

Side Channels

*The hum of either army stilly sounds,
That the fixed sentinels almost receive
The secret whispers of each others' watch;
Fire answers fire, and through their paly flames
Each battle sees the other's umber'd face.*

– WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY V, ACT IV

*Optimisation consists of taking something that works and replacing
it with something that almost works but is cheaper.*

– ROGER NEEDHAM

19.1 Introduction

Electronic devices such as computers and phones leak information in all sorts of ways. A *side channel* is where information leaks accidentally via some medium that was not designed or intended for communication; a *covert channel* is where the leak is deliberate. Side channel attacks are everywhere, and 3–4 of them have caused multi-billion dollar losses.

1. First, there are conducted or radiated electromagnetic signals, which can compromise information locally and occasionally at longer ranges. These ‘Tempest’ attacks led NATO governments to spend billions of dollars a year on shielding equipment, starting in the 1960s. After the end of the Cold War, people started to realise that there had usually been nobody listening.
2. Second, side channels leak data between tasks on a single device, or between devices that are closely coupled; these can exploit both power and timing information, and also contention for shared system resources. The discovery of Differential Power Analysis in the late 1990s held up the deployment of smartcards in banking and elsewhere by 2–3 years once it was realised that all the cards then on sale were vulnerable.

3. The third multibillion-dollar incident started in January 2018 with the announcement of the ‘Spectre’ and ‘Meltdown’ attacks, which exploit speculative execution to enable one process on a CPU to snoop on another, for example to steal its cryptographic keys. This will probably force the redesign of all superscalar CPUs over 2020–5.
4. There are attacks that exploit shared local physical resources, such as when a phone listens to keystrokes entered on a nearby keyboard, or indeed on a keyboard on its own touch screen – whether that sensing is done with microphones, the accelerometer and gyro, or even the camera. Another example is that a laser pulse can create a click on a microphone, so a voice command can be given to a home assistant through a window. So far, none of the side-channel attacks on phones and other IoT devices has scaled up to have major impact – but there are ever more of them.
5. Finally, there are attacks that exploit shared social resources. An example is identifying someone in a supposedly anonymous dataset from patterns of communications, location history or even just knowing when they went on holiday. This has led to many poor policy decisions and much wishful thinking around whether personal data can be anonymised sufficiently to escape privacy law. There have been both scandalous data leaks, and complaints that data should be made more available for research and other uses. It’s hard to put a dollar value on this, but it is significant in fields such as medical research, as we discussed in Chapter 11.

We have known about side channels for years but have consistently underestimated the importance of some, while spending unreasonable sums on defending against others. A security engineer who wants to protect systems long-term without either overlooking real and scalable threats, or wasting money chasing shadows, needs to understand the basics.

19.2 Emission security

Emission security, or Emsec, is about preventing attacks using *compromising emanations*, namely conducted or radiated electromagnetic signals. It’s mostly military organizations that worry about *Tempest*, where the stray RF emitted by computers and other electronic equipment is picked up by an opponent and used to reconstruct the data being processed. It has become an issue for voting machines too, after a Dutch group found they could tell at a distance which party a voter had selected on a voting machine, and attacks have also been demonstrated on automatic teller machines (though these don’t really scale).

Both active and passive emission security measures are closely related to *electromagnetic compatibility* (EMC) and *radio frequency interference* (RFI),

which can disrupt systems accidentally, as well as *electromagnetic pulse* (EMP) weapons, which disrupt them deliberately. (I discuss these in more detail in the chapter on electronic warfare.) As more and more everyday devices get hooked up to wireless networks, and as devices acquire more sensors, all these problems – RFI/EMC, side channels and electronic warfare threats – may get worse.

19.2.1 History

Crosstalk between telephone wires was well known to the 19th century telephony pioneers, whose two-wire circuits were stacked on tiers of crosstrees on supporting poles. They learned to cross the wires over at intervals to make each circuit a twisted pair. Crosstalk first came to the attention of the military in 1884–85, and the first known combat exploit was in 1914. Field telephone wires were laid to connect units bogged down in the mud of Flanders, and often ran for miles, parallel to enemy trenches a few hundred yards away. An early WWI phone circuit was a single-core insulated cable which used earth return in order to halve the cable's weight and bulk. It was soon discovered that earth leakage caused crosstalk, including messages from the enemy side. Listening posts were quickly established and protective measures were introduced, including the use of twisted-pair cable. By 1915, valve amplifiers had extended the earth leakage listening range to 100 yards for telephony and 300 yards for Morse code. People found that the tangle of abandoned telegraph wire in no-man's land provided such a good communications channel, and leaked so much traffic, that clearing it away became a task for which lives were spent. By 1916, earth return circuits had been abolished within 3000 yards of the front [1382].

The intelligence community discovered side-channel attacks on cryptographic equipment around World War 2, when Bell sold the US government a mixer to add one-time tapes to telegraph traffic and discovered plaintext leaking out in ciphertext. Through the 1950s, both the USA and the UK struggled to suppress electromagnetic and acoustic emanations from their own cipher machines; from 1957 there was a machine, the KW-27, which was 'reasonably well protected' against Tempest emissions. In 1960, after the UK Prime Minister ordered surveillance on the French embassy during negotiations about joining the European Economic Community, his security service's scientists noticed that the enciphered traffic from the embassy carried a faint plaintext signal, and constructed equipment to recover it. By the 1960s, NATO started work on Tempest standards; America and Britain gave their European allies selective and incomplete security advice, so they could continue to spy on them. Meanwhile the Russians developed serious proficiency at exploiting spurious emissions and spied on all of them. When

the Americans and British realised this, they used manual one-time pads as a stopgap for traffic at Secret and above, then started putting crypto equipment in shielded rooms in vulnerable embassies [600]. There was a brief public reference to the possibility that computer data might leak in Rand Corporation reports by Willis Ware in 1967 and 1970 [1989, 1990]. After that, emission security became a classified topic, with secret NATO standards set by 1980 that were only declassified in 2000.

Meanwhile the stray RF leaking from the local oscillator signals in domestic television sets was being targeted by direction-finding equipment in ‘TV detector vans’ in Britain, where TV owners must pay an annual license fee to support public broadcast services. The fact that computer data might also leak came to public attention in 1985 when Wim van Eck, a Dutch researcher, published an article describing how to reconstruct the picture on a VDU at a distance using a modified TV set [601]. The story of the leaky French cipher machine was leaked by the security service whistleblower Peter Wright in 1987 [2049]. Published research in emission security and related topics took off in the 1990s, as I’ll discuss shortly.

19.2.2 Technical surveillance and countermeasures

Before we dive into the details of Tempest attacks, it is worth noting that the simplest and most widespread attacks that use the electromagnetic spectrum are not those exploiting unintended RF emissions of innocuous equipment, but where a listening device is introduced by the attacker, or (more recently) when a target’s device is compromised by malware. No matter how well it is protected by encryption and access controls while in transit or storage, most highly confidential information comes into being either as speech or as keystrokes on a laptop or phone. If it can be captured by the opponent at this stage, then no subsequent protective measures are likely to help very much.

