# Artificial Intelligence I Introduction: what's AI for? Dr Sean Holden What is the purpose of Artificial Intelligence (AI)? If you're a philosopher or a *psychologist* then perhaps it's: Computer Laboratory, Room FC06 Telephone extension 63725 • To understand intelligence. • To understand *ourselves*. Email: sbh11@cl.cam.ac.uk www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sbh11/ Philosophers have worked on this for at least 2000 years. They've also wondered about: • Can we do AI? Should we do AI? • Is AI impossible? (Note: I didn't write possible here, for a good reason...) Despite 2000 years of work, there's essentially *diddly-squat* in the way of results. Copyright (c) Sean Holden 2002-2012. 2 1

# Introduction: what's AI for?

Luckily, we were sensible enough not to pursue degrees in philosophy—we're scientists/engineers, so while we might have *some* interest in such pursuits, our perspective is different:

- Brains are small (true) and apparently slow (not quite so clear-cut), but incredibly good at some tasks—we want to understand a specific form of *computation*.
- It would be nice to be able to *construct* intelligent systems.
- It is also nice to make and sell cool stuff.

This view seems to be the more successful...

AI is entering our lives almost without us being aware of it.

## Introduction: now is a fantastic time to investigate AI

In many ways this is a young field, having only really got under way in 1956 with the *Dartmouth Conference*.

www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/history/dartmouth/dartmouth.html

- This means we can actually *do* things. It's as if we were physicists before anyone thought about atoms, or gravity, or....
- Also, we know what we're trying to do is *possible*. (Unless we think humans don't exist. *NOW STEP AWAY FROM THE PHILOSOPHY* before *SOMEONE GETS HURT!!!*)

Perhaps I'm being too hard on them; there was some good groundwork: *Socrates* wanted an algorithm for "*piety*", leading to *Syllogisms*. Ramon Lull's *concept wheels* and other attempts at mechanical calculators. Rene Descartes' *Dualism* and the idea of mind as a *physical system*. Wilhelm Leibnitz's opposing position of *Materialism*. (The intermediate position: mind is *physical system*. Wilhelm Leibnitz's opposing position of *Materialism*. (The intermediate position: mind is *physical but unknowable*.) The origin of *knowledge*: Francis Bacon's *Empiricism*, John Locke: "*Nothing is in the understanding, which was not first in the senses*". David Hume: we obtain rules by repeated exposure: *Induction*. Further developed by Bertrand Russel and in the *Confirmation Theory* of Carnap and Hempel.

More recently: the connection between *knowledge* and *action*? How are actions *justified*? If to achieve the end you need to achieve something intermediate, consider how to achieve that, and so on. This approach was implemented in Newell and Simon's 1957 *General Problem Solver (GPS)*.

## Further reading Is AI possible? Many philosophers are particularly keen to argue that AI is *impossible*? Why is Why do people dislike the idea that humanity might not be special. this? We have: An excellent article on why this view is much more problematic than it might seem is: • Perception (vision, speech processing...) • Logical reasoning (prolog, expert systems, CYC...) "Why people think computers can't," Marvin Minsky. AI Magazine, volume 3 number 4, 1982. • Playing games (chess, backgammon, go...) • Diagnosis of illness (in various contexts...) • Theorem proving (Robbin's conjecture...) • Literature and music (automated writing and composition...) • And many more... What's made the difference? In a nutshell: we're the first lucky bunch to get our hands on computers, and that allows us to build things. The simple ability to *try things out* has led to huge advances in a relatively short

5

# Aside: when something is understood it stops being AI

To have AI, you need a means of *implementing* the intelligence. Computers are (at present) the only devices in the race. (Although *quantum computation* is looking interesting...)

AI has had a major effect on computer science:

- Time sharing
- Interactive interpreters

time. So: don't believe the critics...

- Linked lists
- Storage management
- Some fundamental ideas in object-oriented programming
- and so on...

When AI has a success, the ideas in question tend to stop being called AI.

Similarly: do you consider the fact that *your phone can do speech recognition* to be a form of AI?

# The nature of the pursuit

What is AI? This is not necessarily a straightforward question.

It depends on who you ask...

We can find many definitions and a rough categorisation can be made depending on whether we are interested in:

- The way in which a system *acts* or the way in which it *thinks*.
- Whether we want it to do this in a *human* way or a *rational* way.

Here, the word *rational* has a special meaning: it means *doing the correct thing in given circumstances*.

# Acting like a human Acting like a human What is AI, version one: acting like a human The Turing test is informative, and (very!) hard to pass. • It requires many abilities that seem necessary for AI, such as learning. BUT: Alan Turing proposed what is now known as the Turing Test. a human child would probably not pass the test. • A human judge is allowed to interact with an AI program via a terminal. • Sometimes an AI system needs human-like acting abilities-for example expert systems often have to produce explanations—but not always. • This is the *only* method of interaction. • If the judge can't decide whether the interaction is produced by a machine or See the Loebner Prize in Artificial Intelligence: another human then the program passes the test. www.loebner.net/Prizef/loebner-prize.html In the unrestricted Turing test the AI program may also have a camera attached, so that objects can be shown to it, and so on. 10 9 Thinking like a human Thinking rationally: the "laws of thought" What is AI, version two: thinking like a human What is AI, version three: thinking rationally There is always the possibility that a machine *acting* like a human does not actu-The idea that intelligence reduces to *rational thinking* is a very old one, going at ally *think*. The *cognitive modelling* approach to AI has tried to: least as far back as Aristotle as we've already seen. The general field of *logic* made major progress in the 19th and 20th centuries, • Deduce how humans think—for example by introspection or psychological allowing it to be applied to AI. experiments. • Copy the process by mimicking it within a program. • We can *represent* and *reason* about many different things. • The *logicist* approach to AI. An early example of this approach is the *General Problem Solver* produced by Newell and Simon in 1957. They were concerned with whether or not the program This is a very appealing idea. However... reasoned in the same manner that a human did. Computer Science + Psychology = *Cognitive Science*

Thinking rationally: the "laws of thought"	Further reading
<ul> <li>Unfortunately there are obstacles to any naive application of logic. It is hard to:</li> <li>Represent <i>commonsense knowledge</i>.</li> <li>Deal with <i>uncertainty</i>.</li> <li>Reason without being tripped up by <i>computational complexity</i>.</li> <li>These will be recurring themes in this course, and in AI II.</li> <li>Logic alone also falls short because:</li> <li>Sometimes it's necessary to act when there's <i>no</i> logical course of action.</li> <li>Sometimes inference is <i>unnecessary</i> (reflex actions).</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The <i>Fifth Generation Computer System</i> project has most certainly earned the badge of "<i>heroic failure</i>".</li> <li>It is an example of how much harder the logicist approach is than you might think:</li> <li>"Overview of the Fifth Generation Computer Project," Tohru Moto-oka. ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News, volume 11, number 3, 1983.</li> </ul>
13	14
Acting rationally         What is AI, version four: acting rationally         Basing AI on the idea of acting rationally means attempting to design systems that act to achieve their goals given their beliefs.         Thinking about this in engineering terms, it seems almost inevitably to lead us towards the usual subfields of AI. What might be needed?         • To make good decisions in many different situations we need to represent and reason with knowledge.         • We need to deal with natural language.         • We need to be able to plan.         • We need vision.         • We need learning.	Acting rationally         The idea of acting rationally has several advantages:         • The concepts of action, goal and belief can be defined precisely making the field suitable for scientific study.         This is important: if we try to model AI systems on humans, we can't even propose any sensible definition of what a belief or goal is.         In addition, humans are a system that is still changing and adapted to a very specific environment.         Rational acting does not have these limitations.
And so on, so all the usual AI bases seem to be covered.	


### Acting rationally

Rational acting also seems to include two of the alternative approaches:

- All of the things needed to pass a Turing test seem necessary for rational acting, so this seems preferable to the *acting like a human* approach.
- The logicist approach can clearly form *part* of what's required to act rationally, so this seems preferable to the *thinking rationally* approach alone.

As a result, we will focus on the idea of designing systems that act rationally.

#### Other fields that have contributed to AI



### What's not in this course?

- The classical AI programming languages prolog and lisp.
- A great deal of all the areas on the last slide!
- Perception: *vision, hearing* and *speech processing, touch* (force sensing, knowing where your limbs are, knowing when something is bad), *taste, smell*.
- Natural language processing.
- Acting on and in the world: *robotics* (effectors, locomotion, manipulation), *control engineering, mechanical engineering, navigation.*
- Areas such as *genetic algorithms/programming*, *swarm intelligence*, *artificial immune systems* and *fuzzy logic*, for reasons that I will expand upon during the lectures.
- *Uncertainty* and much further probabilistic material. (You'll have to wait until next year.)

# What's in this course?

17

This course introduces some of the fundamental areas that make up AI:

- An outline of the background to the subject.
- An introduction to the idea of an *agent*.
- Solving problems in an intelligent way by *search*.
- Solving problems represented as *constraint satisfaction* problems.
- Playing games.
- Knowledge representation, and reasoning.
- Planning.
- Learning using neural networks.

Strictly speaking, AI I covers what is often referred to as "Good Old-Fashioned AI". (Although "Old-Fashioned" is a misleading term.)

The nature of the subject changed a great deal when the importance of *uncertainty* became fully appreciated. AI II covers this more recent material.

# Interesting things on the web Text book The course is based on the relevant parts of: A few interesting web starting points: The Honda Asimo robot: world.honda.com/ASIMO Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, Third Edition (2010). Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, Prentice Hall International Editions. AI at Nasa Ames: www.nasa.gov/centers/ames/research/exploringtheuniverse/spiffy.html DARPA Grand Challenge: http://www.darpagrandchallenge.com/ *NOTE:* This is also the main recommended text for AI2. 2007 DARPA Urban Challenge: cs.stanford.edu/group/roadrunner The Cyc project: www.cyc.com Human-like robots: www.ai.mit.edu/projects/humanoid-robotics-group Sony robots: support.sony-europe.com/aibo NEC "PaPeRo": www.nec.co.jp/products/robot/en 21 22 Prerequisites Prerequisites Self test: The prerequisites for the course are: first order logic, some algorithms and data structures, discrete and continuous mathematics, basic computational complexity. 1. Let DIRE WARNING: $f(x_1,\ldots,x_n) = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i x_i^2$ In the lectures on *machine learning* I will be talking about *neural networks*. where the $a_i$ are constants. Can you compute $\partial f / \partial x_i$ where $1 \le j \le n$ ? This means you will need to be able to differentiate and also handle vectors and matrices. 2. Let $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ be a function. Now assume $x_i = g_i(y_1, \ldots, y_m)$ for each $x_i$ and some collection of functions $q_i$ . Assuming all requirements for differentia-If you've forgotten how to do this you WILL get lost—I guarantee it!!! bility and so on are met, can you write down an expression for $\partial f / \partial y_i$ where $1 \leq j \leq m?$ If the answer to either of these questions is "no" then it's time for some revision. (You have about three weeks notice, so I'll assume you know it!)

## And finally...

There are some important points to be made regarding *computational complexity*. First, you might well hear the term *AI-complete* being used a lot. What does it

AI-complete: only solvable if you can solve AI in its entirety.

For example: high-quality automatic translation from one language to another.

mean?

To produce a genuinely good translation of *Moby Dick* from English to Cantonese is likely to be AI complete.

25

Artificial Intelligence I

Dr Sean Holden

An introduction to Agents

And finally...

More practically, you will often hear me make the claim that *everything that's at all interesting in AI is at least NP-complete*.

There are two ways to interpret this:

- 1. The wrong way: "It's all a waste of time.<sup>1</sup>" OK, so it's a partly understandable interpretation. *BUT* the fact that the travelling salesman problem is intractable *does not* mean there's no such thing as a satnav...
- 2. The right way: "It's an opportunity to design nice approximation algorithms." In reality, the algorithms that are *good in practice* are ones that try to *often* find a *good* but not necessarily *optimal* solution, in a *reasonable* amount of time.


<sup>1</sup>In essence, a comment on a course assessment a couple of years back to the effect of: "Why do you teach us this stuff if it's all futile?"

26

Agents

There are many different definitions for the term *agent* within AI.

Allow me to introduce **EVIL ROBOT**.



We will use the following simple definition: *an agent is any device that can sense and act upon its environment.* 

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### Measuring performance

How can we judge an agent's performance? Any measure of performance is likely to be *problem-specific*.

*Example:* For a chess playing agent, we might use its rating.

*Example:* For a mail-filtering agent, we might devise a measure of how well it blocks spam, but allows interesting email to be read.

*Example:* For a car driving agent the measure needs considerable sophistication: we need to take account of comfort, journey time, safety *etc*.

So: the choice of a performance measure is itself worthy of careful consideration.

29

Agents

This definition can be very widely applied: to humans, robots, pieces of software,

We are taking quite an *applied* perspective. We want to *make things* rather than

• Are there sensible ways in which to think about the *structure* of an agent?

Recall that we are interested in devices that *act rationally*, where 'rational' means

*copy humans*, so to be scientific there are some issues to be addressed:

• How can we judge an agent's performance?

doing the *correct thing* under *given circumstances*.

Reading: Russell and Norvig, chapter 2.

• How can an agent's *environment* affect its design?

and so on.

### Measuring performance

We're usually interested in *expected*, *long-term performance*.

- *Expected* performance because usually agents are not *omniscient*—they don't *infallibly* know the outcome of their actions.
- It is *rational* for you to enter this lecture theatre even if the roof falls in today.

An agent capable of detecting and protecting itself from a falling roof might be more *successful* than you, but *not* more *rational*.

- *Long-term performance* because it tends to lead to better approximations to what we'd consider rational behaviour.
- We probably don't want our car driving agent to be outstandingly smooth and safe for most of the time, but have episodes of *driving through the local orphanage at 150 mph*.

#### Environments

30

How can an agent's *environment* affect its design? *Example:* the environment for a *chess program* is vastly different to that for an *autonomous deep-space vehi- cle*. Some common attributes of an environment have a considerable influence on agent design.

- *Accessible/inaccessible:* do percepts tell you *everything* you need to know about the world?
- *Deterministic/non-deterministic:* does the future depend *predictably* on the present and your actions?
- Episodic/non-episodic is the agent run in independent episodes.
- Static/dynamic: can the world change while the agent is deciding what to do?
- *Discrete/continuous:* an environment is discrete if the sets of allowable percepts and actions are finite.

