

9 Security I (MGK)

Block ciphers usually process 64 or 128-bit blocks at a time. To illustrate how their modes of operation work, we can use instead a pseudo-random permutation that operates on the 26 letters of the English alphabet:

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
m	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
$E_K(m)$	P	K	X	C	Y	W	R	S	E	J	U	D	G	O	Z	A	T	N	M	V	F	H	L	I	B	Q

As the XOR operation is not defined on the set $\{A, \dots, Z\}$, we replace it here during encryption with modulo-26 addition (e.g., $C \oplus D = F$ and $Y \oplus C = A$).

- (a) Encrypt the plaintext “TRIPOS” using:
 - (i) electronic codebook mode; [2 marks]
 - (ii) cipher-block chaining (using IV $c_0 = K$); [4 marks]
 - (iii) output feedback mode (using IV $c_0 = K$). [4 marks]
- (b) Decrypt the ciphertext “BSMILVO” using cipher-block chaining. What operation should replace XOR? [4 marks]
- (c) Your opponent is allowed to send you two plaintext messages M_0 and M_1 , each n letters long. You now pick a new private key K , resulting in a new pseudo-random permutation $E_K : \{A, \dots, Z\} \leftrightarrow \{A, \dots, Z\}$. You also pick uniformly at random a private bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and return a ciphertext $C = c_0c_1 \dots c_n$, namely the message M_b encrypted with cipher-block chaining using the fresh E_K . Finally, your opponent has to guess your bit b .

Approximately how large must n be at least for your opponent to have a greater than 75% chance of guessing b correctly? Outline a strategy that your opponent can use to achieve this. [6 marks]