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Hello!
My name is Sergei Skorobogatov (Сергей Скоробогатов), I was born
and grew up in Moscow, Russia. I received a graduate degree (M.Sc.) in
Automatics and Electronics (Engineering Diploma) from the Moscow Engineering
Physics Institute (MEPhI, МИФИ) in March 1997. Then I
worked (part time) as an Engineer in MEPhI and as a contractor for the
Ophthalmic Centre "Prozrenie" in Moscow, where I designed several electronic devices
for eye sight diagnostic and correction.
I won a Computer Laboratory Research Assistantship at Cambridge
and since April 2000 I have been working on a Ph.D. project in the Security Group
at the Computer Laboratory of
the University of Cambridge in the
UK. As a part of this research I participated in EU funded G3Card project aimed to design a new
generation of smartcard chips. This project was finished in January
2003 and since that I had an independent research grant. I submitted
my
Ph.D. thesis in September 2004, defended my dissertation in
November 2004 and graduated in February 2005. In September 2004 I was
promoted to the Research Associate position for my postdoctoral
research here and in July 2006 I was promoted to the Senior Research
Associate position. My research grant was extended several times and
it is currently until the end of 2012, therefore I am always looking for
interesting and beneficial projects which could provide funding for my ongoing
and future research.
I work in the Hardware Security
Group on attack technologies and tamper-resistant processors.
- Frequently asked questions about QVL technology
- Hardware Assurance is vitally important for Cyber Security as the threat from semiconductor chips infected with Trojans and backdoors grows
- the latest testings revealed that using QVL technique it takes only 0.01 seconds (10ms) to extract the AES key from a military grade FPGA marketed as 'virtually unbreakable' and 'highly secure'. With classic DPA setup it would take above 1 hour to get the key and with latest state-of-the-art DPA workstation at least 10 minutes
- using innovative patented technique from Quo Vadis Labs (QVL) we were able to detect and analyse in the first documented case of its kind, a backdoor inserted into the FPGA used in critical industrial infrastructure, avionics and military applications
- health monitoring of hardware can prevent Stuxnet-like attacks on physical systems
- with the improvement of side-channel attacks effectiveness by a factor of one million it is possible to improve the effectiveness of sensors in many areas
- combination of non-invasive, invasive and semi-invasive attacks can break the security in the majority of microcontrollers, FPGAs, secure memories and some ASICs and custom chips
Here is the list of some of my current ongoing projects:
- Using new methods
of side-channel analysis for finding backdoors and trojans in secure chips
- Using new technology
for health monitoring of hardware systems used in automotive, aerospace and
industrial applications
- Using side-channel
analysis and fault
attacks for partial reverse engineering of secure chips
- Developing new
technology for effective side-channel analysis and
secret key
extraction from real-world devices
- Investigation of hardware security related problems in SRAM, Flash and
EEPROM memory of semiconductor chips including microcontrollers, secure memory
chips and FPGAs. Evaluation against:
fault
injection,
data
remanence,
side-channel attacks,
heating
attacks,
side-channel
emission analysis attacks, bumping
attacks, fault masking attacks
and other recently discovered attacks
- Investigation of hardware security related problems in hardware
encryption engines embedded into various semiconductor devices.
Evaluation against:
side-channel
attacks,
fault
injection,
side-channel
emission, bumping
and other recently discovered attacks
- Hardware security analysis of nonvolatile memory structures in
microcontrollers, smartcards, CPLDs and FPGAs against all known attacks
- Flash Memory 'Bumping' Attacks
- Using
Optical Emission Analysis for Estimating Contribution to Power Analysis
- Optically
Enhanced Position-Locked Power Analysis
- Data
remanence in EPROM, EEPROM and Flash memories
- Thermal imaging analysis of semiconductors
- Back side
imaging techniques
- Fault
injection attacks
- Laser
scanning microscopy
- Side-channel
attacks
I am a member of the following communities:
- Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), Program Committee (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012)
- Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES), Program Committee (2010, 2012)
- Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC), Program Committee (2010, 2011, 2012)
- Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference (CARDIS), Program Committee (2011, 2012)
- Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design (COSADE), Program Committee (2012)
- IEEE Transactions on Computers (TC), Peer Reviewer (2006, 2007, 2009)
- European Research Council (ERC), Peer Reviewer (2010)
- Wiley Reviewer (2010)
- Journal of Information Security, Reviewer (2011)
- Journal of Cryptographic Engineering (JCEN), Associate Editor (2011)
Here are some of my current project
ideas for undergraduate students. Old project ideas are placed here and here.
I have been critised a lot about the fact that most of the chips I analyse
and publish successful attacks on, are built with 0.7-micron or even 0.9-micron
technology. This is now changed, meaning that chips I use in my new research
investigations are built with at least 0.5-micron technology (still popular
in some secure chips) and some tests applied down to 90nm chips, with some
interesting results recently published on 0.13-micron chips.