Environments	Basic structures for intelligent agents
All of this assumes there is only one agent. When multiple agents are involved we need to consider: • Whether the situation is <i>competitive</i> or <i>cooperative</i> . • Whether <i>communication</i> required? An example of multiple agents: news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3486335.stm	<ul> <li>Are there sensible ways in which to think about the <i>structure</i> of an agent? Again, this is likely to be <i>problem-specific</i>, although perhaps to a lesser extent.</li> <li>So far, an agent is based on percepts, actions and goals.</li> <li><i>Example:</i> Aircraft piloting agent.</li> <li><i>Percepts:</i> sensor information regarding height, speed, engines <i>etc</i>, audio and video inputs, and so on.</li> <li><i>Actions:</i> manipulation of the aircraft's controls.</li> <li>Also, perhaps talking to the passengers <i>etc</i>.</li> <li><i>Goals:</i> get to the necessary destination as quickly as possible with minimal use of fuel, without crashing <i>etc</i>.</li> </ul>
33	34
Programming agents	Programming agents
<ul> <li>A basic agent can be thought of as working on a straightforward underlying process:</li> <li>Gather perceptions.</li> <li>Update working memory to take account of them.</li> <li>On the basis of what's in the working memory, choose an action to perform.</li> <li>Update the working memory to take account of this action.</li> <li>Update the working memory to take account of this action.</li> <li>Do the chosen action.</li> <li>Obviously, this hides a great deal of complexity.</li> <li>Also, it ignores subtleties such as the fact that a percept might arrive while an action is being chosen.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>We'll initially look at two hopelessly limited approaches, because they do suggest a couple of important points.</li> <li><u>Hopelessly limited approach number 1:</u> use a table to map percept sequences to actions. This can quickly be rejected.</li> <li>The table will be <i>huge</i> for any problem of interest. About 35<sup>100</sup> entries for a chess player.</li> <li>We don't usually know how to fill the table.</li> <li>Even if we allow table entries to be <i>learned</i> it will take too long.</li> <li>The system would have no <i>autonomy</i>.</li> <li>We can attempt to overcome these problems by allowing agents to <i>reason</i>. <i>Autonomy</i> is an interesting issue though</li> </ul>
25	26

#### Autonomy

If an agent's behaviour depends in some manner on its *own experience of the world* via its percept sequence, we say it is *autonomous*.

- An agent using only built-in knowledge would seem not to be successful at AI in any meaningful sense: its behaviour is predefined by its designer.
- On the other hand *some* built-in knowledge seems essential, even to humans.

37

Keeping track of the environment

• Knowledge of how the environment *changes independently of the agent*.

Not all animals are entirely autonomous.

It seems reasonable that an agent should maintain:

• A description of the current state of its environment.

• Knowledge of how the agent's actions affect its environment.

This requires us to do *knowledge representation* and *reasoning*.

For example: dung beetles.

#### Reflex agents

*Hopelessly limited approach number 2:* try *extracting* pertinent information and using *rules* based on this.

<u>Condition-action rules:</u> if a certain state is observed then perform some action

Some points immediately present themselves regarding *why* reflex agents are unsatisfactory:

- We can't always decide what to do based on the *current percept*.
- However storing *all* past percepts might be undesirable (for example requiring too much memory) or just unnecessary.
- Reflex agents don't maintain a description of the state of their environment...
- ...however this seems necessary for any meaningful AI. (Consider automating the task of driving.)

This is all the more important as usually percepts don't tell you *everything about the state*.

38


### Goal-based agents

It seems reasonable that an agent should choose a rational course of action depending on its *goal*.


- If an agent has knowledge of how its actions affect the environment, then it has a basis for choosing actions to achieve goals.
- To obtain a sequence of actions we need to be able to search and to plan.

This is *fundamentally different* from a reflex agent.

For example: by changing the goal you can change the entire behaviour.



What have we learned? (No pun intended)	Artificial Intelligence I
The crucial things that should be taken away from this lecture are:	Dr Sean Holden
<ul> <li>The nature of an agent depends on its <i>environment</i> and <i>performance measure</i>.</li> <li>We're usually interested in <i>expected</i>, <i>long-term performance</i>.</li> <li>Autonomy requires that an agent in some way behaves <i>depending on its experience of the world</i>.</li> <li>There is a <i>natural basic structure</i> on which agent design can be based.</li> <li>Consideration of that structure leads naturally to the basic areas covered in this course.</li> </ul>	Notes on <i>problem solving by search</i>
45 Problem solving by search	Copyright © Sean Holden 2002-2012. 46 Problem solving by search
We begin with what is perhaps the simplest collection of AI techniques: those allowing an <i>agent</i> existing within an <i>environment</i> to <i>search</i> for a <i>sequence of actions</i> that <i>achieves a goal</i> . The algorithms can, crudely, be divided into two kinds: <i>uninformed</i> and <i>informed</i> . Not surprisingly, the latter are more effective and so we'll look at those in more detail. <i>Reading:</i> Russell and Norvig, chapters 3 and 4.	<ul> <li>As with any area of computer science, some degree of <i>abstraction</i> is necessary when designing AI algorithms.</li> <li><i>Search algorithms</i> apply to a particularly simple class of problems—we need to identify: <ul> <li><i>An initial state</i>: what is the agent's situation to start with?</li> <li><i>A set of actions</i>: these are modelled by specifying what state will result on performing any available action from any known state.</li> <li><i>A goal test</i>: we can tell whether or not the state we're in corresponds to a goal. Note that the goal may be described by a property rather than an explicit state or set of states, for example <i>checkmate</i>.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>



# Problem solving by search Problem solving by search Problems of this kind are very simple, but a surprisingly large number of applica-It's worth emphasising that a lot of abstraction has taken place here: tions have appeared: • Can the agent know it's current state in full? • Route-finding/tour-finding. • Can the agent know the outcome of its actions in full? • Layout of VLSI systems. Single-state problems: the state is always known precisely, as is the effect of any • Navigation systems for robots. action. There is therefore a single outcome state. • Sequencing for automatic assembly. Multiple-state problems: The effects of actions are known, but the state can not • Searching the internet. reliably be inferred, or the state is known but not the effects of the actions. • Design of proteins. Both single and multiple state problems can be handled using these search techniques. In the latter, we must reason about the set of states that we could be in: and many others... • In this case we have an initial *set* of states. Problems of this kind continue to form an active research area. • Each action leads to a further *set* of states. • The goal is a set of states *all* of which are valid goals. 53 54 Problem solving by search Problem solving by search *Contingency problems* Sometimes it is actively beneficial to act and see what happens, rather than to try to consider all possibilities in advance in order to obtain a perfect plan. In some situations it is necessary to perform sensing *while* the actions are being carried out in order to guarantee reaching a goal. Exploration problems (It's good to keep your eyes open while you cross the road!) Sometimes you have no knowledge of the effect that your actions have on the environment. This kind of problem requires *planning* and will be dealt with later. Babies in particular have this experience. This means you need to experiment to find out what happens when you act. This kind of problem requires reinforcement learning for a solution. We will not cover reinforcement learning in this course. (Although it is in AI II.)


#### Search trees

The basic idea should be familiar from your *Algorithms I* course, and also from *Foundations of Computer Science*.

- We build a *tree* with the start state as root node.
- A node is *expanded* by applying actions to it to generate new states.
- A path is a sequence of actions that lead from state to state.
- The aim is to find a *goal state* within the tree.
- A solution is a path beginning with the initial state and ending in a goal state.

We may also be interested in the *path cost* as some solutions might be better than others.

Path cost will be denoted by p.



57

We need to make an important distinction between *search trees* and *search graphs*. For the time being we assume that it's a *tree* as opposed to a *graph* that we're dealing with.



(There is a good reason for this, which we'll get to in a moment...)

In a *tree* only *one path* can lead to a given state. In a *graph* a *state* can be reached via possibly *multiple paths*.


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### Search trees

Basic approach:

- Test the root to see if it is a goal.
- If not then *expand* it by generating all possible successor states according to the available actions.
- If there is only one outcome state then move to it. Otherwise choose one of the outcomes and expand it.
- The way in which this choice is made defines a *search strategy*.
- Repeat until you find a goal.

The collection of states generated but not yet expanded is called the *fringe* or *frontier* and is generally stored as a *queue*.



#### Breadth-first search

### Depth-first search

Why is breadth-first search hopeless?


- The procedure is *complete*: it is guaranteed to find a solution if one exists.
- The procedure is *optimal* if the path cost is a non-decreasing function of node-depth.
- The procedure has *exponential complexity for both memory and time*. A branching factor *b* requires

$$1 + b + b^{2} + b^{3} + \dots + b^{d} = \frac{b^{d+1} - 1}{b - 1}$$

nodes if the shortest path has depth d.

In practice it is the *memory* requirement that is problematic.

With depth-first search: for a given branching factor b and depth d the memory requirement is O(bd).



This is because we need to store *nodes on the current path* and *the other unexpanded nodes*.

The time complexity is  $O(b^d)$ . Despite this, if there are *many solutions* we stand a chance of finding one quickly, compared with breadth-first search.

66


# Backtracking search

65

We can sometimes improve on depth-first search by using backtracking search.

- If each node knows how to generate the next possibility then memory is improved to O(d).
- Even better, if we can work by *making modifications* to a *state description* then the memory requirement is:
  - One full state description, plus...
  - ... O(d) actions (in order to be able to *undo* actions).

How does this work?



# Depth-first, depth-limited, and iterative deepening search Iterative deepening search Depth-first search is clearly dangerous if the tree is very deep or infinite. Iterative deepening search: Depth-limited search simply imposes a limit on depth. For example if we're • Essentially combines the advantages of depth-first and breadth-first search. searching for a route on a map with n cities we know that the maximum depth • It is complete and optimal. will be n. However: • It has a memory requirement similar to that of depth-first search. • We still risk finding a suboptimal solution. Importantly, the fact that you're repeating a search process several times is less • The procedure becomes problematic if we impose a depth limit that is too significant than it might seem. small. It's still not a good practical method, but it does point us in the direction of one... Usually we do not know a reasonable depth limit in advance. Iterative deepening search repeatedly runs depth-limited search for increasing depth limits $0, 1, 2, \ldots$ 69 70 Iterative deepening search Iterative deepening search Iterative deepening depends on the fact that the vast majority of the nodes in a tree Example: are in the bottom level: • For b = 20 and d = 5 we have • In a tree with branching factor b and depth d the number of nodes is $f_1(b,d) = 3,368,421$ $f_1(b,d) = 1 + b + b^2 + b^3 + \dots + b^d = \frac{b^{d+1} - 1}{b-1}$ $f_2(b,d) = 3,545,706$ which represents a 5 percent increase with iterative deepening search. • A complete iterative deepening search of this tree generates the final layer • The overhead gets *smaller* as b increases. However the time complexity is still once, the penultimate layer twice, and so on down to the root, which is generexponential. ated d + 1 times. The total number of nodes generated is therefore $f_2(b,d) = (d+1) + db + (d-1)b^2 + (d-2)b^3 + \dots + 2b^{d-1} + b^d$

#### Iterative deepening search

Further insight can be gained if we note that

$$f_2(b,d) = f_1(b,0) + f_1(b,1) + \dots + f_1(b,d)$$

as we generate the root, then the tree to depth 1, and so on. Thus

$$f_2(b,d) = \sum_{i=0}^d f_1(b,i) = \sum_{i=0}^d \frac{b^{i+1} - 1}{b-1}$$
$$= \frac{1}{b-1} \sum_{i=0}^d b^{i+1} - 1 = \frac{1}{b-1} \left[ \left( \sum_{i=0}^d b^{i+1} \right) - (d+1) \right]$$

Noting that

$$bf_1(b,d) = b + b^2 + \dots + b^{d+1} = \sum_{i=0}^{a} b^{i+1}$$

we have

$$f_2(b,d) = \frac{b}{b-1}f_1(b,d) - \frac{d+1}{b-1}$$

so  $f_2(b, d)$  is about equal to  $f_1(b, d)$  for large b.

73

### Bidirectional search - beware!

- It is not always possible to generate efficiently *predecessors* as well as successors.
- If we only have the *description* of a goal, not an *explicit goal*, then generating predecessors can be hard. (For example, consider the concept of *checkmate*.)
- We need a way of checking whether or not a node appears in the *other search*...
- ... and the figure of  $O(b^{d/2})$  hides the assumption that we can do *constant time* checking for intersection of the frontiers. (This may be possible using a hash table).
- We need to decide what kind of search to use in each half. For example, would *depth-first search* be sensible? Possibly not...
- ...to guarantee that the searches meet, we need to store all the nodes of at least one of the searches. Consequently the memory requirement is  $O(b^{d/2})$ .

#### **Bidirectional search**

In some problems we can simultaneously search:

*forward* from the *start* state

*backward* from the *goal* state

until the searches meet.

This is potentially a very good idea:

- If the search methods have complexity  $O(b^d)$  then...
- ...we are converting this to  $O(2b^{d/2}) = O(b^{d/2})$ .

(Here, we are assuming the branching factor is b in both directions.)

74

### Uniform-cost search

Breadth-first search finds the *shallowest* solution, but this is not necessarily the *best* one.

Uniform-cost search is a variant. It uses the path cost p(n) as the priority for the priority queue.

Thus, the paths that are apparently best are explored first, and the best solution will always be found if


 $\forall n \ (\forall n' \in \operatorname{successors}(n) \ . \ p(n') \ge p(n))$ 

Although this is still not a good practical algorithm, it does point the way forward to *informed search*...

#### Repeated states

#### Repeated states

With many problems it is easy to waste time by expanding nodes that have appeared elsewhere in the tree. For example:



#### The sliding blocks puzzle for example suffers this way.

For example, in a problem such as finding a route in a map, where all of the operators are *reversible*, this is inevitable.

There are three basic ways to avoid this, depending on how you trade off effectiveness against overhead.

- Never return to *the state you came from*.
- Avoid cycles: never proceed to a state identical to one of your ancestors.
- Do not expand any state that has previously appeared.

*Graph search* is a standard approach to dealing with the situation. It uses the last of these possibilities.

#### Graph search

77

#### In pseudocode:

```
function graphSearch() {
   closed = {};
   fringe = queue containing only the start state;
   while () {
      if (empty(fringe))
        return fail;
      node = head(fringe);
      if goal(node)
        return solution(node);
      if (node not a member of closed) {
           closed = closed + node;
           fringe = insert(expand(node), fringe); // See note...
      }
   }
}
```

Note: if node is in closed then it must already have been expanded.

