

Introductory Logic Lecture 2: Propositional Logic

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Introductory Logic - Lecture 2

• Forms of Logic

• Propositional (or Sentential) Logic.

- Wffs, and the Computer Science view.
- Valuation of a formula, Truth tables
- Satisfiability, Tautology
- Effectiveness, Feasibility.
- Compactness Theorem.

There are many formulation of logic; all model what we think of as logic, but some are more sophisticated than others:

- Propositional (or Sentential) Logic. No variables.
- Predicate Logic. Adds variables, ∀, ∃. Role of equality.
- Modal Logic. Adds a notion of modality e.g. temporal logics in which we can talk about time and express statements like "once A has become true then it remains true".
- Intuitionistic Logic. Disallows reasoning based on axioms such as " $A \lor \neg A$ " (justification: Gödel and others).

We start with the simplest form.

Syntax 1

We assume a (countable) set $\mathcal{A} = \{A_1, A_2, ...\}$ of propositional variables. The logical connectives are $\{\wedge, \lor, \neg, \rightarrow, \leftrightarrow\}$. The set $\overline{\mathcal{A}}$ of well-formed formulae (wffs), ranged over by σ , is the smallest set such that:

• $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \overline{\mathcal{A}}$

- whenever $\sigma \in \overline{\mathcal{A}}$ then $(\neg \sigma) \in \overline{\mathcal{A}}$
- whenever $\sigma, \sigma' \in \overline{\mathcal{A}}$ then $(\sigma \land \sigma') \in \overline{\mathcal{A}}$
- ditto for $\lor, \rightarrow, \leftrightarrow$.

Note that this is an inductive definition of set $\overline{\mathcal{A}}$.

Formally all wffs are fully bracketed, but we elide them for humans: e.g. $\neg A \lor B \land C$. ['¬' binds tightest, then '∧', then '∨'.] Computer Scientists have an additional formalism to specify inductively-defined sets like that of wffs – we write BNF:

$\sigma ::= \mathbf{A} \mid \sigma \land \sigma' \mid \sigma \lor \sigma' \mid \neg \sigma \mid \sigma \to \sigma' \mid \sigma \leftrightarrow \sigma'$

Seen as a grammar on *strings* this is ambiguous, but seen as a grammar on *trees* then this is fine.

How do we determine when a wff is true, or false? For propositional variables we need a *truth assignment* (or valuation) $v : \mathcal{A} \longrightarrow \mathbb{B}$ to tell us. Don't confuse ' \longrightarrow ' (function space) and ' \rightarrow ' (implication in the logic).

We extend v to all wffs (not just propositional variables) with a function $\overline{v} : \overline{\mathcal{A}} \longrightarrow \mathbb{B}$ using truth tables:

$$\overline{v}(A) = v(A)$$

$$\overline{v}(\sigma \wedge \sigma') = true \text{ if } \overline{v}(\sigma) = true \text{ and } \overline{v}(\sigma') = true$$

$$= false \text{ otherwise}$$

$$\overline{v}(\sigma \vee \sigma') = see \text{ over}$$

Semantics 2

$\overline{v}(A)$	=	$\nu(A)$
$\overline{\textit{v}}(\sigma \wedge \sigma')$	=	<i>true</i> if $\overline{v}(\sigma) = true$ and $\overline{v}(\sigma') = true$
	=	false otherwise
$\overline{\mathbf{v}}(\sigma \lor \sigma')$	=	<i>true</i> if $\overline{\mathbf{v}}(\sigma) = true$ or $\overline{\mathbf{v}}(\sigma') = true$
	=	false otherwise
$\overline{\mathbf{v}}(\neg\sigma)$	=	<i>true</i> if $\overline{\mathbf{v}}(\sigma) = \textit{false}$
	=	true otherwise
$\overline{\mathbf{V}}(\sigma ightarrow \sigma')$	=	<i>true</i> if $\overline{v}(\sigma) = \textit{false} \text{ or } \overline{v}(\sigma') = \textit{true}$
	=	false otherwise
$\overline{\textit{v}}(\sigma \leftrightarrow \sigma')$	=	<i>true</i> if $\overline{\mathbf{v}}(\sigma) = \overline{\mathbf{v}}(\sigma')$
	=	false otherwise

What we're really doing is modelling 'real' 'and', 'or' etc. in the logic. Indeed, if we write $AND : \mathbb{B} \times \mathbb{B} \longrightarrow \mathbb{B}$ (and similarly for the other connectives) then the equations simply mirror our informal understanding of logic within the formal logic:

$\overline{v}(A)$	=	v(A)
$\overline{\mathbf{v}}(\sigma \wedge \sigma')$	=	$AND(\overline{v}(\sigma),\overline{v}(\sigma'))$
$\overline{\mathbf{v}}(\sigma \lor \sigma')$	=	$OR(\overline{v}(\sigma), \overline{v}(\sigma'))$
$\overline{\mathbf{V}}(\neg\sigma)$	=	$NOT(\overline{v}(\sigma))$
$\overline{\mathbf{V}}(\sigma ightarrow \sigma')$	=	$IMP(\overline{\boldsymbol{v}}(\sigma),\overline{\boldsymbol{v}}(\sigma'))$
$\overline{\mathbf{V}}(\sigma \leftrightarrow \sigma')$	=	$EQV(\overline{v}(\sigma),\overline{v}(\sigma'))$