An extraordinary range of bugs is available on the market:

- At the low end, a few tens of dollars will buy a simple radio microphone that you can stick under a table when visiting the target. Battery life is the main constraint on these devices. They typically have a range of only a few hundred yards, and a lifetime of days to weeks.
- At the next step up are devices that draw their power from the mains, a telephone cable or some other external electricity supply, and so can last indefinitely. As a historical example, the UK Security Service got entry to the Egyptian embassy in London during the Suez crisis and modified the telephone to listen in when the clerk was entering the day’s key settings into the cipher machine [600]. Some modern equivalents clip into a keyboard cable and look like a connector; others look like

electrical adaptors but send audio and video back to their owner. Police covert-entry teams install such bugs in the homes and cars of serious crime suspects. Most now use mobile-phone technology: they can be seen as custom handsets that listen and watch when called.

- One exotic device, on show at the NSA Museum in Fort Meade, was presented to the US ambassador in Moscow in 1946 by a class of schoolchildren. It was a wooden replica of the Great Seal of the United States, and the ambassador hung it on the wall of the office in his residence. In 1952, it was discovered to contain a resonant cavity that acted as a microphone when illuminated by microwaves from outside the building, and retransmitted the conversations that took place in his office. Right up to the end of the Cold War, embassies in Moscow were regularly irradiated with microwaves, so variants of the technique presumably remained in use.
- Bugs are also implanted in equipment. In 1984, sixteen bugs were discovered in IBM Selectric typewriters in the US embassy in Moscow; each stored eight key presses and then transmitted them in a single burst. There have been many *keyloggers* designed and fielded since then in keyboards and keyboard cables, using a wide variety of sensors and side channels [1333].
- Laser microphones work by shining a laser beam at a reflective or partially reflective surface, such as a window pane, in the room where the target conversation is taking place. The sound waves induce vibration in the surface which modulates the reflected light, and this can be picked up and decoded at a distance.
- However, it's now possible that the bulk of surveillance worldwide is done by creepware – by software installed on the target's phone either remotely by a skilled attacker, or by a coercive or manipulative family member, or sometimes even as a condition of employment.

An expert in *technical surveillance countermeasures* (TSCM) will have a whole bag of tools to provide protection against such attacks.

- The better *surveillance receivers* sweep the radio spectrum from about 10 KHz to 3 GHz every few tens of seconds, and look for signals that can't be explained as broadcast, police, air traffic control and so on. Direct-sequence spread spectrum can be spotted from its power spectrum, and frequency hoppers will typically be observed at different frequencies on successive sweeps. Burst transmission does better. But the effectiveness of surveillance receivers is limited by the bugs that use the same frequencies and protocols as legitimate mobile phones. Many organizations tried to forbid the use of mobiles, but most have given up; even the Royal Navy eventually had to allow sailors to keep their phones on board ship as too many of them left.

- The *nonlinear junction detector* can find hidden devices at close range. It broadcasts a weak radio signal and listens for odd harmonics, generated when the transistors, diodes and other nonlinear junctions in the equipment rectify the signal. However, if the bug has been planted in or near legitimate equipment, then the nonlinear junction detector is not much help. There are also expensive bugs designed not to re-radiate at all.
- Breaking the line of sight, such as by planting trees around your laboratory, can be effective against laser microphones but is often impractical.
- It's possible to detect hidden wireless cameras that just use the normal building wifi by their traffic patterns, and researchers have developed apps for this purpose [417].
- Some facilities have shielded rooms, so that even if bugs are introduced their signals can't be heard outside [133]. In NATO countries, Top Secret material is supposed to be kept in a *secure compartmented information facility* (SCIF) that has both physical security and acoustic shielding, and is swept regularly for bugs; a SCIF may have electromagnetic shielding too if a threat assessment suggests that capable motivated opponents might get close enough. Shielded rooms are required in the UK for researchers to access sensitive personal data held by government, such as tax records. There are vendors who sell prefabricated rooms with acoustic and electromagnetic shielding. But this is harder than it looks. A new US embassy building in Moscow had to be abandoned after large numbers of microphones were found in the structure, and Britain's counterintelligence service decided to tear down and rebuild a large part of a new headquarters building, at a cost of about \$50m, after an employee of one of the building contractors was found to have past associations with the Provisional IRA.
- After the Obama administration kicked out three dozen Russian diplomats for eavesdropping on US officials' mobile phones, it was reported that the Russians had even picked up conversations in unshielded SCIFs by hacking officials' phones [579].

Technological developments are steadily making life easier for the bugger and harder for the defender. As more and more devices acquire intelligence and short-range radio or infrared communications – as the 'Internet of Things' becomes the 'Internet of Targets' – there is ever more scope for attacks via equipment that's already there rather than stuff that needs to be emplaced for the purpose. It's not just that your laptop, tablet or mobile phone might be running creepware that records audio and uploads it later. The NSA banned Furby toys in its buildings, as the Furby remembers (and randomly repeats) things said in its presence. The Cayla talking doll was banned in Germany as strangers could use it to listen to a child remotely, and speak to them too.

But there are many more subtle ways in which existing electronic equipment can be exploited.

19.3 Passive attacks

We'll first consider passive attacks, that is, attacks in which the opponent exploits electromagnetic signals that are presented to him without any effort on his part to create them. I'll exclude optical signals for now, and discuss them along with acoustic attacks later.

Broadly speaking, there are two categories of electromagnetic attack. The signal can either be conducted over some kind of circuit (such as a power line or phone line), or it may be radiated as radio frequency energy. These are referred to by the military as 'Hijack' and 'Tempest' respectively. They are not mutually exclusive; RF threats often have a conducted component. For example, radio signals emitted by a computer can be picked up by the power main and conducted into nearby buildings.

19.3.1 Leakage through power and signal cables

Every hardware engineer knows that high-frequency signals leak everywhere and you need to work hard to stop them causing problems. Conducted information leakage can be suppressed by careful design, with power supplies and signal cables suitably filtered. But civilian equipment only needs to be well-enough shielded that it doesn't interfere with radio and TV; it's a much harder task to prevent any exploitable leak of information.

In military parlance, *red* equipment (carrying confidential data) has to be isolated by filters and shields from *black* equipment (that can send signals directly to the outside world). Equipment with both red and black connections, such as cipher machines, is tricky to get right, and shielded equipment tends to be available only in small quantities, made for government markets. But the costs don't stop there. The operations room at an air base can have hundreds of cables leading from it; filtering them all, and imposing strict configuration management to preserve red/black separation, can cost millions. The contractors are expensive, as the staff all need clearances – the NATO standard SDIP-20 for emission security (formerly AMSG 720B) is classified.

