

Online Payment Methods

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
Computer Laboratory

Visa and MasterCard


- What do they do?
- Some important tasks for online (and offline) payments:
 - Run communication network
 - Set standards
 - Manage disputes between members
 - **Set contractual terms between members**




Terminology




Terminology




Terminology



How well does the system work?



The EMV protocol



Counterfeit fraud

- Producing fake (typically magnetic stripe card) from harvested details




Liability engineering

	Terminal		
Card	magstrip	chip	chip & PIN
magstrip	Issuer	Issuer	Issuer
chip	Acquirer	Issuer	Issuer
chip & PIN	Acquirer	Acquirer	Issuer


The no-PIN attack



The EMV protocol



The no-PIN attack protocol



Online banking authentication

- Simple scam is to “phish” for account details
- Ask for username and password
- Low success rate, but just a few customers is enough to make investment worthwhile
- Actually moving money out is the high-risk part of the scam
- This is allocated to money-mules recruited supposedly to pay foreign staff
- Often the money mule will lose money and may be prosecuted for fraud



Dear Customer

Account Protection Update, To ensure th
scam and other account threats, it's strc
update account protection
click on "Protection" to continue the proc

Protection .

Online Internet Banking Security Center
Halifax Internet Banking.

Thanks for your co-operation.

**Fraud Prevention Unit
Legal Advisor
Halifax PLC.**

Please do not reply to this e-mail. Mail sent to this address

Hardening passwords



Confirm that your SiteKey is correct

If you recognize your SiteKey, you'll know for sure that you are at the valid Bank of America site. Confirming your SiteKey is also how you'll know that it's safe to enter your Passcode and click

An asterisk (*) indicates a required field.

Your SiteKey:

Ready Freddie



If you don't recognize your personalized SiteKey, don't enter your Passcode.

* Passcode:

(4 - 20 Characters, case sensitive)

Sign In

Memorable Name

Please enter character 1

A

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

N

O

P

Q

R

S

Please enter character 7

Please enter character 9

Replacing passwords (iTAN)

Empfänger:
Max Mustermann

Konto-Nr. des Empfängers: 123456 Bankleitzahl: 55555555

Bei Kreditinstitut: Testbank

Betrag in EUR: 1,23

Verwendungszweck 1: Verwendungszweck 2:

Konto-Nr. des Auftraggebers: 4720 Ausführungsdatum (TT.MM.JJJJ): (Optional)

Auftraggeber: Mustermann

Als Vorlage unter folgendem Namen speichern:


Bitte geben Sie die TAN neben der Nummer 35 ein: 533098 OK

TAN-Nummer

Nr.	TAN	Nr.	TAN	Nr.	TAN
1	687716	31	842387	61	723733
2	143690	32	559269	62	164612
3	908192	33	900420	63	491715
4	150266	34	950912	64	858265
5	637410	35	533098	65	500439
6	632961	36	734080	66	832015
7	028567	37	872269	67	046584
8	179016	38	301940	68	212578
9	888375	39	038797	69	784722
10	606687	40	780513	70	115323
11	051256	41	807036	71	040492
12	647111	42	085357	72	637365
13	529030	43	508000	73	470604
14	844281	44	781571	74	217050
15	714399	45	484862	75	790635

Laufende Nummer (Index)

Man in the Browser



MitB protection

Überweisung Hilfe

Konto Daniel Richter Privatkonten
Saldo in EUR: **50,00 S** online-verfügb. Betrag in EUR: 950,00

Empfänger:

Konto-Nr. des Empfängers: Bankleitzahl:
Bei Kreditinstitut:

Betrag in EUR:
Verwendungszweck:
Ausführungsdatum: (O

Konto-Nr. des Kontoführers:
Auftraggeber:
Als Vorlage unter folgendem Namen speichern:

i TAN plus-Kontrollbild für Überweisung 13:42:34 Uhr
Betrag in EUR: 20,56 Bankleitzahl: 85090000 Konto-Nr.: 123457890
Bitte geben Sie die TAN neben der Nr. 110 ein.

Bitte Auftragsdaten im Kontrollbild prüfen und geforderte TAN eingeben:

Transaktionsdaten und Anforderung iTAN

Geburtstag des VR-NetKey-Inhabers als „Wasserzeichen“ im Hintergrund,

Transaction authentication




Summary so far

- Counterfeit fraud
 - Magnetic stripe fallback facilitated by Chip and PIN
- Lost and stolen/Mail-non-receipt
 - no-PIN attack can bypass PIN protection
- Cheque fraud and ID theft
 - Primarily not a technology problem
- Online banking
 - Transaction authentication likely the way to move

Combining EMV with online banking



Combining EMV attacks with online banking



Card not present transactions

- Basic version: same as old card-present transaction
 - Card number and expiry date sent back
 - Can also send back CVV2 off back of card
 - Can also perform address verification
- Every extra step will lose customers at check-out stage
- Some vendors will skip security measures
 - Amazon don't even perform CVV2 checks
- Leaves non-Amazon users at risk of fraud (though will eventually be refunded)

Acquirer interface for web based merchants

- Small web merchants will not deal directly with acquirer
 - To allow international payments, many acquirers likely needed
 - Merchants might like to avoid access to customer details as much as possible to reduce liability
- Examples of payment processors include
 - Sage Pay
 - Worldpay
- Paypal slightly different
 - Hoped people would leave money in account; actually mostly ended up as payment processor

Example: Sage Pay (Form)




- A.** Shopper visits your website to make a purchase.
- B.** You re-direct your shopper through to our payment pages.
- C.** We capture the details, and pass these through to the bank for authorisation.
- D.** We send your shopper back to your Success or Failure page with the transaction results.