The functions AND, OR etc. can be written as truth tables:

AND	true	false	OR	true	false	NOT	true
true	true	false	true	true	true	true	false
false	false	false	false	true	false	false	true
	IMP	true	false	EQV	true	false	
	true	true	false	true	true	false	
	false	true	true	false	false	true	

People who have done Computer Hardware/Digital Electronics have seen this all before.

One particular aspect is that *any* function $\mathbb{B} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{B} \longrightarrow \mathbb{B}$ can be written as a composition of *AND*, *OR* and *NOT*.

We say {*AND*, *OR*, *NOT*} is *universal* for boolean functions.

Note that {NAND} is also universal where

NAND(x, y) = NOT(AND(x, y))

as is {*NOR*}.

We say, given a wff σ that:

- valuation *v* satisfies σ if $\overline{v}(\sigma) = true$
- σ is satisfiable if there is a valuation which satisfies σ
- σ is a *tautology* if every valuation satisfies σ
- σ is *unsatisfiable* if no valuation satisfies σ

A particularly interesting question is when does wff σ 'imply' wff σ' . We *could* write $\sigma \rightarrow \sigma'$ but we're interested in situations where the LH σ behaves like a theory and the RH σ' behaves like a question (or some hypotheses and a conclusion).

So we write $\sigma \models \tau$ where \models is part of our mathematics, not part of the logic.

In fact we generalise to the form $\Sigma \models \tau$ where Σ is a set of wffs and define $\Sigma \models \tau$ to hold

if whenever a valuation satisfies all $\sigma \in \Sigma$ then it also satisfies τ

[Note the use of 'hold' when we're talking about maths (the meta-level) rather than 'is *true*' which is a value within the logic.]

Given wff σ consider $\emptyset \models \sigma$, often written $\models \sigma$. By vacuous reasoning this holds whenever σ is a tautology.

Some tautologies:

- A $\vee \neg$ A (excluded middle)
- $\neg (A \lor B) \leftrightarrow \neg A \land \neg B$ (de Morgan)
- $\neg (A \land B) \leftrightarrow \neg A \lor \neg B$ (de Morgan)
- $A \land (B \lor C) \leftrightarrow (A \land B) \lor (A \land C)$ (distributivity)
- $A \lor (B \land C) \leftrightarrow (A \lor B) \land (A \lor C)$ (distributivity)

Meta-theorem (duality): swapping \land and \lor in a tautology only involving \land , \lor , \neg , \leftrightarrow gives another tautology.

- Determining whether a statement (in propositional logic) is satisfiable or a tautology is (effectively) computable, as indeed almost anything else about propositional logic.
- But satisfiablity is NP-complete, often called *infeasible* as the best-known algorithm is exponential in the number of variables in the worst case.
- However there's a growth industry in SAT solvers which get fast results on many cases which arise in practice.

Intuitively there are two ways to show two expressions are equivalent:

- show they have the same output value for every input value
- do algebraic manipulations on both until they are syntactically equal.
- Note that (interpreting 'expression' as 'wff') we have only exploited the former version here which is easy and computable because there are only a finite number of possible input values.

So we haven't bothered with the latter (which corresponds to proof). But it will rise in prominence when we turn to *predicate calculus* (a.k.a. *first-order logic*) when the range of input values may be infinite. One more tricky question concerns the behaviour of $\Sigma \models \tau$ when Σ is infinite (perhaps not even countable).

Note the the more members we put in Σ the less satisfiable it becomes (and vice versa):

- {*A*} is satisfiable
- {¬A} is satisfiable
- $\{A, \neg A\}$ is not satisfiable

We have seen that sometimes odd things happen when we move to infinite sets, so the question we ask is (*compactness*):

Is the behaviour of $\Sigma \models \tau$ explained by the behaviour of $\Sigma' \models \tau$ where Σ' ranges over all finite subsets of Σ .

We answer the question in the affirmative.

Notation: a set Σ of wffs is satisfiable if there is a truth assignment which satisfies every $\sigma \in \Sigma$.

Theorem (compactness): a set Σ of wffs is satisfiable iff every finite subset $\Sigma_0 \subseteq \Sigma$ is satisfiable.

Equivalent form of compactness: if $\Sigma \models \tau$ then there is a finite $\Sigma_0 \subseteq \Sigma$ such that $\Sigma_0 \models \tau$.

Why is this important? Reading Σ as a set of hypotheses (allowed to be infinite) which imply τ , we want to be able to construct a textual proof (which must be finite and so can't use an infinite number of hypotheses in Σ).