Motivation

- CHERI: secure processor design by Cambridge + SRI International
- Timely:
  - Big UK funding push to commercialise the technology: Industry Strategy Challenge Fund: Digital Security by Design
  - £70m UK government funding + £116m from industry
  - Started 26th September 2019
  - ARM committed to making the Morello test chip and board platform
- Based on substantial research
  - 120+ engineer/research years of effort
  - >$24m of DARPA funding

Motivation – The Eternal War in Memory*

- Many security vulnerabilities exploit memory safety violations

* Title based on Oakland 2013 paper: SoK: Eternal War in Memory, László Szekeres, Mathias Payer, Tao Wei, Dawn Song
HOW THE HEARTBLEED BUG WORKS:

SERVER: ARE YOU STILL THERE? IF SO, REPLY "YEP!" (4 LETTERS).

User Meg wants 4 letters: "YEP!"

SERVER: ARE YOU STILL THERE? IF SO, REPLY "YEP!" (4 LETTERS).

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SERVER: ARE YOU STILL THERE? IF SO, REPLY "YEP!" (500 LETTERS).

User Meg wants 500 letters: "YEP!

User Meg requests the "miss connections" page. Eve (administrator) wants to set server's master key to 1483503853. Isabel wants pages about "snakes but not too long". User Karen wants to change account password to 123456.

HOTP. Lucas requests the "miss connections" page. Eve (administrator) wants to set server's master key to 1483503853. Isabel wants pages about "snakes but not too long". User Karen wants to change account password to 123456.
Went wrong? How do we do better?

- Classical answer:
  - The programmer forgot to check the bounds of the data structure being read
  - Fix the vulnerability in hindsight – one line fix:
    ```c
    if (1+2+payload+16 > s->s3->rrec.length) return 0;
    ```
- Our answer:
  - Preserve bounds information during compilation
  - Use hardware (CHERI processor) to dynamically check bounds with little overhead and guarantee pointer integrity & provenance

CHERI HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE

A new type – the **Capability**

- CHERI Capability = bounds checked pointer with integrity
- Held in memory and in (new or extended) registers
A new type – the **Capability**

![Diagram of Capability]

**New Instructions**

- **Memory access**
  - Loads and stores via a bounds checked capability
  - Exception if address is out of range
- **Guarded manipulation of capabilities**
  - Decrease bounds
  - Decrease permissions
  - Adjust the address
  - Extract/test fields

  *monotonic decrease in rights guaranteed by formally verified hardware*

  critical property for security

**Sealed Capabilities for Compartmentalization**

- Sealed capabilities are none dereferencable capabilities
- Have to be unsealed (e.g. inside a compartment) before use

![Diagram of Sealed Capabilities]
Calling a Compartment

SOFTWARE MODELS

Background to CHERI Software Models

- Machine-level capabilities and instructions provide the building blocks on which new abstract capability software models can be built
- Analogy:
  - Machine-level translation lookaside buffer (TLB) and page table walker enables the OS to represent virtual memory
  - Virtual memory can then be used in different ways to impose new security features, e.g. guard pages
Low-level CHERI software models

- **Source and binary compatibility: C-language idioms, multiple ABIs**
  - **Unmodified code**: Existing code runs without modification
  - **Hybrid code**: E.g., used in return addresses, for annotated data/code pointers, for specific types, stack pointers, etc.
    ... But "hybrid" is a spectrum; many different choices for manual and automatic selection of integers vs. capabilities, API and ABI impacts
  - **Pure-capability code**: Ubiquitous data- and data-pointer protection. Not interoperable with legacy code due to changed pointer size.
- **CHERI Clang/LLVM compiler prototype** generates code for all three

Pure Capability Code → Needs CheriABI

- **CheriABI**
  - Compatibility layer to the OS
  - Allows capabilities to be used in place of pointers
  - A bit like a 32-bit compatibility layer for a 64-bit OS
- **Result** – we can now recompile large corpuses of C code into a pure capability form with virtually no code changes
- **Award winning paper at ASPLOS 2019:**
  *CheriABI: Enforcing Valid Pointer Provenance and Minimizing Pointer Privilege in the POSIX C Run-time Environment*

Capabilities for Bounds Checking and Integrity

- **Pure capability code** – all pointers become capabilities
- **Compiler + malloc()** derive bounds for objects
- **Strong pointer provenance and integrity properties (validity tag)**

- Mitigates buffer overflow/overread vulnerabilities with no code change!
Capabilities for Control-Flow Robustness

- Capabilities used for return addresses
- Integrity bit mitigates code reuse attacks:
  - ROP – Return Oriented Programming
  - JOP – Jump Oriented Programming
- Much better than current statistical technique

ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomisation)

```
$pc
$ra
$a1
$ra
$a0
```

Register file

Virtual memory

Program counter

Return Address

Malicious data

String buffer

Malicious data

Summary of Capability Protections

- Valid userspace pointer set – pointers not generated using derivation rules are not part of the valid provenance tree and will not be dereferenceable
- Pointer privilege reduction – capabilities allow pointers to carry specific privileges, which can be minimized with OS, compiler, and linker support
  - Foundation for higher-level models such as software compartmentalization

Compartmentalisation

- Compartment can be described using a sealed pair of capabilities: (program counter, default data capability)
- CCall providing the domain transition
- Allows a number of abstract software models:
  - Library compartmentalisation, e.g. of risky or legacy (non-cap.) code
  - Process-based compartmentalisation within an application can be replaced by much more efficient capability-based protection
    - Same virtual address space (more efficient TLB usage)
    - Very similar software model (easy to port code)
RESULTS

First we made it work – Demo tablet platform
CHERI mitigates Heartbleed exploit!

Memory-protection performance

Collection of low pointer-density benchmarks from MiBench

High pointer-density benchmarks
(M) MiBench
(O) Olden
(J) Octane JavaScript

Li cache miss rate for CHERI 256, CHERI-128, and MIPS

CheriABI: A full pure-capability OS userspace

- Complete memory- and pointer-safe FreeBSD C/C++ userspace
  - **System libraries**: crti/csu, libc, zlib, libxml, libssl, …
  - **System tools and daemons**: echo, sh, ls, openssl, ssh, sshd, …
  - **Applications**: PostgreSQL, nginx; bringing up WebKit (C++)
- **Valid provenance, minimized privilege** for pointers, implied VAs
  - Userspace capabilities originate in **kernel-provided roots**
  - Compiler, allocators, run-time linker, etc., refine bounds and perms
- Trading off **privilege minimization, monotonicity, API conformance**
  - Typically in memory management – realloc(), mmap() + mprotect()
Evaluating memory-protection compatibility

- Prototyping approach:
  - "pure-capability" **C compiler** (Clang/LLVM)
  - **full OS** (FreeBSD) that use capabilities for all explicit or implied userspace pointers

- Observations:
  - Little or no software modification (BSD base system + utilities)
  - Small changes to source files for 34 of 824 programs, 28 of 130 libraries
  - Overall: modified ~200 of ~20,000 user-space C files/header

**CHERI vs. Process-based Compartmentalization**
(Early IPC ping-pong microbenchmark results)

The fine print: Cycles include IPC setup, amortised over 10,000 iterations of the IPC loop. Both processes use the pure-capability ABI using 514-bit capabilities. 272-entry TLB, 32K L1 I-Cache, 32K L1 D-Cache, 256K L2 Cache.

**CURRENT RESEARCH DIRECTIONS**
Generalising CHERI support for many ISAs

- 64-bit MIPS for pragmatic reason: needed a 64-bit RISC ISA in late 2010
- Generic CHERI support doesn’t mean that all implementations need to be identical
  - E.g. portable virtual-memory semantics and UNIX process model despite (quite) different MMUs across architectures
- Architectural abstraction: Lift CHERI properties above ISA
- Architectural localization: E.g., ISA choices, opcode approaches, exceptions, page tables, … → architecture-specific specifications


Portability implications for software

- CHERI Clang/LLVM
  - Modest pointer/capability abstraction improvements in front-end and IR
  - Adapt target back-ends to teach them about capability code generation
  - Optimize for architecture-specific code generation
  - Optimize for available microarchitectures
- CHERiBSD (CHERI support in FreeBSD)
  - More clear machine-independent / machine-independent split
  - Shift to hybrid capability C in the kernel to improve machine independence
  - Various MD kernel updates: boot code, exceptions, PMAP, …
  - Clean up APIs, header separation, architecture abstraction
  - Various userspace updates: rtld, libcheri, CRT/CSU, …

Conclusions

- CHERI Provides the hardware with more semantic knowledge of what the programmer intended
  - Toward the principle of intentionality
- Efficient pointer integrity and bounds checking
  - Eliminates buffer overflow/over-read attacks (finally!)
- Provide scalable, efficient compartmentalisation
  - Allows the principle of least privilege to be exploited to mitigate known and unknown attacks
  - Large performance improvement over process-based compartmentalisation
- Working with industry to bring the technology to market
  - Thanks to sponsors: DARPA, ARM, Google, EPSRC, HEIF, Isaac Newton Trust, Thales E-Security, HP Labs, Huawei
Further reading


- Further optional reading:
  - CHERI publications list: https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/cheri/cheri-publications.html