

Extrusion Detection

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UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Computer Laboratory



The logo for thus™, consisting of three colored dots (dark grey, orange, and light blue) positioned above the word "thus" in a large, dark grey sans-serif font. A trademark symbol (TM) is located at the top right of the "us".

Some jargon

- **Spam** unsolicited bulk email (UBE, UCE etc)
- **Smarthost** email server used as sole destination
- **Bounce** to reject email with a failure report
- **Relay** to send via an intermediate machine
- **Proxy** to provide a service on behalf of others
- **Virus** self-replicating malware (aka Worm)
- **Extrusion** a bad pun on “intrusion” detection

Summary

- A short history of “spam”
- Logging by email “smartheads”
- Spotting open servers
- Spotting viruses
- Mail loops
- False positives & clueless behaviour
- Where next ?

NB: all examples are anonymised!

A short history of spam


- 1994: Individual senders
- 1995: Throwaway accounts
- 1996: Open relays
- 1997: Dedicated systems `friend@public.com`
- 1998: Proxy hijacking `wingate`
- 2001: Brute forcing SMTP AUTH
- 2003: Trojan networks

All dates are approximate

Current (Feb 04) problems for ISPs

- SMTP AUTH
 - Exchange “admin” accounts + *many others*
- Open proxies
 - mainly “trojans on non-standard ports”
- Systems still insecure “out of the box”
 - brand new XP is compromised before secured
- Blacklisting of IP ranges & smartheosts
 - `listme@listme.dsbl.org`

more people get on with us



Where do lists come from ?

- Usenet
- Archives
- FAQs and other articles
- Web sites
- Mailing lists
- Magazine subscriptions & trade shows
- Imagination
- OTHER LISTS!


8 October 1998



Who are they sending it to ?

- Me ! <richard@turnpike.com> 14 last week
other addresses 6 last week
- Abuse desk <abuse@demon.net> 100 emails in September
- Robots <faq_request@turnpike.com> 25% of 1998 activity
- Invented names <merchantlike@highwayman.com> 20 a week
- Dead names <richard@locomotive.com> 22 last week
last used in July '96

Guaranteed "spam" in 2003



*If I am rejecting this amount, why
haven't I been seen as a problem?*

Smarthost logging summaries

- Traditional reports give top 50 sources and destinations
 - intended for load balancing
 - used to spot mail loops
 - used to spot outrageous abuse
- They are often irrelevant (hence unread)
 - sysadmin primary concern is service protection, not with more general abuse issues

Smarthost logging details I

These are for Exim v3 (YMMV)

- IP address *for Demon this is account*
- HELO *identity of source*
- MAIL FROM *the “envelope” sender*
- Size *number of bytes*
- Message ID *supposedly unique*

Smarthost logging details II

Continued...

- RCPT TO *actual destination*
 - successful delivery (or to “fallback”)
 - failures (5xx)
 - necessity to retry (no response or 4xx)
- Other reports
 - restarts, system failures etc

NO CONTENT IS RECORDED

2004-02-02 09:55:54

09:55:54

1Anao3-0004b6-0U <= Accounts@example.co.uk H=mailgate.example.co.uk
(basil.example.co.uk) [212.240.1.2] P=esmtp S=47563 id=XXXX@BASIL

09:55:55

1Anao6-0004Pi-0U <= FILTER-DAEMON@example2.co.uk H=example.demon.co.uk (e800-
lam1.sbs.local) [193.237.1.1] P=esmtp S=1485
id=FSHWTDMFZV.MOX.quarantine@example2.co.uk

1Anao6-0004bm-0U => nichola@example1.com R=lookuphost T=remote_smtp
H=mail2.example1.com [212.78.2.3] C="250 2.0.0 i129tt001977 Message
accepted for delivery"

1Anao6-0004bm-0U Completed

1Anano-0004Vn-0U ** fwDOpQDeUf@puebla.com R=error_message T=remote_smtp: SMTP error
from remote mailer after RCPT TO:<fwDOpQDeUf@puebla.com>: host
puebla-com.mr.outblaze.com [205.158.62.147]: 550 1Anano-0004Vn-0U
fwDOpQDeUf@puebla.com: error ignored

1AnYor-000KPC-0U SMTP error from remote mailer after RCPT TO:<handtech@email.com>:
host email-com.mr.outblaze.com [205.158.62.23]: 450
<handtechhandtech@YAHOO.COM.JP>: No thank you: rejected: Domain not
found

1Anao4-0004Zn-0U => slotcarshop@example.net R=lookuphost T=remote_smtp
H=mail.example.net [196.25.0.1] C="250 ok 1075715185 qp 22534"

09:55:58

1Anao3-0004b6-0U => yo_takenaka@example.com R=lookuphost T=remote_smtp
H=mailsweeper.example.com [194.130.1.2] C="250 192.168.0.12: Message
accepted for delivery"

