Security for volatile FPGAs

Saar Drimer

November 2009
© 2009 Saar Drimer

This technical report is based on a dissertation submitted August 2009 by the author for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the University of Cambridge, Darwin College.

Technical reports published by the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory are freely available via the Internet:

http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/

ISSN 1476-2986
Security for volatile FPGAs

Saar Drimer

Summary

With reconfigurable devices fast becoming complete systems in their own right, interest in their security properties has increased. While research on “FPGA security” has been active since the early 2000s, few have treated the field as a whole, or framed its challenges in the context of the unique FPGA usage model and application space. This dissertation sets out to examine the role of FPGAs within a security system and how solutions to security challenges can be provided. I offer the following contributions.

I motivate authenticating configurations as an additional capability to FPGA configuration logic, and then describe a flexible security protocol for remote reconfiguration of FPGA-based systems over insecure networks. Non-volatile memory devices are used for persistent storage when required, and complement the lack of features in some FPGAs with tamper proofing in order to maintain specified security properties. A unique advantage of the protocol is that it can be implemented on some existing FPGAs (i.e., it does not require FPGA vendors to add functionality to their devices). Also proposed is a solution to the “IP distribution problem” where designs from multiple sources are integrated into a single bitstream, yet must maintain their confidentiality.

I discuss the difficulty of reproducing and comparing FPGA implementation results reported in the academic literature. Concentrating on cryptographic implementations, problems are demonstrated through designing three architecture-optimized variants of the AES block cipher and analyzing the results to show that single figures of merit, namely “throughput” or “throughput per slice”, are often meaningless without the context of an application. To set a precedent for reproducibility in our field, the HDL source code, simulation testbenches and compilation instructions are made publicly available for scrutiny and reuse.

Finally, I examine payment systems as ubiquitous embedded devices, and evaluate their security vulnerabilities as they interact in a multi-chip environment. Using FPGAs as an adversarial tool, a man-in-the-middle attack against these devices is demonstrated. An FPGA-based defense is also demonstrated: the first secure wired “distance bounding” protocol implementation. This is then put in the context of securing reconfigurable systems.
Acknowledgments

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Mika and Gideon, for their unconditional love and support throughout my life, and to my kind siblings Hadar and Oz, and their families. They have all seen less of me than they deserved in the past twelve years as I was pursuing my goals.

Markus Kuhn, my supervisor, has been an influential part of my academic development, and I thank him for his guidance, especially on how to produce solid research. I thank Ross Anderson for valuable lessons on security in the real world through our collaborations and conversations. I enjoyed collaborating with Steven Murdoch on our banking security projects, and I also thank current and past members of the Security Group – in particular, Mike Bond, Richard Clayton, Robert Watson, Gerhard Hancke, Shishir Nagaraja, Frank Stajano, Dan Cvrcek, and Tyler Moore – for listening, teaching, and reading my drafts, but also for our stimulating conversations about security, life, and everything else. I’m also grateful for comments from my examiners, Ingrid Verbauwhede and Simon Moore.

I’m fortunate to have been the recipient of a generous research grant from Xilinx. On that interview day as a new college grad I was privileged to have met my mentor and friend Austin Lesea; I thank him for being exactly the person he is. At Xilinx, Steve Trimberger, Jason Moore, Jesse Jenkins and Neil Jacobson were always there to provide technical assistance, but much more importantly, they shared their life experiences with me. Christof Paar and Tim Güneysu hosted me at Ruhr-Universität Bochum for three months. I thank them and the rest of the CoSY group for a productive time and for their hospitality. Additional financial support was kindly provided by the Computer Laboratory and Darwin College.

Sabine, my first Cambridge friend, kept me sane at the onset by our frequent bike excursions around Cambridge. My friendship with Shlomy meant a lot to me, as I could always rely on him for help and good company. Other friends gave me “a life” outside the “lab”: Dan T, Alban, Margaret, Matt, Davide, Philip, Bogdan, Niki, Andreas, and Satnam. To my friends from the rest of the world – Amir, Ron, Udi, Assaf, Nir D, Nir S, Phil, Kristin, Max – you are not forgotten, even though I’ve been distant. In particular, Sina and Dirk always believed in me more than I believed in myself; I thank them for their consistent encouragement. A fortuitous conference seating arrangement introduced me to Owen, who simply wants a lot of “freedom”; I thank him for keeping the dream alive during the dark times.

Lastly, the love and encouragement from Caroline got me through all of this; thank you, my dear.

Saar Drimer, Cambridge, UK, August 2009
## Contents

1 Introduction ........................................... 11
   1.1 Motivation and contribution ......................... 12
   1.2 Reading this dissertation .......................... 14

2 FPGA security foundations ............................ 17
   2.1 FPGA usage model .................................. 18
      2.1.1 Principals ..................................... 18
      2.1.2 Design and manufacturing flow .................. 22
      2.1.3 Defense categories .............................. 24
      2.1.4 Trust and trustworthiness ........................ 25
      2.1.5 Distribution security ............................ 26
   2.2 Usage model attacks ................................ 27
      2.2.1 Bitstream reverse engineering ..................... 29
      2.2.2 Counterfeits ..................................... 31
      2.2.3 Readback ......................................... 33
      2.2.4 Side-channels .................................... 34
      2.2.5 Invasive and semi-invasive attacks ................. 40
      2.2.6 Others ........................................... 42
   2.3 Defenses ........................................... 44
      2.3.1 Configuration confidentiality ....................... 44
      2.3.2 Configuration authenticity ........................ 46
      2.3.3 Design theft deterrents ........................... 49
      2.3.4 Watermarking and fingerprinting ..................... 51
      2.3.5 Physical unclonable functions ....................... 53
      2.3.6 Evolvable hardware ................................ 56
      2.3.7 Isolation ......................................... 57
   2.4 Conclusion ......................................... 58

3 Secure remote reconfiguration ....................... 59
   3.1 Update logic ....................................... 60
      3.1.1 Assumptions ..................................... 61
      3.1.2 Protocol .......................................... 62
      3.1.3 Recovery from errors ............................. 66
   3.2 Update server routines .............................. 66
      3.2.1 Offline operation ................................ 69
   3.3 Authenticity and confidentiality ..................... 70
   3.4 Multiple NVM slots .................................. 71
Published work

Of note are papers I have published in two of the top information security conferences: “Keep your enemies close: distance bounding against smartcard relay attacks” was published at USENIX Security Symposium 2007 and was the recipient of the “Best Student Paper” award; and, “Thinking inside the box: system-level failures of tamper proofing” was published at IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (“Oakland”) 2008 and received the “Outstanding Paper Award” from IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine. A poster based on the former has been chosen for third place in a departmental competition, and participated in a regional poster competition.

Listed below are my academic contributions while a research student:

JOURNAL ARTICLES


BOOK CHAPTER


CONFERENCE PAPERS


Online and technical reports


Work done in collaboration

Chapter 3 on secure remote updates is based on a paper co-authored with Markus Kuhn who significantly contributed to the presentation and robustness of the protocols, especially in the support of multiple update policies.