#### Graph search

78

There are several points to note regarding graph search:

- 1. The closed list contains all the expanded nodes.
- 2. The closed list can be implemented using a hash table.
- 3. Both worst case time and space are now proportional to the size of the state space.
- 4. *Memory:* depth first and iterative deepening search are no longer linear space as we need to store the closed list.
- 5. *Optimality:* when a repeat is found we are discarding the new possibility even if it is better than the first one.
  - This never happens for uniform-cost or breadth-first search with constant step costs, so these remain optimal.
  - Iterative deepening search needs to check which solution is better and if necessary modify path costs and depths for descendants of the repeated state.

#### Search trees

Everything we've seen so far is an example of *uninformed* or *blind* search—we only distinguish goal states from non-goal states.

(Uniform cost search is a slight anomaly as it uses the path cost as a guide.)

To perform well in practice we need to employ informed or heuristic search.

This involves exploiting knowledge of the *distance between the current state and a goal*.

### Problem solving by informed search

Basic search methods make limited use of any *problem-specific knowledge* we might have.

• We have already seen the concept of *path* cost p(n)

 $p(\boldsymbol{n}) = \operatorname{cost}$  of path (sequence of actions) from the start state to  $\boldsymbol{n}$ 

• We can now introduce an *evaluation function*. This is a function that attempts to measure the *desirability of each node*.

The evaluation function will clearly not be perfect. (If it is, there is no need to search.)


*Best-first search* simply expands nodes using the ordering given by the evaluation function.

82

# Example: route-finding

*Example:* for route finding a reasonable heuristic function is

h(n) =straight line distance from n to the nearest goal



Accuracy here obviously depends on what the roads are really like.

# Greedy search


81

We've already seen path cost used for this purpose.

- This is misguided as path cost is not in general *directed* in any sense *toward the goal*.
- A *heuristic function*, usually denoted h(n) is one that *estimates* the cost of the best path from any node n to a goal.
- If n is a goal then h(n) = 0.

Using a heuristic function along with best-first search gives us the *greedy search* algorithm.

# Example: route-finding $A^*$ search Greedy search suffers from some problems: Well, we can. $A^{\star}$ search combines the good points of: • Its time complexity is $O(b^d)$ . • Its space-complexity is $O(b^d)$ . • Greedy search—by making use of h(n). • It is not optimal or complete. • Uniform-cost search—by being optimal and complete. *BUT*: greedy search *can* be effective, provided we have a good h(n). It does this in a very simple manner: it uses path cost p(n) and also the heuristic function h(n) by forming Wouldn't it be nice if we could improve it to make it optimal and complete? f(n) = p(n) + h(n)where p(n) = cost of path to nand h(n) = estimated cost of best path from n So: f(n) is the estimated cost of a path through n. 85 86 $A^{\star}$ search $A^*$ tree-search is optimal for admissible h(n) $A^{\star}$ search: To see that $A^*$ search is optimal we reason as follows. Let Goal<sub>opt</sub> be an optimal goal state with • A best-first search using f(n). $f(\text{Goal}_{\text{opt}}) = p(\text{Goal}_{\text{opt}}) = f_{\text{opt}}$ • It is both complete and optimal... (because $h(\text{Goal}_{opt}) = 0$ ). Let $\text{Goal}_2$ be a suboptimal goal state with • ...provided that h obeys some simple conditions. $f(\text{Goal}_2) = p(\text{Goal}_2) = f_2 > f_{\text{opt}}$ Definition: an admissible heuristic h(n) is one that never overestimates the cost We need to demonstrate that the search can never select Goal<sub>2</sub>. of the best path from n to a goal. So if h'(n) denotes the *actual* distance from n to the goal we have $\forall n.h(n) \le h'(n).$ If h(n) is admissible then *tree-search* $A^*$ is optimal.



## Monotonicity

#### The pathmax equation

Monotonicity:


- If it is always the case that  $f(n') \ge f(n)$  then h(n) is called *monotonic*.
- h(n) is monotonic if and only if it obeys the *triangle inequality*.


 $h(n) \le \cos(n \xrightarrow{a} n') + h(n')$ 

If h(n) is *not* monotonic we can make a simple alteration and use

 $f(n') = \max\{f(n), p(n') + h(n')\}$ 

This is called the *pathmax* equation.





The fact that f(n) = 9 tells us the cost of a path through n is *at least* 9 (because h(n) is admissible).

94

But n' is on a path through n. So to say that f(n') = 7 makes no sense.

 $A^*$  graph search is optimal for monotonic heuristics

93

 $A^{\star}$  graph search is optimal for monotonic heuristics.

The crucial fact from which optimality follows is that if h(n) is monotonic then the values of f(n) along any path are non-decreasing.

Assume we move from n to n' using action a. Then

$$\forall a . p(n') = p(n) + \operatorname{cost}(n \xrightarrow{a} n')$$


and using the triangle inequality

$$h(n) \le \cot(n \xrightarrow{a} n') + h(n') \tag{1}$$

Thus

$$f(n') = p(n') + h(n')$$
  
=  $p(n) + \operatorname{cost}(n \xrightarrow{a} n') + h(n')$   
 $\geq p(n) + h(n)$   
=  $f(n)$ 


where the inequality follows from equation 1.





Consequently everything with  $f(n'') < f_{opt}$  gets explored. Then one or more things with  $f_{opt}$  get found (not necessarily all goals).


#### $A^{\star}$ search is complete Complexity • $A^*$ search has a further desirable property: it is *optimally efficient*. $A^{\star}$ search is complete provided: • This means that no other optimal algorithm that works by constructing paths 1. The graph has finite branching factor. from the root can guarantee to examine fewer nodes. 2. There is a finite, positive constant c such that each operator has cost at least c. • BUT: despite its good properties we're not done yet... Why is this? The search expands nodes according to increasing f(n). So: the • ... $A^*$ search unfortunately still has exponential time complexity in most cases only way it can fail to find a goal is if there are infinitely many nodes with f(n) < 1unless h(n) satisfies a very stringent condition that is generally unrealistic: f(Goal). $|h(n) - h'(n)| < O(\log h'(n))$ There are two ways this can happen: where h'(n) denotes the *real* cost from *n* to the goal. 1. There is a node with an infinite number of descendants. • As $A^*$ search also stores all the nodes it generates, once again it is generally memory that becomes a problem before time. 2. There is a path with an infinite number of nodes but a finite path cost. 97 98 $IDA^{\star}$ - iterative deepening $A^{\star}$ search $IDA^{\star}$ - iterative deepening $A^{\star}$ search How might we improve the way in which $A^*$ search uses memory? The function contour searches from a given node, as far as the specified f limit. It returns either a solution, or the *next biggest* value of f to try. • Iterative deepening search used depth-first search with a limit on depth that is (ActionSequence,float) contour(Node node, float fLimit, ActionSequence s) gradually increased. float nextF = infinity; • $IDA^*$ does the same thing with a limit on f cost. if (f(node) > fLimit) return (emptySequence,f(node)); ActionSequence s' = addToSequence(node,s); ActionSequence ida() { root = root node for problem; if (goalTest(node)) float fLimit = f(root); return (s',fLimit); while() { for (each successor n' of node) { (sequence, fLimit) = contour(root,fLimit,emptySequence); (sequence,newF) = contour(n',fLimit,s'); if (sequence != emptySequence) if (sequence != emptySequence) return sequence; return (sequence,fLimit); nextF = minimum(nextF,newF); if (fLimit == infinity) return emptySequence; return (emptySequence,nextF);

100










### The n-queens problem

We might however consider the following:

- A state (node) n is a permutation of  $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ , denoting the rows that the queens appear on.
- We move from one node to another by moving a *single queen* to *any* alternative row.
- We define f(n) to be the number of pairs of queens attacking one-another in the new position<sup>2</sup>. (Regardless of whether or not the attack is direct.)

### The *n*-queens problem

Here,  $n = \{4, 3, ?, 8, 6, 2, 4, 1\}$  and the f values for the undecided queen are shown.



As we can choose which queen to move, each node in fact has 56 neighbours in the graph.

<sup>2</sup>Note that we actually want to minimize f here. This is equivalent to maximizing -f, and I will generally use whichever seems more appropriate.

117

### Hill-climbing search

#### Hill-climbing search is remarkably simple:

```
Generate a start state n.
while () {
  Generate the N neighbours {n_1,...,n_N} of n;
  if (max(f(n_i)) <= f(n)) return n;
   n = n_i maximizing f(n_i);
}</pre>
```

In fact, that looks so simple that it's amazing the algorithm is at all useful.

In this version we stop when we get to a node with no better neighbour. We might alternatively allow *sideways moves* by changing the stopping condition:


if  $(max(f(n_i)) < f(n))$  return n;

Why would we consider doing this?

## Hill-climbing search: the reality

118

In reality, nature has a number of ways of shaping f to complicate the search process.



Sideways moves allow us to move across plateaus and shoulders.

However, should we ever find a *local maximum* then we'll return it: we won't keep searching to find a *global maximum*.

## Hill-climbing search: the reality

Of course, the fact that we're dealing with a *general graph* means we need to think of something like the preceding figure, but in a *very large number of dimensions*, and this makes the problem *much harder*.

There is a body of techniques for trying to overcome such problems. For example:

• Stochastic hill-climbing: Choose a neighbour at random, perhaps with a probability depending on its f value. For example: let N(n) denote the neighbours of n. Define

 $N^{+}(n) = \{n' \in N(n) | f(n') \ge f(n)\}$  $N^{-}(n) = \{n' \in N(n) | f(n') < f(n)\}.$ 


Then

$$\Pr(n') = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } n' \in N^-(n) \\ \frac{1}{Z}(f(n') - f(n)) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

121

#### Gradient ascent and related methods

For some problems<sup>3</sup>—we do not have a search graph, but a *continuous search space*.



Typically, we have a function  $f(\mathbf{x}): \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}$  and we want to find

$$\mathbf{x}_{opt} = \operatorname*{argmax}_{\mathbf{x}} f(\mathbf{x})$$

<sup>3</sup>For the purposes of this course, the training of neural networks is a notable example.

### Hill-climbing search: the reality

- *First choice:* Generate neighbours at random. Select the first one that is better than the current one. (Particularly good if nodes have *many neighbours*.)
- *Random restarts:* Run a procedure k times with a limit on the time allowed for each run.

Note: generating a start state at random may itself not be straightforward.

• *Simulated annealing:* Similar to stochastic hill-climbing, but start with lots of random variation and *reduce it over time*.

*Note:* in some cases this is *provably* an effective procedure, although the time taken may be excessive if we want the proof to hold.

• *Beam search:* Maintain k nodes at any given time. At each search step, find the successors of each, and retain the best k from *all* the successors. *Note:* this is *not* the same as random restarts.

122

### Gradient ascent and related methods

In a single dimension we can clearly try to solve

$$\frac{df(x)}{dx} = 0$$

to find the *stationary points*, and use

$$\frac{d^2 f(x)}{dx^2}$$

to find a global maximum. In multiple dimensions the equivalent is to solve

$$\nabla f(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{\partial f(\mathbf{x})}{\partial \mathbf{x}} = \mathbf{0}$$

where

$$\frac{\partial f(\mathbf{x})}{\partial \mathbf{x}} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_1} & \frac{\partial f(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_2} & \cdots & \frac{\partial f(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_n} \end{bmatrix}.$$

and the equivalent of the second derivative is the Hessian matrix

$$\mathbf{H} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial f^2(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_1^2} & \frac{\partial f^2(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_1 \partial x_2} & \cdots & \frac{\partial f^2(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_1 \partial x_n} \\ \frac{\partial f^2(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_2 \partial x_1} & \frac{\partial f^2(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_2^2} & \cdots & \frac{\partial f^2(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_2 \partial x_n} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \frac{\partial f^2(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_n \partial x_1} & \frac{\partial f^2(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_n \partial x_2} & \cdots & \frac{\partial f^2(\mathbf{x})}{\partial x_n^2} \end{bmatrix}.$$

#### Gradient ascent and related methods

However this approach is usually *not analytically tractable* regardless of dimensionality.

The simplest way around this is to employ gradient ascent:

- Start with a randomly chosen point x<sub>0</sub>.
- Using a small *step size*  $\epsilon$ , iterate using the equation

$$\mathbf{x}_{i+1} = \mathbf{x}_i + \epsilon \nabla f(\mathbf{x}_i).$$

This can be understood as follows:


- At the current point  $\mathbf{x}_i$  the gradient  $\nabla f(\mathbf{x}_i)$  tells us the *direction* and *magnitude* of the slope at  $\mathbf{x}_i$ .
- Adding  $\epsilon \nabla f(\mathbf{x}_i)$  therefore moves us a *small distance upward*.

This is perhaps more easily seen graphically...

125

## Gradient ascent and related methods


Simply increasing the step size  $\epsilon$  can lead to a different problem:



We can easily jump too far...

#### Gradient ascent and related methods

Here we have a simple *parabolic surface*:



With  $\epsilon=0.1$  the procedure is clearly effective at finding the maximum.

Note however that *the steps are small*, and in a more realistic problem *it might take some time*...

126

## Gradient ascent and related methods

There is a large collection of more sophisticated methods. For example:


- *Line search:* increase *ϵ* until *f* increases and minimise in the resulting interval. Then choose a new direction to move in. *Conjugate gradients*, the *Fletcher*-*Reeves* and *Polak-Ribiere* methods etc.
- Use H to exploit knowledge of the local shape of *f*. For example the *Newton-Raphson* and *Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS)* methods etc.

Artificial Intelligence I	Solving problems by search: playing games
Dr Sean Holden	How might an agent act when the outcomes of its actions are not known because an adversary is trying to hinder it?
Notes on games (adversarial search)	• This is essentially a more realistic kind of search problem because we do no know the exact outcome of an action.
	• This is a common situation when <i>playing games</i> : in chess, draughts, and so or an opponent <i>responds</i> to our moves.
	• We don't know what their response will be, and so the outcome of our moves is not clear.
	Game playing has been of interest in AI because it provides an <i>idealisation</i> of a world in which two agents act to <i>reduce</i> each other's well-being.
Copyright © Sean Holden 2002-2012.	
129	130
Playing games: search against an adversary	Playing games: search against an adversary
Despite the fact that games are an idealisation, game playing can be an excellent source of hard problems. For instance with chess:	<ul><li>And chess isn't even very hard:</li><li>Go is much harder than chess.</li></ul>
• The average branching factor is roughly 35.	<ul><li> The branching factor is about 360.</li></ul>
• Games can reach 50 moves per player.	
• So a rough calculation gives the search tree $35^{100}$ nodes.	Until very recently it has resisted all attempts to produce a good AI player.
• Even if only different, legal positions are considered it's about $10^{40}$ .	See: senseis.xmp.net/?MoGo
So: in addition to the uncertainty due to the opponent:	and others.
• We can't make a complete search to find the best move	
• so we have to act even though we're not sure about the best thing to do.	