1Anao3-0004b6-0U Completed

Simplification

- Process logs into single line per email
 - discard logs for system machines
 - read all details (discards info at midnight)
 - record failure status
 - remote site may indicate is spam
 - encode difficult characters (commas etc)
 - sort the resultant 300MB+ file
- About 1200 lines of (professional) Perl

[062.049.001.001] 2004-01-18

16:03:16 1AiFOL-000LKL-0V 0,4650,rod@example.com,example.demon.co.uk,[192.168.0.1],
BC305E52.17B7%%rod@example.com,<accounts@example.com>
16:08:09 1AiFT6-000LnB-0V 0,1262,rod@example.com,example.demon.co.uk,[192.168.0.1],
BC305F7E.17B8%%rod@example.com,<media@example.com>
16:34:27 1AiFsY-000DVK-0Z 0,4305,rod@example.com,example.demon.co.uk,[192.168.0.1],
BC3065A8.17BD%%rod@example.com,<Jessy.Hunter@example.co.uk>
16:35:28 1AiFtX-000Dcs-0Z 0,995,rod@example.com,example.demon.co.uk,[192.168.0.1],
BC3065E5.17BE%%rod@example.com,<jules@example1.co.uk><adgewiseman@example2.co.uk>
16:36:40 1AiFuc-000DkB-0Z 0,102305,rod@example.com,example.demon.co.uk,[192.168.0.1],
BC306628.17BF%%rod@example.com,<media@example.com>
16:40:02 1AiFxx-000EBV-0Z 0,1672,rod@example.com,example.demon.co.uk,[192.168.0.1],
BC3066F7.17C1%%rod@example.com,<!vik_lok@yahoo.com>
16:40:02 1AiFxy-000EC8-0Z 0,2712,<>,<bounce>,1AiFxx-000EBV-0Z,,<rod@example.com>
16:44:41 1AiG2T-000EjP-0Z 0,4174,rod@example.com,example.demon.co.uk,[192.168.0.1],
BC306810.17C3%%rod@example.com,<jeff@example2.com>
18:24:34 1AiHaj-000Jzn-0W 0,480842,rod@example.com,example.demon.co.uk,[192.168.0.1],
BC307F5F.17CB%%rod@example.com,<media@example.com>
18:29:34 1AiHfx-000Kyi-0W 0,3263,rod@example.com,example.demon.co.uk,[192.168.0.1],
BC3080A5.17CD%%rod@example.com,<specialprojects@lexample.net>
18:31:36 1AiHhw-000LSf-0W 0,3178,rod@example.com,example.demon.co.uk,[192.168.0.1],
BC30811F.17CE%%rod@example.com,<example@aol.com>
18:34:19 1AiHkY-000Luz-0W 0,3924,rod@example.com,example.demon.co.uk,[192.168.0.1],
BC3081C2.17D0%%rod@example.com,<paulf@example.co.uk>
18:39:20 1AiHpQ-000MUL-0W 0,3975,rod@example.com,example.demon.co.uk,[192.168.0.1],
BC3082EF.17D2%%rod@example.com,<hitsch@example.ch>
18:49:48 1AiHzy-0004yv-0Z 0,1986,rod@example.com,example.demon.co.uk,[192.168.0.1],
BC308560.17D7%%rod@example.com,<jules@example.co.uk>

Spotting “spam”

☛ Report “too many” failures to deliver

- also consider the encoded value of failures
- Ignore “bounces” !
 - have null “<>” return path, these often fail
- Add some further heuristics
 - multiple destinations and all fail
- Unfortunately aol.com never rejects email

Needs (eventually)... 2500 lines of Perl!