In Chapter 4 on AES implementations, Tim Güneysu proposed the structure for fitting AES into specific embedded functions of the Virtex-5 architecture and was instrumental in discussing the design choices. Tim generated the T-table content of the BRAMs and implemented the key schedule and counter mode of operation, described in Sections 4.3.4 and 4.5.2, respectively. Otherwise, the implementations are entirely my own.

Discussions with Markus Kuhn on reproducible research motivated the related ideas presented in Chapter 5.

Chapter 6 on relay attacks and distance bounding is based on a paper co-authored with Steven J. Murdoch, who developed the PC software tools that interface with my custom hardware. Both Steven and Markus Kuhn have contributed to the design choices required for adapting the Hancke-Kuhn distance bounding protocol to a wired implementation, though the implementation is entirely my own.
Chapter 1

Introduction

A “gate array” is an integrated circuit (IC) consisting of a transistor grid fabricated on a silicon wafer. Different arrangement of interconnect metal layers can be added in order to define the function of the circuit, allowing the same mass produced wafers to be used for performing different logic functions. Thus, gate arrays are one-time programmable with limited integration, but are cheaper to manufacture than custom-made application specific integrated circuits (ASIC). “Field programmability” is the property that allows the functionality of a device to be modified in the field, outside of the factory. Adding this property to gate arrays gives us field programmable gate arrays (FPGA), generic semiconductor devices that are made of an interconnected array of functional blocks that can be programmed, and reprogrammed, to perform virtually any user-described logic functions within the limits of the resources it contains.

Gate array programmable logic devices (PLD) from the late 1970s (e.g., PLAs, PALs, GALs) preceded what we know today as FPGAs, although when FPGAs became available in the mid 1980s they were the first SRAM-based PLDs, highly integrated, and volatile. Until the late 1990s, they were used mainly as interface “glue logic”, while the largest FPGAs were, and still are, used for ASIC prototyping and verification. Additionally, FPGAs could not have competed with ASICs on price for the performance they provided, so their application space was limited and they usually were not the main processor of a product.

In the past decade this has changed. Since the late 1990s, with the introduction of what FPGA manufacturers call “platform FPGAs” and “systems on a programmable chip”, FPGAs have increasingly included functions that previously required other discrete ICs. 2009’s FPGAs have embedded processors, gigabit serial transceivers, analog-to-digital converters, digital signal processing blocks, Ethernet controllers, substantial memory capacity, and other functional blocks, such as clock managers and multipliers, for performing a range of commonly required functions. In recent FPGA generations we also see application-specific subfamilies that offer different
arrangements and concentration of functional blocks for particular sets of applications, such as DSP, military, automotive, or communication. This means that the application space of FPGAs has widened as they became more capable, and that designing with FPGAs now requires specialization, as they are no longer just an array of simple logic blocks.

In terms of performance and power consumption, FPGAs are usually inferior to ASICs, but compete by being readily available, reprogrammable, and manufactured using the latest technologies. They provide an appealing alternative where the resources (cost, know how, time) required for ASIC development are not available. Against application-specific standard products (ASSP) – devices that perform a fixed set of functions – FPGAs compete by being reprogrammable and by being able to perform a variety of digital functions, not only those that are preset. The ability to parallelize operations and execute customizable functions also makes their performance competitive compared to sequential microprocessors.

In terms of security, the growth of FPGA capability and application space has two main implications. Firstly, FPGA designs represent a significant investment that requires protection; and secondly, FPGAs are increasingly being used in applications that require FPGA security properties that are either unavailable today, or that have yet to be adequately investigated. Thus, we may see increased attention to the security attributes of FPGAs as more of them are used in the military, automotive and consumer industries, each having their own security requirements.

In the academic community, “FPGA security” research has been steadily increasing since the late 1990s, though the intersection of two significantly different fields – engineering and security – has been problematic. This may be because security is not a traditional engineering “problem” in that it does not have specifications that can be shown to have been met. That is, a system is not proven to be more “secure” simply because it has been implemented and shown to “work”. What we sometimes see are published security schemes that appear to work, but exhibit subtle security flaws, and ones that have sound security proposals but are impractical to implement or incomplete (see for example Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.5.2).

1.1 Motivation and contribution

This dissertation sets out to examine the role of FPGAs within a security system and consider how solutions to security challenges, unique to the FPGA usage model, can be provided. The term “FPGA security” includes the secure operation of designs

1In 2006, Kuon and Rose [116] estimated that on average FPGAs are roughly forty times larger, three times slower, and consume twelve times more dynamic power compared to ASICs, though FPGA vendors have recently been focusing on designing low power-consuming FPGAs, so the margins may have narrowed.
running within the FPGA; the secure delivery of configuration content to FPGAs; the use of FPGAs for enhancing the security of systems; and, the use of FPGAs as an adversarial tool. The contributions in this dissertation fall within these categories. Additionally, security analysis without context of where and how the target of evaluation is used can lead to insecure systems. Thus, another important theme of this dissertation is to provide context for the security analysis of reconfigurable systems.

Chapter 2 is based on “Volatile FPGA design security – a survey” [51], which I have written over the course of my time as a research student. It seems to have become a reference for those entering the field and has also motivated new research by others (Badrignans et al. [20], for example). Also in Chapter 2, I include a summary of “Authentication of FPGA bitstreams: why and how” [50], which evaluates the merits of bitstream authentication – an essential building block for secure systems.

Chapter 3 is based on “A protocol for secure remote updates of FPGA configurations” [54], which describes the first practical and secure remote-update protocol of FPGA configurations that can work with existing FPGAs. Chapter 4 is based on “DSPs, BRAMs and a pinch of logic: new recipes for AES on FPGAs” [56, 60], and describes new ways to implement the AES block cipher on Virtex-5 FPGAs. These can be used for encryption, decryption and message authentication code generation, integral parts of security systems.

One of the AES variants presented in Chapter 4 is the fastest FPGA AES implementation reported in the academic literature. In that context, I argue in Chapter 5 that the performance of FPGA designs can vary significantly under different implementation conditions, and discuss the importance of having the ability to reproduce implementation results, so that better comparisons to prior work can be made. This discussion is especially pertinent in the context of competitions for cryptographic primitives such as for the AES and the SHA-3, where comparison issues can have an impact on the choice of candidates.

Chapter 6 is based on “Keep your enemies close: distance bounding against smartcard relay attacks” [55], and describes the first secure distance bounding implementation. The flexibility of FPGAs was crucial here, as programmable delays and hand placement of circuit elements enabled the use of routing with specific delays. Chapter 6 also demonstrates how FPGAs can be used as an adversarial tool in a successful man-in-the-middle attack on a smartcard-based payment system. It also discusses how man-in-the-middle attacks can violate assumptions made in the design of reconfigurable systems.

I also include in Appendix A a discussion of how to protect multiple cores –

---

2The survey has been available online since October 2007, and was updated several times since. As a companion to the survey, I also provide a comprehensive “FPGA design security bibliography” as a resource for the community [52].
from mutually distrusting contributors – that are integrated into a single FPGA
design so to enable a “pay-per-use” cores distribution model. The idea is described
qualitatively, exploring its feasibility in the context of trust between principals,
additional configuration logic circuitry, and communication bandwidth.