# Playing games: search against an adversary Perfect decisions in a two-person game It seems that games are a step closer to the complexities inherent in the world Say we have two players. Traditionally, they are called Max and Min for reasons around us than are the standard search problems considered so far. that will become clear. The study of games has led to some of the most celebrated applications and tech-• We'll use *noughts and crosses* as an initial example. niques in AI. • Max moves first. We now look at: • The players alternate until the game ends. • How game-playing can be modelled as *search*. • At the end of the game, prizes are awarded. (Or punishments administered— **EVIL ROBOT** is starting up his favourite chainsaw...) • The *minimax algorithm* for game-playing. • Some problems inherent in the use of minimax. This is exactly the same game format as chess, Go, draughts and so on. • The concept of $\alpha - \beta$ pruning. Reading: Russell and Norvig chapter 6. 133 134 Perfect decisions in a two-person game Perfect decisions in a two-person game We can *construct a tree* to represent a game. From the initial state Max can make Games like this can be modelled as search problems as follows: nine possible moves: • There is an *initial state*. Max to move • There is a set of *operators*. Here, Max can place a cross in any empty square, or Min a nought. • There is a *terminal test*. Here, the game ends when three noughts or three Then it's Min's turn... crosses are in a row, or there are no unused spaces. • There is a *utility* or *payoff* function. This tells us, numerically, what the outcome of the game is. This is enough to model the entire game.


#### Perfect decisions in a two-person game

For each of Max's opening moves Min has eight replies:




### And so on...

This can be continued to represent *all* possibilities for the game.



At the leaves a player has won or there are no spaces. Leaves are *labelled* using the utility function.



As Min plays the last move, she *minimises* the utility available to Max.


### The minimax algorithm

#### The minimax algorithm

Min takes the final move:

- If Min is in game position 1, her best choice is move 3. So from Max's point of view this node has a utility of 2.
- If Min is in game position 2, her best choice is move 3. So from Max's point of view this node has a utility of 6.
- If Min is in game position 3, her best choice is move 1. So from Max's point of view this node has a utility of 1.
- If Min is in game position 4, her best choice is move 4. So from Max's point of view this node has a utility of 4.

Moving one further step up the tree:



We can see that Max's best opening move is move 2, as this leads to the node with highest utility.

141

## The minimax algorithm

In general:

- Generate the complete tree and label the leaves according to the utility function.
- Working from the leaves of the tree upward, label the nodes depending on whether Max or Min is to move.
- If *Min* is to move label the current node with the *minimum* utility of any descendant.
- If *Max* is to move label the current node with the *maximum* utility of any descendant.

If the game is p ply and at each point there are q available moves then this process has (surprise, surprise)  $O(q^p)$  time complexity and space complexity linear in p and q.

## Making imperfect decisions

142

We need to avoid searching all the way to the end of the tree. So:

- We generate only part of the tree: instead of testing whether a node is a leaf we introduce a *cut-off* test telling us when to stop.
- Instead of a utility function we introduce an *evaluation function* for the evaluation of positions for an incomplete game.

The evaluation function attempts to measure the expected utility of the current game position.

## Making imperfect decisions

#### The evaluation function

How can this be justified?

- This is a strategy that humans clearly sometimes make use of.
- For example, when using the concept of *material value* in chess.
- The effectiveness of the evaluation function is *critical*...
- ... but it must be computable in a reasonable time.
- (In principle it could just be done using minimax.)

The importance of the evaluation function can not be understated—it is probably the most important part of the design.

Designing a good evaluation function can be extremely tricky:

- Let's say we want to design one for chess by giving each piece its material value: pawn = 1, knight/bishop = 3, rook = 5 and so on.
- Define the evaluation of a position to be the difference between the material value of black's and white's pieces

 $eval(position) = \sum_{black's \ pieces \ p_i} value \ of \ p_i \ - \sum_{white's \ pieces \ q_i} value \ of \ q_i$ 

This seems like a reasonable first attempt. Why might it go wrong?

145

## The evaluation function

Consider what happens at the start of a game:

- Until the first capture the evaluation function gives 0, so in fact we have a *category* containing many different game positions with equal estimated utility.
- For example, all positions where white is one pawn ahead.
- The evaluation function for such a category should perhaps represent the probability that a position chosen at random from it leads to a win.

So in fact this seems highly naive...

## The evaluation function

146

Ideally, we should consider individual positions.

If on the basis of past experience a position has 50% chance of winning, 10% chance of losing and 40% chance of reaching a draw, we might give it an evaluation of

 $eval(position) = (0.5 \times 1) + (0.1 \times -1) + (0.4 \times 0) = 0.4.$ 

Extending this to the evaluation of categories, we should then weight the positions in the category according to their likelihood of occurring.

Of course, we don't know what any of these likelihoods are ...

#### The evaluation function

Using material value can be thought of as giving us a *weighted linear evaluation function* 

$$eval(position) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i f_i$$

where the  $w_i$  are *weights* and the  $f_i$  represent *features* of the position. In this example

 $f_i$  = value of the *i*th piece

 $w_i =$  number of *i*th pieces on the board

where black and white pieces are regarded as different and the  $f_i$  are positive for one and negative for the other.

#### The evaluation function

Evaluation functions of this type are very common in game playing.

There is no systematic method for their design.

Weights can be chosen by allowing the game to play itself and using *learning* techniques to adjust the weights to improve performance.

By using more carefully crafted features we can give *different evaluations* to *individual positions*.

149

## $\alpha - \beta$ pruning

Even with a good evaluation function and cut-off test, the time complexity of the minimax algorithm makes it impossible to write a good chess program without some further improvement.


- Assuming we have 150 seconds to make each move, for chess we would be limited to a search of about 3 to 4 ply whereas...
- ...even an average human player can manage 6 to 8.

Luckily, it is possible to prune the search tree *without affecting the outcome* and *without having to examine all of it*.


 $\alpha - \beta$  pruning

150

Returning for a moment to the earlier, simplified example:



The search is depth-first and left to right.



#### $\alpha - \beta$ pruning in general $\alpha - \beta$ pruning in general Applying this to the earlier example and keeping track of the values for $\alpha$ and $\beta$ The function opponent is exactly analogous: vou should obtain: opponent( $\alpha, \beta, n$ ){ if (n is at the cut-off point) return evaluation(n); $\alpha = -\infty = \mathfrak{X} = 6$ value = $+\infty$ ; Return 2 for(each successor n' of n){ value = min(value, player( $\alpha, \beta, n'$ )); Return 1 Return 6 if (value $< \alpha$ ) return value; if (value $< \beta$ ) $\beta$ = value; 2 20 20 15 6 7 return value; $\alpha = -\infty$ $\alpha = 2$ $\alpha = 6$ $\beta = +\infty = 2$ $\beta = +\infty = 6$ *Note:* the semantics here is that parameters are passed to functions *by value*. 157 158 How effective is $\alpha - \beta$ pruning? How effective is $\alpha - \beta$ pruning? If moves are arranged at random then $\alpha - \beta$ pruning is: (Warning: the theoretical results that follow are somewhat idealised.) A quick inspection should convince you that the order in which moves are ar-• $O((q/\log q)^p)$ asymptotically when q > 1000 or... ranged in the tree is critical.

So, it seems sensible to try good moves first:

- If you were to have a perfect move-ordering technique then  $\alpha \beta$  pruning would be  $O(q^{p/2})$  as opposed to  $O(q^p)$ .
- so the branching factor would effectively be  $\sqrt{q}$  instead of q.
- We would therefore expect to be able to search ahead *twice as many moves as before*.

However, this is not realistic: if you had such an ordering technique you'd be able to play perfect games!

• ...about  $O(q^{3p/4})$  for reasonable values of q.

In practice simple ordering techniques can get close to the best case. For example, if we try captures, then threats, then moves forward *etc*.

Alternatively, we can implement an iterative deepening approach and use the order obtained at one iteration to drive the next.

A further optimisation: the transposition table	Artificial Intelligence I
Finally, note that many games correspond to <i>graphs</i> rather than <i>trees</i> because the same state can be arrived at in different ways.	Dr Sean Holden
• This is essentially the same effect we saw in heuristic search: recall graph search versus tree search.	
• It can be addressed in a similar way: store a state with its evaluation in a hash table—generally called a <i>transposition table</i> —the first time it is seen.	
The transposition table is essentially equivalent to the <i>closed list</i> introduced as part of graph search.	Notes on constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs)
This can vastly increase the effectiveness of the search process, because we don't have to evaluate a single state multiple times.	
	Copyright © Sean Holden 2002-2012.
161	162
Constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs)	Constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs)
The search scenarios examined so far seem in some ways unsatisfactory.	By standardising like this we benefit in several ways:
• States were represented using an <i>arbitrary</i> and <i>problem-specific</i> data structure.	• We can devise <i>general purpose</i> algorithms and heuristics.
• Heuristics were also <i>problem-specific</i> .	• We can look at general methods for exploring the <i>structure</i> of the problem.
• It would be nice to be able to <i>transform</i> general search problems into a <i>stan-</i> <i>dard format</i> .	• Consequently it is possible to introduce techniques for <i>decomposing</i> problems.
CSPs <i>standardise</i> the manner in which states and goal tests are represented	• We can try to understand the relationship between the <i>structure</i> of a problem and the <i>difficulty of solving it</i> .
	<i>Note:</i> another method of interest in AI that allows us to do similar things involves transforming to a <i>propositional satisfiability</i> problem. We'll see an example of this in AI II.

## Introduction to constraint satisfaction problems

We now return to the idea of problem solving by search and examine it from this new perspective.

Aims:

- To introduce the idea of a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) as a general means of representing and solving problems by search.
- To look at a *backtracking algorithm* for solving CSPs.
- To look at some general heuristics for solving CSPs.
- To look at more intelligent ways of backtracking.

Reading: Russell and Norvig, chapter 5.

## Constraint satisfaction problems

We have:

- A set of *n* variables  $V_1, V_2, \ldots, V_n$ .
- For each  $V_i$  a *domain*  $D_i$  specifying the values that  $V_i$  can take.
- A set of *m* constraints  $C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_m$ .

Each constraint  $C_i$  involves a set of variables and specifies an *allowable collection of values*.


- A state is an assignment of specific values to some or all of the variables.
- An assignment is *consistent* if it violates no constraints.
- An assignment is *complete* if it gives a value to every variable.

A *solution* is a consistent and complete assignment.

Example

165

We will use the problem of *colouring the nodes of a graph* as a running example.



Each node corresponds to a *variable*. We have three colours and directly connected nodes should have different colours.

## Example

166

This translates easily to a CSP formulation:

• The variables are the nodes

 $V_i =$ node i

• The domain for each variable contains the values black, red and cyan

 $D_i = \{B, R, C\}$ 

• The constraints enforce the idea that directly connected nodes must have different colours. For example, for variables  $V_1$  and  $V_2$  the constraints specify

(B,R), (B,C), (R,B), (R,C), (C,B), (C,R)

• Variable  $V_8$  is unconstrained.

#### Different kinds of CSP

This is an example of the simplest kind of CSP: it is *discrete* with *finite domains*. We will concentrate on these.

We will also concentrate on *binary constraints*; that is, constraints between *pairs of variables*.

- Constraints on single variables—*unary constraints*—can be handled by adjusting the variable's domain. For example, if we don't want  $V_i$  to be *red*, then we just remove that possibility from  $D_i$ .
- *Higher-order constraints* applying to three or more variables can certainly be considered, but...
- ...when dealing with finite domains they can always be converted to sets of binary constraints by introducing extra *auxiliary variables*.

How does that work?

169

# Backtracking search

Consider what happens if we try to solve a CSP using a simple technique such as *breadth-first search*.

The branching factor is nd at the first step, for n variables each with d possible values.

Step 2: 
$$(n-1)d$$
  
Step 3:  $(n-2)d$   
 $\vdots$   
Step n: d
Number of leaves  $= nd \times (n-1)d \times \cdots \times 1$   
 $= n!d^n$ 

BUT: only  $d^n$  assignments are possible.


The order of assignment doesn't matter, and we should assign to one variable at a time.

## Auxiliary variables

*Example:* three variables each with domain  $\{B, R, C\}$ .

A single constraint

$$(C, C, C), (R, B, B), (B, R, B), (B, B, R)$$



New, binary constraints:  $(A = 1, V_1 = C), (A = 1, V_2 = C), (A = 1, V_3 = C), (A = 2, V_1 = R), (A = 2, V_2 = B), (A = 2, V_3 = B), (A = 3, V_1 = B), (A = 3, V_2 = R), (A = 3, V_3 = B), (A = 4, V_2 = B), (A$ 


Introducing auxiliary variable A with domain  $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$  allows us to convert this to a set of binary constraints.

170


# Backtracking search

Using the graph colouring example:

The search now looks something like this...




... and new possibilities appear.



## Heuristics I: Choosing the order of variable assignments and values

How do we choose a variable to begin with?

The *degree heuristic* chooses the variable involved in the most constraints on as yet unassigned variables.




MRV is usually better but the degree heuristic is a good tie breaker.

Continuing the previous slide's progress, now add 1 = C.

177

Heuristics II: forward checking and constraint propagation




Each time we assign a value to a variable, it makes sense to delete that value from the collection of *possible assignments to its neighbours*.

This is called *forward checking*. It works nicely in conjunction with MRV.

## Heuristics I: Choosing the order of variable assignments and values

Once a variable is chosen, in what order should values be assigned?



The *least constraining value* heuristic chooses first the value that leaves the maximum possible freedom in choosing assignments for the variable's neighbours.

178

# Heuristics II: forward checking and constraint propagation

We can visualise this process as follows:

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Start	BRC							
2 = B	RC	= B	RC	RC	BRC	BRC	BRC	BRC
3 = R	C	= B	= R	RC	BC	BRC	BC	BRC
6 = B	C	= B	= R	RC	C	= B	C	BRC
5 = C	C	= B	= R	R	= C	= B	!	BRC

At the fourth step 7 has no possible assignments left.

However, we could have detected a problem a little earlier...

## Heuristics II: forward checking and constraint propagation

...by looking at step three.