19.3.2 Leakage through RF signals

When I first learned to program in 1972 at the Glasgow Schools' Computer Centre, we had an IBM 1401 with a 1.5 MHz clock. A radio tuned to this frequency in the machine room would emit a loud whistle, which varied depending on the data being processed. Some people used this as a debugging aid. A school colleague had a better idea: he wrote a set of subroutines of different lengths so that by calling them in sequence, the computer could play a tune. It never occurred to us that this could be used for mischief as well as fun.

Moving now to more modern equipment, the VDUs used as monitors until the early 2000s naturally emit a TV signal – a VHF or UHF radio signal modulated with the image currently being displayed. The beam current is

The *zone* system works as follows. Equipment certified as Zone 0 should not emit any signals that are exploitable at a distance of one meter; it should protect data from electronic eavesdropping even if the opponent is in the next room, and the wall is something flimsy like plasterboard. Zone 1 equipment should be safe from opponents at a distance of 20 meters, so the Dutch ‘Zone 1 - 12dB’ criterion means that a voting machine should not leak any data on what vote was cast to an eavesdropper 5 meters away. Zone 2 and Zone 3 mean 120 and 1200 meters respectively. Technical details of zoning were briefly published by the Germans in 2007, as [345]. This document was then withdrawn, perhaps because the Americans objected. But everything in it was already in the public domain except the zone limit curves, which are worst-case relative attenuations between distances of 20m, 120m and 1200m from a small dipole or loop antenna, taking into account the difference between nearfield and farfield dropoff. Any competent RF engineer can reverse engineer the rest of it.

The zone system has come into wide governmental use since the end of the Cold War slashed military budgets. Governments faced up to the fact that there are almost no attacks, except on high-value targets to which an opponent can get really close, such as diplomatic missions. The Snowden papers revealed that the US’s principal Tempest target was the UN diplomatic missions in New York, and even there, such techniques were only used against the handful of nations whose computers couldn’t be compromised using malware.

Governments realised they had been wasting billions on shielding everything, and cost cuts forced them to use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment for almost everything. COTS equipment tends to be zone 2 when tested, with some particularly noisy pieces of kit in zone 3. By knowing which equipment radiates what, you can keep your most sensitive data on equipment furthest from the facility perimeter, and shield stuff only when you really have to. Zoning has greatly cut the costs of emission security.

Markus Kuhn and I developed a lower-cost protection technology, called ‘Soft Tempest’, which was deployed for a while in some products, from email encryption programs to Dutch voting machines [1107]. It uses software techniques to filter or mask the information-bearing electromagnetic emanations from a computer system. We discovered that most of the information-bearing RF energy from a VDU was concentrated in the top of the spectrum, so we removed the top 30% of the Fourier transform of a standard font by convolving it with a suitable low-pass filter (see Figures 19.2 and 19.3).



Figure 19.2: Normal text



Figure 19.3: Text low-pass filtered

This has an almost imperceptible effect on the screen contents as seen by the user. Figures 19.4 and 19.5 display photographs of the screen with the two video signals from Figures 19.2 and 19.3.



Figure 19.4: Screen, normal text



Figure 19.5: Screen, filtered text

However, the difference in the emitted RF is dramatic, as illustrated in the photographs in Figures 19.6 and 19.7. These show the potentially compromising emanations, as seen by a Tempest monitoring receiver.

Using Soft Tempest techniques on VDUs translated to a difference of a zone [109]. Less can be done for modern flat screens, but for some devices, there may still be useful gains to be had.

However, the attacker can use active as well as passive techniques. The phenomenon we observed with the IBM 1401 – that a suitable program would turn a computer into a radio broadcast transmitter – is easy to reimplement on a modern computer. Figures 19.8 and 19.9 show what the screen on a PC looks like when the video signal is an RF carrier at 2 MHz, modulated with pure tones of 300 and 1200 Hz.

Using such tricks, malware can infect a machine that's air-gapped from the Internet and exfiltrate data to a radio receiver hidden nearby [1107]. And the intelligence community knew this: there had been a report of the CIA using software-based RF exploits in economic espionage in a TV documentary in 1995 [1064]. Material declassified by the NSA in response to a FOIA request [988] revealed that the codeword *Teapot* refers to “the investigation, study, and control of intentional compromising emanations (i.e., those that are hostilely induced or provoked) from telecommunications and automated



Figure 19.6: Page of normal text



Figure 19.7: Page of filtered text




Figure 19.8: Hz AM signal




Figure 19.9: 1200 Hz AM signal

information systems equipment.” The possibility of malware is one reason why Tempest testing involves not just listening passively to the device under test, but injecting into it signals that simulate the worst-case attack in which the opponent has used a software exploit to take over the device and tries to set up a covert channel [253].

The final class of classical Emsec attacks is the exploitation of RF emanations that are accidentally induced by nearby RF sources, called *Nonstop* by the US military [133]. If equipment processing sensitive data is used near a mobile phone, then the phone’s transmitter may induce currents in the equipment that get modulated with sensitive data by the nonlinear junction effect and re-radiated. For this reason, it used to be forbidden to use a mobile phone within 5 meters of classified equipment. Nonstop attacks are also the main Emsec concern for ships and aircraft; here, an attacker who can get close enough to do a passive Tempest attack can probably do much more serious harm than eavesdropping, but as military ships and aircraft often carry very powerful radios and radars, one must be careful that their signals don’t get modulated accidentally with something useful to the enemy. In one case, Soviet spy ships were found to be listening to US military data in Guam from outside the 3-mile limit.

19.3.3 What goes wrong

As Ed Snowden confirmed, the Emsec threats to embassies in hostile countries are real. The UK embassy in one hostile Arab country used to be on the second floor of an office block whose first and third floors were occupied by the Mukhabarat, the local secret police; if that’s what you get given as diplomatic premises, then shielding all electronic equipment (except that used for deception) will be part of the solution. It won’t be all of it; your cleaning staff will be

in the pay of the Mukhabarat so they will helpfully loosen your equipment's Tempest gaskets, just as they change the batteries in the room bugs.

As for the defensive side of things, there was a scandal in April 2007 when it emerged that Lockheed Martin had ignored Tempest standards when installing equipment in US Coast Guard vessels. Documents were left on the website of the Coast Guard's Deepwater project and ended up on an activist website, `cryptome.org`, which was closed down for a while. The documents tell a story not just of emission security defects – wrong cable types, violations of cable separation rules, incorrect grounding, missing filters, red/black violations, and so on – but of a more generally botched job. The ships also had hull cracks, outdoor radios that were not waterproof, a security CCTV installation that did not provide the specified 360 degree coverage, and much more [501]. This led to a Congressional inquiry. The documents provide some insight into Tempest and Nonstop accreditation procedures.

