countries with tighter privacy laws such as France

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8In one case where you’d expect there to be an exemption, there wasn’t: journalists who kept notes on their laptops or PCs which identified people were formally liable to give copies of this information to the data subjects on demand.
and Germany that they pushed for the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which passed in 2016 and came into force in May 2018. This was the most heavily lobbied piece of European legislation ever, with over 3,000 amendments discussed in committee in the European Parliament [64]; it was helped over the line by the Snowden disclosures, although it had been cooking for some time before that\(^9\). It takes direct effect in all EU member states, removing the wriggle room for Britain or Ireland to introduce loopholes; but lobbyists got quite a few of those in the Regulation already (particularly for ‘research’, whether of the scientific or marketing kind). The main effect on normal businesses is to force them to document all their uses of personal information and write down, in advance, what the legal basis is for each of them; it’s not enough to try and figure this out once challenged. For information-intensive businesses, the implications could be much more significant, and there have been fascinating disclosures recently of how Facebook executives lobbied to amend the regulation – effectively using the Irish prime minister, Enda Kenny, as their advocate in Brussels [1016].

Despite the many carve-outs inserted by the lobbyists, GDPR is still providing regulators with tools to push back. France fined Google €50m for failing to tell users enough about its data consent policies or give them enough control over how their information is used [1106]. The fact that consent cannot now be either coerced or presumed may become a big deal, and there are many further cases in the pipeline.

### 24.6.2 Privacy regulation in the USA

In the USA, business has mostly managed to persuade government to leave privacy largely to ‘self-regulation’. Although there’s a patchwork of state and federal laws, they are application-specific and fragmented. In general, privacy in federal government records and in communications is regulated, while business data are largely uncontrolled. The few islands of regulation include the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, which governs disclosure of credit information and is broadly similar to European rules; the Video Privacy Protection Act or “Bork Bill”, enacted after a Washington newspaper published Judge Robert Bork’s video rental history following his nomination to the US Supreme Court; the Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act, enacted to protect privacy of DMV records after the actress Rebecca Schaeffer was murdered by an obsessed fan who hired a private eye to find her address; and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act which protects medical records and which I discussed in Chapter 9. Most states also have a breach disclosure law, which requires firms suffering any security failure that compromises residents’ personal information to inform them about it. Several torts also provide a basis for civil action in a surprising number of circumstances; for a survey, see Daniel Solove [1280].

The first case that started to put privacy on CEOs’ radar came in 2006, when Choicepoint paid $10m to settle a lawsuit brought by the FTC after it failed to vet subscribers properly and let crooks buy the personal information of...
over 160,000 Americans, leading to at least 800 cases of ‘identity theft’ [482]. In
2007, it came out that the store chain TJ Maxx had had 45.7 million customers’
credit card details stolen [848]; Albert Gonzales got 20 years in prison for this
in 2010, and it’s reckoned that the breach cost the company $800m. The FTC
sued Facebook over deceptive changes to privacy settings and settled in 2011,
just before its IPO, requiring it to get user consent for certain changes and
subjecting it to 20 years of audits [134]. The real shock to CEO-land came
when Target’s CEO, Gregg Steinhafel, was fired in May 2014 following a hack
of more than 100m credit card numbers the previous December; the CIO was
also replaced [506]. The C-suite carnage has continued, both in the USA10
and elsewhere11 moving cybersecurity steadily up the corporate agenda.

In 2018, California passed a consumer privacy law, the California Consumer
Privacy Act. This followed a privacy ballot initiative which, if it had gone to
a ballot and passed, would have entrenched an even tougher privacy law. The
ballot in turn followed the Cambridge Analytica scandal where the Facebook
data of 87 million users was harvested without their knowledge or consent and
used to target behavioural advertising during the 2016 election campaign. The
big tech companies’ defence was to negotiate a privacy law instead of the ballot
initiative, in the hope that they can have it amended later, or even trumped by
a Federal law. The new law is somewhat similar to European data-protection
law: it empowers consumers to request the deletion of personal information, opt
out of its sale, and access it in a format that enables its transfer to third parties.
It can be enforced by the state attorney general but also by private action. A
really important policy question now is whether this law is progressively copied
by other states, or whether Big Tech manages to emasculate it. But the USA
is not the only serious player here.