1		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Start	BRC							
	2 = B	RC	= B	RC	RC	BRC	BRC	BRC	BRC
	3 = R	C	= B	= R	RC	BC	BRC	BC	BRC
	6 = B	C	= B	= R	RC	C	= B	C	BRC
	5 = C	C	= B	= R	R	= C	= B	!	BRC

- At step three, 5 can be C only and 7 can be C only.
- But 5 and 7 are connected.
- So we can't progress, but this hasn't been detected.
- Ideally we want to do *constraint propagation*.

Trade-off: time to do the search, against time to explore constraints.

181

## Constraint propagation

#### Example:

In step three of the table,  $D_4 = \{R, C\}$  and  $D_5 = \{C\}$ .

•  $5 \rightarrow 4$  in step three of the table *is consistent*.

•  $4 \rightarrow 5$  in step three of the table *is not consistent*.

 $4 \rightarrow 5$  can be made consistent by deleting C from  $D_4$ .

Or in other words, regardless of what you assign to i you'll be able to find something valid to assign to j.

## Constraint propagation

## Arc consistency:

Consider a constraint as being *directed*. For example  $4 \rightarrow 5$ .

In general, say we have a constraint  $i \to j$  and currently the domain of i is  $D_i$  and the domain of j is  $D_j$ .

 $i \rightarrow j$  is consistent if

$$\forall d \in D_i, \exists d' \in D_j \text{ such that } i \to j \text{ is valid}$$

182


## Enforcing arc consistency

We can enforce arc consistency each time a variable i is assigned.

- We need to maintain a *collection of arcs to be checked*.
- Each time we alter a domain, we may have to include further arcs in the collection.

This is because if  $i \to j$  is inconsistent resulting in a deletion from  $D_i$  we may as a consequence make some arc  $k \to i$  inconsistent.


Why is this?



# Backjumping

## Backjumping

The basic backtracking algorithm backtracks to the *most recent assignment*. This is known as *chronological backtracking*. It is not always the best policy:



Say we've assigned 1 = B, 3 = R, 5 = C and 4 = B and now we want to assign something to 7. This isn't possible so we backtrack, however re-assigning 4 clearly doesn't help.

With some careful bookkeeping it is often possible to *jump back multiple levels* without sacrificing the ability to find a solution.

We need some definitions:

- When we set a variable V<sub>i</sub> to some value d ∈ D<sub>i</sub> we refer to this as the assignment A<sub>i</sub> = (V<sub>i</sub> ← d).
- A partial instantiation  $I_k = \{A_1, A_2, \dots, A_k\}$  is a consistent set of assignments to the first k variables...
- ... where *consistent* means that no constraints are violated.

Henceforth we shall assume that variables are assigned in the order  $V_1, V_2, \ldots, V_n$  when formally presenting algorithms.

190

189


# Gaschnig's algorithm

*Gaschnig's algorithm* works as follows. Say we have a partial instantiation  $I_k$ :

- When choosing a value for  $V_{k+1}$  we need to check that any candidate value  $d \in D_{k+1}$ , is consistent with  $I_k$ .
- When testing potential values for d, we will generally discard one or more possibilities, because they conflict with some member of  $I_k$
- We keep track of the most recent assignment  $A_j$  for which this has happened.

Finally, if *no* value for  $V_{k+1}$  is consistent with  $I_k$  then we backtrack to  $V_j$ .

If there are no possible values left to try for  $V_j$  then we backtrack *chronologically*.



X

If there's no value left to try for 5 then backtrack to 3 and so on.

# Graph-based backjumping


This allows us to jump back multiple levels when we initially detect a conflict.

Can we do better than chronological backtracking thereafter?

Some more definitions:

- We assume an ordering  $V_1, V_2, \ldots, V_n$  for the variables.
- Given  $V' = \{V_1, V_2, \dots, V_k\}$  where k < n the *ancestors* of  $V_{k+1}$  are the members of V' connected to  $V_{k+1}$  by a constraint.
- The *parent* P(V) of  $V_{k+1}$  is its most recent ancestor.

The ancestors for each variable can be accumulated as assignments are made. Graph-based backjumping backtracks to the parent of  $V_{k+1}$ .



At this point, backjump to the *parent* for 7, which is 5.

193

# Backjumping and forward checking

If we use *forward checking*: say we're assigning to  $V_{k+1}$  by making  $V_{k+1} = d$ :


- Forward checking removes d from the  $D_i$  of all  $V_i$  connected to  $V_{k+1}$  by a constraint.
- When doing graph-based backjumping, we'd also add  $V_{k+1}$  to the ancestors of  $V_i$ .

In fact, use of forward checking can make some forms of backjumping redundant.

*Note:* there are in fact many ways of combining *constraint propagation* with *back-jumping*, and we will not explore them in further detail here.



194




	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Start	BRC							
1=B	= B	RC	RC	BRC	BRC	BRC	RC	BRC
3 = R	= B	C	= R	BRC	BC	BRC	C	BRC
5 = C	= B	C	= R	BR	= C	BR	!	BRC
4=B	= B	C	= R	BR	= C	BR	!	BRC

Forward checking finds the problem before backtracking does.


# Graph-based backjumping

We're not quite done yet though. What happens when *there are no assignments left for the parent we just backjumped to*?



<sup>197</sup> <u>Graph-based backjumping</u>


Also



If  $V_i$  was backtracked to from a later leaf dead-end and there are no more values to try for  $V_i$  then we refer to it as an *internal dead-end variable* and call  $I_{i-1}$  an *internal dead-end*.

## Graph-based backjumping

To describe an algorithm in this case is a little involved.



Given an instantiation  $I_k$  and  $V_{k+1}$ , if there is no consistent  $d \in D_{k+1}$  we call  $I_k$  a *leaf dead-end* and  $V_{k+1}$  a *leaf dead-end variable*.


198

# Graph-based backjumping

To keep track of exactly where to jump to we also need the definitions:

- The *session* of a variable V begins when the search algorithm visits it and ends when it backtracks through it to an earlier variable.
- The *current session* of a variable V is the set of all variables visiting during its session.
- In particular, the current session for any V contains V.
- The relevant dead-ends for the current session R(V) for a variable V are:
- 1. If V is a leaf dead-end variable then  $R(V) = \{V\}$ .
- 2. If V was backtracked to from a dead-end V' then  $R(V) = R(V) \cup R(V')$ .

And we're not done yet...



Artificial Intelligence I
Dr Sean Holden
Notes on knowledge representation and reasoning using first-order logic (FOL)
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Interesting reading         Reading: Russell and Norvig, chapters 7 to 10.         Knowledge representation based on logic is a vast subject and can't be covered in full in the lectures.         In particular:         • Techniques for representing further kinds of knowledge.         • Techniques for moving beyond the idea of a situation.         • Reasoning systems based on categories.         • Reasoning systems using default information.         • Truth maintenance systems.         Happy reading :-)

## Knowledge representation and reasoning

Earlier in the course we looked at what an *agent* should be able to do.

It seems that all of us—and all intelligent agents—should use *logical reasoning* to help us interact successfully with the world.

Any intelligent agent should:

- Possess *knowledge* about the *environment* and about *how its actions affect the environment*.
- Use some form of *logical reasoning* to *maintain* its knowledge as *percepts* arrive.
- Use some form of *logical reasoning* to *deduce actions* to perform in order to achieve *goals*.

#### Knowledge representation and reasoning

This raises some important questions:

- How do we describe the current state of the world?
- How do we infer from our percepts, knowledge of unseen parts of the world?
- How does the world change as time passes?
- How does the world stay the same as time passes? (The *frame problem*.)
- How do we know the effects of our actions? (The *qualification* and *ramifica-tion problems*.)

We'll now look at one way of answering some of these questions.

209

#### Logic for knowledge representation

FOL (arguably?) seems to provide a good way in which to represent the required kinds of knowledge:

- It is *expressive*—anything you can program can be expressed.
- It is *concise*.
- It is unambiguous
- It can be adapted to *different contexts*.
- It has an *inference procedure*, although a semidecidable one.

In addition is has a well-defined *syntax* and *semantics*.

# Logic for knowledge representation

210

*Problem:* it's quite easy to talk about things like *set theory* using FOL. For example, we can easily write axioms like

 $\forall S . \forall S' . ((\forall x . (x \in S \Leftrightarrow x \in S')) \Rightarrow S = S')$ 

But how would we go about representing the proposition that *if you have a bucket* of water and throw it at your friend they will get wet, have a bump on their head from being hit by a bucket, and the bucket will now be empty and dented?


More importantly, how could this be represented within a wider framework for reasoning about the world?

It's time to introduce my friend, The Wumpus...

## Wumpus world

#### Wumpus world

As a simple test scenario for a knowledge-based agent we will make use of the *Wumpus World*.



The Wumpus World is a 4 by 4 grid-based cave.

EVIL ROBOT wants to enter the cave, find some gold, and get out again unscathed.

The rules of Wumpus World:

- Unfortunately the cave contains a number of pits, which EVIL ROBOT can fall into. Eventually his batteries will fail, and that's the end of him.
- The cave also contains the Wumpus, who is armed with state of the art *Evil Robot Obliteration Technology*.

• The Wumpus itself knows where the pits are and never falls into one.

# Wumpus world

213

## EVIL ROBOT can move around the cave at will and can perceive the following:

- In a position adjacent to the Wumpus, a stench is perceived. (Wumpuses are famed for their *lack of personal hygiene*.)
- In a position adjacent to a pit, a *breeze* is perceived.
- In the position where the gold is, a glitter is perceived.
- On trying to move into a wall, a *bump* is perceived.
- On killing the Wumpus a *scream* is perceived.

In addition, EVIL ROBOT has a single arrow, with which to try to kill the Wumpus.

"Adjacent" in the following does not include diagonals.

## Wumpus world

214

## So we have:

Percepts: stench, breeze, glitter, bump, scream.

Actions: forward, turnLeft, turnRight, grab, release, shoot, climb.

Of course, our aim now is *not* just to design an agent that can perform well in a single cave layout.

We want to design an agent that can *usually* perform well *regardless* of the layout of the cave.

# Logic for knowledge representation Some nomenclature The choice of knowledge representation language tends to lead to two important The fundamental aim is to construct a knowledge base KB containing a collection commitments: of statements about the world—expressed in FOL—such that useful things can be derived from it. • Ontological commitments: what does the world consist of? Our central aim is to generate sentences that are true, if the sentences in the KB • Epistemological commitments: what are the allowable states of knowledge? are true. This process is based on concepts familiar from your introductory logic courses: Propositional logic is useful for introducing some fundamental ideas, but its ontological commitment-that the world consists of facts-sometimes makes it too • Entailment: $KB \models \alpha$ means that the KB entails $\alpha$ . limited for further use. • Proof: KB $\vdash_i \alpha$ means that $\alpha$ is derived from the KB using *i*. If *i* is *sound* then FOL has a different ontological commitment—the world consists of facts, objects we have a *proof*. and relations. • *i* is *sound* if it can generate only entailed $\alpha$ . • *i* is *complete* if it can find a proof for *any* entailed $\alpha$ . 217 218 Example: Prolog Example: Prolog You have by now learned a little about programming in *Prolog*. For example: ... we are in fact doing inference from a KB: concat([],L,L). • The Prolog programme itself is the KB. It expresses some knowledge about concat([H|T],L,[H|L2]) := concat(T,L,L2).lists. is a program to concatenate two lists. The query • The query is expressed in such a way as to *derive some new knowledge*. concat([1,2,3],[4,5],X). How does this relate to full FOL? First of all the list notation is nothing but syntacresults in tic sugar. It can be removed: we define a constant called empty and a function called cons. X = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].Now [1,2,3] just means cons(1, cons(2, cons(3, empty)))) which What's happening here? Well, Prolog is just a more limited form of FOL so... is a term in FOL. I will assume the use of the syntactic sugar for lists from now on.

# Prolog and FOL

The program when expressed in FOL, says

 $\forall x. \texttt{concat}(\texttt{empty}, x, x) \land$ 

 $\forall h, t, l_1, l_2. \texttt{concat}(t, l_1, l_2) \Longrightarrow \texttt{concat}(\texttt{cons}(h, t), l_1, \texttt{cons}(h, l_2))$ 

The rule is simple—given a Prolog program:

- Universally quantify all the unbound variables in each line of the program and ...
- ... form the conjunction of the results.

If the universally quantified lines are  $L_1, L_2, \ldots, L_n$  then the Prolog programme corresponds to the KB

$$\mathsf{KB} = L_1 \wedge L_2 \wedge \cdots \wedge L_n$$

Now, what does the query mean?

221

# Prolog and FOL

Prolog differs from FOL in that, amongst other things:

- It restricts you to using *Horn clauses*.
- Its inference procedure is not a *full-blown proof procedure*.
- It does not deal with *negation* correctly.

However the central idea also works for full-blown theorem provers.

If you want to experiment, you can obtain Prover9 from

http://www.cs.unm.edu/~mccune/mace4/

We'll see a brief example now, and a more extensive example of its use later, time permitting...

## Prolog and FOL

When you give the query

concat([1,2,3],[4,5],X).

to Prolog it responds by trying to prove the following statement

 $KB \Longrightarrow \exists x. concat([1, 2, 3], [4, 5], x)$ 

So: it tries to prove that the KB *implies the query*, and variables in the query are existentially quantified.

When a proof is found, it supplies a *value for x* that *makes the inference true*.

222

# Prolog and FOL

Expressed in Prover9, the above Prolog program and query look like this:

set(prolog\_style\_variables).

% This is the translated Prolog program for list concatenation. % Prover9 has its own syntactic sugar for lists.

formulas(assumptions). concat([], L, L).  $concat(T, L, L2) \rightarrow concat([H:T], L, [H:L2]).$ end\_of\_list.

% This is the query.

```
formulas(goals).
 exists X concat([1, 2, 3], [4, 5], X).
end_of_list.
```

*Note:* it is assumed that *unbound variables are universally quantified*.

Prolog and FOL	The fundamental idea
<pre>You can try to infer a proof using</pre>	<pre>So the basic idea is: build a KB that encodes knowledge about the world, the effects of actions and so on. The KB is a conjunction of pieces of knowledge, such that:</pre>
225	226
Using FOL in AI: the triumphant return of the Wumpus We want to be able to <i>speculate</i> about the past and about <i>possible futures</i> . So:	<u>Situation calculus</u> In <i>situation calculus</i> : • The world consists of sequences of <i>situations</i> . • Over time, an agent moves from one situation to another.
Evil Robot	<ul> <li>Situations are changed as a result of <i>actions</i>.</li> <li>In Wumpus World the actions are: forward, shoot, grab, climb, release, turnRight, turnLeft.</li> <li>A <i>situation argument</i> is added to items that can change over time. For example</li> </ul>
• We include <i>situations</i> in the logical language used by our KB.	At(location, s)
• We include <i>axioms</i> in our KB that relate to situations.	Items that can change over time are called <i>fluents</i> .
This gives rise to <i>situation calculus</i> .	• A situation argument is not needed for things that don't change. These are sometimes referred to as <i>eternal</i> or <i>atemporal</i> .

