

Limitations of the Method


- Formal proof can't guarantee actual chips will work:
 - design models are not always accurate
 - there may be fabrication defects
- Specifications may not capture requirements:
 - large specifications may be unreadable
 - some input conditions may be ignored

Modelling Hardware in Higher Order Logic

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(edited by Mike Gordon)

Why Formal Specification?

Consider this device (J. Herbert's example):



This can be specified *informally* by


The input line *datain* accepts a stream of bits, and the output line *dataout* emits the same stream delayed by four cycles. The bus *out* is four bits wide. If the input *sample* is false then the 4-bit word at *out* is the last four bits input at *datain*. Otherwise, the output word is all zeros.

Hardware Verification Method

- Classical method of hardware verification:
 1. write a specification of intended behaviour
Spec
 2. write specifications of the design components
Part-1, ... Part-*n*
 3. define a formal model of the design
 $\vdash \text{Design} = \text{Part-1} + \dots + \text{Part-}n$
 4. formulate and prove correctness
 $\vdash \text{Design satisfies Spec}$
- This general verification approach
 - underlies various specific formal methods
 - requires mechanized support for large designs
 - is usually applied hierarchically


Specification Examples

- Simple combinational behaviour:



$$\vdash \text{Xor}(i_1, i_2, o) = (o = \neg(i_1 = i_2))$$

- Bidirectional wires:



$$\vdash \text{Ntran}(g, s, d) = (g \Rightarrow (d = s))$$


Why Formal Specification?

The informal specification is

- vague: does ‘the last four bits input’ include the current bit?
- incomplete: what is the value at *dataout* during the first three cycles?
- unusable: a natural language specification can’t be simulated or compiled!

Specification Examples

Sequential (time-dependent) behaviour:




$$\vdash \text{Dtype}(ck, d, q) = \forall t. q(t+1) = (\text{if Rise } ck \ t \ \text{then } d \ t \ \text{else } q \ t)$$

$$\vdash \text{Rise } ck \ t = \neg ck(t) \wedge ck(t+1)$$

Formal Specification in HOL

- Consider the following device:




This is specified by a boolean term $S[a, b, c, d]$ with free variables $a, b, c,$ and d .

- The idea is that


- a, b, c, d model externally-observable values
- $S[a, b, c, d] = \begin{cases} \text{T} & \text{if } a, b, c, \text{ and } d \text{ could occur} \\ & \text{simultaneously on the} \\ & \text{corresponding external wires of the} \\ & \text{device Dev} \\ \text{F} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Composing Behaviours

- Consider the following two devices:



- Logical conjunction (\wedge) models the effect of connecting components together:




Specification of the Sampler

- We can specify the sampler formally by


$\forall t: \text{time.}$
 $(\text{dataout}(t) = \text{datain}(t-4))$
 \wedge
 $(\text{out}(t) = \text{if } \text{sample}(t)$
 then [F; F; F; F]
 else [datain(t-4); datain(t-3);
 datain(t-2); datain(t-1)]])

Hiding Internal Structure

- Consider the composite device



- Existential quantification (\exists) models the effect of making wires internal to the design:



- Existential quantification is called a *hiding* operator—it ‘hides’ internal wires.

Specification of the Sampler

- We can specify the sampler formally by

$\forall t: \text{time.}$
 $(\text{dataout}(t) = \text{datain}(t-4))$
 \wedge
 $(\text{out}(t) = \text{if } \text{sample}(t)$
 then [F; F; F; F]
 else [datain(t-4); datain(t-3);
 datain(t-2); datain(t-1)]])

- The formal specification is
 - precise: ‘last four bits input’ doesn’t include current bit
 - complete: can infer that *dataout* equals *datain*(0) during the first three cycles.
 - usable: logic notation can be processed by machine

Hierarchical Verification

The hierarchical verification method:


Level 0

Model:

$$\vdash M = \exists z. S_1 \wedge S_2$$

Correctness:

$$\vdash M \underset{F}{\text{sat}} S$$



Level 1

Models:


$$\vdash M_1 = \exists x. P_1 \wedge P_2$$

$$\vdash M_2 = \exists y. P_3 \wedge P_4$$

Correctness:

$$\vdash M_1 \underset{G}{\text{sat}} S_1$$

$$\vdash M_2 \underset{G}{\text{sat}} S_2$$



Shallow embedding of Verilog

- Some typical structural Verilog

```
module COMP (p1, ..., pm);
  wire w1, ..., wn;
```

```
  COMP1 M1 (...);
```

```
  COMP2 M2 (...);
```

```
endmodule
```

- Assume formulas for COMP1, COMP2 already defined

- Logical representation:

$$\text{COMP}(p1, \dots, pm) = \exists w1 \dots wn. \text{COMP1}(\dots) \wedge \text{COMP2}(\dots)$$

