



Ad hoc C: Reflections on Pragmatic Semantics

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Australian Government
**Department of Broadband, Communications
and the Digital Economy**
Australian Research Council

NICTA Funding and Supporting Members and Partners



Three seL4 Stories

Basic C Technology (the “C parser”)

- worryingly *ad hoc*


Binary Validation (Sewell & Myreen)

- *ad hoc*, but **dispels** worry
- PLDI 2013



Automatic Abstraction (Greenaway)

- *ad hoc* complexity/effort removal
- ITP 2012





Fully featured operating system kernel


9000 lines of source code

Full functional correctness

25 person-years of effort








C



Making C a high integrity language?

- some industrial experience, *e.g.*, MISRA C
- Better, CompCert is a **verified compiler!**
- but we can't use it



C in L4.verified

- for the OS hackers: pointer arithmetic, casts, interpreting memory as untyped bytes
- for the verifiers: restrictions on side effects
- tool-chain: very dependent on `gcc -O2` and linker

Other Bits of C Technology



SIMPL's Verification Condition Generator

- general tool that often “just works”

seL4 Refinement Tactic


- used to verify link between C code to and (Haskell-derived) design-level spec.

Union preprocessing


- seL4 hackers didn't trust/like gcc's implementation of unions
- custom tool translates out all unions into structs and casts

[TPHOLs 2009]

Binary Validation: the Problem




Binary Validation: the Problem



seL4: Formal Verification and All That

Gerwin Klein, Kevin Elphinstone, Gernot Heiser, June Andronick, David Cock, Philip Derrin, Dhammika Elkaduwe, Kai Engelhardt, Michael Norrish, Rafal Kolanski, Thomas Sewell, Harvey Tuch, Simon Winwood, Peter Gammie, Toby Murray, David Greenaway, Andrew Boyton, Daniel Matichuk, Matthew Brassil, Timothy Bourke, Sean Seefried, Corey Lewis and Xin Gao.



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Binary Validation: the Problem



seL4: Formal Verification and All That


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ARM ISA and Decompiler

Anthony Fox and Magnus Myreen


Binary Validation: Solution in a Graph



Binary Validation: Solution in a Graph




- Informal transformations



Machine Code Decompilation



```
uint avg (uint i, uint j) {  
    return (i + j) / 2;  
}
```



<avg>:

avg+0	e0810000	add r0, r1, r0	// add r1 to r0
avg+4	e1a000a0	lsr r0, r0, #1	// shift r0 right
avg+8	e12fff1e	bx lr	// return


$$\text{avg}(r_0, r_1) = \text{let } r_0 = r_1 + r_0 \text{ in}$$
$$\text{let } r_0 = r_0 \gg \gg 1 \text{ in}$$
$$r_0$$

Control-Flow Graphs

Machine code and C code eventually turn into annotated control flow graphs

```

struct node *
find (struct tree *t, int k) {
  struct node *p = t->trunk;
  while (p) {
    if (p->key == k)
      return p;
    else if (p->key < k)
      p = p->right;
    else
      p = p->left;
  }
  return NULL;
}
  
```



1: `p := Mem[t + 4];`

2: `p == 0 ?`

8: `ret := 0`

3: `Mem[p] == k ?`

4: `ret := p;`

5: `Mem[p] < k ?`

6: `p := Mem[p + 4];`

7: `p := Mem[p + 8];`

Critically, can consider one function at a time when verifying (modulo inlining).

Comparing Graphs: Challenges



inlining

- if gcc inlines a function, the “C graph” has to do so too

loops

- must prove that loop points are reached the same number of times
- must also cope with complete or partial unrollings

treatment of the stack

- machine code accesses to memory that are loads/stores of spilled parameters need to be recognised as such

Loops, Loops, Loops, Loops, Loops, ...



Can sometimes infer that a loop should only ever execute a fixed n times.

- e.g., `for (i=0; i < 10; i++) { ... }`
- SMT solver can confirm such an inference ...
 - formula is finite, of size $O(n)$
- ... and establish appropriate post-condition(s)

Alternatively, use k -induction to prove that every visit to a loop point in the binary is matched by one in the C.

- invariant relating C and binary variables is also preserved
- offsets may be required to handle partial unrollings

Graph Equivalence Technology



Problem domain is good fit for QF_ABV SMT category

- *i.e.*, arrays + boolean vectors

Used both Z3 and Sonolar

- Sonolar performs better on arrays (used to represent memory)
- Z3 can restart (retracting facts), making efficiency performance better

Fully featured operating system kernel

9000 lines of source code

Full functional correctness

25 person-years of effort


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
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
Full functional correctness

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This is a disturbingly large number; where can we improve productivity?