1.2 Reading this dissertation

For material that can be easily found on an organization’s website using a document
identifier, I reference the organization and indicate the identifier in the citation. A
reference to the NIST AES specification, for example, appears as [139, FIPS197]. A
shorthand notation for document types is also used: UG (user guide), WP (white
paper), DS (data sheet), TN (technical note), AN (application note), and SP (special
publication); for pointers within a document, p (page), ch (chapter), and t (table)
are used. A reference to page 7 of Altera Application Note 357, for example, appears
as [7, AN357, p7].

Some references to online news articles and webpages are given as a URL together
with the title, and there is a chance that some will eventually become invalid. Thus,
the URL references are chosen to not detract from the point that is being made
if missing; if a dead link is found, there is always the possibility of finding the
information by searching the Internet or looking for it on the WayBackMachine
(http://www.archive.org/)

Finally, I sometimes include extra information in text boxes (such as the one the
next page). These are written informally and usually contain insights, unfinished
thoughts, or interesting anecdotes that are related to the material I discuss. The
content of these boxes is not crucial for the understanding or flow of the text, so
they can be safely ignored.
**Personal motivation.** I became intrigued by the security aspects of FPGAs during lunch with a few senior engineers as a “new college graduate” working for Xilinx. One of them asked my boss if we had a true random number generator for FPGAs; my boss said “no” and I intervened with “possibly”, remembering some seemingly random behavior of a circuit I was working on. I was able to create a true random number generator out of this circuit [53], and started to explore what else is available under the general topic of “FPGA security”. Back then, 2003-2004, I found Wollinger et al. [185] to be a good survey, but thought that it did not exactly satisfy what I was looking for: a comprehensive study of the unique problems of distributing content to FPGAs and how to ensure secure operation. I was also looking for a readable reference for industry engineers. I started working on security related projects within Xilinx for the next couple of years, learning as I went along, eventually embarking on the PhD adventure at Cambridge in October 2005.

I began writing “Non volatile FPGA design security – a survey” shortly after I had started the program, and had found that much of the material I was reading did not fit well with the world view I had of where and how FPGAs are used; essentially, my industry view clashed with the academic one. I have since observed that the reason was that many of the contributions were either made by “security people” working with FPGAs, or “FPGA people” exploring design security. With my background I wanted to position myself as someone that can do both reasonably well. One of the goals of my survey was to provide a framework and common terminology for others to use as the basis of their research, so that there is background material already set. The goal of this dissertation is similar, with my own contributions in the areas where I thought solutions, or other perspectives, are needed.
Chapter 2

FPGA security foundations

“FPGA security” is an intersection of two rather different fields, and I anticipate a variety of audiences: experienced security or FPGA professionals, and computer scientists or engineers with little background in either. Authoring a document that would keep all of them constantly intrigued is impossible, so I try to balance the discussion. Where I use cryptographic primitives I will not discuss their finer details – except for Chapter 4 on AES implementations – and refer the interested reader to Anderson [10], Menezes et al. [134], and Schneier [150].

For those who are not expert FPGA users, I think that the content of this chapter is sufficiently detailed in order to appreciate the work described in later ones; for a recent and comprehensive FPGA architecture survey, I refer the reader to Kuon et al. [117]. I take this opportunity, however, to both introduce the basic mode of operation of volatile FPGAs, and the terminology I use throughout the dissertation to describe FPGA functionality, as shown in Figure 2.1.

Volatile FPGAs lose their functional definition on power loss. In order to redefine their functionality, a *bitstream*¹ configuration file, usually stored in a local *non-volatile memory* (NVM) device, is sent to the FPGA. The bitstream is processed by the *configuration logic* – a part of the FPGA that is *not* programmable – in order to establish routing to and from instantiated elements by setting the state of memory cells, pass gates, and routing switches. The *user logic* is the FPGA’s reconfigurable part and where the user-defined application operates.

A typical bitstream is made of four parts, in order: command header, configuration payload, command footer, and start-up sequence, with optional no-op commands used for creating delays. While the size of the header and footer is in the order of hundreds of kilobytes, the configuration payload can range between 1 and 10 megabytes (taking the Xilinx Virtex-5 as an example [186, UG191, t6-1]). Comm-

¹The term “bitstream” is common in industry and academic literature, but is unfortunate because it is also used in many other contexts. Not having a better alternative, I use it here as well, interchangeably with “configuration”.

17
Figure 2.1: A volatile FPGA requires a configuration file to define its functionality. The configuration logic processes this file so to set the user logic to perform user defined functions. A complete bitstream includes a header with configuration instructions followed by a payload and footer, which includes the start-up sequence to activate the FPGA.

ands are 32 bits wide and control various aspects of the FPGA configuration options. Header commands, for example, tell the configuration logic which configuration mode to use (serial, parallel, etc.), whether the payload is encrypted, whether to disable readback, or when to assert the global signals that prevent contention during configuration. The footer contains commands to check the integrity of the bitstream (by comparing the bitstream CRC checksum with a precalculated value), and a series of instructions for starting up the FPGA with the new configuration.

2.1 FPGA usage model

2.1.1 Principals

“A principal is an entity that participates in a security system. This entity can be a subject, a person, a role, or a piece of equipment, such as a PC, smartcard, or card-reader terminal” [10, p12]. FPGAs, FPGA vendors, engineers, configuration programming controllers, etc. are principals interacting within a security system; understanding their limitations and interests is important for any security analysis. The principals that comprise the design and distribution of FPGA-based systems are introduced below.

FPGA vendor. Three FPGA vendors dominate the volatile FPGA market: Altera, Lattice and Xilinx – each introducing a new family of FPGAs roughly every 12 to 18 months. FPGA vendors have two primary security concerns. Firstly, protect their own proprietary designs and technology from being reverse engineered, copied, or modified. And secondly, provide their customers ways to protect their designs throughout the development flow and in the field. FPGA vendors also have an incentive to facilitate secure integration and distribution of design modules from multiple sources in order to to stimulate that market, which leads to increased FPGA sales. The recent availability of volatile FPGAs that target security applications (such as
Cyclone III LS and Spartan 3AN) reflects demand, and may indicate that security has become a competitive factor.

Understanding the mindset of FPGA vendors is important when we suggest architectural and logistical changes to how FPGAs are used. My own experiences working for an FPGA vendor suggest that the following considerations play an important role when new features are evaluated.

- “Transistor count” as a sole criterion for cost evaluation can be misleading because it does not take into account verification (pre-fab simulation), characterization (post-fab testing), and production testing costs. Characterization and verification require significant amount of engineering hours, even for simple circuits, while production testing requires “IC testers” that may cost millions of dollars and are expensive to operate. Each engineer-hour and tester-milli-second is factored into the cost of adding a circuit to the FPGA (more in box on this page). The contribution of this circuit must be justified by future returns. Thus, transistors can be expensive (i.e., not “free”).