I was contacted many times in the past with questions about consulting
projects I can perform here in the lab. It was mainly caused by rapidly
growing concerns about hardware security of semiconductor products (mostly
microcontrollers, CPLDs and FPGAs) and growing intellectual property
theft in Asian countries where most outsourcing is taking place. Some
projects were aimed on finding security flaws in existing devices in order
to improve their security or to select the most secure parts from a list.
Other projects were dedicated for teaching and educating personnel. While
other projects were about developing of certain attack techniques.
More information on the types of research projects
and possible collaboration with industry.
Upcoming events (soonest first)
Will be added in due course.
Past events (latest first)
I created a new page: Up-to-date information
on my hardware security research.
I wrote chapter Physical
Attacks and Tamper Resistance in Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust, Eds: Mohammad
Tehranipoor and Cliff Wang, Springer, September 2011, ISBN 978-1-4419-8079-3
I gave an invited talk "Hardware
Security of Semiconductor Chips: Progress and Lessons"
on 27 June 2011 at School of Computing Science, Newcastle University (abstract).
I gave two invited talks: Fault attacks on secure chips: from glitch to flash (slides); and
Side-channel attacks: new directions and horizons (slides) at ECRYPT2
School
on Design and Security of Cryptographic Algorithms and Devices,
29 May-03 June 2011, Albena near Varna, Bulgaria.
I gave an invited talk at the 2nd ARO Special Workshop on Hardware Assurance (abstract,
slides and
video).
Synchronization
method for SCA and fault attacks. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering (JCEN),
Springer, 2011. New application for frequency locking in side-channel and fault
attacks on secure microcontrollers and secure FPGAs.
I gave a talk at the
Security Group seminar on 7 December 2009 (slides:
Bumping attacks: the affordable way of obtaining chip secrets).
I presented my research into a new class of fault injection attacks called
bumping attacks. These attacks are aimed at data extraction from secure
embedded memory, which usually stores critical parts of algorithms, sensitive
data and cryptographic keys. I evaluated memory verification and AES
authentication schemes used in secure microcontrollers and a highly secure
FPGA. Partial reverse engineering of the FPGA made bumping attacks possible
via the use of non-invasive threshold voltage alteration combined with power
glitching. How the sensitive areas can be found? How the AES key can be
attacked? How long does it take to get the AES key? How the super secret
factory backdoor can be found? What was the biggest security mistake in Actel
ProASIC3, Igloo, Fusion and SmartFusion FPGAs? How not to get screwed by
irresponsible corporate security strategy? These and other questions are
answered.
I gave a guest lecture "Tamper resistance
and hardware security" in the Part II
Security course for undergraduate students 2010-11.
Slides are substantially revised and new material is included compared to
the last year lecture.
Optical Fault
Masking Attacks.
(slides).
I presented new inexpensive semi-invasive optical fault technique which can
disable Flash memory write and erase operations
7th Workshop
on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC 2010).
Real world AES
key extraction.
Rump
session at Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems Workshop (CHES-2010).
Flash
Memory 'Bumping' Attacks
(slides). New powerful attack method aimed at secure memory integrity
check which allows contents and secret key extraction. Appeared at Cryptographic Hardware
and Embedded Systems Workshop (CHES-2010).
I gave an invited talk at the PASTIS-2010
Workshop on PACA Security Trends in Embedded Systems (abstract and
slides).
I gave an invited talk at the Lorentz
Center Workshop on Provable Security against Physical Attacks (abstract and
slides).
I gave a guest lecture "Tamper resistance
and hardware security" in the Part II
Security course for undergraduate students 2009-10.
Slides are revised and new material is included compared to the last year
lecture.
I gave a talk at the
Security Group seminar on 13 October 2009 (slides:
Optical surveillance on silicon chips: your crypto keys are visible).
I presented my research into a new class of side-channel attacks - optical
side-channel attacks on secure semiconductor chips. By using an inexpensive
CCD camera to monitor the emission from operating chip, information stored
in SRAM, EEPROM and Flash was successfully recovered. In extreme cases, AES
key stored inside a secure FPGA chip and used for secure code updates could
be extracted thus seriously compromising the hardware security. Protection
against these new side-channel attacks should become a new challenge to chip
manufacturers.
Using
Optical Emission Analysis for Estimating Contribution to Power Analysis.
(slides).
I presented new inexpensive semi-invasive side-channel attack method which is
marking new direction in the hardware security arm race between developers
and attackers.
6th Workshop
on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC 2009).
Local
Heating Attacks on Flash Memory Devices
(slides).
I presented a new semi-invasive attack technique which is aimed on modifying
Flash and EEPROM memory as well as data extraction directly from the memory
cell. Appeared at 2nd IEEE
International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST-2009).