The most recent development has been Tempest attacks on smartphones. Such devices do not have a design requirement to withstand a capable motivated opponent sitting in the next room with decent radio equipment; so it should have been no surprise when, in 2015, Gabriel Goller and Georg Sigl described how to go about extracting private keys from smartphones at a distance using passive RF monitoring [779]. The main difficulty with such attacks is that a phone's clock frequency typically varies with workload; if this frequency can somehow be fixed (e.g., by malware) then attacks become much easier – in fact, they reduce to a standard timing attack, of a kind I will now describe.

19.4 Attacks between and within computers

In the chapter on multilevel security, I remarked that Butler Lampson pointed out in 1973 covert channels may allow a process at high to signal down to low [1127]. As a simple example, the high process can keep some shared resource busy at time t_i to signal that the i -th bit of a secret key is 1. If a machine is shared between high and low, and resources are not allocated in fixed slices, then the high process can signal by filling up the disk drive, or by using a lot of CPU cycles (some people call the former case a *storage channel* and the latter a *timing channel*, though in practice they can often be converted into each other). There are many others such as sequential process IDs, shared file locks and last access times on files – reimplementing all of these in a multilevel secure way is an enormous task. It's also possible to limit the covert channel capacity by introducing noise. Some machines have had randomised system clocks for this purpose. But some covert channel capacity almost always remains [809].

In classical multilevel-secure systems, it was considered a good result to get covert channel bandwidth down to one bit per second. This would make it hard

to leak many Top Secret satellite images, but of course it would be trivial to leak a 256-bit crypto key. This is one of the reasons the NSA was traditionally suspicious of crypto in software. And covert channels are even harder to analyse and block in distributed systems where the software can initiate communications on the network. DNS supports covert channels, for example, which are hard to block because of the service's legitimate use, but which have been used by malware to exfiltrate credit card numbers [1373]. Such channels have easily enough bandwidth to smuggle out crypto keys.

In the mid-1990s, side-channel research was invigorated by the discovery of novel attacks on smartcards and other crypto implementations.

19.4.1 Timing analysis

In 1996, Paul Kocher showed that many implementations of public-key algorithms such as RSA and DSA leaked key information through the amount of time they took [1066]. When doing exponentiation, software typically steps through the secret exponent one bit at a time, and if the next bit is a one it does a multiply. Paul's idea was to guess the exponent one bit at a time, work through the consequences of this guess for the timing measurements, and see if it reduced their variance. This clever signal-processing technique was steadily refined. By 2003, David Brumley and Dan Boneh implemented a timing attack against Apache using OpenSSL, and showed how to extract the private key from a remote server by timing about a million decryptions [331]. Some implementations of public-key algorithms use blinding to prevent such attacks (OpenSSL did offer it as an option, but Apache didn't use it). In fact, there was a whole series of timing attacks on SSL/TLS; despite this protocol's having been proven secure in the late 1990s, there has been about one attack a year since on its implementation, mostly using side channels.

Symmetric-key block ciphers are vulnerable too. John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier, David Wagner and Chris Hall had pointed out in 1998 that Rijndael, the algorithm that later became AES, is vulnerable to timing attacks based on cache misses [1036]. The attacker can verify guesses about the output of the first round of the cipher by predicting whether the guessed value would cause a cache miss on S-box lookup, and verifying this against observation. A number of researchers improved this attack steadily since then, and a naïve implementation of AES can be broken by observing a few hundred encryptions [233, 1485, 1491]. Many crypto libraries and toolkits are vulnerable; you need to work out whether they are an issue for your application and if so what you're going to do. And it's not just the algorithms that leak; protocol and implementation features such as padding and error handling leak secrets too.

19.4.2 Power analysis

Timing attacks can work from a distance, but if you can get up close to the target equipment, there's a lot more you can do. Smartcard makers were aware from the 1980s that information could leak through the power line and patented various defences; by the early 1990s, it appears to have been known to pay-TV hackers and to some government agencies that information could be gathered by simply measuring the current a card drew. Known as *power analysis* or *rail noise analysis*, this may involve as little as inserting a resistor in the ground line and connecting a digital storage scope across it to observe the device's current draw. An example of such a power trace can be seen in Figure 19.10. This shows how a password can be extracted from a microcontroller by guessing it a byte at a time and looking for a change in the power trace when you guess right.

Different instructions have quite different power profiles, and, as you can see, the power consumption also depends on the data being processed. The main data-dependent contribution in many circumstances is from the bus driver transistors, which are quite large. Depending on the design, the current may vary by several hundred microamps over a period of several hundred nanoseconds for each bit of the bus whose state is changed [1300]. Thus the Hamming




Figure 19.10: Plot of the current measured during 256 single attempts to guess the first byte of a service password stored in the microcontroller at the heart of a car immobilizer (courtesy of Markus Kuhn and Sergei Skorobogatov)

weight of the difference between each data byte and the preceding byte on the bus (the *transition count*) is visible to an attacker. In some devices, the Hamming weight of each data byte is available too [1305]. EEPROM reads and writes can give even stronger signals. If a wrong PIN guess leads to a PIN-retry counter being decremented, this may cause a sharp increase in current draw as a charge pump prepares to write memory (at this point, an attacker might even reset the card and try another PIN).

The effect of this leakage is not limited to password extraction. An attacker who understands (or guesses) how a cipher is implemented can obtain significant information about the card's secrets and in many cases deduce the value of the key in use. This was brought forcefully to the industry's attention in 1998 by Paul Kocher, when he adapted the signal-processing ideas developed for timing attacks into an efficient technique to extract the key bits used in a block cipher such as DES from a collection of power traces, without knowing any implementation details of the card software [1067]. This technique, known as *differential power analysis*, involves partitioning a set of power traces into subsets, then computing the difference of the averages of these subsets. If the subsets are correlated with information of interest, the difference should be nonzero [1069].

As a concrete example, the attacker might collect several hundred traces of transactions with a target card, for which either the plaintext or the ciphertext is known. They then guess some of the cipher's internal state. In the case of DES, each round of the cipher has eight table look-ups in which six bits of the current input are xor'ed with six bits of key, and then used to look up a four-bit output from an S-box. So if it's the ciphertext to which the attacker has access, they will guess the six input bits to an S-box in the last round. The power traces are then sorted into two sets based on this guess and synchronized. Average traces are then computed and compared. The difference between the two average traces is called a *differential trace*.

The process is repeated for each of the 64 possible six-bit inputs to the target S-box. The correct input value – which separates the power traces into two sets each with a different S-box output value – will typically give a differential trace with a noticeable peak. Wrong guesses, however, give randomly-sorted traces, so the differential trace looks like random noise. In this way, the six keybits that go to the S-box in question can be found, followed by the others used in the last round of the cipher. In the case of DES, this gives 48 of the 56 keybits, so the remainder can be found trivially.