2004-01-31 08:19:49 242pdr1242pdr1@yahoo.com -> !sksk13@hanmail.net Size=4821
2004-01-31 08:19:55 dixtt6idixtt6i@yahoo.com -> !sksago@hanmail.net Size=4821
2004-01-31 08:20:02 xttiidixttiidi@yahoo.com -> !searchna@hanmail.net Size=4824
2004-01-31 08:27:07 242pdr1242pdr1@yahoo.com -> !sks0607@hanmail.net Size=4823
2004-01-31 08:27:16 2sp4ia22sp4ia2@yahoo.com -> !seamg@hanmail.net Size=4814
2004-01-31 08:27:21 xttiidixttiidi@yahoo.com -> !seain0325@hanmail.net Size=4830
2004-01-31 14:13:13 dixtiridixtiri@yahoo.com -> !skoin@hanmail.net Size=4815
2004-01-31 14:13:18 2pdr1242pdr124@yahoo.com -> !sea4548@hanmail.net Size=4822
2004-01-31 14:13:33 ap2s2iiap2s2ii@yahoo.com -> !skl2035@hanmail.net Size=4823
2004-01-31 14:13:35 242pdr1242pdr1@yahoo.com -> !skko16@hanmail.net Size=4821
2004-01-31 14:13:38 2sp4ia22sp4ia2@yahoo.com -> !se3127@hanmail.net Size=4820
2004-01-31 14:13:55 a22sp4ia22sp4i@yahoo.com -> !skj13@hanmail.net Size=4815
2004-01-31 14:13:59 dixtsaidixtsai@yahoo.com -> !skinart0743@hanmail.net Size=4835
2004-01-31 14:14:09 dixtt6idixtt6i@yahoo.com -> !skid-row0228@hanmail.net Size=4841
2004-01-31 14:14:11 xttiidixttiidi@yahoo.com -> !sds1443@hanmail.net Size=4822
2004-01-31 14:14:20 dixtiridixtiri@yahoo.com -> !skhhks@hanmail.net Size=4821
2004-01-31 14:14:24 dixtsaidixtsai@yahoo.com -> !skh6755@hanmail.net Size=4823
2004-01-31 14:14:31 xttiidixttiidi@yahoo.com -> !sdk5269@hanmail.net Size=4822
2004-01-31 14:14:38 2pa2pis2pa2pis@yahoo.com -> !skftlwkd@hanmail.net Size=4825
2004-01-31 14:14:40 ap2s2iiap2s2ii@yahoo.com -> !skfmfrkwuqhk@hanmail.net Size=4841
2004-01-31 14:14:47 dixttiidixtti@yahoo.com -> !sketco@hanmail.net Size=4821
2004-01-31 14:14:52 xtsaidixtsaidi@yahoo.com -> !sdh1005@hanmail.net Size=4822
2004-01-31 14:14:59 uttiyryuttiyry@yahoo.com -> !sdfam@hanmail.net Size=4814
2004-01-31 14:15:02 a22sp4ia22sp4i@yahoo.com -> !ske08@hanmail.net Size=4815
2004-01-31 14:15:08 2sp4ia22sp4ia2@yahoo.com -> !sdd74@hanmail.net Size=4814

Viruses

- Common for mass mailing “worms” to use address book (mainly valid addresses)
- Recent trend towards using contents of email storage, browser cache and (Swen) accessing Usenet servers via NNTP
 - so many addresses now invalid or badly formed
- **So virus infections are also detected**
 - ☛ but HELOs are a dead give-away!

HOST = example.demon.co.uk, HELO = Pozdds
2004-01-23 15:37:09 info@example.demon.co.uk -> ShiongJoo@example.com.my Size=135574

HOST = example.demon.co.uk, HELO = Vgkgqyldf
2004-01-23 15:37:15 info@example.demon.co.uk -> siewmei@example.com.my Size=134898

HOST = example.demon.co.uk, HELO = Hprnljq
2004-01-23 15:37:20 info@example.demon.co.uk -> !Veronique_Prigaux@examplegroup Size=134896

HOST = example.demon.co.uk, HELO = Rbg
2004-01-23 15:37:25 info@example.demon.co.uk -> alanmassow@example.net Size=137550

HOST = example.demon.co.uk, HELO = Enrlnsfdi
2004-01-23 15:37:31 info@example.demon.co.uk -> alison@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=137601

HOST = example.demon.co.uk, HELO = Ukgod
2004-01-23 15:37:38 info@example.demon.co.uk -> ashley@example.co.uk Size=135068

HOST = example.demon.co.uk, HELO = Vsrzo
2004-01-23 15:37:44 info@example.demon.co.uk -> !bestfit@example.net Size=134773

HOST = example.demon.co.uk, HELO = Jmeoqa
2004-01-23 15:37:49 info@example.demon.co.uk -> !cechala@example.net.co Size=134663

HOST = example.demon.co.uk, HELO = Tian
2004-01-23 15:37:54 info@example.demon.co.uk -> Christine@example-recruitment.com Size=133830

Validation

- Against remote site reports
 - scheme misses low volume virus infections
 - AOL has their own (high noise) feedback
 - conclusion: we have a very successful detector
- Against traditional “top 50” measures
 - shows we are failing to deal with loops
- BUT excessive “false positives”
 - too expensive to handle ~500 a day

Mail loops

- Simple loop spotted by smarthost
 - “Too many “Received” headers”
 - Simple loop spotted by customer
 - repeated mail ID
 - if no mail ID, then same source & destination
 - Responding to Mailer-Daemons
 - may not be a loop at present, but will be!
-  **viz: relatively easy to detect mail loops**

Message ID = E1Aaxoi-0008C4-I2.2003-12-29-13-52-21@mailg3.svr.pol.co.uk
2004-01-05 09:08:57 dick@gochampion.com -> enquiries@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=4476
2004-01-05 09:22:21 dick@gochampion.com -> enquiries@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=5365
2004-01-05 09:48:32 dick@gochampion.com -> enquiries@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=6254
2004-01-05 10:03:15 dick@gochampion.com -> enquiries@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=7143