I gave a talk at the
Security Group seminar
on 20 January 2009 (slides:
Hardware security: trends and pitfalls of the past decade). I
was talking about progress in the hardware security area during the past
decade. Instead of looking at various attack technologies, like I did in my
previous lectures, I paid more attention to underlying problems of security
failures caused by silicon hardware. I summarised achievements in attack
and defence technologies and discussed some hardware security related issues
of security economics and security psychology. After giving some examples of
low-cost attacks on moderately secure silicon chips, I finally tried projecting
the trend of hardware security area into the nearest future which is likely to
be fruitful on news of more previously thought unbreakable devices actually
being easy to attack.
I gave a guest lecture "Tamper resistance
and hardware security" in the Part II
Security course for undergraduate students 2008-09.
I prepared a short live
hardware security
demonstration course for students. Demonstrations involved decapsulated
samples show, optical microscopy and rear-side infrared microscopy of various
microcontrollers including deprocessed chips, optical fault injection
history and live attack on security in microcontroller, power analysis
attack on security in custom design. A short version of the
demonstrations were also given as a part of Show and Tell local
event here in the Computer Lab on 29 September 2008.
I gave a talk as invited speaker at the IPAM Workshop on
Special purpose hardware for cryptography: Attacks and Applications (abstract and
slides).
I gave a talk at the Security Group seminar
on 31 October 2006 (slides:
Optically Enhanced Position-Locked Power Analysis). I introduced a
refinement of the power analysis attack on integrated circuits. By using a
laser to illuminate a specific area on the chip surface, the current through
an individual transistor can be made visible in the circuit's power trace.
Optically
Enhanced Position-Locked Power Analysis (slides). New fascinating results
of applying semi-invasive attacks to on-chip SRAM arrays for recovering
information about its internal functionality without interfering with
the chip operation. Appeared at Cryptographic Hardware
and Embedded Systems Workshop (CHES-2006).
I gave a four-hour talk as invited lecturer at the ECRYPT Summer
School on Cryptography in Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium) 12-15 June
2006. I gave an introduction to hardware security and presented my
achievements in hardware security analysis in the last six years. The
abstract of the talk and references are available here. Slides
for Part
1, Part 2,
Part
3 and Part 4
of my talk are now available.
Cryptographic
Processors -- A Survey (Invited Paper). IEEE Proceedings, Special
Issue on Cryptography and Security, February 2006, Vol.94, No.2,
pp.357-369. Full version is available as a Technical
Report UCAM-CL-TR-641.
Data
Remanence in Flash Memory Devices. Cryptographic Hardware and
Embedded Systems Workshop (CHES-2005), 30 August - 1 September 2005, LNCS 3659,
Springer-Verlag, ISBN 3-540-28474-5, pp.339-353 (slides).
My Ph.D. thesis, which discusses the area of my research and
achievements up until the end of 2003, has been out since April 2005
and exists in forms of hardbound copy and
on-line Technical
Report version. No part of my thesis or correspondent Technical
Report may be used to produce any other reports or publications. It
can be viewed on a computer or printed out for reference and
consultation purposes only. You must contact me and obtain my
permission in writing if you want to reproduce or use any images or
diagrams from my thesis. I do not provide or authorise any translation
of my thesis into other languages.
I gave a talk at the
Security
Group seminar on 26 October 2004 (slides: Data
remanence in non-volatile semiconductor memories. Part I: Introduction and
non-invasive approach). I showed how the security protection in
microcontrollers and smartcards with EEPROM/Flash memories can be compromised
if the information from embedded memory does not disappears completely after
erasing.
On a
New Way to Read Data from Memory. First International IEEE
Security in Storage Workshop, 11 December 2002, Greenbelt Marriott,
Maryland, USA.
Optical Fault Induction Attacks. Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded
Systems Workshop (CHES-2002), 13-15 August 2002, LNCS 2523, Springer-Verlag,
ISBN 3-540-00409-2, pp.2-12
(slides, Russian version).
We describe a new class of attacks on secure microcontrollers and smartcards.
Illumination of a target transistor causes it to conduct, thereby inducing a
transient fault. Such attacks are practical; they do not even require
expensive laser equipment. As an illustration of the power of this attack,
we developed techniques to set or reset any individual bit of SRAM
in a microcontroller. Unless suitable countermeasures are taken, optical
probing may also be used to induce errors in cryptographic computations
or protocols, and to disrupt the processor's control flow. It thus provides
a powerful extension of existing glitching and fault analysis techniques.
This vulnerability posed a big problem for the industry, similar to
those resulting from probing attacks in the mid-1990s and power analysis
attacks in the late 1990s.
Low
Temperature Data Remanence in Static RAM. Technical Report UCAM-CL-TR-536,
University of Cambridge,Computer Laboratory, June 2002.
Copy
Protection in Modern Microcontrollers is an overview of copy
protection reliability in modern microcontrollers, 2000.
Up-to-date information
on my hardware security research.