The industry had not anticipated this attack, and all smartcards then on the market appeared vulnerable [1067]. As it is a noninvasive attack, it can be carried out by modified terminal equipment against a bank card carried by an unsuspecting customer. So once the attacker has taken the trouble to understand a card and design a Trojan terminal, a large number of cards may be compromised at little marginal cost.

Paul's discovery held up the deployment of smartcards in banking for two or three years while people worked on defences. In fact, his company had patented many of the best ones, and ended up licensing them to most crypto vendors. Some work at the protocol level; for example, the EMV protocol for bank cards mandates (from version 4.1) that the key used to compute the MAC on a transaction be a session key derived from an on-card master key by encrypting a counter. In this way, no two ciphertexts visible outside the card are ever generated using the same key. Other defences include randomised clocking, to make trace alignment harder, and masking, where you introduce some offsets in each round and recalculate the S-boxes to compensate for them. This way, the implementation of the cipher changes every time it's invoked. With public-key algorithms, there are even stronger arguments for masking, because they also help mitigate fault attacks, which I'll discuss below. The more expensive cards have dedicated crypto engines for modular multiplication and for DES/AES. Testing a device for DPA resistance is not straightforward; there is a discussion by Paul Kocher at [1068] and a 2011 survey article that discusses the practicalities of attack and defence at [1069].

There are many variants on the theme. Attacks based on cache misses can measure power as well as the time taken to encrypt, as a miss activates a lot of circuitry to read nonvolatile memory; you can't stop cache attacks on AES just by using a timer to ensure that each encryption takes the same number of clock cycles. Another variant is to use different sensors: David Samyde and Jean-Jacques Quisquater created *electromagnetic analysis*, in which they move a tiny pickup coil over the surface of the chip to pick up local signals rather than relying simply on the whole device's current draw [1571]. And, as I noted in the last chapter, DPA can be combined with optical probing; Sergei Skorobogatov's optically-enhanced position-locked power analysis uses a laser to illuminate a single target transistor for half of the test runs, giving access not just to a Hamming weight of a computation, but a single targeted bit [1775].

A spectacular demonstration of power analysis arrived in 2016 when Eyal Ronen, Colin O'Flynn, Adi Shamir and Achi-Or Weingarten demonstrated a worm that could take over Philips Hue lamps, after they developed an improved power-analysis attack to retrieve the AES key that these lamps used to authenticate firmware updates [1617]. Philips had made several other mistakes: relying on a single AES key, present in millions of low-cost devices, to protect updates, using the same key for CBC and MAC, and having two bugs in the light link protocol they used. As updates could propagate by ZigBee, malware could spread in a chain reaction from one lamp to the next; the authors showed that in a city such as Paris, there were enough lamps for such a chain reaction to be self-sustaining, like nuclear fission.

The state of the art in 2019 is probably the *template attack* where the attacker studies a device's current draw closely for the instructions of interest and builds a multivariate Gaussian distribution giving the probability distribution

for an observed trace given the instruction, the operands, the results and the state. For details, see for example Marios Choudary and Markus Kuhn [421]. It is also possible to use special hardware tools to capture a power trace with less noise, a significant factor in power analysis [1787].

19.4.3 Glitching and differential fault analysis

In 1996 Markus Kuhn and I reported that many smartcards could be broken by inserting transients, or *glitches*, in their power or clock lines [107]. For example, one smartcard used in early banking applications had the feature that an unacceptably high clock frequency only triggered a reset after a number of cycles, so that transients would be less likely to cause false alarms. You could replace a single clock pulse with two much narrower pulses without causing a reset, but forcing the processor to execute a NOP instead of the instruction it was supposed to execute. This gives rise to a *selective code execution* attack where the attacker can step over jump instructions to bypass access controls, or construct his own program out of gadgets found in the card's own code.

The following year, Dan Boneh, Richard DeMillo and Richard Lipton noticed that a number of public key cryptographic algorithms break horribly if a random error can be induced [286]. For example, when doing an RSA signature the secret computation $S = h(m)^d \pmod{pq}$ is carried out mod p , then mod q , and the results are then combined, as this is much faster. But if the card returns a defective signature S_p which is correct modulo p but incorrect modulo q , then we will have

$$p = \gcd(pq, S_p^e - h(m))$$

which breaks the system at once.

Also in 1997, Eli Biham and Adi Shamir pointed out that if we can set a given bit of memory to zero (or one), and we know where in memory a key is kept, we can find out the key by just doing an encryption, zeroising the leading bit, doing another encryption and seeing if the result's different, then zeroising the next bit and so on [247]. Optical probing turned out to be just the tool for this [1651], and using a laser to set key bits to zero one at a time has now become a routine reverse-engineering technique.

Glitches induced by lasers are not limited to attacks on chips. It turns out that if you fire a laser at a MEMS microphone, as used in phones and in voice-controlled digital assistants such as Google Home and Amazon Alexa, it records a click. Kevin Fu and colleagues found that by modulating a laser pointer with spoken commands, they could activate such devices from tens of meters away – so they could order Alexa to unlock a house's front door by shining a laser pointer through the window from the garden [1848].

Many real-world attacks now use a combination of active and passive methods. In section 19.3 above, I discussed optically enhanced position-locked

power analysis, which uses a laser to partially ionise a target transistor during power analysis. And you can use a power glitch to greatly increase the optical emissions from a chip for a short period of time, in order to distinguish specific memory writes, as I discussed in section 18.5.5.

19.4.4 Rowhammer, CLKscrew and Plundervolt

One very serious chip-level side channel is when DRAM memory contents can leak into adjacent rows. In 2014, Yoongu Kim and colleagues at CMU found that DRAM manufactured in 2012 and 2013 was vulnerable to disturbance errors; repeatedly accessing a row in a modern DRAM chip causes bit flips in physically-adjacent rows at consistently predictable bit locations, an attack now known as Rowhammer [1050]. The following year, Mark Seaborn and Thomas Dullien found how this hardware fault could be exploited by application code to gain kernel privileges [1697]. By the year after that, Kaveh Razavi and colleagues had shown how to use the technique to replace a strong public key with a weak one – with the effect that one virtual machine could attack a co-hosted target machine by subverting its OpenSSH public-key authentication, and also compromise the software update mechanism by forging GPG signatures from trusted keys [1590]. The vulnerable type of DRAM is still in such wide use and the attacks can target so many different software mechanisms, that they may be around for some time. The first generation of hardware mitigation from vendors includes *target row refresh* (TRR) where the DRAM chip controller refreshes rows to block the most common hammering patterns; Pietro Frigo and colleagues built a fuzzer to analyse 42 chips with TRR defences, and found other patterns that gave attacks on 13 of them [725]. And in 2020, Andrew Kwong and colleagues found that the mechanism could be used to read as well as write; an attacker can exploit the dependence between Rowhammer-induced bit flips and the bits in adjacent rows to deduce those bits – and what’s more, this works even when ECC memory detects and corrects each bit flip [1116].