Hierarchical Design—Advantages

- Each type of module verified only once
 - the statement of its correctness will be reused many times
- Controls complexity through abstraction
 - each verification is done at the appropriate level of complexity

Formulating Correctness

- A key part of formal hardware verification is formalizing what ‘correctness’ *means*.
- The strongest formulation is *equivalence*:

$$\vdash \forall v_1 \dots v_n. M[v_1, \dots, v_n] = S[v_1, \dots, v_n]$$

- For *partial* specifications, use *implication*:

$$\vdash \forall v_1 \dots v_n. M[v_1, \dots, v_n] \Rightarrow S[v_1, \dots, v_n]$$

- In general, the satisfaction relationship

$$\vdash M[v_1, \dots, v_n] \underset{abs}{\text{sat}} S[abs(v_1), \dots, abs(v_n)]$$


must be one of *abstraction*. The specification will be an abstraction of the design model. Various kinds of abstractions on signals (*abs*) will be discussed later.

Design Model and Correctness

- We define the design model using composition and hiding, as follows:

$$\vdash \text{Inv}(i, o) =$$

$$\exists g p. \text{Pwr } p \wedge \text{Gnd } g \wedge \\ \text{Ntran}(i, g, o) \wedge \text{Ptran}(i, p, o)$$




- Correctness is formulated by the equivalence:

$$\vdash \forall i o. \text{Inv}(i, o) = (o = \neg i)$$

This follows by purely logical inference...

A Simple Correctness Proof

- Here is the design of a CMOS inverter:
- Suppose we wish to verify that $o = \neg i$.
- There are three steps:
 - define a model of the circuit in logic
 - formulate the correctness of the circuit
 - prove the correctness of the circuit



The Correctness Proof

- Definition of Inv:

$$\vdash \text{Inv}(i, o) =$$

$$\exists g p. \text{Pwr } p \wedge \text{Gnd } g \wedge \\ \text{Ntran}(i, g, o) \wedge \text{Ptran}(i, p, o)$$

- Expanding with definitions:

$$\vdash \text{Inv}(i, o) =$$

$$\exists g p. (p = \mathbf{T}) \wedge (g = \mathbf{F}) \wedge \\ (i \Rightarrow (o = g)) \wedge (\neg i \Rightarrow (o = p))$$

- By simple logical reasoning:

$$\vdash \text{Inv}(i, o) = (i \Rightarrow (o = \mathbf{F})) \wedge (\neg i \Rightarrow (o = \mathbf{T}))$$

CMOS Primitives

- Formal specifications of primitives:

$$\begin{array}{c} g \\ | \\ \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \\ | \\ s \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} d \end{array} \vdash \text{Ptran}(g, s, d) = (\neg g \Rightarrow (d = s))$$

$$\begin{array}{c} g \\ | \\ \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \\ | \\ s \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} d \end{array} \vdash \text{Ntran}(g, s, d) = (g \Rightarrow (d = s))$$


$$\begin{array}{c} g \\ | \\ \text{---} \\ | \\ \text{---} \end{array} \vdash \text{Gnd } g = (g = \mathbf{F})$$

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{---} \\ | \\ p \end{array} \vdash \text{Pwr } p = (p = \mathbf{T})$$

- This is the so-called *switch model* of CMOS.

Another Example

- An $(n+1)$ -bit ripple-carry adder:



- We wish to prove that:

$$(2^{n+1} \times \text{cout}) + s = a + b + \text{cin}$$

- There are, as usual, three steps:
 - define a model of the circuit in logic
 - formulate the correctness of the circuit
 - prove the correctness of the circuit

The Correctness Proof continued

- Simplifying gives:

$$\vdash \text{Inv}(i, o) = (i \Rightarrow \neg o) \wedge (\neg i \Rightarrow o)$$

- By the law of the contrapositive:

$$\vdash \text{Inv}(i, o) = (o \Rightarrow \neg i) \wedge (\neg i \Rightarrow o)$$

- By the definition of boolean equality:

$$\vdash \text{Inv}(i, o) = (o = \neg i)$$

- Generalizing the free variables gives:

$$\vdash \forall i o. \text{Inv}(i, o) = (o = \neg i)$$

Defining the Model: types

- Specification uses numbers, i.e. values of type *num*
- Implementation uses words – values of type *word*
 - n^{th} bit of w denoted by $w[n]$
 - $w[m : n]$ denotes bits m to n of w
 - $\text{Bv}(b)$ is the number represented by bit b
 - $\text{V}(w)$ is the natural number represented by word w
- Abstraction from words to numbers (data abstraction):

$$\vdash \text{Bv } b \quad = \text{ if } b \text{ then } 1 \text{ else } 0$$

$$\vdash \text{V } w[0 : 0] \quad = \text{Bv } w[0]$$


$$\vdash \text{V } w[n+1 : 0] \quad = 2^{n+1}(\text{Bv } w[n+1]) + \text{V } w[n : 0]$$