$\label{eq:presenting change as a result of actions} \\ \mbox{Situation calculus uses a function} \\ \mbox{result}(action, s) \\ \mbox{to denote the $new$ situation arising as a result of performing the specified action in the specified situation.} \\ \mbox{result}(grab, s_0) = s_1 \\ \mbox{result}(turnLeft, s_1) = s_2 \\ \mbox{result}(shoot, s_2) = s_3 \\ \mbox{result}(forward, s_3) = s_4 \\ \mbox{i} \mbox{i} \\ \mbox{i} \\ \mbox{i} \\ \mbox{i} \\ \mbox{i} \mbox{i} \mbox{i} \\ \mbox{i} \mbox{i} \mbox{i} \mbox{i} \\ \mbox{i} \mbo$	$\underline{Axioms I: possibility axioms}$ The first kind of axiom we need in a KB specifies when particular actions are possible. We introduce a predicate Poss(action, s)denoting that an action can be performed in situation s. We then need a possibility axiom for each action. For example: $At(l, s) \land Available(gold, l, s) \Longrightarrow Poss(grab, s)$ Remember that unbound variables are universally quantified.
229	230
Axioms II: effect axiomsGiven that an action results in a new situation, we can introduce effect axioms to specify the properties of the new situation.For example, to keep track of whether EVIL ROBOT has the gold we need effect axioms to describe the effect of picking it up: $Poss(grab, s) \Longrightarrow Have(gold, result(grab, s))$ Effect axioms describe the way in which the world changes. We would probably also include $\neg Have(gold, s_0)$ in the KB, where $s_0$ is the starting state. Important: we are describing what is true in the situation that results from performing an action in a given situation.	$\begin{tabular}{lll: frame axioms} \hline \hline Axioms III: frame axioms \\ \hline We need frame axioms to describe the way in which the world stays the same. \\ \hline Example: \\ \hline Have(o, s) \land \\ \neg(a = \texttt{release} \land o = \texttt{gold}) \land \neg(a = \texttt{shoot} \land o = \texttt{arrow}) \\ \implies Have(o, \texttt{result}(a, s)) \\ \hline describes the effect of having something and not discarding it. \\ \hline In a more general setting such an axiom might well look different. For example \\ \neg Have(o, s) \land \\ (a \neq \texttt{grab}(o) \lor \neg(\texttt{Available}(o, s) \land \texttt{Portable}(o))) \\ \implies \neg \texttt{Have}(o, \texttt{result}(a, s)) \\ \hline describes the effect of not having something and not picking it up. \\ \hline \end{tabular}$

## The frame problem

#### Successor-state axioms

The *frame problem* has historically been a major issue.

*Representational frame problem*: a large number of frame axioms are required to represent the many things in the world which will not change as the result of an action.

We will see how to solve this in a moment.

*Inferential frame problem*: when reasoning about a sequence of situations, all the unchanged properties still need to be carried through all the steps.

This can be alleviated using *planning systems* that allow us to reason efficiently when actions change only a small part of the world. There are also other remedies, which we will not cover.

Effect axioms and frame axioms can be combined into successor-state axioms.

One is needed for each predicate that can change over time.

Action a is possible  $\implies$ (true in new situation  $\iff$ (you did something to make it true  $\lor$ 

it was already true and you didn't make it false))

For example

```
\begin{array}{l} \operatorname{Poss}(a,s) \Longrightarrow \\ (\operatorname{Have}(o,\operatorname{result}(a,s)) \iff ((a = \operatorname{grab} \land \operatorname{Available}(o,s)) \lor \\ (\operatorname{Have}(o,s) \land \neg (a = \operatorname{release} \land o = \operatorname{gold}) \land \\ \neg (a = \operatorname{shoot} \land o = \operatorname{arrow})))) \end{array}
```

234

## Knowing where you are

The concept of adjacency is very important in the Wumpus world

Adjacent $(l_1, l_2) \iff \exists d \text{ forwardResult}(l_1, d) = l_2$ 

We also know that the cave is 4 by 4 and surrounded by walls

WallHere $((x, y)) \iff (x = 0 \lor y = 0 \lor x = 5 \lor y = 5)$ 

It is only possible to change location by moving, and this only works if you're not facing a wall. So...

...we need a successor-state axiom:

 $\begin{aligned} \operatorname{Poss}(a,s) \implies \\ \operatorname{At}(l,\operatorname{result}(a,s)) &\iff (l = \operatorname{goForward}(s) \\ & \land a = \operatorname{forward} \\ & \land \neg \operatorname{WallHere}(l)) \\ & \lor (\operatorname{At}(l,s) \land a \neq \operatorname{forward}) \end{aligned}$ 

Knowing where you are

If  $s_0$  is the initial situation we know that

 $At((1,1),s_0)$ 

233

I am *assuming* that we've added axioms allowing us to deal with the numbers 0 to 5 and pairs of such numbers. *(Exercise: do this.)* 

We need to keep track of what way we're facing. Say north is 0, south is 2, east is 1 and west is 3.

 $facing(s_0) = 0$ 

We need to know how motion affects location

forwardResult((x, y), north) = (x, y + 1)forwardResult((x, y), east) = (x + 1, y)


and

 $At(l, s) \Longrightarrow goForward(s) = forwardResult(l, facing(s))$ 

$\label{eq:constraint} \begin{array}{l} \underline{\text{Knowing where you are}} \\ \text{It is only possible to change orientation by turning. Again, we need a successor-state axiom} \\ & \text{Poss}(a,s) \Longrightarrow \\ & \text{facing(result}(a,s)) = d \iff \\ & (a = \texttt{turnRight} \land d = \texttt{mod}(\texttt{facing}(s) + 1, 4)) \\ & \lor (a = \texttt{turnLeft} \land d = \texttt{mod}(\texttt{facing}(s) - 1, 4)) \\ & \lor (\texttt{facing}(s) = d \land a \neq \texttt{turnRight} \land a \neq \texttt{turnLeft}) \\ & \text{and so on} \end{array}$	<u>The qualification and ramification problems</u> Qualification problem: we are in general never completely certain what conditions are required for an action to be effective.Consider for example turning the key to start your car.This will lead to problems if important conditions are omitted from axioms.Ramification problem: actions tend to have implicit consequences that are large in number.For example, if I pick up a sandwich in a dodgy sandwich shop, I will also be picking up all the bugs that live in it. I don't want to model this explicitly.
237	238
$\label{eq:solving the ramification problem} \\ \begin{tabular}{lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	$\label{eq:constraint} \hline \underline{Deducing \ properties \ of \ the \ world: \ causal \ rules}}$ If you know where you are, then you can think about <i>places</i> rather than just <i>situ-ations</i> . Synchronic rules relate properties shared by a single state of the world. There are two kinds: <i>causal</i> and <i>diagnostic</i> . Causal rules: some properties of the world will produce percepts. WumpusAt(l_1) \land Adjacent(l_1, l_2) \Longrightarrow StenchAt(l_2) PitAt(l_1) \land Adjacent(l_1, l_2) \Longrightarrow BreezeAt(l_2) Systems reasoning with such rules are known as <i>model-based</i> reasoning systems.

# Deducing properties of the world: diagnostic rules General axioms for situations and objects Diagnostic rules: infer properties of the world from percepts. Note: in FOL, if we have two constants robot and gold then an interpretation is free to assign them to be the same thing. For example: $At(l, s) \wedge Breeze(s) \Longrightarrow BreezeAt(l)$ This is not something we want to allow. $At(l, s) \land Stench(s) \Longrightarrow StenchAt(l)$ Unique names axioms state that each pair of distinct items in our model of the world must be different These may not be very strong. $robot \neq gold$ The difference between model-based and diagnostic reasoning can be important. $robot \neq arrow$ For example, medical diagnosis can be done based on symptoms or based on a $robot \neq wumpus$ model of disease. : wumpus $\neq$ gold : 241 242 General axioms for situations and objects General axioms for situations and objects The situations are *ordered* so Unique actions axioms state that actions must share this property, so for each pair of actions $s_0 \neq \operatorname{result}(a, s)$ $qo(l, l') \neq qrab$ $go(l, l') \neq drop(o)$ and situations are *distinct* so : $\operatorname{result}(a,s) = \operatorname{result}(a',s') \iff a = a' \land s = s'$ $drop(o) \neq shoot$ Strictly speaking we should be using a many-sorted version of FOL. and in addition we need to define equality for actions, so for each action In such a system variables can be divided into *sorts* which are implicitly separate from one another. $qo(l, l') = qo(l'', l''') \iff l = l'' \land l' = l'''$ $drop(o) = drop(o') \iff o = o'$ ÷

The start state	Sequences of situations
Finally, we're going to need to specify what's true in the start state. For example $At(robot, [1, 1], s_0)$ $At(wumpus, [3, 4], s_0)$ $Has(robot, arrow, s_0)$ : and so on.	We know that the function result tells us about the situation resulting from performing an action in an earlier situation. How can this help us find <i>sequences of actions to get things done</i> ? Define Sequence( $[], s, s') = s' = s$ Sequence( $[a], s, s') = Poss(a, s) \land s' = result(a, s)$ Sequence( $a :: as, s, s') = \exists t$ . Sequence( $[a], s, t$ ) $\land$ Sequence( $as, t, s'$ ) To obtain a <i>sequence of actions that achieves</i> Goal( $s$ ) we can use the query $\exists a \exists s$ . Sequence( $a, s_0, s$ ) $\land$ Goal( $s$ )
245	246
<ul> <li><u>Knowledge representation and reasoning</u></li> <li>It should be clear that generating sequences of actions by inference in FOL is highly non-trivial.</li> <li>Ideally we'd like to maintain an <i>expressive</i> language while <i>restricting</i> it enough to be able to do inference <i>efficiently</i>.</li> <li><i>Further aims</i>:</li> <li>To give a brief introduction to <i>semantic networks</i> and <i>frames</i> for knowledge representation.</li> <li>To see how <i>inheritance</i> can be applied as a reasoning method.</li> <li>To look at the use of <i>rules</i> for knowledge representation, along with <i>forward chaining</i> and <i>backward chaining</i> for reasoning.</li> <li><i>Further reading: The Essence of Artificial Intelligence</i>, Alison Cawsey. Prentice Hall, 1998.</li> </ul>	Frames and semantic networks         Frames and semantic networks represent knowledge in the form of classes of objects and relationships between them:         • The subclass and instance relationships are emphasised.         • We form class hierarchies in which inheritance is supported and provides the main inference mechanism.         As a result inference is quite limited.         We also need to be extremely careful about semantics.         The only major difference between the two ideas is notational.



#### Rule-based systems

#### Other issues

- Slots and slot values can themselves be frames. For example Dementia may have an instrument slot with the value Electric harp, which itself may have properties described in a frame.
- Slots can have *specified attributes*. For example, we might specify that instrument can have multiple values, that each value can only be an instance of Instrument, that each value has a slot called owned\_by and so on.
- Slots may contain arbitrary pieces of program. This is known as *procedural attachment*. The fragment might be executed to return the slot's value, or update the values in other slots *etc*.

## A rule-based system requires three things:

1. A set of *if-then rules*. These denote specific pieces of knowledge about the world.

They should be interpreted similarly to logical implication.

Such rules denote *what to do* or *what can be inferred* under given circumstances.

- 2. A collection of *facts* denoting what the system regards as currently true about the world.
- 3. An interpreter able to apply the current rules in the light of the current facts.

253

# Forward chaining

The first of two basic kinds of interpreter *begins with established facts and then applies rules to them*.

This is a *data-driven* process. It is appropriate if we know the *initial facts* but not the required conclusion.

Example: XCON-used for configuring VAX computers.

In addition:

- We maintain a *working memory*, typically of what has been inferred so far.
- Rules are often *condition-action rules*, where the right-hand side specifies an action such as adding or removing something from working memory, printing a message *etc*.
- In some cases actions might be entire program fragments.

Forward chaining

254


The basic algorithm is:

1. Find all the rules that can fire, based on the current working memory.

2. Select a rule to fire. This requires a *conflict resolution strategy*.

3. Carry out the action specified, possibly updating the working memory.

Repeat this process until either *no rules can be used* or a *halt* appears in the working memory.



#### Reason maintenance

Some systems will allow information to be removed from the working memory if it is no longer *justified*.

For example, we might find that

patient\_coughing

and

patient\_smoker

are in working memory, and hence fire

 $\texttt{patient\_coughing} \ AND \ \texttt{patient\_smoker} \Longrightarrow ADD \ \texttt{lung\_cancer}$ 

but later infer something that causes patient\_coughing to be *withdrawn* from working memory.

The justification for lung\_cancer has been removed, and so it should perhaps be removed also.

#### 261

## Backward chaining

The second basic kind of interpreter begins with a *goal* and finds a rule that would achieve it.

It then works *backwards*, trying to achieve the resulting earlier goals in the succession of inferences.

Example: MYCIN-medical diagnosis with a small number of conditions.

This is a *goal-driven* process. If you want to *test a hypothesis* or you have some idea of a likely conclusion it can be more efficient than forward chaining.

## Pattern matching

In general rules may be expressed in a slightly more flexible form involving *variables* which can work in conjunction with *pattern matching*.

For example the rule

 $\operatorname{coughs}(X)$  AND  $\operatorname{smoker}(X) \Longrightarrow$  ADD  $\operatorname{lung\_cancer}(X)$ 

contains the variable X.

If the working memory contains coughs(neddy) and smoker(neddy) then


X = neddy

provides a match and

lung\_cancer(neddy)

is added to the working memory.

262



# Example with backtracking

If at some point more than one rule has the required conclusion then we can *back*-*track*.

Example: *Prolog* backtracks, and incorporates pattern matching. It orders attempts according to the order in which rules appear in the program.

Example: having added

 $up\_early \Longrightarrow ADD$  tired

and

 $\texttt{tired} \text{ AND} \texttt{lazy} \Longrightarrow \texttt{ADD} \texttt{go\_bar}$ 


265

Artificial Intelligence I

Dr Sean Holden

Notes on *planning* 

to the rules, and up\_early to the working memory:



- *Represent states*: and a state representation contains *everything* that's relevant about the environment.
- *Represent actions*: by describing a new state obtained from a current state.
- *Represent goals*: all we know is how to test a state either to see if it's a goal, or using a heuristic.
- A sequence of actions is a 'plan': but we only consider sequences of consecutive actions.