I am a member of the following communities:
- Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), Program Committee (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012)
- Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES), Program Committee (2010, 2012)
- Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC), Program Committee (2010, 2011, 2012)
- Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference (CARDIS), Program Committee (2011, 2012)
- Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design (COSADE), Program Committee (2012)
- IEEE Transactions on Computers (TC), Peer Reviewer (2006, 2007, 2009)
- European Research Council (ERC), Peer Reviewer (2010)
- Wiley Reviewer (2010)
- Journal of Information Security, Reviewer (2011)
- Journal of Cryptographic Engineering (JCEN), Associate Editor (2011)
Added publications list:
- Physical
Attacks and Tamper Resistance. Chapter 7 in Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust,
Eds: Mohammad Tehranipoor and Cliff Wang, Springer, September 2011, ISBN 978-1-4419-8079-3
- Hardware Security of
Semiconductor Chips: Progress and Lessons. School of Computing Science,
Newcastle University, 27 June 2011, Newcastle upon Tyne.
- Fault attacks on secure
chips: from glitch to flash. ECRYPT2 School on Design and Security of Cryptographic
Algorithms and Devices, 29 May-03 June 2011, Albena near Varna, Bulgaria.
- Side-channel attacks:
new directions and horizons. ECRYPT2 School on Design and Security of Cryptographic
Algorithms and Devices, 29 May-03 June 2011, Albena near Varna, Bulgaria.
- Physical Attacks on
Tamper Resistance: Progress and Lessons. 2nd ARO Special Workshop on Hardware
Assurance, 11-12 April 2011, Washington DC, USA.
- Synchronization
method for SCA and fault attacks. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering (JCEN),
Vol.1, No.1, Springer, 2011, pp.71-77.
- Bumping attacks: the
affordable way of obtaining chip secrets. Talk at the Security Group
seminar 07/12/2010.
(slides).
- Tamper
resistance and hardware security. Guest lecture in the Part II
Security course 2010-11.
- Optical
Fault Masking Attacks. 7th Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in
Cryptography (FDTC 2010), 21 August 2010, Santa Barbara, USA. IEEE-CS Press,
ISBN 978-0-7695-4169-3, pp.23-29.
(slides).
- Real world
AES key extraction.
Rump
session at Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems Workshop
(CHES-2010), 19 August 2010, Santa Barbara, USA.
- Flash
Memory 'Bumping' Attacks. Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Workshop (CHES-2010), 18-20 August 2010, LNCS 6225, Springer,
ISBN 3-642-15030-6, pp.158-172.
(slides).
- Fault and
side-channel attacks on memory. PASTIS-2010 Workshop on PACA Security
Trends in Embedded Systems, June 16 - 17, 2010, Gardanne, France.
- Hardware
security of silicon chips: progress, pitfalls and challenges for physical
attacks. Lorentz Center Workshop on Provable Security against Physical
Attacks. February 15 - 19, 2010, Leiden, Netherlands.
- Poster: Optical
surveillance on silicon chips
- Tamper resistance
and hardware security. Guest lecture in the Part II
Security course 2009-10.
- Optical surveillance
on silicon chips: your crypto keys are visible. Talk at the Security
Group seminar 13/10/2009
(slides).
- Using
Optical Emission Analysis for Estimating Contribution to Power Analysis.
6th Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC 2009).
IEEE-CS Press, ISBN 978-0-7695-3824-2, pp.111-119
(slides).
- Local
Heating Attacks on Flash Memory Devices. 2nd IEEE International Workshop
on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST-2009). IEEE Xplore,
ISBN 978-1-4244-4804-3
(slides).
- Hardware security:
trends and pitfalls of the past decade. Talk at the Security Group
seminar 20/01/2009 (slides).
Using new methods
of side-channel analysis for finding backdoors and trojans in secure chips
Status: ongoing research project. Publications to come in 2012-2013
Using side-channel
analysis and fault
attacks for partial reverse engineering of secure chips
Status: ongoing research project. Publications to come in 2012-2013
Developing new
technology for effective side-channel analysis and
secret key
extraction from real-world devices
Status: ongoing research project. Publications to come in 2012-2013
EEPROM and Flash memory modification attacks. This research
project is aimed on developing new techniques to alter the EEPROM and
Flash memory contents using semi-invasive methods.
Status: ongoing research project. Publications to come in 2012-2013
Investigation of hardware security related problems in Flash and EEPROM
memory structures. Evaluation against:
fault
injection,
data
remanence, external influence, side-channel leakage, memory extraction
and new attacks.
Status: ongoing research project. Publications to come in 2012-2013
Practical use of fault-injection
attacks. We introduced these attacks in 2002. Unfortunately
they have still not been properly investigated. Research is needed to
estimate the requirements on these attacks for each chip manufacturing
technology and possible success rate. We are currently setting up the
equipment necessary for this research. Some of the results are very
likely to be published in 2011 once new special equipment has arrived.
