topic.anonymity.bib

@comment{{This file has been generated by bib2bib 1.96}}
@comment{{Command line: /usr/bin/bib2bib -c topic:"anonymity" -ob topic.anonymity.bib sewellbib2.bib}}
@inproceedings{SS03,
  author = {Andrei Serjantov and Peter Sewell},
  title = {Passive Attack Analysis for Connection-Based Anonymity Systems},
  conf = {ESORICS 2003},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of   the 8th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (Gj{\o}vik), LNCS 2808},
  optcrossref = {},
  optkey = {},
  pages = {116--131},
  year = {2003},
  opteditor = {},
  optvolume = {},
  optnumber = {},
  optseries = {},
  optaddress = {},
  month = oct,
  optorganization = {},
  optpublisher = {},
  note = {},
  optannote = {},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-004-0059-3},
  doi = {10.1007/s10207-004-0059-3},
  pdf = {http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/pes20/conn_sys.pdf},
  ps = {http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/pes20/conn_sys.ps},
  abstract = {In this paper we consider low latency connection-based anonymity system which
can be used for applications like web browsing or SSH. Although several such sys
tems have been designed and built, their anonymity has so far not been adequatel
y
evaluated.

We analyse the anonymity of connection-based systems against passive adversaries. We give a precise description of two attacks, evaluate their effectiveness,
and calculate the amount of traffic necessary to render the attacks useless.
},
  topic = {anonymity}
}
@article{SS05,
  author = {Andrei Serjantov and Peter Sewell},
  title = {Passive-attack analysis for connection-based anonymity systems},
  journal = {International Journal of Information Security},
  year = {2005},
  optkey = {},
  volume = {4},
  number = {3},
  pages = {172--180},
  month = jun,
  note = {Special issue on ESORICS 2003},
  optannote = {},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-004-0059-3},
  doi = {10.1007/s10207-004-0059-3},
  abstract = {In this paper we consider low-latency connection-based anonymity systems which can be used for applications like web browsing or SSH. Although several such systems have been designed and built, their anonymity has so far not been adequately evaluated.

We analyse the anonymity of connection-based systems against global passive adversaries. We give a precise description of a packet-counting attack which requires a very low degree of precision from the adversary, evaluate its effectiveness against connection-based systems depending on their size, architecture and configuration, and calculate the amount of traffic necessary to provide a minimum degree of protection. We then present a second attack based on tracking connection starts which gives us another lower bound on traffic volumes required to provide at least some anonymity.
},
  topic = {anonymity}
}