Search algorithms are good for solving problems that fit this framework. However for more complex problems they may fail completely...

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# Problem solving is different to planning Introduction to planning Representing a problem such as: 'go out and buy some pies' is hopeless: We now look at how an agent might *construct a plan* enabling it to achieve a goal. Aims: • There are *too many possible actions* at each step. • A heuristic can only help you rank states. In particular it does not help you • To look at how we might update our concept of knowledge representation and ignore useless actions. reasoning to apply more specifically to planning tasks. • We are forced to start at the initial state, but you have to work out how to get • To look in detail at the basic *partial-order planning algorithm*. the pies—that is, go to town and buy them, get online and find a web site that Reading: Russell and Norvig, chapter 11. sells pies etc-before you can start to do it. Knowledge representation and reasoning might not help either: although we end up with a sequence of actions—a plan—there is so much flexibility that complexity might well become an issue. 270 269 Planning algorithms work differently Planning algorithms work differently Difference 1: Difference 2: • Planning algorithms use a *special purpose language*—often based on FOL or • Planners can add actions at any relevant point at all between the start and the a subset— to represent states, goals, and actions. goal, not just at the end of a sequence starting at the start state. • States and goals are described by sentences, as might be expected, but... • This makes sense: I may determine that Have(carKeys) is a good state to be in without worrying about what happens before or after finding them. • ...actions are described by stating their *preconditions* and their *effects*. • By making an important decision like requiring Have(carKeys) early on we So if you know the goal includes (maybe among other things) may reduce branching and backtracking. Have(pie) • State descriptions are not complete—Have(carKeys) describes a *class of* states-and this adds flexibility. and action Buy(x) has an effect Have(x) then you know that a plan *including* So: you have the potential to search both forwards and backwards within the same Buy(pie) problem. might be reasonable.

## Planning algorithms work differently Running example: gorilla-based mischief Difference 3: We will use the following simple example problem, which as based on a similar one due to Russell and Norvig. It is assumed that most elements of the environment are *independent of most other* The intrepid little scamps in the Cambridge University Roof-Climbing Society elements. wish to attach an *inflatable gorilla* to the spire of a *Famous College*. To do this • A goal including several requirements can be attacked with a divide-and-conquer they need to leave home and obtain: approach. • An inflatable gorilla: these can be purchased from all good joke shops. • Each individual requirement can be fulfilled using a subplan... • Some rope: available from a hardware store. • ...and the subplans then combined. • A first-aid kit: also available from a hardware store. This works provided there is not significant interaction between the subplans. They need to return home after they've finished their shopping. Remember: the frame problem. How do they go about planning their *jolly escapade*? 273 274 The STRIPS language The STRIPS language STRIPS: "Stanford Research Institute Problem Solver" (1970). STRIPS represents actions using operators. For example States: are conjunctions of ground literals. They must not include function sym-At(x), Path(x, y)bols. $At(home) \land \neg Have(gorilla)$ Go(y) $\wedge \neg Have(rope)$ $At(y), \neg At(x)$ $\wedge \neg \text{Have}(\text{kit})$ Goals: are conjunctions of literals where variables are assumed existentially quantified. Op(Action: Go(y), Pre: At(x) $\land$ Path(x, y), Effect: At(y) $\land \neg$ At(x)) $At(x) \wedge Sells(x, gorilla)$ All variables are implicitly universally quantified. An operator has: A planner finds a sequence of actions that when performed makes the goal true. We are no longer employing a full theorem-prover. • An *action description*: what the action does. • A precondition: what must be true before the operator can be used. A conjunction of positive literals. • An effect: what is true after the operator has been used. A conjunction of literals. 275 276

The space of plans	Representing a plan: partial order planners
We now make a change in perspective—we search in <i>plan space</i> :	When putting on your shoes and socks:
<ul> <li>Start with an <i>empty plan</i>.</li> <li><i>Operate on it</i> to obtain new plans. Incomplete plans are called <i>partial plans</i>. <i>Refinement operators</i> add constraints to a partial plan. All other operators are called <i>modification operators</i>.</li> <li>Continue until we obtain a plan that solves the problem.</li> <li>Operations on plans can be: <ul> <li><i>Adding a step</i>.</li> <li><i>Instantiating a variable</i>.</li> <li><i>Imposing an ordering</i> that places a step in front of another.</li> <li>and so on</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul> <li>It <i>does not matter</i> whether you deal with your left or right foot first.</li> <li>It <i>does matter</i> that you place a sock on <i>before</i> a shoe, for any given foot.</li> <li>It makes sense in constructing a plan <i>not</i> to make any <i>commitment</i> to which side is done first <i>if you don't have to</i>.</li> <li><i>Principle of least commitment</i>: do not commit to any specific choices until you have to. This can be applied both to ordering and to instantiation of variables. A <i>partial order planner</i> allows plans to specify that some steps must come before others but others have no ordering. A <i>linearisation</i> of such a plan imposes a specific sequence on the actions therein.</li> </ul>
277	278
Representing a plan: partial order planners	Representing a plan: partial order planners
A plan consists of:	The <i>initial plan</i> has:
<ol> <li>A set {S<sub>1</sub>, S<sub>2</sub>,, S<sub>n</sub>} of <i>steps</i>. Each of these is one of the available <i>operators</i>.</li> <li>A set of <i>ordering constraints</i>. An ordering constraint S<sub>i</sub> &lt; S<sub>j</sub> denotes the fact that step S<sub>i</sub> must happen before step S<sub>j</sub>. S<sub>i</sub> &lt; S<sub>j</sub> &lt; S<sub>k</sub> and so on has the obvious meaning. S<sub>i</sub> &lt; S<sub>j</sub> does <i>not</i> mean that S<sub>i</sub> must <i>immediately</i> precede S<sub>j</sub>.</li> <li>A set of variable bindings v = x where v is a variable and x is either a variable or a constant.</li> <li>A set of <i>causal links</i> or <i>protection intervals</i> S<sub>i</sub> <sup>c</sup>→ S<sub>j</sub>. This denotes the fact that the purpose of S<sub>i</sub> is to achieve the precondition c for S<sub>j</sub>.</li> <li>A causal link is <i>always</i> paired with an equivalent ordering constraint.</li> </ol>	<ul> <li>Two steps, called Start and Finish.</li> <li>a single ordering constraint Start &lt; Finish.</li> <li>No variable bindings.</li> <li>No causal links.</li> <li>In addition to this:</li> <li>The step Start has no preconditions, and its effect is the start state for the problem.</li> <li>The step Finish has no effect, and its precondition is the goal.</li> <li>Neither Start or Finish has an associated action.</li> <li>We now need to consider what constitutes a <i>solution</i></li> </ul>

# Solutions to planning problems

A solution to a planning problem is any *complete* and *consistent* partially ordered plan.

*Complete*: each precondition of each step is *achieved* by another step in the solution.

A precondition c for S is achieved by a step S' if:

1. The precondition is an effect of the step

 $S' < S \text{ and } c \in \mathrm{Effects}(S')$ 

and...

- 2. ... there is *no other* step that *could* cancel the precondition. That is, no S'' exists where:
  - The existing ordering constraints allow S'' to occur *after* S' but *before* S.
  - $\neg c \in \operatorname{Effects}(S'')$ .

Solutions to planning problems


*Consistent*: no contradictions exist in the binding constraints or in the proposed ordering. That is:


1. For binding constraints, we never have v = X and v = Y for distinct constants X and Y.


2. For the ordering, we never have S < S' and S' < S.

Returning to the roof-climber's shopping expedition, here is the basic approach:

- Begin with only the Start and Finish steps in the plan.
- At each stage add a new step.
- Always add a new step such that a *currently non-achieved precondition is achieved*.
- Backtrack when necessary.







# The algorithm

# The algorithm

Simplifying slightly to the case where there are no variables.

Say we have a partially completed plan and a set of the preconditions that have yet to be achieved.

- Select a precondition p that has not yet been achieved and is associated with an action B.
- At each stage the partially complete plan is expanded into a new collection of plans.
- To expand a plan, we can try to achieve p *either* by using an action that's already in the plan or by adding a new action to the plan. In either case, call the action A.

We then try to construct consistent plans where A achieves p.

This works as follows:

- For each possible way of achieving p:
  - Add Start < A, A < Finish, A < B and the causal link  $A \xrightarrow{p} B$  to the plan.
  - If the resulting plan is consistent we're done, otherwise *generate all possible ways of removing inconsistencies* by promotion or demotion and *keep any resulting consistent plans*.

At this stage:

• If you have no further preconditions that haven't been achieved then any plan obtained is valid.

# Possible threats

294

What about dealing with variables?

If at any stage an effect  $\neg At(x)$  appears, is it a threat to At(JS)?

Such an occurrence is called a *possible threat* and we can deal with it by introducing *inequality constraints*: in this case  $x \neq JS$ .

- Each partially complete plan now has a set *I* of inequality constraints associated with it.
- An inequality constraint has the form  $v \neq X$  where v is a variable and X is a variable or a constant.
- Whenever we try to make a substitution we check *I* to make sure we won't introduce a conflict.

If we *would* introduce a conflict then we discard the partially completed plan as inconsistent.

293

# The algorithm

But how do we try to enforce consistency?

When you attempt to achieve p using A:

- Find all the existing causal links  $A' \stackrel{\neg p}{\rightarrow} B'$  that are *clobbered* by A.
- For each of those you can try adding A < A' or B' < A to the plan.
- Find all existing actions C in the plan that clobber the *new* causal link  $A \xrightarrow{p} B$ .
- For each of those you can try adding C < A or B < C to the plan.
- Generate *every possible combination* in this way and retain any consistent plans that result.

# Artificial Intelligence I

Dr Sean Holden

Notes on machine learning using neural networks

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297

# Did you heed the DIRE WARNING?

2. Let  $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$  be a function. Now assume  $x_i = g_i(y_1, \ldots, y_m)$  for each  $x_i$  and some collection of functions  $g_i$ . Assuming all requirements for differentiability and so on are met, can you write down an expression for  $\partial f/\partial y_j$  where  $1 \le j \le m$ ?

Answer: this is just the chain rule for partial differentiation

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial y_j} = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial f}{\partial g_i} \frac{\partial g_i}{\partial y_j}$$

# Did you heed the DIRE WARNING?

At the beginning of the course I suggested making sure you can answer the following two questions:

1. Let

$$f(x_1,\ldots,x_n) = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i x_i^2$$

where the  $a_i$  are constants. Compute  $\partial f / \partial x_j$  where  $1 \le j \le n$ ? Answer: As

$$f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = a_1 x_1^2 + \dots + a_j x_j^2 + \dots + a_n x_n^2$$

only one term in the sum depends on  $x_j$ , so all the other terms differentiate to give 0 and

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial x_j} = 2a_j x_j$$

298

# Supervised learning with neural networks

We now look at how an agent might *learn* to solve a general problem by seeing *examples*.

Aims:

- To present an outline of *supervised learning* as part of AI.
- To introduce much of the notation and terminology used.
- To introduce the classical *perceptron*.
- To introduce *multilayer perceptrons* and the *backpropagation algorithm* for training them.

Reading: Russell and Norvig chapter 20.

# An example

A common source of problems in AI is medical diagnosis.

Imagine that we want to automate the diagnosis of an Embarrassing Disease (call it *D*) by constructing a machine:



Could we do this by *explicitly writing a program* that examines the measurements and outputs a diagnosis?

Experience suggests that this is unlikely.

### An example, continued...

An alternative approach: each collection of measurements can be written as a vector,  $T_{T} = C_{T}$ 

 $(x_n)$ 

$$\mathbf{x}' = (x_1 \ x_2 \ \cdots$$

where,

$$x_1$$
 = heart rate  
 $x_2$  = blood pressure  
 $x_3$  = 1 if the patient has green spots  
0 otherwise  
:  
and so on

(*Note*: it's a common convention that vectors are *column vectors* by default. This is why the above is written as a *transpose*.)

301

# An example, continued...

A vector of this kind contains all the measurements for a single patient and is called a *feature vector* or *instance*.

The measurements are *attributes* or *features*.

Attributes or features generally appear as one of three basic types:

- Continuous:  $x_i \in [x_{\min}, x_{\max}]$  where  $x_{\min}, x_{\max} \in \mathbb{R}$ .
- *Binary*:  $x_i \in \{0, 1\}$  or  $x_i \in \{-1, +1\}$ .
- *Discrete*:  $x_i$  can take one of a finite number of values, say  $x_i \in \{X_1, \ldots, X_p\}$ .

An example, continued...

302

Now imagine that we have a large collection of patient histories (m in total) and for each of these we know whether or not the patient suffered from D.

- The *i*th patient history gives us an instance  $x_i$ .
- This can be paired with a single bit—0 or 1—denoting whether or not the *i*th patient suffers from D. The resulting pair is called an *example* or a *labelled example*.
- Collecting all the examples together we obtain a *training sequence*

 $\mathbf{s} = ((\mathbf{x}_1, 0), (\mathbf{x}_2, 1), \dots, (\mathbf{x}_m, 0))$ 

# An example, continued...

In supervised machine learning we aim to design a *learning algorithm* which takes s and produces a *hypothesis* h.

s \_\_\_\_\_ Learning Algorithm \_\_\_\_\_ h

Intuitively, a hypothesis is something that lets us diagnose *new* patients. This is *IMPORTANT*: we want to diagnose patients that *the system has never seen*. The ability to do this successfully is called *generalisation*.

# An example, continued...

In fact, a hypothesis is just a *function* that maps *instances* to *labels*.



As h is a function it assigns a label to any x and not just the ones that were in the training sequence.

What we mean by a *label* here depends on whether we're doing *classification* or *regression*.

305

# Supervised learning: classification

In *classification* we're assigning x to one of a set  $\{\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_c\}$  of *c* classes.

For example, if x contains measurements taken from a patient then there might be three classes:

- $\omega_1 =$  patient has disease
- $\omega_2 =$  patient doesn't have disease
- $\omega_3 =$ don't ask me buddy, I'm just a computer!

The *binary* case above also fits into this framework, and we'll often specialise to the case of two classes, denoted  $C_1$  and  $C_2$ .

Supervised learning: regression

306

In *regression* we're assigning  $\mathbf{x}$  to a *real number*  $h(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathbb{R}$ .