Status: several ongoing research projects. Publications to come in
2012-2013
Investigation of hardware security related problems in encryption engines
implemented in semiconductor devices. Evaluation against:
side-channel
attacks,
fault
injection, side-channel leakage and new attacks.
Status: ongoing research project. Publications to come in 2012-2013
Practical reverse engineering of programmable logic chips. It is
strongly believed that CPLDs and FPGAs offer superior IP protection by design as
there is no sequential programming execution flow and the device functionality
is obscured using proprietary encoding. The question is how far an attacker can
go by observing the device configuration process and analysing the differences.
Status: ongoing research project. Publications to come in 2012-2013
Optically controlled microcontroller chip. Despite to the
fact that I discovered the optical
fault injection attacks in 2001 and introduced them to public in
2002, there still were very little done in the direction of performing
such attacks in a controllable and reliable way. This project is aimed
to eliminate such disproportion by showing a good demonstration how
such attacks can be used to run an arbitrary code on a standard 8-bit
microcontroller with fully disabled or damaged memory programming
interface.
Status: ongoing development project. Publications to come in 2012-2013
Data remanence in EEPROM and Flash memory devices under special
conditions. Additional directions for my previous research on data
remanence in semiconductor memory devices.
Status: several ongoing research projects. Publications to come in
2012-2013
Advanced optical probing attacks. Research into practical
methods of reading SRAM, EEPROM and Flash memory contents using
semi-invasive approach.
Status: several ongoing research projects. Publications to come in
2012-2013
Advanced EMA attacks. Research into combining of EMA
attacks with semi-invasive methods.
Status: ongoing research project. Publications to come in
2013-2014
High-resolution power analysis. Research into improving
effectiveness of power analysis attacks by using special data
acquisition, measurement and post-processing techniques.
Status: ongoing research project. Publications to come in
2012-2013
Using nanotechnologies for hardware security analysis.
Current trends in the miniaturisation of electronic devices demand the
ability to understand the structure and properties on the deep
submicron level (latest technology is 28nm and 20nm is already
proposed). Recent achievements in scanning probe microscopy allow us
to observe many characteristics of semiconductor chip surface such as
landscape (with atomic force microscopy), doping concentration (with
scanning capacitance microscopy), resistance (with scanning spreading
resistance microscopy), magnetic field (with magnetic force
microscopy), temperature (with scanning thermal microscopy), and many
others. We need research to estimate how much information could be
extracted from silicon chips by using such technologies. This research
might involve designing and building some special microscopes. As such
research requires large investments in equipment, it is difficult to
predict when it will be started.
Status: estimating the initial requirements, looking for funding
- Secure microcontrollers
- Tamper resistance, smartcard systems, analysis of secure systems
- Decapsulation and chemical (wet) etching
- Semi-invasive
attacks
- FIB workstation (FEI Vectra 200)
- Laser
cutting systems
- Probing
stations and microprobing techniques
- Submicron mechanical positioning (stage1,
stage2,
stage3,
stage4 ).
- Laser
microscopy
- Advanced
imaging techniques
- Assembler programming (8048, Z80, 8051, 6502, 80x86,
6805/08/11, PIC12/16/18/24, 68000, AVR, MIPS, ARM, MSP430, H8/300, PowerPC)
- C/C++ programming for PC and embedded systems
- Verilog HDL programming (Altera, Xilinx)
- Designing of hardware devices using CPLDs and FPGAs (Altera, Xilinx)
- Printed Circuit Boards (PCB) design
- IBM PC hardware design and programming
- Hardware design and programming for Sinclair ZX Spectrum,
Nintendo (NES) game console, SEGA Megadrive game console
Up-to-date information
on my hardware security research.
My first security-related research project was an analysis of the
copy
protection mechanisms in modern microcontrollers. I still work in
this area and I occasionally provide penetration testing and
consulting services for old and new microcontroller designs. My work
aims at understanding the detailed mechanism of how protection
can be broken and how the security of new designs can be improved.
Using new methods
of side-channel analysis for finding backdoors and trojans in secure chips.
Using side-channel
analysis and fault
attacks for partial reverse engineering of secure chips.
Developing new
technology for effective side-channel analysis and
secret key
extraction from real-world devices.
My other research is more about a general evaluation of
different memory structures against all kind of attacks, rather than
testing any particular samples. As I expected long time ago (it was
announced by me in 1999) Flash and EEPROM memories are not very good
candidates for hardware security on their own, unless special
attention was taken into data flow control and interface protocols. It
was also suggested in my popular article on copy protection in
microcontrollers with its first edition in year 2000. Much more
information about various problems in EPROM, EEPROM and Flash memories
are in my Ph.D. thesis which is available for public. My further research
will involve detailed investigation in different Flash/EEPROM memory
cells as well as in antifuse cells which are believed to be highly secure
and my personal opinion is that it was not properly proved and
tested. The next step would be learning and testing FRAM and MRAM
memory structures as they are considered to be a highly secure
replacement to Flash and EEPROM memories.