- “Unreliable” circuits are unlikely to be added as hard functions. For example, it is sometimes useful for some security applications to have the ability to permanently disable a device (i.e., “kill switch”), or to have an embedded true random number generator. However, the former increases support costs, opens the FPGA to denial of service attacks, and can have an effect on reputation if reliability is questioned. Similarly, it is notoriously difficult to guarantee reliable operation of true random number generators under all environmental conditions. So even if a function is efficient, compact, and useful, it may still not be adopted.

- The price of a single FPGA chip is not a function of the amount of resources that are being used. Every FPGA type has several family members, each having a fixed number of resources. System developers can only purchase FPGAs in fixed sizes, so any unused resource is a loss for them. Therefore, FPGA vendors design each embedded function such that it provides utility to the largest amount of users. The view of FPGA vendors, it seems, is that if developers want to use an FPGA in an “out of the ordinary” way, they will need to pay for it (by using larger FPGAs or additional peripheral devices).

**Testing is expensive.** If the tester-time argument still seems unconvincing, consider what Xilinx does with EasyPath; they seem to sell FPGAs at a significant discount if they only fully test the parts of the FPGA that the designer uses, and at the application’s maximum frequency, not of the FPGA’s.

Foundry. All current FPGA vendors are fabless – they design the FPGAs but other companies, “foundries”, manufacture them. Foundries are principals on their own right since they play a crucial role in the security of FPGAs, as it is possible that designs are modified or stolen while in their possession. If cryptographic keys or serial numbers embedded in the FPGA by the foundry are compromised, then that may undermine the application’s security. Until the late 1990s it was still economically viable to maintain “trusted foundries” in the country where the devices were designed (mainly the United States). Today, most advanced foundries are in Asia, where oversight by foreign governments is not likely to be possible. In a 2005 report [177], the U.S. Department of Defense discusses the “alarming” rate at which “critical” microelectronics facilities are migrating to foreign countries. More recently, the U.S. DoD has allocated many resources for researching detection of malicious circuits, or any deviation from the original design [2]. Researchers for the Australian Department of Defence also indicate that the “curious arrangement” of sourcing low-level components for critical infrastructure from potential adversary countries, makes “silicon Trojans” an attractive proposition [9, p3]. More on this in Section 2.1.4.

System developer. FPGA vendors sell FPGAs, often through distributors, to system developers who use them in their product. System developers fall into two groups based on their security needs and views.

- **Cost-conscious.** The goal of commercial designers is to meet product specifications at the lowest cost. Most often, there is a performance/cost trade-off and a tendency to avoid any additional components, delays, maintenance, support and so on, all of which lead to increased costs. The life-cycle of a commercial product can be quite short, from months to a few years, so designs may only need to be protected for that long. An “old” product is not a worth-while target for attackers, and even if it was, the resulting losses may no longer be significant. Commercial product designers are often concerned about cheap counterfeits competing with the original product. Therefore, it is sometimes sufficient to make the process of stealing the design at least as costly as re-inventing it (or slightly harder to copy than a competing product).

- **Security-conscious.** Government contractors and security-industry system developers are concerned with protecting designs, methods of operation, and communications for long periods – from years to decades – while cost considerations may be secondary if those imply security compromises. The security-conscious designer is often interested in robust “approved” security mechanisms, based on established protocols and algorithms. Some security-conscious designers use
older and mature integrated circuits, which are seen as more reliable. Others take advantage of more recent technologies that are seen as more resistant to probing (“invasive”) attacks, and with a higher entry threshold for adversaries because of high equipment costs and required expertise.

FPGA vendors, therefore, have a challenge: in a resource-limited device, they would (ideally) like to satisfy both cost- and security-conscious designers, who have significantly different views on security, and what they are willing to spend on it.

**EDA software vendor.** Electronic design automation (EDA) tools are used for the development of printed circuit boards, integrated circuits, FPGA designs, and they are extensively used for simulation, among many other applications. The various EDA vendors provide the tools that are used by all the principals mentioned above with FPGA vendors also being EDA tool suppliers themselves. Therefore, EDA software vendors play a pivotal role in the FPGA design flow and their contribution is critical to the security of both the FPGA and FPGA-based products.

**Cores designer.** Cores\(^2\) are ready-made functional descriptions that allow system developers to save on design cost and time by purchasing and integrating them into their own design. A single “external” core can also occupy the entire FPGA to create a virtual application-specific standard product (VASSP; a term first used for this purpose by Kean [103]). Cores are sold as hardware description language (HDL) modules or as compiled netlists. Some are also available freely from FPGA vendors (who profit from selling the FPGAs) and from Internet sites such as OpenCores\(^3\). Today, there exist free or commercial cores for many commonly required logic and cryptographic function.

**System owner.** The system owner (or current holder) possesses the FPGA-based system, and may be a user who purchased the system at a shop, or a government that obtained it from a fallen reconnaissance aircraft; both may be considered malicious (“the enemy”), trying to pry secrets out or circumvent security. While in the hands of the owner, the system developer has restricted or no control over the system. The developer may try to restrict the owner from using certain functions aiming to prevent theft of services, execution of “unauthorized” code, or to price-discriminate.

\(^2\)I use the following definitions for types of cores. “Hard cores” refer to embedded functions in the non-reconfigurable part of the FPGA. “Soft cores” are HDL modules, with a distinction between generic and architecture-specific cores. The former is portable and synthesizable to any architecture, so not optimized, while the latter uses specific properties of the target architecture for better performance. Here, “cores” will mean architecture-specific ones; otherwise, I will use “generic cores”. Finally, “firm cores” refers to cores with properties between “hard” and “soft” and can mean an encrypted core or one with limited portability; to avoid confusion I will be specific.

\(^3\)http://www.opencores.org/
Figure 2.2: Simplified FPGA design, manufacturing, packaging, and testing processes.

For example, some set-top box developers profit from providing programming services, not from supplying the hardware itself, so have the incentive to invest in mechanisms that prevent theft of these services. Some mobile phone manufacturers have mechanisms to prevent users from using a network other than the one they are “supposed” to be locked into. The security-conscious designer may also want to have a way to completely erase or destroy portions of the system when it falls into the “wrong” hands and perhaps employ the ability to “call home” when tampered-with as a sign of distress (a radio carried by a soldier in the field, for example).

System manufacturer. The system developer does not usually have the ability to mass produce a product, so designs are sent to a system manufacturer for production and often also for testing. This principal includes all parties involved in the process of making the system ready for delivery: printed circuit fabrication, assembly (where components are soldered onto the board), testing, and packaging.

Trusted party. Some security protocols require a principal that is trusted by all other principals in order to maintain particular security properties (storing, generating, processing and transferring of data and keys, for example). It is quite easy to add a trusted party to a protocol, though establishing a mutually trusted principal in practice can be challenging. The centralized nature of a trusted party makes it vulnerable to denial of service attacks, and a lucrative target for attackers. Additionally, practical issues such as location, trusted personnel, physical security, liability, insurance, governance, auditability, and so on can be problematic and expensive.

2.1.2 Design and manufacturing flow

Figure 2.2 shows a simplified manufacturing process of an FPGA. HDL design files are processed by software tools that produce a netlist that is laid-out, providing
The system developer must be assisted by several other principals such as manufacturers, and cores and EDA vendors. At the end of the development cycle the product is in the system owner’s hands.