24.6.3 Fragmentation?

Since 1998, European law has forbidden companies from sending personal data
to organizations in countries where the law does not provide comparable protec-
tion – in practice, that means America and India. The first attempt to resolve
this was the Safe Harbour Agreement whereby a data processor in America or In-
dia would promise their European customer to abide by European law. In 2000,
the European Commission adopted an executive decision to the effect that this
would give ‘adequate protection’. However, it left no practical recourse for EU
citizens who felt that their rights have been violated.

The case that killed Safe Harbour was brought by Max Schrems, an Austrian
lawyer, against Facebook. Following the Snowden revelations, he argued that
for Facebook in Ireland (its EU headquarters) to pass his data to the USA for
processing was unlawful, as the law and practice of the United States do not offer

in 2017; and maybe we can note Marissa Meyer of Yahoo who forfeited her bonus and stock
in 2017, and perhaps even Travis Kavalnick of Uber whose successor publicised a hack that
had been covered up.

11Dido Harding of TalkTalk, UK, in 2017, Bruce Liang of Integrated Health Information
Systems, Singapore in 2019; and maybe we can count Martin Winterkorn of VW and Rupert
Stadler of Audi too, though in their case it was because they’d presided over the company
hacking its car emissions.
sufficient protection against surveillance by the public authorities, specifically the NSA. The European Court of Justice agreed and in 2015 it struck down the Safe Harbour principles. The USA and the EU then agreed to replace them with a fresh arrangement, called Privacy Shield, which Schrems and others believe will also fall in turn; in 2017, he got the Irish Supreme Court to refer another case to the ECJ [1058]. There is also a case pending at the European Court of Human Rights, brought by Big Brother Watch against US mass surveillance [315], which has been granted an appeal to the Grand Chamber.

Many companies that do data processing in the USA have fallen back on contract, forcing customers agree to their personal data being shared before they do business with them. This has a long history (it’s how medical insurers get away with selling your data to drug companies), but it doesn’t work in the world of the GDPR as coercive consent is specifically disallowed.

So this looks like developing into a real fight, with real consequences for how and where the world’s server farms are located and controlled. Some of the better-informed firms assume that they will eventually have to process European data in Europe and under European law; Google, for example, had done its privacy research and development for some years in Munich.

Meanwhile, data-protection law is pushing into new areas where it gives a way of responding to abuses. For example, after the Brexit referendum, the UK Information Commissioner fined Facebook £500,000 after they let Cambridge Analytica harvest personal data on 87 million people worldwide, which were then used for election ads in both the Brexit referendum and the US 2016 presidential election [691]. As many modern marketing practices involve offences under data-protection law, this gives scope for regulatory innovation. The US equivalent is the FTC’s use of truth-in-advertising law.

### 24.7 Freedom of Information

Information tends to flow from the weak to the powerful, increasing their power and making it harder for others to hold them to account. As James Madison wrote:

> A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.

In the aftermath of Watergate, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act, and other countries followed; Britain got one in 1997\(^\text{12}\). More radical versions have been tried: tax returns are published in Iceland and in some Swiss cantons, and the practice cuts evasion, as rich men fear the loss of social status that a low declared income would bring. The most radical version is proposed by David Brin, in ‘The Transparent Society’ [248]. He reasons that the falling costs

\(^{12}\)Tony Blair later described it as his biggest mistake.
24.8 Summary

Public policy is increasingly entangled with the work of the security engineer. The largest single concern of governments, if we measure it in dollar terms, is intelligence; a typical government spends a hundred times more money collecting information on its enemies, real and potential, than it does on fighting cybercrime. Intelligence collection is also in conflict with both defensive security and with privacy, both of which have historically come second. However, since the Snowden revelations made clear the scale of US data collection worldwide, and of five eyes operations against allied countries, the balance has started to shift, and the effects have propagated through privacy and data protection law, albeit slowly and with so far little effect on the agencies themselves. Perhaps when the analysis is done, Snowden’s effect on the agencies’ capabilities will be largely technical (through getting people to use cryptography more, and more intelligently) while the policy effect may be to curb some of the excesses of ‘surveillance capitalism’ by making privacy more salient to more people. The strains between the US and European ways of dealing with privacy are becoming
more significant and in the medium term we may see more localisation – where US companies have to keep data on citizens on servers in Europe and perhaps even under the control of European trustees. Other countries are starting to follow suit.