- Physical
Attacks and Tamper Resistance. Chapter 7 in Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust,
Eds: Mohammad Tehranipoor and Cliff Wang, Springer, September 2011, ISBN 978-1-4419-8079-3
- Hardware Security of
Semiconductor Chips: Progress and Lessons. School of Computing Science,
Newcastle University, 27 June 2011, Newcastle upon Tyne.
- Fault attacks on secure
chips: from glitch to flash. ECRYPT2 School on Design and Security of Cryptographic
Algorithms and Devices, 29 May-03 June 2011, Albena near Varna, Bulgaria.
- Side-channel attacks:
new directions and horizons. ECRYPT2 School on Design and Security of Cryptographic
Algorithms and Devices, 29 May-03 June 2011, Albena near Varna, Bulgaria.
- Physical Attacks on
Tamper Resistance: Progress and Lessons. 2nd ARO Special Workshop on Hardware
Assurance, 11-12 April 2011, Washington DC, USA.
- Synchronization
method for SCA and fault attacks. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering (JCEN),
Vol.1, No.1, Springer, 2011, pp.71-77.
- Bumping
attacks: the affordable way of obtaining chip secrets. Talk at the
Security Group seminar 07/12/2010.
(slides).
- Tamper
resistance and hardware security. Guest lecture in the Part II
Security course 05/11/2010.
- Evaluation of secure memory types (FRAM, NAND ROM/Flash,
VTROM, Antifuse) to different attacks (in process).
- Optical
Fault Masking Attacks. FDTC 2010
(slides).
- Real world
AES key extraction. Rump session at CHES-2010.
- Flash
Memory 'Bumping' Attacks. CHES-2010
(slides).
-
Fault and side-channel attacks on memory. PASTIS-2010 Workshop on PACA
Security Trends in Embedded Systems
(abstract
and slides).
- Hardware
security of silicon chips: progress, pitfalls and challenges for physical
attacks. Lorentz Center Workshop on Provable Security against Physical
Attacks (abstract and
slides).
- Tamper
resistance and hardware security. Guest lecture in the Part II Security
course 20/11/2009.
- Optical surveillance
on silicon chips: your crypto keys are visible. Talk at the Security
Group seminar 13/10/2009
(slides).
- Using
Optical Emission Analysis for Estimating Contribution to Power Analysis.
FDTC 2009
(slides).
- Local
Heating Attacks on Flash Memory Devices. HOST-2009
(slides).
- Hardware security:
trends and pitfalls of the past decade. Talk at the Security Group
seminar 20/01/2009 (slides).
- Tamper resistance
and hardware security. Guest lecture in the Part II
Security course 24/11/2008.
-
Semi-Invasive Extension to Physical Attacks. IPAM Workshop on Special
purpose hardware for cryptography
(Abstract
and Slides).
- Optically
enhanced position-locked power analysis. Talk at the Security
Group seminar 31/10/2006 (slides).
- Optically
Enhanced Position-Locked Power Analysis. CHES-2006
(slides).
- Data
Remanence in Flash Memory Devices. CHES-2005
(slides).
- Using
semi-invasive attacks for reverse engineering and semiconductor
testing purposes
-
Semi-Invasive Attacks - A New Approach to Hardware Security
Analysis. My Ph.D. thesis
submitted on 22 September 2004.
- Data
remanence in non-volatile semiconductor memories. Part I: Introduction
and non-invasive approach. Talk at the Security Group seminar 26/10/2004
(slides).
-
Optical Fault Induction Attacks. CHES-2002
(slides).
-
Semi-Invasive Attacks (definition)
-
Low Temperature Data Remanence in Static RAM. Talk at the Security Group
seminar.
- Applying Semi-Invasive attacks to EPROM, EEPROM, Flash and
MaskROM memories inside microcontrollers and smartcards (see publications
from 2002 to present time).
- Copy
Protection in Modern Microcontrollers is an overview of copy
protection reliability in modern microcontrollers.
Dr Sergei P. Skorobogatov
University of Cambridge
Computer Laboratory
William Gates Building
15 JJ Thomson Avenue
Cambridge CB3 0FD
United Kingdom
Phone: +44 (0)1223 763563
+44 (0)1223 763744
Fax: +44 (0)1223 334678
Email: Sergei.Skorobogatov (at) cl.cam.ac.uk
sps32 (at) cl.cam.ac.uk
sps32 (at) cam.ac.uk
Sergei.Skorobogatov (at) hushmail.com
Secure email: For confidential messages use HushMail and send email to my HushMail
address Sergei.Skorobogatov (at) hushmail.com. Alternatively, use my PGP key.