The design’s physical representation as transistors and metal interconnects. From the layout, “mask sets” are sent to a foundry where they are turned into physical “wafers”. (This is a simplification; several other principals other than the foundry may be involved in the process.) The wafers are then tested for good dice and then sent for assembly where those are cut and embedded in a carrying package. Finally, these packaged dice are sent back to the FPGA vendor for final testing before they are shipped to distributors and developers.

Figure 2.3 shows the design and manufacturing processes of an FPGA-based system. It is not a complete description, but is meant to indicate where the principals interact. In the development phase, the system in which the FPGA operates is developed, and the developer combines internally- and externally-designed cores
that describe the FPGA logical function. The software flow, as shown in Figure 2.4, begins with HDL synthesis that optimizes and translates the functional description according to the resources available in the target FPGA architecture (e.g., Stratix look-up table, Spartan multiplier, etc.) into a netlist. Netlists describe instantiated primitives and the connections between them, often in the electronic design interchange format (EDIF). Several EDA vendors offer synthesis tools, including the FPGA vendors themselves, though the post-synthesis flow is nearly always performed by proprietary FPGA vendor tools. Netlists are then mapped/fitted to primitives in the target architecture and then those are placed and routed (PAR) to a particular target device to produce a placelist\(^4\), where the specific placement and routing of every interconnect and physical placement of all primitives is described. Placelists are encoded into bitstreams that configure the FPGA to perform the logical function initially described in HDL. As SRAM FPGAs are volatile, they must receive the bitstream on every power-up from an external source, usually a non-volatile memory device, EEPROM or Flash, placed nearby on the circuit board.

Designs are simulated at the HDL, netlist, and post-PAR stages, and can also be verified for correct operation when “executed” on the FPGA itself in its intended hardware setting\(^5\). Static timing analysis takes into account the architecture and actual delays after the place and route process in order to verify that timing violations, such as of setup and hold tolerances, do not occur. When the prototyping process is done, the system is manufactured and tested before being shipped. In the field, the product is in the hands of the system owner and thus, no longer under the developer’s control, though he can still perform field reconfiguration if the system is capable. For example, a firmware upgrade to a digital camera may be done remotely by the owner by plugging it into an Internet-connected PC, or an upgrade to a car processor may be done by a service technician at a garage.

2.1.3 Defense categories

The effectiveness of a defense mechanism is evaluated by the cost of circumventing it and how well it copes with the incentives of attackers. The cost of acquiring skill, tools, and time required for “breaking” the defense give analysts a metric for the system’s estimated level of security. I define the following defense categories.

- **Social** deterrents are laws, peoples’ good social conduct and aversion from being prosecuted and punished. Designs can be protected by non-disclosure agreements, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, patents, contracts, and licensing agreements, often summed up by the term “intellectual property” (IP)\(^6\). How-

\(^4\)I coin this new term here in order to make sure that the difference between traditional netlists and placelists is clear.

\(^5\)With tools such as “SignalTap” by Altera [7, AN323] and “ChipScope” by Xilinx [186, UG029].

\(^6\)I try to avoid this overloaded catch-all term in favor of other, more descriptive, terms.
ever, social deterrents are only effective where appropriate laws exist and are enforced. Attitudes towards design-ownership rights vary significantly worldwide, making this type of deterrent not wholly effective in places where it matters the most: countries that source counterfeit goods tend to be places where design ownership rights laws and enforcement are weak or ambiguous.

- **Active** deterrents are physical and cryptographic mechanisms that prevent theft and abuse of designs. Active protection is highly effective if implemented correctly, and is also locale-independent (if we ignore export restrictions). Further, combined with social deterrents, active deterrents can help convince a court that the designer has taken appropriate measures to protect a design and that the perpetrator showed significant malicious intent by circumventing them.

- **Reactive** deterrents provide detection or evidence of breaches, which may help in applying available social tools. Digital forensics relies on video surveillance, fingerprinting, and steganography, etc., for initiating investigation or improving the security of a system after a breach. Audit trails are reactive, but are also an important facet of security in the absence of, or in addition to, active ones. Reactive measures do not actively prevent fraud or theft, but their presence may deter would-be attackers, and it can be beneficial to advertise them.

### 2.1.4 TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS

How can users of software and hardware be confident that the tools they use are “honest”, and not covertly inserting malicious code or circuits into their products? Software and chip verification is an option, but usually prohibitively costly. The sheer enormity of EDA tools make this impractical even if we assume that EDA vendors made their source code available for scrutiny. Further, how can one be sure that the source code compiler or simulator are trustworthy? In *Reflections on trusting trust*, Thompson [170] elegantly discusses these issues and concludes that “you can’t trust code that you did not totally create yourself... No amount of source-level verification or scrutiny will protect you from using untrusted code”. Verifying integrated circuits is even harder than software verification, especially so without access to the design files and a complete audit along the manufacturing process.

Some may rely on knowing that companies want to build and maintain a positive reputation: being honest, technologically advanced, quality-driven, etc., which is an asset that is slowly gained, but easily lost. By striving to maintain such reputation, companies are aligning themselves with the interests of their customers (assuming a competitive market). Many millions of dollars are invested in designing and manufacturing an FPGA family, and it is in the interest of both FPGA vendors and foundries that these do not go to waste. This requires many self-enforced checkpoints to ensure that no flaws or deviations from the intended design are made.
For example, the foundry must deliver high-yielding wafers that perform (only) the original design, and in turn, FPGA vendors need to provide their customers reliable FPGAs that correspond to data-sheets\textsuperscript{7}.

“Silicon Trojans” are increasingly gaining attention in the defense [2, 9, 177] and research [109] communities\textsuperscript{8}. Developers may rely on the “scatter gun” [9] nature of FPGA; that is, attackers do not know where the “Trojan inside” devices end up and must create a discovery mechanism, increasing the likelihood of detection. If the Trojan relies in any way on certain user logic functions being used, the likelihood of discovery is further reduced. Concerned developers can purchase devices manufactured at different foundries, or of different batches in order to decrease the likelihood of a targeted attack. That said, Thompson showed us that we can always step back: what if an IC FPGA designer consistently inserts malicious circuits into the circuit designs? What if the EDA tools used for IC design insert these circuits? The silicon Trojan problem is an interesting and timely one, but outside the scope of this dissertation.

2.1.5 Distribution security

“FPGA security” can be divided into two categories: “operational” and “distribution”. Operational security is where we want to secure systems already running inside of the FPGA. Distribution security is how to get these designs to the FPGA while maintaining certain security properties.

We may consider distribution security as the following three categories. The first is securing configurations from local storage (a PROM, for example) in a hostile environment, as will be discussed in Section 2.3.1. The second is securing remote configuration updates, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. The third is maintaining the confidentiality and authenticity of individual cores from multiple sources, which are integrated into a single design.

