# Honeycomb **Automated NIDS Signature Creation using Honeypots**

#### **The Problem**

Creating signatures for Network Intrusion Detection Systems is difficult for a number of reasons:

- The process is manual, slow and errorprone, leading to signatures that often are either too narrow (causing false negatives) or too loose (causing false positives).
- Good signatures require **detailed knowledge** of the specific traffic phenomenon they are designed to capture.

## **Our Approach**

Honeycomb applies protocol analysis and pattern detection techniques to network traffic on honeypots, without hardcoding any application-specific knowledge. This approach has the following benefits:

- Traffic on a honeypot can be assumed to be malicious.
- Traffic volumes are manageable as honeypots see comparatively little traffic.

The results are automatically-generated, precise signatures for malicious traffic.

### System Design

Our system is a pluggable extension to the open-source honeypot honeyd. The Honeycomb plugin runs within honeyd and hooks



itself into the connection state engine and the traffic entering and leaving honeyd.

#### **Signature Creation Algorithm** The algorithm triggers on two major events: **Packet interception** In- and outgoing packets are intercepted and analyzed in two phases: **Protocol Analysis** tests headers for Connection State Update protocol compliance. Payload Analysis Signature Report looks for repeated patterns within flow data. For each known Connection New signatures are File Output added to a signature Signature<sup>4</sup> pool, dropped if they Signature Pool Update are duplicates, or used to augment existing signatures. **Periodic timeouts** The signature pool is periodically reported to configurable output mechanisms, currently producing Bro or Snort signatures. **Flow Reassembly**

Honeycomb performs per-direction flow reassembly, creating connection state as a sequence of messages. Terminated

connections are marked but not immediately released, as the system uses them to look for traffic patterns later on.



### LCS Algorithm

Honeycomb uses an O(n) longest-commonsubstring algorithm based on a suffix tree implementation to detect patterns in the flow messages.



#### **Christian Kreibich**

christian.kreibich@cl.cam.ac.uk





#### **Message Pattern Detection**

Honeycomb employs two pattern detection strategies:

- Horizontal Detection applies LCS to individual messages at the same depth.
- Vertical Detection concatenates a number of messages before applying LCS. This improves detection in interactive

sessions and masks TCP protocol dyna-





### **Initial Results**

Our tests have produced **encouraging** results, particularly for worm detection:

The system generated full signatures for the SQL Slammer and Code Red II worms.

1 D8 89|E|B4|j|10 8D|E|B0|P1|C9|Qf|81 F1|x|01|Q|8D|E|03|P|8B|E|AC|E

Aggregating identical signatures by destination ports reduces the number of signatures and is well-suited to capture portscans.

#### Summary

The system works and creates useful signatures. Future work will include minimizing the per-packet overhead and approximate pattern detection to allow generation of regular-expression type signatures.