CPUs are also vulnerable to hardware fault injection, using dynamic scaling of frequency and voltage. To save power, many modern CPUs change frequency in response to load, and scale the voltage appropriately. In 2017 Adrian Tang, Simha Sethumadhavan, and Sal Stolfo discovered the CLKscrew attack, where they overclocked the Arm processor on a Nexus 6 to defeat TrustZone, extracting crypto keys and escalating privilege [1861]. In 2019, Kit Murdock and colleagues discovered Plundervolt: here an undocumented voltage scaling interface in Intel Core processors is exploited to cause an undervoltage that induces faults in multiply and AES-NI operations that allow RSA and AES keys to be extracted using fault analysis, as well as mistakes in pointer arithmetic that leak arbitrary memory contents from SGX enclaves [1368].

Although Arm and Intel released microcode patches for CLKscrew and Plundervolt, we may expect other CPU attacks of the same genre. Rowhammer / RAMBleed attacks remain an issue. In the long term, hardware security will require more defensive design. This will not be trivial: just increasing the DRAM refresh rate increases device power consumption, as would less aggressive frequency scaling. Two of the scientists who discovered Rowhammer, Onur Mutlu and Jeremie Kim, suggest that when the memory controller closes a row, then it refreshes the adjacent rows with a probability tuned to the dependability of the chip [1371]. This may in turn add more complexity at the system level. Given that ever more side channels will lurk in new chip technologies as firms push devices ever closer to the boundaries set by physics, a more principled approach is needed to semiconductor security. Chip vendors are learning the hard way that they need to involve good security engineers at design time, rather than just hoping to patch stuff later. When failures emerge at the level of a popular semiconductor process, or a widely-used CPU, remediation is expensive.

19.4.5 Meltdown, Spectre and other enclave side channels

The latest tsunami to hit the chipmakers (and indeed the whole information security world) is a family of attacks based on CPU microarchitecture. The story starts in 2005, when Colin Percival found that AES cache misses could be used by an attacker to observe an encryption operation in another hyperthread on the same Intel CPU; by pulling data into the L1 cache, then measuring a moment later how long it takes to access the same data, you can see whether your data were evicted by the other hyperthread [1510]. Two years later, Onur Aciı̇mez, Çetin Kaya Koç and Jean-Pierre Seifert invented branch prediction analysis (BPA). Modern high-performance CPUs have a superscalar architecture in which the CPU no longer fetches and executes one instruction at a time, but has a pipeline that fetches as many as a dozen instructions ahead, and tries to predict which branch the code will take. BPA enabled a spy thread to extract a secret key from a parallel crypto thread by observing the CPU's branch-prediction state; a misprediction imposed a penalty of 20 cycles at the time; in the best circumstances, an RSA private key could be extracted from observing a single signature [13]. Others explored other cache behaviour; in 2015, Fangfei Liu, Yuval Yarom and colleagues showed that the L3 cache gave practical *prime and probe* cross-core attacks that enabled the recovery of GPG private keys [1177]. By 2017, the Cachezoom attack allowed an attacker to extract keys from SGX enclaves [1330]. The most recent such attack is the Membuster attack by Dayeol Lee and colleagues, which uses OS privilege to induce cache misses that leak data [1136]. (Intel's response has been simply to declare such attacks to be out of scope.) This was a field in which, over more

than a decade of work, many ideas came together; the CPU vendors should have been paying more attention.

The most impactful attacks were Meltdown and Spectre, disclosed in early 2018. They both exploit speculative memory reads, and build on the previous work on prime-and-probe, branch prediction and cache side-channels. They are so serious that both Intel and Arm announced that they will redesign their CPUs to block them; but that will take years, and in the meantime software mitigations (where available) may cause a 15% performance hit with some workloads, and occasional reboots. Given that the world's data centres consume perhaps 3% of all electric power, this is potentially a big deal.

Meltdown creates a race condition between memory access and privilege checking, and reads out forbidden memory via a cache side channel. It was discovered independently by multiple researchers who disclosed their findings responsibly to the chip makers and then consolidated their results [1173]. The chip makers spent much of 2017 working secretly on bug fixes.

Spectre was disclosed at the same time, having also been discovered by many of the same teams. It's actually a (growing) family of vulnerabilities exploiting the branch prediction logic that is a special case of speculative execution. This logic tries to guess which code path will be taken after a conditional jump, and rogue software can train it to mispredict. The CPU will then fetch instructions that will never be executed, and if some of these perform forbidden operations – such as when a user program reads protected kernel memory – then the protected pages may be fetched from cache. Even if they are never read – so the access-control check is never done – this gives a reliable timing side-channel that enables an attacker to observe crypto key material [1071]. In short, even if a CPU's execution is formally correct, all sorts of lower-level optimisations can make the timing depend on secret data, and a whole series of Spectre variants have come along to exploit this. While Meltdown reads a target process's data directly, Spectre tricks the target process into revealing its data via side-channels.

The Spectre family of attacks keeps on growing; shortly after Spectre was announced, researchers discovered a variant called Foreshadow that cracks many of the features on Intel processors that Spectre didn't, including SGX and system management mode [340]. The 2019 security conferences brought a whole series of other attacks that exploit subtle microarchitectural features: Zombieload, Fallout, Smotherspectre and RAMBleed to name but four, while 2020 brought Load Value Injection, which combines ideas from Meltdown and Spectre [341], and CrossTalk, which enables one core in a CPU to attack another [1573]. Pretty well all CPUs now use branch prediction – except the tiniest – and have become so complex that there are lots of side channels. Finding them at design time isn't easy, as the tools the chipmakers developed for verifying their designs merely check that the logic gives the right answer – not how long it takes. The reason they're now being found is that the formerly

sleepy backwater of microarchitectural covert channels suddenly became the hottest topic in security research, and hundreds of bright research students are suddenly looking hard. Fixing everything they find will take years, and given the nature of the technology I doubt that everything will ever be fixed. Arm, for example, has introduced new barrier instructions CSDB, SSBB and PSSBB. After CSDB appears in code, for example, no instruction may be speculatively executed using predicted data or state [132]. There's also a new data field CVS2 from v8.5A onwards to indicate the presence of mitigations against adversarial prediction training. It will take perhaps four years to get this all into silicon, and several more for the necessary support to appear in software toolchains – and longer still for programmers to learn to use it all. Many programmers won't bother, and many managers' reaction to such wicked and complex problems will be denial.

So, during the 2020s, any crypto that you do on CPUs that also run untrustworthy processes is potentially at risk. Quite possibly all CPUs of any size will acquire cryptoprocessors, with hardware engines that do AES, ECDH, ECDSA and so on in constant time. (But that then opens up several new cans of worms, as we'll discuss in the chapter on advanced cryptographic engineering.)