Message ID = E1AaM8L-0007ZR-GV.2003-12-27-21-38-05@mailm1.svr.pol.co.uk
2004-01-05 09:08:57 coltons@helicon.net -> enquiries@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=4503
2004-01-05 09:22:22 coltons@helicon.net -> enquiries@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=5392
2004-01-05 09:48:22 coltons@helicon.net -> enquiries@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=6281
2004-01-05 10:03:17 coltons@helicon.net -> enquiries@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=7170

Message ID = 5g-mg\$2ex0r7\$t25v0w@c5m9o97
2004-01-05 09:08:54 h58wjuo@juno.com -> enquiries@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=4469
2004-01-05 09:22:23 h58wjuo@juno.com -> enquiries@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=5355
2004-01-05 09:48:22 h58wjuo@juno.com -> enquiries@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=6241

Message ID = BAY9-DAV48ylqgrKQ2C0001e111@hotmail.com
2004-01-05 09:09:36 mikepage007@hotmail.com -> kirsty@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=2432
2004-01-05 09:22:23 mikepage007@hotmail.com -> kirsty@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=3319
2004-01-05 09:48:21 mikepage007@hotmail.com -> kirsty@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=4206

Message ID = 0w-\$i65-zy-g9@99b.nfgym.1db
2004-01-05 09:09:38 np3gvp@wild-flower.net -> enquiries@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=2175
2004-01-05 09:22:34 np3gvp@wild-flower.net -> enquiries@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=3067
2004-01-05 09:48:18 np3gvp@wild-flower.net -> enquiries@example.freeserve.co.uk Size=3959

False positives

- **Bounces**
 - customer rejects email without NULL path
 - bounce@
 - postmaster@
 - root@
- **Mailing lists**
 - if many failures then looks like spammer!
 - fortunately, most spammers change sender

unwise Other ~~clueless~~ behaviour

- Saying HELO to destination when bounce
- Invalid MAIL FROM
 - `username@pop3.demon.co.uk`
- Vacation programs
 - small message sent back to every spammer
 - but they fail -- and hence look like spam
- Virus rejections
 - dear 3rd party, I've just stopped MyDoom

Some statistics I

- 14 day period (1-14 Nov)
 - 76K customers, 16.8 million emails
- 47 open servers
 - zero “false negatives”
 - 87 “false positives”
 - 2 failing senders indicates “spam” (5 is better?)
 - 498 correctly spotted as “clueless” bouncing or mailing lists with high incidence of failures

Some statistics II

- 34 virus infections (mainly Swen)
 - 22 false positives (5+ HELOs at single site)
- 147 email loops
 - 23 false negatives (>1200 emails but not detected as a loop)
 - Considering email size in preference to message ID for “same again” will improve the false negatives considerably

More to come ???

- Real-time processing of reports
 - probably not worthwhile since rejections are key aspect of heuristics & these can be slow
 - real-time assessing of 5xx messages may assist
- Tar-pits
 - once we have ?100 failures then slow down
 - collateral damage on poorly run mailing lists
 - shutting the stable door (but assists reputation)

About those static addresses...

- Have been assuming that customer records can be collated by IP address
 - ie: static IP address
- Many ADSL systems have long term IP address stability (even if DHCP)
 - ie: static on a day-to-day basis
- For dynamic IP (ie dialup) then collating events with similar times looks promising

What next?

- Spammers will evolve!
 - Looking like bounces will be hard to deal with
 - A valid MAIL FROM will be harder to detect
 - Reducing the volume will be harder to spot
- Viruses will evolve!
 - Changing HELO isn't doing them much good
 - May begin spot nonsense destinations

Darwin was right!

User Modelling [academics woz here!]

- Stolfo et al (Columbia)
 - collect stats on “normal” behaviour
 - get excited when things change
- but ISP customers are often businesses
 - multiple people
 - random decisions to launch mailshots
- Doesn’t look as if single valued statistics would be sufficient to spot anomalies

Dealing with MyDoom

- Mainly detected as “open server” ☹
 - many customer sites suppressed the HELOs
 - multiple emails meant HELO re-used
- But very effective detection ☺
 - spotting just a dozen emails sent from a dialup
 - figures commercially sensitive, so unpublished
 - one week later, ~80% now cleaned up!

Conclusions

- It is always worthwhile to wonder why your own strange behaviour hasn't been detected
- Spammers & viruses that hide a pattern at the destination make a pattern at the source
- Some simple heuristics currently spot these patterns : with delivery failures being key
- False positives mainly caused by software & users that are being especially clueless ☹

Extrusion Detection

THE END : Any questions ??



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