

A Hybrid Decentralised Topology for Recommendations with Improved Privacy

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

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Background and Motivation


- Recommender systems using matrix factorisation to update factors P and Q .



(Source - <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/fundamental-matrix-factorization-recommender-system-saurav-kumar>)

- Distributed approaches promise increased privacy.
 - Update locally, only share Q (item factors), and then aggregate on a server or with neighbours.
- However, sharing Q can leak information about the user profile.

Distributed Learning Topologies



- **Federated Learning (FL)**
 - Clients communicate only with a central server.
- **Anonymous Random Walks (FL-ARW)**
 - Clients communicate in sequential walks before communicating with server.
 - Small (Beta) probability of not updating the model weights.
- **Gossip-learning ARW (GL-ARW)**
 - ARW, but with no central server.

Privacy Attacks

- Distance correlation.
 - Measure mutual information between profiles and updates

$$dCorr(X, Y) := \frac{dCov(X, Y)}{\sqrt{dVar(X)dVar(Y)}}$$

- Profile reconstruction.
 - PCA on updates can easily reconstruct profiles from updates.
- Membership inference.
 - Linear Regression method + prior knowledge can find who contributed to an update.

Algorithm 2: Estimate rated items of client k

- 1 **Require:** Updated local item factors Q^k , previous global item factors Q ;
 - 2 Compute $D = Q^k - Q$;
 - 3 Select C , the sub-matrix of non-zeros rows D ;
 - 4 Compute covariance matrix G from C ;
 - 5 Compute principal eigenvector e with largest G eigenvalue;
 - 6 Return $e^T D$: estimation of user's rating preferences.
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


Figure 2: (A) PCA vectors and plotted items in a 2d matrix factorisation update. (B) Plotted representations of items in an update to which multiple users have contributed

Results

- ARW converges faster when measured in communication cost (fig. 3).
- ARW leaks less information when measured via distance correlation (fig. 4).
- ARW variants are more robust to profile reconstruction attack (fig. 6).
- ARW becomes more robust to membership inference as walk length increased (fig. 8)




Figure 3: Convergence for the various topologies on three, measuring HitRatio@10 against communication cost. The number after ARW indicates the ratio of random walks to clients.




Figure 4: Average distance correlation under different topologies (lower value is better).




Figure 6: Profile Reconstruction Attack success rate




Figure 8: Membership inference varying the walk length.