Some background to this mess



```
int max(int a, int b) {  
    if (a < b) {  
        return b;  
    }  
    return a;  
}
```

Some background to this mess

Source Code

```
int max(int a, int b) {  
    if (a < b) {  
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    }  
    return a;  
}
```

Some background to this mess

Logic


```
max a b ≡  
if a > b then b else a
```



Source Code

```
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


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
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```
max ≡  
    TRY  
        IF { 'a < s 'b } THEN  
            'ret_int ::= 'b;;  
            'exn_var ::= Return;;  
        THROW  
    ELSE  
        SKIP  
    FI;;  
    'ret_int ::= 'a;;  
    'exn_var ::= Return;  
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    GUARD DontReach {}  
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    CATCH  
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    END
```

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
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
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Some background to this mess

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  'exn_var ::= Return;  
  THROW;  
  GUARD DontReach {}  
  SKIP;;  
CATCH  
  SKIP  
END
```

- Uninitialised variables
- Undefined behaviour
- Pointer arithmetic
- Type casting


Our approach



[Source Code](#)

Our approach

- Start with a conservative logical representation




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
- Start with a conservative logical representation
- Automatically abstract low-level spec into higher-level spec
 - Goal: Suitable for human consumption

Our approach




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- Automatically generate a *refinement proof* showing the original spec is a refinement of the generated spec

Our approach




- Start with a conservative logical representation
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
Our approach



Our approach



Our approach



```
max ≡
  TRY
    IF { 'a <s 'b } THEN
      'ret_int ::= 'b;;
      'exn_var ::= Return;;
      THROW
    ELSE
      SKIP
    FI;;
    'ret_int ::= 'a;;
    'exn_var ::= Return;
    THROW;
    GUARD DontReach {}
      SKIP;;
  CATCH
    SKIP
  END
```

```
max a b ≡  
  if (a <_s b) then b else a
```




⑥ Type Strengthening

```
max a b ≡  
  condition (a <_s b)  
  return b  
  return a
```

```
int max(int a, int b) {  
    if (a < b) {  
        return b;  
    }  
    return a;  
}
```

```
int max(int a, int b) {  
    if (a < b) {  
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    }  
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```
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```

```
        'ret_int ::= 'a;;  
        'exn_var ::= Return;  
    THROW;  
    GUARD DontReach {}  
        SKIP;;  
    CATCH  
        SKIP  
    END
```

```
int gcd(int a, int b) {  
    int c;  
    while (a != 0) {  
        c = a;  
        a = b % a;  
        b = c;  
    }  
    return b;  
}
```



```

int gcd(int a, int b) {
    int c;
    while (a != 0) {
        c = a;
        a = b % a;
        b = c;
    }
    return b;
}

```

```

gcd ≡
TRY
    NonDetInit `c `c_update
    WHILE { `a ≠ 0 } THEN
        `c ::= `a;;
        GUARD Div0 { `a ≠ 0 }
            `a ::= `b mod `a;;
            `b ::= `c
        OD;;
        `ret_int ::= `b;
        `exn_var ::= Return;
    THROW;
    GUARD DontReach {}
        SKIP
    CATCH
        SKIP
    END

```

```

int gcd(int a, int b) {
  int c;
  while (a != 0) {
    c = a;
    a = b % a;
    b = c;
  }
  return b;
}

```

```

gcd ≡
  TRY
    NonDetInit 'c' 'c_update'
  WHILE { 'a ≠ 0' } THEN
    'c ::= 'a:::

```

```

gcd a b ≡ do
  (a, b) ←
    while (λ(a, b) _. a ≠ 0)
      (λ(a, b). return (b mod a, a))
  return b
od

```

```

  THROW;
  GUARD DontReach {}
  SKIP
  CATCH
  SKIP
  END

```


```
void swap(int *a, int *b)
{
    int t = *a;
    *a = *b;
    *b = t;
}
```



```

void swap(int *a, int *b)
{
    int t = *a;
    *a = *b;
    *b = t;
}

```



```

swap ≡
TRY
  GUARD C_Guard {c_guard 'a}
    ('t := h_val (hrs_mem 't_hrs) 'a);;
  GUARD C_Guard {c_guard 'a}
    (GUARD C_Guard {c_guard 'b}
      ('globals :=
        t_hrs_'_update
          (hrs_mem_update
            (heap_update 'a
              (h_val (hrs_mem 't_hrs)
                'b))))));;
  GUARD C_Guard {c_guard 'b}
    ('globals :=
      t_hrs_'_update
        (hrs_mem_update
          (heap_update 'b 't)))
CATCH
  SKIP
END