Consider a multimedia device startup company that developed a clever way for implementing an H.264/MPEG-4 AVC encoder/decoder. They would like to add USB and encryption support to their devices so they license AES and USB 2.0 cores developed externally. In the absence of an industry standard, FPGA vendors created their own solutions for allowing potential users to evaluate these external cores. Altera, for example, allows non-Altera cores hosted on its website to be compiled and evaluated for resource use, but its software does not allow bitstream generation from these [7, AN343]. For its own cores, Altera software creates time-limited bitstreams

\textsuperscript{7}ASIC design and manufacturing has similar problems, but FPGAs have the advantage of being generic such that tampering may be detected with higher probability simply because of the larger user-base.

\textsuperscript{8}The “Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust” (HOST) IEEE workshop is dedicated to the topic, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/tocresult.jsp?isnumber=4559030.
(“untethered”), or ones that require continuous connection between the FPGA and the development software through a programming cable (“tethered”), so designs can be tested on-chip [7, AN320]. Xilinx allows evaluating of some cores for embedded processors that expire after “6–8 hours when running at the nominal clock frequency specified for the core” [187], while other HDL cores are available through various licenses that allow a time-limited evaluation. Both Altera and Xilinx schemes require that users agree to restricted use of the cores, and likely rely on the bitstream’s encoding, not cryptography, for enforcing the timing restrictions while the cores are operating inside the FPGA.

Our startup may have been able to evaluate the cores, but is faced with only one choice for purchasing them: pay a “blanket license” for unrestricted use of the cores. Such licenses can be prohibitive for the startup, especially since they do not know how successful their product will be. Even if they can afford such a license, they may not actually be sold one. The “design-reuse” industry has dealt with secure distribution of cores by mostly relying on social constructs such as “trusted partners” and reputation as we discussed in Section 2.1.4. An industry-wide panel discussion in early 2007 [183, 184] provides some insight into the industry’s perception of using a software encryption flow for cores protection. They concluded that the current trust-based system is working well for large corporations – less so for startups – and a better solution is desirable for the long-run, but is not necessarily urgent (note that the focus is on ASIC cores, so the unique FPGA usage model is not considered carefully). What this may mean is that cores vendors have a risk perception, and may choose not to sell to non-established companies who have no reputation to lose, or ones that are based in particular countries.

For small companies, we probably need to create a distribution system that does not rely on social deterrents, and that allows developers to integrate cores from multiple sources into their design, but still only pay on a per-use basis. Encrypted netlists are one solution, already supported by some EDA vendors, though it may be too cumbersome or even insecure (see the box on the next page). Therefore, I argue that if we rely on hardware-based protection mechanisms that operate at the design flow’s final stages, we are likely to better resist attacks. Appendix A discusses the merits of one possible solution I propose.

### 2.2 Usage model attacks

Security is an arms race; in a typical cycle, incremental defenses are put in place as older defenses are overcome and new attacks emerge. Smartcards and microcontrollers have been in the midst of such a race for the past two decades, starting with naive, if present at all, security mechanisms and incrementally improv-
ing as exploits are discovered; examples are the work by Anderson, Kömmerling, Kuhn, and Skorobogatov [12, 13, 112, 157]; Anderson et al. [14] provide a survey of cryptographic processors designed for security applications. But, compared to typical FPGA applications, smartcards can have short life-cycles and are considerably cheaper. Pay-TV smartcard hacking emerged in the 1990s when IC cards were issued by service providers to combat subscription fraud. The usage model allowed issuing new smartcards on a monthly basis, or the adding of a security feature in a short development cycle, which is not possible for FPGAs. We may now be seeing the beginning of such an arms-race for FPGAs, as they are used in applications that require security (military, automotive), but also because designs are becoming more valuable. Incentives are mounting for attackers to concentrate their efforts on FPGA exploits.

Can a software-encrypted netlist flow withstand determined attackers? In June 2006, Synplicity proposed the “Open IP Encryption Initiative” for secure core exchange [44] and offered it to the Virtual Socket Interface Alliance (VSIA) to become an industry standard. In June 2007 VSIA shut down\(^a\), and in April 2008 Synplicity launched its initiative under the “ReadyIP” brand name\(^b\). But Synplicity’s original Open IP proposal had made some poor security choices, such as the distribution of vendors’ private keys with each instance of the software. Barrick\(^c\) argues against using encrypted netlists on practical grounds, but also claims that sometimes they can be worth it in terms of savings. While these measures may keep “honest people honest”, how long will it take before the software is cracked on a “break once, run anywhere” basis? If there is anything to be learned from the rich history of software protection failures, it is that very few copy protection schemes have withstood (determined) attackers [10, p681–688]. Perhaps there is a silver lining in encrypted flow: incentives are aligned for better security. Varian [181] argued that security suffers if the principal in the position to improve it does not bear the loss due to breaches. Thus, if an FPGA vendor implements a design protection scheme for its own cores, or even for others’, and it fails, the vendor is the one who bears the loss (directly, or indirectly due to loss of reputation), so has an incentive to make it the best it can be.

\(^a\)“Legacy Documents of the VSI Alliance”, http://www.vsi.org/
\(^c\)“Designing Around an Encrypted Netlist: Is The Pain Worth the Gain?”, http://www.design-reuse.com/articles/18205/encrypted-netlist.html
2.2.1 Bitstream reverse engineering

I define *bitstream reversal* as the transformation of an encoded bitstream into a (human readable and editable) functionally-equivalent description of the original design that produced it. It is the reversal of the flow shown in Figure 2.4, from bitstream back to HDL or netlist. *Partial bitstream reversal* is the extraction of limited information from bitstreams – such as keys, BRAM/LUT content, or memory cell states – without reproducing complete functionality. Full bitstream reversal would allow replicating functionality (with a different looking bitstream); extracting secret cryptographic keys; and proof of infringement (interestingly making both criminals and developers interested in reverse engineering). Partial reversal helps recovering hidden data, but may also reveal the types of cryptographic primitives used and how they are implemented, which can enhance power analysis attacks.

The Virtex-5 Configuration User Guide [186, UG191] is quite revealing about the structure of its bitstreams, compared with previous disclosures of the proprietary bitstream format, which is outlined in Figure 2.5. I will use this conceptual simplification of the Virtex bitstream format when I discuss bitstream manipulation.

“Frames” are the fundamental configuration unit: a single-bit column of 1312 bits (41 × 32-bit words) that cover the entire FPGA. Each frame contains the configuration for one hardware primitive (configurable logic blocks, DSP, I/O blocks, block RAM, etc.) and is addressable such that it can be written and read individually. This allows, for example, partial reconfiguration, and detection/correction of upsets due to ambient radiation using an internal configuration access port.

