Content filtering: methods & failures

Dr Richard Clayton



Byron Inquiry 30th October 2006

How a browser works

• User supplies URL

- http://www.example.com/page.html

- Domain is translated to "IP address"
 - www.example.com is found to be at 172.16.17.18
- Request is sent to web server (172.16.17.18)
 - GET page.html
 - HOST www.example.com
- Appropriate page is returned; repeat for images etc

Blocking at the ISP (affects everyone, not just kids)

TAXONOMY

- DNS poisoning
 - refuse to resolve the wicked domains
 - low cost, and highly scalable
- Blackhole routeing
 - refuse to carry the traffic to the wicked site
 - low cost, but limits to the number of possible rules
- Proxy filtering
 - refuse to serve the wicked pages
 - high cost, and all traffic has to be inspected
- Deep packet inspection
 - spot "bad traffic passing by" and discard (or send resets)
 - expensive especially at high bandwidth (but used for Great Firewall of China and for proprietary P2P filtering)

Problems with DNS poisoning

- Apparently easy...
 - @ IN SOA localhost. root.localhost. (
 2004010100 86400 3600 604800 3600)
 - @ IN NS localhost.
 - @ IN A 127.0.0.1
 - * IN A 127.0.0.1
- But getting it right for subdomains and for email requires some thought! Dornseif found that every German ISP he studied had made errors!

Problems with blackhole routeing

- Dropping packets will (obviously) affect every website hosted at the IP address!
 - hence useless for geocities.com or lycos.com
 - in fact useless for huge numbers of other sites as well. Edelman study found "overblocking" a significant issue: 87.3% of com/net/org sites share IP address with at least one other; 69.9% with at least 50 others (and a continuum exists at all sizes)
 - do you really want to block the "Romanian Tourist Board" website ?

Problems with proxy filtering

- This method avoids overblocking (huzzah!)
- However, it can have significant costs in equipment, in customer satisfaction and in network reliability
 - economic justifications for caching proxies continue to get weaker
 - proxies often slower than going direct!
 - caching proxies obstruct many personalisation schemes for website content providers

Problems with packet inspection

- Traffic may be encrypted (or otherwise obscure)
- Resets can be just ignored
 - often hard to inspect in real time, resets can be sent when decision on acceptability of traffic known
- Deals with more than just HTML, but other protocols are far more fluid and (in case of P2P) rapidly evolve to avoid the blocking.

Avoidance for clients


- Use a different DNS server
- Use IP addresses
- Use a relay (often encrypts and anonymises)
- Encode request%73 to avoid recognition
 look at your spam to see this raised to an art form
- Send malformed HTTP requests
 - eg: multiple HOST protocol elements

Avoidance for servers

- Move site to another IP address (easy)
- Change port number (hard to discover)
- Provide same content on many different URLs
- Accept unusually formatted requests
 - servlets at client could obfuscate or encrypt so that an intermediary has no chance of using anything short of the IP address to identify content

CleanFeed

- Part of BT "anti-child-abuse initiative"
 - two stage (hybrid) system, BT, June 2004
 - similar designs deployed by other ISPs
- First stage is IP address based
 - candidate traffic for blocking is redirected
- Second stage matches URLs
 - redirected traffic passes through a web proxy
- Best of both worlds?
 - accurate, but low cost because #2 is low volume




Fragility of Cleanfeed

- Evading either stage evades the system
 - all previous attacks continue to be relevant
- PLUS can attack the system in new ways
 - the credulous will fail to notice Google (or iTunes)
 IP addresses in DNS results for wicked sites and will
 flood the second stage with legitimate traffic
 - the clueless will fail to spot local IP addresses in DNS results and construct routing loops

The oracle attack

- Detect the redirection by the first stage by seeing what traffic reaches the second
- Send tcp/80 packets with TTL set to 8, see what then comes back:



The oracle attack

- Detect the redirection by the first stage by seeing what traffic reaches the second
- Send tcp/80 packets with TTL set to 8, see what then comes back:
 - ICMP time exceeded means no redirect
 - RST (or SYN ACK) means redirect to proxy
- Then use a suitable database to get domain names, eg: whois.webhosting.info

Oracle attack results

~~~.~~.191.40	lolitaportal.***
~~~.~~.191.42	no websites recorded in the database
~~~.~~.191.49	samayhamed.***
~~~.~~.191.50	amateurs-world.****
	anime-worlds.****
	boys-top.****
	cute-virgins.****
	cyber-lolita.****
	egoldeasy.***
	elite-sex.***
•••	and 26 more sites with similar names

NB: missing names probably .ru or outdated database NB: dodgy names on .41 .43 ... BUT no IWF "endorsement" NB: It is illegal for me to check the ACTUAL contents

Politics

- Blocking was considered "impossible" until BT deployed CleanFeed
- ISPA claim 80% of consumers covered by systems that block illegal child images
- Minister now wants all of (broadband) industry to be blocking by the end of 2007
 - voluntary except: "If it appears that we are not going to meet our target through co-operation, we will review the options"

Whitehall comprehension?

- "Recently, it has become technically feasible for ISPs to block home users' access to websites irrespective of where in the world they are hosted"
- In my view, doubtful that they understand the cost, fragility or ease of evasion of these blocking systems, let alone the reverse engineering of the blocking lists.

Other uses?

- Fratini (EU) wants Internet to be a "hostile environment" for terrorists
 - "I think it's very important to explore further possibilities of blocking websites that incite to commit terrorist action"
- Drugs, gambling, holocaust denial...
- and don't overlook civil cases:
 - such as, defamation, copyright material, industrial secrets, home addresses of company directors, lists of MI6 agents...

Summary

- Four basic ways of blocking content
- All have problems and can be evaded
- Hybrid systems can be lower cost, but have some extra problems as well
- Government signalling that blocking of sites on IWF list to become *de rigeur*
- Top of a very slippery slope for us all

Blocking at the end user (can be very user-specific)

Filtering software

- Most products are for web pages and chat
- Mix blacklists and keyword detection
 hence whitelist for when keywords fail
- Parental overrides depend on passwords...
- Australian system turned off in minutes

 and you can just copy the tricks...
- http://www.peacefire.org/ (bit dated)
 - "you'll understand when you're younger"

Lemons

- Quality (and "hidden agenda") of products not easy to determine; nor is age accuracy
- Kite mark has been in process of development for several years which may remove some of the weaker products from the marketplace.
- HEAnet (Irish school) filtering has 85% approval from primary schools, 57% from secondary schools (+ want teacher override)

Avoidance

- Blacklists may be avoided by URL obfuscation (%73 etc) depending on software design (and quality)
- Proxy sites may avoid blocks altogether
- Keyword filtering fine for fixed pages, but useless for chat (euphemisms become as offensive as the words they replace – frak!)

Webpage labelling

- Originally based on video games ratings
- Concepts apply badly on web, and even revised they are extremely crude
- In practice, honest rating is extremely expensive and webmasters not interested
- 99.99% of web (and growing) is unrated
- DoH thinks "fuck" is not bad language!

Consent/self-censorship

- Becoming clear that the major way in which the Great Firewall of China works is that people censor themselves...
- ... lesson undoubtedly applies to end-user filtering systems. Even the smartest kids may be prepared to leave system on for most of the time... (IANAP)

http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1

http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org

Dr Richard Clayton



Byron Inquiry 30th October 2006