Scope of the Method

- The inverter example is, of course, trivial!
- But the same method has been applied to
 - a commercial CMOS cell library
 - several complete microprocessors (e.g. ARM)
 - floating point algorithms and hardware
- Features of the approach:
 - the specification language is just logic
 - * *logic can mimic HDL constructs*
 - the rules of reasoning are also pure logic
 - * *special-purpose derived rules are possible*
 - big formal proofs require machine assistance

Defining the Model

- Recursive view of an $n+1$ -bit adder:




- Primitive recursive definition in logic:

$$\text{AdderImp}(0)(a, b, cin, s, cout) = \text{Add1}(a[0], b[0], cin, s[0], cout)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{AdderImp } n (a, b, cin, s, cout) = \\ \exists c. \text{Add1}(a[n], b[n], c, s[n], cout) \wedge \\ \text{AdderImp}(n-1)(a[n-1:0], b[n-1:0], cin, s[n-1:0], c) \end{aligned}$$

Defining the Model: recursive definition

- If $n > 0$ an $(n+1)$ -bit adder is built from an n -bit adder



Formulation of Correctness

- Logical formulation of correctness:

$$\text{Spec } n (a, b, cin, s, cout) = ((2^{n+1} \text{ cout}) + s = a + b + cin)$$

$$\forall n \ a \ b \ cin \ s \ cout.$$

$$\text{AdderImp } n (a, b, cin, s, cout)$$


\Rightarrow

$$\text{Spec } n (\forall a[n:0], \forall b[n:0], \forall cin, \forall s[n:0], \forall cout)$$

- Note the data abstraction (*abs* in an earlier slide)
- This is easy to prove (done later in the course)

Defining the Model: Add1

- Diagram of a 1-bit full adder:



- Lines a , b , cin , sum and $cout$ carry boolean values
- Specification (note data abstraction from *bool* to *num*):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Add1}(a, b, cin, sum, cout) = \\ (2 \times \text{Bv}(cout) + \text{Bv}(sum) = \text{Bv}(a) + \text{Bv}(b) + \text{Bv}(cin)) \end{aligned}$$

Formulating Correctness

- Then correctness is stated by:


$$\begin{aligned} \vdash \forall ck. \text{Inf}(\text{Rise } ck) \Rightarrow \\ \forall d q. \text{Dtype}(ck, d, q) \Rightarrow \\ \text{Del}(d \text{ when } (\text{Rise } ck), q \text{ when } (\text{Rise } ck)) \end{aligned}$$

- Note the formal *validity condition*:

$$\vdash \text{Inf } P = \forall t. \exists t'. t' > t \wedge P t'$$

Temporal Abstraction

- Example—abstracting to unit delay:



- Notions of time involved:


- coarse grain of time—unit time = 1 clock cycle
- fine grain of time—unit time \approx 1 gate delay

Industry use of theorem proving

- Intel
 - floating point algorithms (uses HOL Light system)
 - hardware (uses internal tools Forte/reFL^{ect})
- AMD
 - floating point (uses ACL2 prover)
- Sun
 - high level architecture verification (PVS)
- Rockwell Collins
 - low level code verification (ACL2)
-
- Use of model checking widespread
 - discussed in latter part of the course

Formulating Correctness

- A mapping between time-scales:



- Define the temporal abstraction functions:

$$\begin{aligned} \vdash \text{Timeof } P n &= \text{the time on } t_c \text{ such that } P \text{ true for } n\text{th time} \\ \vdash \text{signal when } P &= \text{signal} \circ (\text{Timeof } P) \\ \text{where } (f \circ g)x &= f(g x) \quad [\circ \text{ is function composition}] \end{aligned}$$

Summary

- Specifying behaviour:
 - predicates— $S[a, b, c, d]$
- Specifying structure:
 - composition— $S_1[a, x] \wedge S_2[x, b]$
 - hiding— $\exists x. S_1[a, x] \wedge S_2[x, b]$
- Formulating correctness:
 - $\vdash \forall v_1 \dots v_n. M[v_1, \dots, v_n] = S[v_1, \dots, v_n]$
 - $\vdash \forall v_1 \dots v_n. M[v_1, \dots, v_n] \Rightarrow S[v_1, \dots, v_n]$
 - $\vdash \forall v_1 \dots v_n. M[v_1, \dots, v_n] \Rightarrow S[abs\ v_1, \dots, abs\ v_n]$
- Abstraction
 - data: $w \mapsto V(w)$
 - temporal: $sig \mapsto sig\ when\ (Rise\ clk)$