Extracting RAM and LUT content from bitstreams is not difficult (see Ziener

---

*Bitstream reverse engineering background.* In the early 1990s, the startup company NeoCAD created a complete FPGA development tool chain for a few FPGA families. According to Xilinx [123, 172], NeoCAD managed to reverse engineer the bitstream generation executable in order to generate compatible bitstreams, rather than reverse engineer the bitstream format itself. In 1995 NeoCAD was acquired by Xilinx to become its software division. In the late 1990s, the startup Clear Logic was able to use Altera’s software-generated bitstreams to produce pin-compatible, smaller, cheaper, laser-programmable ASICs, which were also more secure since they did not require an external bitstream source. Altera sued and requested that Clear Logic cease operations. In 2001, a court prohibited Clear Logic from asking its customers to use Altera’s software tools since that violated its end-user license agreement (EULA). In 2003 Clear Logic closed down, and in late 2005, Altera won the case [8, 178].
et al. [191], devices’ datasheets [186, UG191], and vendors’ own tools). The hard part is to automate the process, and convert the placelist into a netlist from which the original functional design can be extracted. An Internet search yields quite a few hits for projects and services that supposedly do this, though most of them seem to be half-baked or stale, with companies providing such a service making claims that are hard to verify.

A notable exception is “ULogic”, a “free software project aimed at netlist recovery from FPGA closed bitstream formats” [176]. A report by Ulogic developers Note and Rannaud [140] describes a tool that can convert Xilinx bitstreams into placelists using the Xilinx Design Language (XDL). XDL is a largely undocumented plain text representation of placelists (which are otherwise in unintelligible form) supported by Xilinx development tools since ISE 4.1i. Using XDL, developers can directly manipulate placed and routed designs, and even bypass the entire software flow by creating XDL representations from scratch. From XDL, the files can be converted back to a placelist and encoded into a bitstream. This allows the iterative process of producing an XDL design, converting it to a placelist and then to a bitstream; by changing single bits, routing and settings at a time, one can create a database that correlates placelist data to bitstream bits. Note and Rannaud seem to have automated this process to create a “de-bit” tool. They also created “xdl2bit”, a bitstream generation tool that aims to be equivalent to Xilinx “bitgen” for some device families, but is much faster. The authors do not think that their work poses security risks to deployed systems from their tools and state that the step of “making sense” of the data is still missing, namely, the full reversal to what they call a “true netlist”. A related project by Kepa et al. [104] provides an “FPGA analysis tool... an open-source tool framework for low level FPGA design analysis”. Part of this framework is a “bitstream API” which decodes bitstreams and provides a graphical representation of them.

Most bitstream encodings are largely undocumented and obscure, but not confidential in a cryptographic sense. As discussed in Section 2.3.3, several design
protection schemes rely on the continued secrecy of these encodings, and vendors seem to intend to keep it this way. The obscurity, complexity, and size of bitstreams makes the reverse engineering process difficult and time consuming, though theoretically possible. The Ulogic project stated goal is the re-production of netlists, and there are likely to be similar efforts that are not public. The possibility of legal action can be an effective deterrent in academic and commercial environments, although for some organizations or countries, these are less of a concern. The increased value embodied in bitstreams may inevitably drive increasingly more people and organizations to invest time in accomplishing automated full reversal. Such a tool only needs to be created once before it can be used by others with little effort.

If reverse engineering is a concern, or thought to be within the capabilities of potential adversaries, it seems prudent to no longer rely on bitstream encoding for protection, even while the actual cost of full reversal remains unclear. Merely hiding keys in look-up tables and RAM is not a good strategy: recovering those requires only partial reversal and basic knowledge of the bitstream format. Future solutions may best relay on cryptographic protection of designs rather than on bitstream format obscurity; this view is reflected in the schemes I propose in Chapter 3 and Appendix A.

2.2.2 COUNTERFEITS

Where all FPGAs of the same family and size are identical, a bitstream made for one device can be used in another. Because of that, attackers can, and do, clone bitstreams by recording them in transmission to the FPGA and use them in similar systems or products, usually cheaper clones that are sold instead of, or as, the originals. Since cloning requires no more than a logic analyzer and a competent technician, it is very simple to perform. The attacker, who does not need to understand the details of the design, regards it as a black-box, and only needs to invest in copying the circuit board the FPGA is mounted on, saving development costs.

The original system developers have two main concerns with regards to cloning. Firstly, cloned systems reduce profits after a significant development investment, and secondly, if the clone is marked as the original, the system developer suffers a reputation and support loss if the fake is of poor quality. Deterrents such as those discussed in Section 2.3.3 aim to increase the cost of cloning, and may make cloning unprofitable for low level attackers.

The electronic industry is losing out to large amounts of counterfeit hardware that is either cloned or the result of overbuilding (“run-on fraud”) [6, 179]. When a product is manufactured at a contracted facility that manufactures and tests the hardware before it is shipped to the customer, such a facility may build more than the ordered quantities and sell the excess on its own, without the development costs.
They may even sell the designs themselves (PCB layout, bitstreams) to competitors. To avoid this, some companies qualify facilities as “trusted” and supervise/audit them, but this may be probably too expensive for most companies.

Mislabeling of FPGAs is also a problem for both FPGA manufacturers and system developers. Modifying or erasing markings on an IC package is trivial, and

---

**Open source bitstreams and tools?** The dominant argument for open architectures is that they may enable vendor-independent tools for applications and languages that are unsupported by FPGA vendors. Megacz [133] demonstrated this by creating a complete open-source application programming interface (API) for manipulating Atmel FPSLIC FPGA bitstreams after their format was posted on the comp.arch.fpga Usenet newsgroup in late 2005. One of Ulogic’s goals is to prove to FPGA vendors that tools developed independently can do better than theirs, as demonstrated by their nimble bitstream encoder. There are a few instances that show that FPGA vendors may be (or were) warming up to being more “open”. The first was the 1997 Xilinx XC6200 FPGA (and its predecessor, the Algotronix CAL1024), which had an open configuration format. The second is the Xilinx JBits API [76] (released in 1998) that allowed direct bitstream manipulation. It supported only a few device families and was not very convenient to use, but marked a step in the direction of openness that would enable the creation of independent tools. JBits was quite extensively used by researchers but was updated only to the Virtex-II family; it seems to have been abandoned by Xilinx since.

It appears that, as a whole, FPGA vendors are not convinced that “openness” is currently a worthwhile strategy, otherwise it would be more common. Firstly, they may want to avoid support costs associated with people who create their own bitstreams and use home-grown tools. This argument is rather weak, though perhaps discrimination for hardware support based on which software tools were used is logistically difficult and bad for public-relations. Secondly, they may fear competition with their own software tools and the loss of control over how their devices are used, or losing the revenue from selling software. Lastly, and most importantly, the “openness” will also require revealing proprietary information, including portions of the architecture, which is the edge vendors have over one another and which they have little interest in losing. That said, it may simply be that there is no business opportunity there, as the most relevant consumers of FPGAs are large companies who prefer to get the entire package, including support, accountability, and regular updates. Business motives may dictate that appeasing open-source advocates is not currently worth losing control and profit, no matter how compelling are the counter-arguments. In 2000, Seaman compiled the arguments for both sides, and I recommend reading them for further insights; the page is now only available through the WayBackMachine [151].

---

*a*“Atmel AT40k/94k Configuration Format Documentation”,
http://groups.google.com/group/comp.arch.fpga/msg/a90fca82aafe8e2b/

---
system designers have been doing so for years to make the reverse engineering of a system slightly more difficult. But when FPGAs are not purchased through distributors endorsed by FPGA vendors, how can the buyer be sure that the package markings match what is inside? If it is a completely different device, or even a smaller FPGA family member, that would be quite simple to verify through the programming interface, albeit only after purchase. Slow speed-grade die can be sold as faster speed-grade for a premium, and there is no easy way for the buyer to discover this type of fraud.