19.5 Environmental side channels

The past twenty years have seen a host of side-channel attacks that exploit human behaviour and the environment of the device. Such attacks exploit acoustics, optics, device motion and combinations too; once attackers figure out how to recover text from the sound of someone typing, they can apply the same techniques to keystroke timings observed by other means, such as on the network or by measuring device motion.

19.5.1 Acoustic side channels

Acoustic security has a long history in terms of preventing people or devices eavesdropping on sensitive conversations, as I mentioned in section 19.2.2. As for listening to machines, the first case may have been during the Suez crisis in 1956, when the British figured out the settings of the Egyptian embassy's Hagelin cipher machine using a phone bug. There was later a 'folk rumour' that the agencies were able to tell what someone was typing on the old IBM Selectric typewriter by just recording the sound they made, and that data could be recovered from the noise made by dot matrix printers [324]. It later turned out that the KGB had indeed bugged IBM typewriters in the US embassy in Moscow from 1976 to 1984, though they used magnetic bugs rather than microphones [791].

In 2001, Dawn Song, David Wagner and Xuqing Tian showed that the timing of keystrokes contained enough information for an opponent to recover a lot of information merely by observing traffic encrypted under SSH. As each keystroke is sent in a separate packet when SSH is used in interactive mode, encrypted packet timing gives precise inter-keystroke timing and even a simple hidden Markov model gives about one bit of information per keystroke pair about the content; they noted that this would enable an attacker about a factor of 50 advantage in guessing a password whose encrypted value he'd observed [1807].

In 2004, Dmitri Asonov and Rakesh Agrawal showed that the different keys on a computer keyboard made sufficiently different sounds. They trained a neural network to recognise the clicks made by key presses on a target keyboard and concluded that someone's typing could be picked up from acoustic emanations with an error rate of only a few percent [137]. In 2005, Li Zhuang, Feng Zhou, and Doug Tygar combined these threads to come up with an even more powerful attack. Given a recording of someone typing text in English for about ten minutes on an unknown keyboard, they recognised the individual keys, then used the inter-keypress times and the known statistics of English to figure out which key was which. Thus they could decode text from a recording of a keyboard to which they had never had access [2075]. Other researchers quickly joined in; by the following year, Yigael Berger, Avishai Wool, and Arie Yeredor had shown that with improved signal-processing algorithms, acoustic reconstruction could be made much more efficient [229].

Others took acoustic analysis down to a much lower level: Eran Tromer and Adi Shamir showed that keys leak via the acoustic emanations from a PC, generated mostly at frequencies above 10KHz by capacitors on the motherboard [1912].

The deep neural network revolution that began in 2012 enabled much more information to be wrung out of such signals, and by 2016 Alberto Compagno and colleagues had shown that if you type while talking to someone over Skype, they can reconstruct a lot of what you're typing [465]. Also in 2016, Mengyuan Li and colleagues had shown that when you type on a smartphone, your finger motions interfere with the RF signal in ways that change the multipath behaviour on wifi enough to modulate the channel state information; this enables a rogue wifi hotspot to infer keystroke information [1164]. By 2017, Ilia Shumailov had figured out how one app on a mobile phone could recover passwords and PINs typed into another app by listening to the taps on the screen, using the two microphones in the device [1734]. Such *time-difference-of-arrival* (TDOA) processing had previously been the domain of sophisticated electronic-warfare kit; here was an application in your pocket, and that would enable a rogue app to steal your online banking password, even despite the protection available if the password entry mechanism is implemented in the Trusted Execution Environment, so malware cannot tap it directly.

19.5.2 Optical side channels

Turning now to optics, there are obvious optical side-channels such as *shoulder surfing*, where someone watches your PIN over your shoulder at an ATM and then picks your pocket; ATM crime gangs have also used CCTV cameras in shop ceilings above a PIN entry device, and even in furniture vans parked next to a cash machine. And now that everyone has a camera in their pocket and a 3-d printer in their den, physical keys are easy to duplicate – even by someone watching at a distance. But there is much, much more.

Have you ever looked across a city at night, and seen someone working late in their office, their face and shirt lit up by the diffuse reflected glow from their computer monitor? Did you ever stop to wonder whether any information might be recovered from the glow? In 2002 Markus Kuhn showed that the answer was ‘pretty well everything’: he hooked up a high-performance photomultiplier tube to an oscilloscope, and found that the light from the blue and green phosphors used in common VDU tubes decays after a few microseconds. As a result, the diffuse reflected glow contains much of the screen information, encoded in the time domain. Thus, given a telescope, a photomultiplier tube and suitable image-processing software, it was possible to read the computer screen at which a banker was looking by decoding the light scattered from his face or his shirt [1105]. (According to Ed Snowden, this was one of the techniques the NSA used to spy on foreign embassies, and went under the code-name ‘Ocean’.)

The next headline was from Joe Loughry and David Umphress, who looked at the LED status indicators found on the data serial lines of PCs, modems, routers and other communications equipment. They found that a significant number of them were transmitting the serial data optically: 11 out of 12 modems tested, 2 out of 7 routers, and one data storage device. The designers were just driving the tell-tale light off the serial data line, without stopping to realise that the LED had sufficient bandwidth to transmit the data to a waiting telescope [1191].

The latest discovery, by Ben Nassi and colleagues in 2020, is the lamphone channel. Speech or music in a room induces vibration in a hanging lightbulb, which can be read from across the street using a telescope and a suitable photodiode [1389]. Unlike a laser microphone that picks up sound from a window, this is entirely passive, and the direction is less sensitive.

19.5.3 Other side-channels

Thermal covert channels arrived in 2006, when Steven Murdoch discovered that a typical computer’s clock skew, which can be measured remotely, showed diurnal variation, and realised this was a function of ambient temperature. His experiments showed that unless a machine’s owner takes countermeasures,

anyone who can extract accurate timestamps from it can measure its CPU load; and this raises the question of whether an attacker can find where in the world a hidden machine is located. The longitude comes from the time zone, and the latitude (more slowly) from the seasons. So hiding behind an anonymity service such as Tor might not be as easy as it looks [1358, 1360].

It had long been known that oily fingerprint residues can compromise fingerprint scanners, as we discuss in the chapter on biometrics. However, they also leave traces on touchscreens. After these screens started being used on phones, Adam Aviv documented the *smudge attack*: these residues are a very effective way of breaking the pattern lock commonly used on Android devices [146]. (Smudges also help guess the PINs used on all sorts of touchscreen devices – even your Tesla.)

