

3 Cryptography (mgk25)

- (a) *YottaVPN*, your employer’s main network-encryption product, generates a master key  $K \in_{\mathbb{R}} \{0, 1\}^{128}$  and an initial seed  $R_0 \in_{\mathbb{R}} \{0, 1\}^{80}$  randomly once, when the product is installed. It then uses

$$\text{Algorithm (A):} \quad R_i = \text{Enc}_K(R_{i-1}) \quad \text{for } i > 0$$

to generate a stream  $R_1, R_2, \dots$  of session keys for encrypting individual network connections. That algorithm then runs continuously throughout the lifetime of the product. Your colleague suggests to replace (A) with

$$\text{Algorithm (B):} \quad R_i = \text{Enc}_K(R_{i-1}) \oplus R_{i-1} \quad \text{for } i > 0$$

because they feel that would be more secure. [Enc is a government-approved blockcipher with 80-bit blocksize and  $\oplus$  is bit-wise exclusive-or.]

- (i) For each of algorithm (A) and (B), averaged over all  $(K, R_0)$ , what is the expected number of different session keys  $|\{R_1, R_2, \dots\}|$  that they will be able to generate from one  $(K, R_0)$ ? State your assumptions. [5 marks]
- (ii) What is the smallest number of different values  $|\{R_1, R_2, \dots\}|$  that could be generated by (A) and (B) from any fixed pair  $(K, R_0)$ ? [2 marks]
- (iii) Suggest another deterministic key-derivation algorithm (C), using the same blockcipher, 80-bit state and fixed parameters  $(K, R_0)$ , that maximises  $|\{R_1, R_2, \dots\}|$ . [2 marks]
- (iv) Years later, a worried user discovers that, due to an operator error, the state  $(K, R_{65535})$  of their *YottaVPN* installation was accidentally committed to a publicly accessible Git repository. Compare which other values  $R_i$  were compromised by this leak, if either algorithm (A), (B), or (C) had been used. [6 marks]
- (v) Name a security benefit that could be claimed for algorithm (B) compared to (A). [1 mark]
- (b) Your colleagues designed a scheme that encrypts messages  $M_i \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$  with one-time pads  $R_i \in_{\mathbb{R}} \{0, 1\}^\ell$  into ciphertexts  $C_i = M_i \oplus R_i$ . But to help estimate the frequency of transmission errors when transferring the  $R_i$ , they decided to occasionally replace the last random bit of any  $R_i$  with a “parity” bit, with a probability of 0.01. As a result, the probability of any  $R_i$  containing an even number of one bits is 0.505. Does this encryption scheme offer *indistinguishability in the presence of an eavesdropper*? Explain your answer. [4 marks]