Censorship is also a growing issue; some countries, like China, ban many of the large US service firms outright, while more and more are demanding that they take down not just abusive material but also material that offends local political sensitivities. The Internet still makes it harder for countries that won’t go as far as China to censor subversive content but much of the optimism we had ten years ago about its being a force for liberalisation has dissipated with the failure of the Arab Spring. In developed countries, there is a push to require the large service firms to moderate and filter user-generated content at scale, and this a host of largely policy problems whether we’re talking about radicalisation, harassment or fake news.

The security-industrial complex, whose growth was fuelled by the climate of fear whipped up after the 9/11 attacks, has got a second wind from China and the Arab Spring, as the world’s authoritarians buy surveillance systems to keep track of their populations. This has led to the proliferation of computer and network exploitation tools that erode our security, our liberty, and our quality of life. This proliferation is aided and abetted by Western governments who should know better, and is bound to be extended as social media firms and others are co-opted into ever more content screening as a condition of doing business. Understanding and pushing back on the surveillance ecosystem while mitigating online harms is the highest priority for security engineers who have the ability to get involved in public life – whether directly, or via our writing and teaching. And research also helps. Individual academics can’t hope to compete with national leaders in the mass media, but the slow, careful accumulation of knowledge over the years can and will undermine their excuses. I don’t mean just knowledge about why extreme airport screening measures are a waste of money; we also must disseminate knowledge about the economics and psychology that underlie maladaptive government behaviour. The more people understand what’s going on, the sooner it will stop.

Research Problems

Technology policy involves a complex interplay between science, engineering, psychology, law and economics. There is still too little serious cross-disciplinary research, and initiatives which speed up this process are almost certainly a good thing. Since 2002 I’ve worked to build up the security-economics research community; and since 2008 we’ve run an annual workshop on security and human behaviour to engage psychologists, anthropologists and philosophers too. But we need much, much more. Where are the historians, the sociologists and the political scientists?
Further Reading

It’s extraordinarily easy for technopolicy arguments to get detached from reality, and many of the scares conjured up to get attention and money (such as ‘cyberterrorism’) are the modern equivalent of the monsters that appeared on medieval maps to cover up the cartographer’s ignorance. An engineer should look for primary sources – material written by experienced insiders such as R.V. Jones [717] and of course the thousands of documents leaked by Ed Snowden.

There’s a good book on the history of wiretapping and crypto policy by Whit Diffie and Susan Landau, who had a long involvement in the policy process [413], an NRC study on cryptography policy was also influential [1012]; and there’s a compilation of primary materials at [1212]. There’s a video on my website of the history of the crypto wars from an European perspective.

There are many resources on online censorship, from the OpenNet Initiative to and Reporters without Borders, who publish a ‘Handbook for bloggers and cyber-dissidents’ on how to circumvent censorship, with a number of case histories of how blogging has helped open up the media in less liberal countries [1143].

The standard work on computer forensics is by Tony Sammes and Brian Jenkinson [1179], and the Department of Justice’s “Guidelines for Searching and Seizing Computers” also bear some attention [407]. For early computer crime case histories, see Peter Neumann [1025], Dorothy Denning [396] and Donn Parker [1076]. The standard work on computer evidence in the common law countries is by Stephen Mason [897].

On the topic of privacy versus data protection, there is a huge literature but no concise recent guide that I know of. Recent material can be found on the web sites of organizations such as EPIC [454], EFF [445], FIPR [509] and EDRi [464], and of Max Schrems [1216].

As for the policy problems around the filtering of inflammatory content and propaganda, the two most thought-provoking books for me are those by Tim Wu [1455] and Yochai Benkler [175].