For example, if x contains measurements taken regarding today's weather then we might have

 $h(\mathbf{x}) =$  estimate of amount of rainfall expected tomorrow

For the two-class classification problem we will also refer to a situation somewhat between the two, where

$$h(\mathbf{x}) = \Pr(\mathbf{x} \text{ is in } C_1)$$

and so we would typically assign x to class  $C_1$  if  $h(\mathbf{x}) > 1/2$ .



# This is very similar to curve fitting

Curve fitting


This process is in fact very similar to curve fitting.


Think of the process as follows:

- Nature picks an  $h' \in \mathcal{H}$  but doesn't reveal it to us.
- Nature then shows us a training sequence s where each  $\mathbf{x}_i$  is labelled as  $h'(\mathbf{x}_i) + \epsilon_i$  where  $\epsilon_i$  is noise of some kind.

Our job is to try to infer what h' is on the basis of s only.

This is easy to visualise in one dimension: *it's just fitting a curve to some points*.






The line is dashed to emphasise the fact that we don't get to see it.

313

# Curve fitting

We can now use h' to obtain a training sequence s in the manner suggested.



# Here we have,

 $\mathbf{s}^{T} = ((x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2), \dots, (x_m, y_m))$ 

where each  $x_i$  and  $y_i$  is a real number.

# Curve fitting

314

We'll use a *learning algorithm* L that operates in a reasonable-looking way: it picks an  $h \in \mathcal{H}$  minimising the following quantity,

$$E = \sum_{i=1}^{m} (h(x_i) - y_i)^2$$

In other words

$$h = L(\mathbf{s}) = \operatorname*{argmin}_{h \in \mathcal{H}} \sum_{i=1}^{m} (h(x_i) - y_i)^2$$

Why is this sensible?

1. Each term in the sum is 0 if  $h(x_i)$  is exactly  $y_i$ .

2. Each term *increases* as the difference between  $h(x_i)$  and  $y_i$  increases.

3. We add the terms for all examples.

# Curve fitting

If we pick h using this method then we get:

# $\begin{array}{c} 0.6 \\ 0.4 \\ 0.2 \\ 0.5 \\$

The chosen h is close to the target h', even though it was chosen *using only a small* number of noisy examples.

It is not quite identical to the target concept.


However if we were given a new point  $\mathbf{x}'$  and asked to guess the value  $h'(\mathbf{x}')$  then guessing  $h(\mathbf{x}')$  might be expected to do quite well.

# Curve fitting

*Problem*: we don't know *what*  $\mathcal{H}$  *nature is using*. What if the one we choose doesn't match? We can make *our*  $\mathcal{H}$  'bigger' by defining it as

 $\mathcal{H} = \{h : h \text{ is a polynomial of degree at most } 5\}$ 

If we use the same learning algorithm then we get:



The result in this case is similar to the previous one: h is again quite close to h', but not quite identical.


318

# Curve fitting

So we have to make H huge, right? WRONG!!! With

 $\mathcal{H} = \{h : h \text{ is a polynomial of degree at most } 25\}$ 

we get:



BEWARE!!! This is known as overfitting.


# Curve fitting

317

So what's the problem? Repeating the process with,

 $\mathcal{H} = \{h : h \text{ is a polynomial of degree at most } 1\}$ 

gives the following:



In effect, we have made *our*  $\mathcal{H}$  too 'small'. It does not in fact contain any hypothesis similar to h'.

# Curve fitting

# Curve fitting

An experiment to gain some further insight: using

$$h'(x) = \frac{1}{10}x^{10} - \frac{1}{12}x^8 + \frac{1}{15}x^6 + \frac{1}{3}x^3 - \frac{3}{2}x^2 + 2x - \frac{1}{2}.$$

as the unknown underlying function.

We can look at how the degree of the polynomial the training algorithm can output affects the generalisation ability of the resulting h.

We use the same training algorithm, and we train using

 $\mathcal{H} = \{h : h \text{ is a polynomial of degree at most } d\}$ 

for values of d ranging from 1 to 30

• Each time we obtain an h of a given degree—call it  $h_d$ —we assess its quality using a further 100 inputs  $\mathbf{x}'_i$  generated at random and calculating


$$q(d) = \frac{1}{100} \sum_{i=1}^{100} (h'(\mathbf{x}'_i) - h_d(\mathbf{x}'_i))^2$$

- As the values q(d) are found using inputs that are not necessarily included in the training sequence *they measure generalisation*.
- To smooth out the effects of the random selection of examples we repeat this process 100 times and average the values q(d).

321


# Curve fitting

Here is the result:



10

5



Clearly: we need to choose  $\mathcal{H}$  sensibly if we want to obtain *good generalisation performance*.

### 322

# The perceptron

The example just given illustrates much of what we want to do. However in practice we deal with *more than a single dimension*.

The simplest form of hypothesis used is the *linear discriminant*, also known as the *perceptron*. Here

$$h(\mathbf{w}; \mathbf{x}) = \sigma \left( w_0 + \sum_{i=1}^m w_i x_i \right) = \sigma \left( w_0 + w_1 x_1 + w_2 x_2 + \dots + w_n x_n \right)$$

So: we have a *linear function* modified by the *activation function*  $\sigma$ .

The perceptron's influence continues to be felt in the recent and ongoing development of *support vector machines*.

# The perceptron activation function I

There are three standard forms for the activation function:

1. Linear: for regression problems we often use

 $\sigma(z) = z$ 

2. Step: for two-class classification problems we often use

$$\sigma(z) = \begin{cases} C_1 & \text{if } z > 0\\ C_2 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

3. Sigmoid/Logistic: for probabilistic classification we often use

$$\Pr(\mathbf{x} \text{ is in } C_1) = \sigma(z) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-z)}.$$

The *step function* is important but the algorithms involved are somewhat different to those we'll be seeing. We won't consider it further.

The sigmoid/logistic function plays a major role in what follows.

325

# Gradient descent

A method for *training a basic perceptron* works as follows. Assume we're dealing with a *regression problem* and using  $\sigma(z) = z$ .

We define a measure of *error* for a given collection of weights. For example


$$E(\mathbf{w}) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} (y_i - h(\mathbf{w}; \mathbf{x}_i))^2$$

Modifying our notation slightly so that

$$\mathbf{x}^T = (1 \ x_1 \ x_2 \ \cdots \ x_n)$$
$$\mathbf{w}^T = (w_0 \ w_1 \ w_2 \ \cdots \ w_n$$

lets us write

$$E(\mathbf{w}) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} (y_i - \mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{x}_i)^2$$



# Gradient descent

We want to *minimise*  $E(\mathbf{w})$ .

One way to approach this is to start with a random  $\mathbf{w}_0$  and update it as follows:

$$\mathbf{w}_{t+1} = \mathbf{w}_t - \eta \left. \frac{\partial E(\mathbf{w})}{\partial \mathbf{w}} \right|_{\mathbf{w}_t}$$

where

$$\frac{\partial E(\mathbf{w})}{\partial \mathbf{w}} = \left(\begin{array}{cc} \frac{\partial E(\mathbf{w})}{\partial w_0} & \frac{\partial E(\mathbf{w})}{\partial w_1} & \cdots & \frac{\partial E(\mathbf{w})}{\partial w_n} \end{array}\right)^T$$

and  $\eta$  is some small positive number.

The vector

$$\partial E(\mathbf{w})$$

 $\partial \mathbf{w}$  tells us the *direction of the steepest decrease in*  $E(\mathbf{w})$ .


Gradient descent

# With

$$E(\mathbf{w}) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} (y_i - \mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{x}_i)^2$$

we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial E(\mathbf{w})}{\partial w_j} &= \frac{\partial}{\partial w_j} \left( \sum_{i=1}^m (y_i - \mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{x}_i)^2 \right) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^m \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial w_j} (y_i - \mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{x}_i)^2 \right) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^m \left( 2(y_i - \mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{x}_i) \frac{\partial}{\partial w_j} \left( -\mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{x}_i \right) \right) \\ &= -\mathbf{x}_i^{(j)} \sum_{i=1}^m 2\left( y_i - \mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{x}_i \right) \end{aligned}$$




 $\partial E($ 

329

Perceptrons aren't very powerful: the parity problem

There are many problems a perceptron can't solve.



We need a network that computes *more interesting functions*.

# Gradient descent

The method therefore gives the algorithm

$$\mathbf{w}_{t+1} = \mathbf{w}_t + 2\eta \sum_{i=1}^m \left( y_i - \mathbf{w}_t^T \mathbf{x}_i \right) \mathbf{x}_i$$


Some things to note:

- In this case  $E(\mathbf{w})$  is *parabolic* and has a *unique global minimum* and *no local* minima so this works well.
- Gradient descent in some form is a very common approach to this kind of problem.
- We can perform a similar calculation for *other activation functions* and for other definitions for  $E(\mathbf{w})$ .
- Such calculations lead to *different algorithms*.

330

The multilayer perceptron

Each *node* in the network is itself a perceptron:



- Weights  $w_i$  connect nodes together.
- $a_j$  is the weighted sum or *activation* for node j.
- $\sigma$  is the *activation function*.
- The *output* is  $z_i = \sigma(a_i)$ .

# The multilayer perceptron

Reminder:

We'll continue to use the notation

$$\mathbf{z}^T = (1 \ z_1 \ z_2 \ \cdots \ z_n)$$
$$\mathbf{w}^T = (w_0 \ w_1 \ w_2 \ \cdots \ w_n)$$

So that


$$\sum_{i=0}^{n} w_i z_i = w_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i z_i$$
$$= \mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{z}$$

333

Backpropagation

# The multilayer perceptron

In the general case we have a *completely unrestricted feedforward structure*:



*Each node* is a perceptron. *No specific layering* is assumed.  $w_{i \rightarrow j}$  connects node *i* to node *j*.  $w_0$  for node *j* is denoted  $w_{0 \rightarrow j}$ .

334

# Backpropagation: the general case

The *central task* is therefore to calculate

$$\frac{\partial E(\mathbf{w})}{\partial \mathbf{w}}$$

To do that we need to calculate the individual quantities

$$\frac{\partial E(\mathbf{w})}{\partial w_{i \to j}}$$

for every weight  $w_{i \to j}$  in the network.

Often  $E(\mathbf{w})$  is the sum of separate components, one for each example in s

$$E(\mathbf{w}) = \sum_{p=1}^{m} E_p(\mathbf{w})$$

in which case

$$\frac{\partial E(\mathbf{w})}{\partial \mathbf{w}} = \sum_{p=1}^{m} \frac{\partial E_p(\mathbf{w})}{\partial \mathbf{w}}$$

We can therefore consider examples individually.

As usual we have:

- Instances  $\mathbf{x}^T = (x_1, \ldots, x_n).$
- A training sequence  $\mathbf{s} = ((\mathbf{x}_1, y_1), \dots, (\mathbf{x}_m, y_m)).$

We also define a measure of training error

 $E(\mathbf{w}) =$  measure of the error of the network on s

where w is the vector of *all the weights in the network*.

Our aim is to find a set of weights that *minimises*  $E(\mathbf{w})$  using *gradient descent*.

# Backpropagation: the general case

Place example p at the input and calculate  $a_j$  and  $z_j$  for all nodes including the output y. This is forward propagation.

We have

 $\frac{\partial E_p(\mathbf{w})}{\partial w_{i \to j}} = \frac{\partial E_p(\mathbf{w})}{\partial a_j} \frac{\partial a_j}{\partial w_{i \to j}}$ 

where  $a_j = \sum_k w_{k \to j} z_k$ .

Here the sum is over all the nodes connected to node j. As

$$\frac{\partial a_j}{\partial w_{i \to j}} = \frac{\partial}{\partial w_{i \to j}} \left( \sum_k w_{k \to j} z_k \right) = z_i$$

we can write

$$\frac{\partial E_p(\mathbf{w})}{\partial w_{i \to j}} = \delta_j z_i$$

where we've defined

$$\tilde{b}_j = \frac{\partial E_p(\mathbf{w})}{\partial a_j}$$

337

# Backpropagation: the general case

So we now need to calculate the values for  $\delta_j$ ...

When j is the *output node*—that is, the one producing the output  $y = h(\mathbf{w}; \mathbf{x}_p)$  of the network—this is easy as  $z_i = y$  and

$$\begin{split} \delta_j &= \frac{\partial E_p(\mathbf{w})}{\partial a_j} \\ &= \frac{\partial E_p(\mathbf{w})}{\partial y} \frac{\partial y}{\partial a_j} \\ &= \frac{\partial E_p(\mathbf{w})}{\partial y} \sigma'(a_j) \end{split}$$

using the fact that  $y = \sigma(a_j)$ .

338

# Backpropagation: the general case

The first term is in general easy to calculate for a given E as the error is generally just a measure of the distance between y and the label in the training sequence.

*Example:* when


 $E_p(\mathbf{w}) = (y - y_p)^2$ 

we have

$$\frac{\partial E_p(\mathbf{w})}{\partial y} = 2(y - y_p)$$
$$= 2(h(\mathbf{w}; \mathbf{x}_p) - y_p)$$

Backpropagation: the general case


When *j* is *not an output node* we need something different:



We're interested in

$$\delta_j = \frac{\partial E_p(\mathbf{w})}{\partial a_j}$$

Altering  $a_j$  can affect several other nodes  $k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_q$  each of which can in turn affect  $E_p(\mathbf{w})$ .



# Putting it all together

We can then use the derivatives in one of two basic ways:

*Batch*: (as described previously)

$$\frac{\partial E(\mathbf{w})}{\partial \mathbf{w}} = \sum_{p=1}^{m} \frac{\partial E_p(\mathbf{w})}{\partial \mathbf{w}}$$

 $\partial \mathbf{w}$ 


then

 $\partial E(\mathbf{w})$  $\mathbf{w}_{t+1} = \mathbf{w}_t - \eta$ 


Sequential: using just one pattern at once

$$\mathbf{w}_{t+1} = \mathbf{w}_t - \eta \left. \frac{\partial E_p(\mathbf{w})}{\partial \mathbf{w}} \right|_{\mathbf{w}}$$

selecting patterns in sequence or at random.



349



# Example: the parity problem revisited

As an example we show the result of training a network with:

- Two inputs.
- One output.
- One hidden layer containing 5 units.
- $\eta = 0.01$ .
- All other details as above.

The problem is the parity problem. There are 40 noisy examples.

The sequential approach is used, with 1000 repetitions through the entire training sequence.

350

# Example: the parity problem revisited