Adam also developed the use of the smartphone’s accelerometer as a side-channel, finding that the phone’s rocking motion as the user typed would reveal significant information. Even in uncontrolled settings, while users were walking, his model could classify 20% of PINs and 40% of unlock patterns within 5 attempts [147]. The accelerometer had already been used by Philip Marquardt and others to decode the vibrations from a nearby conventional computer keyboard [1231]. Liang Cai and Hao Chen then studied using both the accelerometer and gyro, finding that the latter was more effective, and allowed a 4-digit PIN to be guessed about 80 times better than by chance [367]. Laurent Simon and I then played with turning the camera into a virtual gyroscope, as the phone tilts when you tap in a PIN; we found that camera plus microphone was just as good as the gyro for keystroke inference [1760]. Gesture typing also leaks; text entered into one app can be read by others, although this is a technical side channel that exploits shared interrupt state [1763].

The arrival of the Apple watch in 2015 inspired more people to study smartwatch side channels; by the end of the year, Xiangyu Liu and colleagues had shown that a smartwatch not only allows you to do the accelerometer inference attacks on smartphone PIN entry, but also to reconstruct text typed at a normal keyboard – though if you wear it on your left wrist you get more accuracy with the left-hand letters [1178].

Are these side channels a big deal? The answer appears to be ‘not yet’. Joel Reardon and colleagues studied 88,000 apps from the Google Play Store and reported in 2019 that while over 12,000 had the means to exploit side channels to observe other apps or system data, or to communicate in ways that they shouldn’t, only 61 actually did so [1591]. However, the security engineer must remain aware that as we move to devices such as smartphones with a rich set of sensors, we get a rich set of side channels that make it ever more difficult to confine information to specific apps and contexts. As we move to a world with gazillions of smart objects, the number and type of side channels will multiply. We might expect this to give us a nasty surprise one day.

19.6 Social side channels

Many side channels occur at the application layer, and are often overlooked. One classic example is an increase in pizza deliveries to the Pentagon leaking the fact of a forthcoming military operation. A more subtle example is that personal health information derived from visits to genitourinary medicine clinics is considered specially sensitive in the UK, and can't be shared with the GP unless the patient consents. In one case, a woman's visit to a GUM clinic leaked when the insurer failed to recall her for a smear test that her GP knew was due [1312]. The insurer knew that a smear test had been done already by the clinic, and didn't want to pay twice.

I've already discussed such issues at length in the chapter on inference control and don't propose to duplicate that discussion here. I'll merely note that this is also a high-impact family of side channels. Policymakers and the tech industry have both pretended for years to believe that de-identification of sensitive data such as medical records makes it non-sensitive and thus suitable to be treated as an industrial raw material. This is emphatically not the case, as one scandal after another has brought home – leading among other things to the EU General Data Protection Regulation.

Social side channels also play a role on the philosophical side of technology policy debates; for example, Helen Nissenbaum has gone so far as to define privacy as 'contextual integrity'. Most privacy failures that do real harm result from information from one context (such as the clinic) ending up in another (such as a newspaper). Ubiquitous devices with complex side channels are not the only issue; the mass collection of data that's used for advertising without effective opt-outs leads to much more leakage. I'll discuss this later in the chapter on 'Surveillance or Privacy?'

19.7 Summary

Side-channel attacks include a whole range of threats in which the security of systems can be subverted by compromising emanations, whether from unintentional radio frequency or conducted electromagnetic signals, to leakage through shared computational state, to the wide range of sensors found in modern mobile phones and other consumer devices and to leakage via social context too. Side channel leakage is a huge topic and it will get more complex still as we get software and sensors in just about everything. Which side channels pose a real threat will of course depend on the application, and most of them will remain of academic interest most of the time. But occasionally, they'll bite. So the security engineer needs to be aware of the risks.

Research problems

Many of the research papers in the top security conferences in 2019 are about side channels, particularly side-channel attacks on processors that undermine access controls and enclaves, and side-channel attacks on security chips that enable TPMs or payment cards to be defeated. Back in 2015, the emphasis was on side-channel attacks on phones, smart watches and other physical devices. Social side-channels continue to be of interest and drive research into privacy.

Side-channel vulnerabilities are becoming ubiquitous as systems get more complex. More complex supply chains made bug fixes harder, and sometimes vulnerabilities just won't be fixed as it would cost too much in terms of performance, effort or cash. Attacks become easier as techniques are honed and software gets passed around. This applies to classical Tempest attacks too, as *software radios* – radios that digitize a signal at the intermediate frequency stage and do all the subsequent processing in software – are no longer an expensive military curiosity [1119] but are now ubiquitous in cellular radio base stations, GPS receivers, IoT devices, and even hobbyists' bedrooms. The explosion of interest in machine learning is bound to have an effect, improving attacks everywhere from Tempest through power analysis to the exploitation of social channels. It's hard to predict which side channels will scale up to become another billion-dollar issue, but it's a good bet that some of them will.

Further reading

A recent history of Tempest by David Easter tells of the Cold War struggles between Russia, the USA, the UK and their European allies [600]. The classic van Eck article [601] is still worth a read, and our work on Soft Tempest, Teapot and related topics can be found in [1107]. For power analysis, see the papers by Paul Kocher [1067] and Thomas Messergues [1300]. For timing and power analysis, the original papers by Paul Kocher and his colleagues are the classic references [1066, 1067]; there's a textbook by Stefan Mangard, Elisabeth Oswald and Thomas Popp that covers all the major aspects [1216], while Paul Kocher's 2011 survey paper, "Introduction to differential power analysis" explains the engineering detail of both attack and defence [1069]. A 2020 survey by Mark Randolph and William Diehl covers more recent work [1579].

To keep up with progress in timing and power attacks on security chips, you really need to follow the current research literature, as attack techniques improve all the time. For example, in November 2019, Daniel Moghimi, Berk Sunar, Thomas Eisenbarth and Nadia Henninger found timing attacks on a TPM made by STM that had been certified secure to Common Criteria EAL4+ and on a virtual TPM in Intel CPUs, enabling them to extract ECDSA keys; the

latter case led to a real attack on a VPN product [1331]. More than twenty years after timing attacks came along, you still can't rely on either certified products or big brand names to withstand them.

Attacks on mainstream computer hardware are still developing quickly. For attacks on memory, see the 2019 survey paper on Rowhammer by Onur Mutlu and Jeremie Kim [1371]. As for attacks on CPUs exploiting speculative execution, the Meltdown and Spectre attacks attracted so much publicity that microarchitectural security turned overnight from a backwater into one of the hottest research areas in the field. For years the CPU designers (and almost everyone else) had assumed that if hardware had been verified, then it did what it said in the manual, so there was no point looking for bugs. Now we know that the verification tools had nothing to say about side channels, there are hundreds of smart people beating up on CPUs. The bug reports just keep on coming, and CPUs have meanwhile got so complex that it may take years before we get some stability. The best starting point in 2020 is probably the survey paper by Claudio Canella and colleagues at the Usenix Security Symposium [382]. Claudio and colleagues have also broken the first-generation Meltdown mitigations with an attack called EchoLoad [383].