Example: Sage Pay (Server)



- A.** Shopper visits your website selects the item, and enters their details on your website.
- B.** You send the details of the transaction to us using our protocols.
- C.** We validate all of the details, and pass you the "Next URL" for you to transfer your shopper.
- D.** You transfer your shopper from your website through to our payment page.
- E.** We capture the card details, and send these to the bank for authorisation.
- F.** We notify your system of the status of the transaction to your Notification URL.
- G.** You respond to us with your re-direction URL.
- H.** We send your shopper back to your website where they are told the status of the transaction.

Example: Sage Pay (Direct)



- A.** Shopper visits your website selects the item, and enters their card details on your site.
- B.** You send the details of the transaction, and the card information to us using our protocols.
- C.** We validate all of the details, and pass these through to the bank for authorisation.
- D.** We send you the status of the transaction which you then display to your shopper.

3-D Secure (Verified by Visa/MasterCard SecureCode)

The image shows a screenshot of a 3-D Secure verification page. The page features the 'Verified by VISA' logo on the left and 'Your Bank' on the right. Below the logos, there is a prompt: 'Please submit your Verified by Visa password.' The main content area contains the following information:

- Merchant: Online Retailer Ltd.
- Amount: **GBP 9.99**
- Date: 01:01:10
- Card number: XXXX XXXX XXXX 1234
- Personal Message: A personal greeting
- Password:

Below the password field is a link: [Forgot your password?](#)


At the bottom, there are three buttons: 'Submit', 'Help', and 'Cancel'.

Annotations on the right side of the page point to various elements:

- 'Your bank's logo' points to the 'Your Bank' text.
- 'The name of the retailer that you are shopping with' points to 'Online Retailer Ltd.'.
- 'The value of the purchase' points to 'GBP 9.99'.
- 'Today's date' points to '01:01:10'.
- 'The last four digits of your card number' points to '1234'.
- 'The personal message that you set when registering' points to 'A personal greeting'.



Visa

3-D Secure (Verified by Visa/MasterCard SecureCode)



American Express

3D secure phishing vulnerability




Verified by Visa / MasterCard SecureCode Enrollment:
Due to recent changes to FDIC Deposit Insurance Rules all our customers must be enrolled in Verified by Visa or MasterCard SecureCode program depending on type of your Check Card. **To continue complete this form and click Activate Now.**

Social Security #: - -

Card Number: (16 digits)

Expiration Date: / (MM/YY)


Signature Code:  (Last 3 digits on the back)

Card PIN Code: (4-6 digit code that you enter in ATM)

Choose Password: [How will it be used?](#)

Confirm Password: (6-12 characters length)

If you already enrolled in Verified by Visa or MasterCard SecureCode program to continue please enter current password or select new then **click Activate Now.**



Welcome, 00034-5432-PSI-54256

Verified By Visa

Enter Account Information

Please enter the information below and click the "Continue" button. You can review this information verified by visa account..

Payment Information

Tell us the card to add to your Account.

Card Nickname (example: My Bank One Visa)

Card Number

Expiration Date /

CVV2

ATM Pin


Name on Card (first/last)

SOFORT Überweisung

TAN-Eingabe - Payment Network AG - Google Chrome

TAN-Eingabe - Payme... x

https://www.sofortueberweisung.de/payment/payment/go/provide_tan

 **sofort**überweisung.de

Daten erfassen Legitimation **Übermittlung** Zusammenfassung

Geben Sie bitte Ihre TAN ein
Bitte kontrollieren Sie die einzustellende Überweisung.
Wenn diese richtig ist, bestätigen Sie sie durch Eingabe der angeforderten TAN.
[Land und Bankleitzahl ändern](#) oder [Das Absenderkonto ändern](#)

Zahlungsempfänger: Ihr OnlineShop Demo Teststr. 1 00000 Teststadt	Verwendungszweck: Demo	Betrag: 10,00 EUR
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Empfänger-Konto:
Inhaber: Ihr OnlineShop
Konto: 1234XXXX
BLZ: 10000000
Bank: Bundesbank

[Bild vergrößern](#) [Bild verkleinern](#)

Bitte 12345 tippen: **12345**

oder [Vorgang abbrechen](#)

[Hier können Sie sich über unseren Service informieren.](#)


Absender-Konto: Max Mustermann, Kontonummer: 23456789, Bank: Testbank (88888888)

Die Payment Network AG behält sich Lastschriftinzug vor.

sofortüberweisung.de ist ein Service der Payment Network AG, Fußbergstr. 1, D-82131 Gauting
Sicherheit - Datenschutz - Kontakt - Impressum - Käuferinfo - 3-140-9 - Ihre Transaktionsnummer: 25142-72530-48805608-88E2

Mobile payments

- May just be interface to online banking website
- mPESA and similar use mobile SIM as root of trust (serves underbanked)
- Barclays Pingit based around Direct Debit



Summary and conclusions

- For card-present transactions, Chip and PIN was supposed to help
 - Reality was more complex and fraud went up
- Card fraud is now dominated by card-not-present transactions
 - Merchant pays cost, but extra security loses customer conversions
 - For small merchants, much of the work is delegated to payment processor
- Online payment systems typically run on previous rails
 - Credit/debit card (optionally with 3D Secure)
 - Online banking
 - Direct debit