```

```

void swap(int *a, int *b)
{
    int t = *a;
    *a = *b;
    *b = t;
}

```

```

swap ≡
TRY
  GUARD C_Guard {c_guard 'a}
    ('t ::= h_val (hrs_mem 't_hrs) 'a);;
  GUARD C_Guard {c_guard 'a}
    (GUARD C_Guard {c_guard 'b}
      ('t ::= h_val (hrs_mem 't_hrs) 'a));;

```

```

swap a b ≡
do guard (λs. c_guard a);
t ← gets (λs. h_val (hrs_mem (t_hrs_ ' s)) a);
guard (λs. c_guard b);
modify
  (λs. t_hrs_'_update
    (hrs_mem_update
      (heap_update a
        (h_val (hrs_mem (t_hrs_ ' s)) b)))) s);
modify
  (t_hrs_'_update
    (hrs_mem_update (heap_update b t)))
od

```

C Heap Semantics



```
void swap(int *a, int *b)
{
    int t = *a;
    *a = *b;
    *b = t;
}
```

C Heap Semantics

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void swap(int *a, int *b)
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C Heap Semantics

```
void swap(int *a, int *b)
{
    int t = *a;
    *a = *b;
    *b = t;
}
```

The code snippet is annotated with orange circles and question marks to highlight potential issues with pointer semantics. The parameter `int *b` in the function signature is circled, with a question mark above it. The dereferenced pointer `*a` in the assignment `int t = *a;` is circled, with a question mark above it. The dereferenced pointer `*b` in the assignment `*b = t;` is circled, with a question mark below it.

```
swap a b ≡
do guard (λs. c_guard a);
  t ← gets (λs. h_val (hrs_mem (t_hrs_' s)) a);
  guard (λs. c_guard b);
  modify
    (λs. t_hrs_'_update
      (hrs_mem_update
        (heap_update a
          (h_val (hrs_mem (t_hrs_' s)) b)))) s);
  modify
    (t_hrs_'_update
      (hrs_mem_update (heap_update b t)))
od
```

Ensure “a” is aligned, non-NULL.

```
swap a b ≡  
do guard (λs. c_guard a);  
  t ← gets (λs. h_val (hrs_mem (t_hrs_ ' s)) a);  
  guard (λs. c_guard b);  
  modify  
    (λs. t_hrs_'_update  
      (hrs_mem_update  
        (heap_update a  
          (h_val (hrs_mem (t_hrs_ ' s)) b)))) s);  
  modify  
    (t_hrs_'_update  
      (hrs_mem_update (heap_update b t)))  
od
```

```

swap a b ≡
do guard (λs. c_guard a);
t ← gets (λs. h_val (hrs_mem (t_hrs_ ' s)) a);
guard (λs. c_guard b);
modify
  (λs. t_hrs_ ' _update
    (hrs_mem_update
      (heap_update a
        (h_val (hrs_mem (t_hrs_ ' s)) b)))) s);
modify
  (t_hrs_ ' _update
    (hrs_mem_update (heap_update b t)))
od
  
```

Ensure "a" is aligned, non-NULL.

Decode the bytes at "a".

```
swap a b ≡
do guard (λs. c_guard a);
  t ← gets (λs. h_val (hrs_mem (t_hrs_ ' s)) a);
  guard (λs. c_guard b);
  modify
    (λs. t_hrs_'_update
      (hrs_mem_update
        (heap_update a
          (h_val (hrs_mem (t_hrs_ ' s)) b)))) s);
  modify
    (t_hrs_'_update
      (hrs_mem_update (heap_update b
        (h_val (hrs_mem (t_hrs_ ' s)) a)))) s);
od
```

Ensure "a" is aligned, non-NULL.

Decode the bytes at "a".

Decode the bytes at "b", encode back into bytes, store at "a".

Treatment of Heap is Promising Work in Progress

Word Arithmetic Made More Beautiful

- having to worry about overflow is drudgery...
- make the tools do it as automatically as possible

Conclusion



Ad hoc **Proof** makes ad hoc hackery

- sound, and
- beautiful

Tools:

- ssrg.nicta.com.au/software/TS/{c-parser,graph-refine}
- ssrg.nicta.com.au/projects/TS/autocorres/