I always reply to personal emails. But sometimes due to server
problems or spam filters mail could be lost. Therefore please resend
your message if I have not replied within one week. In case of
important messages I would prefer you to forward a copy of your letter
to my HushMail address. Please avoid using HTML format in your emails
(such messages are very likely to be filtered out) and ask my
permission if you want to attach any files to your emails.
Please do not copy any of my publications onto your own Internet
server for public access without explicit permission. If you want to
refer to any of my texts, please use a hyperlink to my original and
not a copy. I update these texts frequently and I want to prevent the
confusion that arises if people read somewhere else obsolete versions
that are not under my control.
Press releases
Posters
English texts
- Physical
Attacks and Tamper Resistance. Chapter 7 in Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust,
Eds: Mohammad Tehranipoor and Cliff Wang, Springer, September 2011, ISBN 978-1-4419-8079-3
- Hardware Security of
Semiconductor Chips: Progress and Lessons. School of Computing Science,
Newcastle University, 27 June 2011, Newcastle upon Tyne.
- Fault attacks on secure
chips: from glitch to flash. ECRYPT2 School on Design and Security of Cryptographic
Algorithms and Devices, 29 May-03 June 2011, Albena near Varna, Bulgaria.
- Side-channel attacks:
new directions and horizons. ECRYPT2 School on Design and Security of Cryptographic
Algorithms and Devices, 29 May-03 June 2011, Albena near Varna, Bulgaria.
- Physical Attacks on
Tamper Resistance: Progress and Lessons. 2nd ARO Special Workshop on Hardware
Assurance, 11-12 April 2011, Washington DC, USA.
- Synchronization
method for SCA and fault attacks. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering (JCEN),
Vol.1, No.1, Springer, 2011, pp.71-77.
- Bumping attacks: the
affordable way of obtaining chip secrets. Talk at the Security Group
seminar 7 December 2010
(slides).
- Tamper resistance
and hardware security. Guest lecture in the Part II
Security course, 5 November 2010.
- Optical Fault Masking Attacks.
7th Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC 2010), 21 August 2010, Santa Barbara,
USA. IEEE-CS Press, ISBN 978-0-7695-4169-3, pp.23-29.
(slides).
- Real world AES key extraction.
Rump session at
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems Workshop (CHES-2010), 19 August 2010, Santa Barbara, USA.
- Flash Memory 'Bumping' Attacks.
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems Workshop (CHES-2010), 18-20 August 2010, LNCS 6225, Springer,
ISBN 3-642-15030-6, pp.158-172.
(slides).
-
Fault and side-channel attacks on memory. PASTIS-2010 Workshop on PACA Security Trends in
Embedded Systems, 16-17 June 2010, Gardanne, France (abstract and slides).
-
Hardware security of silicon chips:
progress, pitfalls and challenges for physical attacks. Lorentz Center
Workshop on Provable Security against Physical Attacks.
15-19 February 2010, Leiden, Netherlands (abstract
and slides).
- Tamper resistance
and hardware security. Guest lecture in the Part II
Security course, 20 November 2009.
- Optical surveillance
on silicon chips: your crypto keys are visible. Talk at the Security
Group seminar 13 October 2009.
(slides).
- Using
Optical Emission Analysis for Estimating Contribution to Power Analysis.
6th Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC 2009),
6 September 2009, Lausanne, Switzerland. IEEE-CS Press,
ISBN 978-0-7695-3824-2, pp.111-119.
(slides).
- Local
Heating Attacks on Flash Memory Devices. 2nd IEEE International Workshop
on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST-2009), 27 July 2009,
San Francisco, CA, USA. IEEE Xplore, ISBN 978-1-4244-4804-3.
(slides).
- Hardware security:
trends and pitfalls of the past decade. Talk at the Security Group
seminar 20 January 2009 (slides).
- Tamper resistance
and hardware security. Guest lecture in the Part II
Security course, 24 November 2008.
-
Semi-Invasive Extension to Physical Attacks. Securing Cyberspace:
Applications and Foundations of Cryptography and Computer Security.
Workshop IV: Special purpose hardware for cryptography: Attacks and
Applications. 4-8 December 2006, Los Angeles (abstract
and slides).
- Optically
enhanced position-locked power analysis. Talk at the Security
Group seminar 31 October 2006 (slides).
- Optically
Enhanced Position-Locked Power Analysis. Cryptographic Hardware and
Embedded Systems Workshop (CHES-2006), 11-13 October 2006, LNCS 4249, Springer,
ISBN 3-540-46559-6, pp.61-75 (slides).
-
Tamper resistance and physical attacks. Summer School on Cryptographic
Hardware, Side-Channel and Fault Attacks (ECRYPT-2006), 12-15 June 2006,
Louvain-la-Neuve (slides 1,
slides
2, slides 3
and slides
4).
- Cryptographic
Processors -- A Survey (Invited Paper). IEEE Proceedings, Special
Issue on Cryptography and Security, February 2006, Vol.94, No.2,
pp.357-369. Full version is available as a Technical
Report UCAM-CL-TR-641.
- Data
Remanence in Flash Memory Devices. Cryptographic Hardware and
Embedded Systems Workshop (CHES-2005), 30 August - 1 September 2005, LNCS 3659,
Springer, ISBN 3-540-28474-5, pp.339-353 (slides).
- Semi-invasive
attacks - A new approach to hardware security analysis. Technical
Report UCAM-CL-TR-630, University of Cambridge,Computer Laboratory,
April 2005.
- Data
remanence in non-volatile semiconductor memories. Part I: Introduction and
non-invasive approach. Talk at the Security Group seminar 26 October 2004
(slides).
- On a
New Way to Read Data from Memory. First International IEEE
Security in Storage Workshop, 11 December 2002, Greenbelt Marriott,
Maryland, USA.
-
Optical Fault Induction Attacks. Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded
Systems Workshop (CHES-2002), 13-15 August 2002, LNCS 2523, Springer-Verlag,
ISBN 3-540-00409-2, pp.2-12
(slides, Russian version).
- Low
Temperature Data Remanence in Static RAM. Technical Report UCAM-CL-TR-536,
University of Cambridge,Computer Laboratory, June 2002.
- Copy
Protection in Modern Microcontrollers is an overview of copy
protection reliability in modern microcontrollers, 2000.
Russian texts
-
Ispolzovanie Sfokusirovannogo Lazernogo Izlucheniya Dlya Izmeneniya
Sostoyaniya Elementov KMOP IS //Electronics, Micro- and
Nanoelectronics. MEPhI, Moscow, 2004, pp.67-72.
-
Ispolzovanie Sfokusirovannogo Lazernogo Izlucheniya Dlya Opredeleniya
Sostoyaniya Yacheek Pamyati KMOP OZU //Electronics, Micro- and
Nanoelectronics. MEPhI, Moscow, 2003, pp.37-42.
- Smart-Karty
- vzgljad na bezopasnost pri svete fotovspyshki //PLAS, Vol.6-7, 2002.
-
Ataki metodom opticheskogo navedeniya oshibok. Approved translation
of Optical Fault Induction Attacks paper. Cryptographic Hardware
and Embedded Systems Workshop (CHES-2002), LNCS 2523, Springer-Verlag,
ISBN 3-540-00409-2, pp.2-12.
- Vliyanie
temperatury na vremya sohraneniya informacii v staticheskih OZU
//Electronics, Micro- and Nanoelectronics. MEPhI, Moscow, 2001,
pp.86-88
- Zaschita
Sovremennyh Mikrokontrollerov ot Kopirovaniya //Automatics,
Electronics, Microelectronics, Measurement Systems. MEPhI, Moscow,
2001, pp.84-85.
-
Ispolzovanie Programmiruemyh Logicheskih Integralnyh Shem v
Oftalmologicheskih Ustrojstvah //Electronics, Micro- and
Nanoelectronics. MEPhI, Moscow, 1999, pp.99-103.
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Sergei
Skorobogatov <Sergei.Skorobogatov (at) cl.cam.ac.uk>
created
12-05-2000 -- last modified 31-01-2012 --
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/
Keywords: hardware security, analysis, evaluation, computer testing, microcontroller, smartcard, embedded systems, tamper resistance, smartcard systems, breaking copy protection, IP, data extraction, AES key, DES, TDES, RSA, SHA-1, electronic engineering, invasive, non-invasive, semi-invasive attacks, optical probing, side-channel, EMA, power analysis, cryptography, encryption, crypto, digital electronics, controllers, MCU, CPLD, FPGA, ASIC, IC, fuse, antifuse, flash, EPROM, EEPROM, lock bits, attacking, cracking, hacking, crack, hack, unlock, unprotect, break, reverse engineer, recover, recovery, Motorola, Atmel, Microchip, NEC, Texas Instruments, Hitachi, Renesas, Winbond, Freescale, Cypress, Maxim, Dallas, Zilog, STMicroelectronics, SGS Thomson, Ubicom, Scenix, Intel, Cygnal, Philips, Holtek, Mitsubishi, Siemens, Samsung, Toshiba, Actel, NXP, ARM, Elan, Altera, Infineon, Lattice, Xilinx, Fujitsu, Maxim, Temic, Macronix, National Semiconductor, PIC, AVR, MSP430, H8, ST62, Z86, MC68HC, HC908, HC12, PIC16, PIC18, PIC24, dsPIC30, dsPIC33, DS2432, AT89, AT90, ATMEGA, ATtiny, PA3, A3P, ProASIC, ProASIC3, Igloo, Fusion, SmartFusion, passkey, flashlock, ibutton, Nintendo, SEGA, SONY, WII, NES, Newport, PM500 card, motorized stage, motion control, Kensington