It is hard to estimate the losses due to these types of fraud because companies do not report such figures. An industry consortium of large hardware development companies, the *Alliance for Gray Market and Counterfeit Abatement* has estimated that in 2006 one in ten purchased products were fake either by over-building or cloning [6]. These types of fraud are hard to prevent, especially when they occur in places where ownership rights are not enforced. We will discuss a few countermeasures in section 2.3.

2.2.3 Readback

“Readback” is the process of retrieving a snapshot of configuration, look-up tables, and memory state while the FPGA is in operation [186, ch7]. Readback data appears either at the external configuration interface (JTAG, for example) or internally through the *internal configuration access port* (ICAP). It is also possible to read back portions of the FPGA state, not necessarily all of it. The read back

---

**Chisco.** In February 2008, the FBI reported on a multi-year operation seizing over $75 million worth of China-manufactured counterfeit Cisco products [179]—now sometimes known as “Chisco”. Counterfeit network products ended up being used by the FBI, U.S. military and other sensitive U.S. Government branches. This was possible because of sloppy supply chain controls, allowing contractors to buy routers on eBay. (Some pictures\(^a\) clearly show FPGAs on several of the cards.) The obvious fear was that this is a coordinated attack by the Chinese Government to infiltrate the U.S. Government network infrastructure, which is a very legitimate concern. Later, the FBI denied that this was the allegation, and Cisco reported that they have analyzed the cards and found no “re-engineering” or backdoors\(^b\), though one wonders exactly how they did that. Fortunately, the issue is rather easy to avoid by simply buying equipment directly from the vendor or its authorized distributors (rather than from what is effectively someone’s car boot).


image differs from the original bitstream by missing the header, footer, initialization commands, and no-ops; the dynamic data in LUTs and BRAMs is also different from their initialized state. Readback is a powerful verification tool used by FPGA vendors, and also allows system developers to debug their designs.

When readback is enabled, an attacker can read back the design, add missing static data and use it in another device, re-program the FPGA with a modified version, or reverse engineer it. It may also enable what I call an active “readback difference attack” where an attacker is able to observe internal state changes on a clock-cycle basis to bypass defense mechanisms. Consider the case where a functional core is waiting for an enable signal from an authentication process (such as the ones we will discuss in Section 2.3.3). If the attacker has control of the input clock, he can take a snapshot before the signal is set, clock the design, and then take another snapshot. Iteratively comparing the snapshots, the attacker can determine which bits are required to be changed in order to modify the state of control signals. Then, the original bitstream can be modified to have these signals set to the appropriate state permanently. Readback can be used as a defense for detecting ionizing radiation attacks (see Section 2.2.6).

When bitstream encryption is used, multiple, majority-voted, disabling registers are activated within the FPGA to prevent readback [124] [186, UG071]. Lattice devices also disable readback when bitstream encryption is used [120, TN1109]. In theory, these disabling bits can be located using (semi-) invasive attacks, but there is no evidence that this has been accomplished. Current Altera FPGAs do not support readback [7, WP01111-1.0, p3] so are not vulnerable to these types of attacks.

2.2.4 Side-channels

Side-channel attacks exploit the external manifestation of operations executed within a device in order to extract secret data. The challenge for designers interested in preventing this analysis is isolating the operations of integrated circuits from their environment, or randomize/mask processing patterns, as they interact with other devices, and consume and emanate energy. Described below are three types of side-channel attacks and their relevance to FPGAs.

2.2.4.1 Power analysis attacks

Integrated circuits consume power in two ways. Dynamic power consumption is due to CMOS gates changing state while parasitic and load capacitance are charged or discharged according to the logic transition, $0 \rightarrow 1$ or $1 \rightarrow 0$, respectively. A simple dynamic power consumption model for a CMOS gate is

$$P = C_{load} \cdot V_{supply}^2 \cdot f \cdot A$$
where $C_{\text{load}}$ is the gate load capacitance, which includes wire, parasitic and output capacitance, that need to be charged or discharged with every transition; $V_{\text{supply}}$ is the supply voltage to the gate; $f$ is the operating frequency; and $A$ is the probability of an output transition. (Standaert et al. [162] describe a simple experiment that confirms this model on an FPGA.) To obtain power trace samples, standard practice is to measure the voltage across a low-value resistor placed between either the circuit’s power or ground, and the respective external power supply terminals. Bucci et al. [27] alternatively suggest an active sampling circuit for better signal to noise ratio. Shang et al. [154] provide a thorough analysis of the dynamic power consumption of a 150 nm Xilinx Virtex-II FPGA by looking at the power contribution of resources along a signal path. They show that about 60% of dynamic power dissipation is due to interconnect routing (the effective capacitance of driven wires), 16% to logic, 14% to clocking resources, and 10% to I/Os.

Static power is consumed through “gate leakage” – current flowing between the source and drain terminals and through gate oxide. As transistor dimensions shrink and threshold voltages decrease, leakage becomes a more dominant portion of total power consumption. Shang et al. [154] estimated that for a 150 nm FPGA, 5–20% of the total consumption is static, though this has increased for 90 nm, 65 nm and 45 nm transistors that are designed for performance. Leakage is also very sensitive to temperature variations, and therefore, not uniform across the die, or in time, and may also correspond to the circuit’s switching activity. Kim et al. [108] provide an excellent introduction to the issues associated with static power consumption. The smaller dimensions have an effect on dynamic consumption as well because of lower $V_{\text{supply}}$, smaller capacitances, and shorter interconnects, resulting in less consumption; on the other hand there are usually more transistors per die as integration becomes denser. It would be interesting to analyze how static power effects power analysis results.

Analysis of an IC electrical current patterns may reveal information about the specific data it is processing, with attackers usually trying to obtain cryptographic keys. In 1999, Kocher et al. [111] introduced two types of power analysis on microprocessors, simple (SPA) and differential (DPA). With SPA the attacker directly searches power traces for patterns such as algorithmic sequences, conditional branches, multiplication, exponentiation, and other signatures that allow the inference of key material. DPA compares many acquired traces with a statistical power consumption model that is tailored to the target device and specific implementation. By knowing the details of the cipher, an attacker can guess internal states and carefully choose plaintexts such that they can be observed and changed on an individual basis. This technique is powerful even if the implementation details are unknown because the attacker can infer key bits by controlling single bit changes during an
encryption using selected input plaintexts. While attacking a device, the model enables the attacker to iteratively guess candidate key bits and obtain statistical correlation between model and measurement. The statistical analysis is required to increase the signal-to-noise ratio such that a candidate guess becomes distinct from the rest of the samples; if noise is present, more samples are required to reach that distinction, but most noise sources and patterns can be modeled such that they can be sufficiently removed. In some cases, even a small number of known bits can make brute forcing the remainder possible.

Much of power analysis research has concentrated on microcontrollers such as smartcards, for which a model is relatively easy to construct and power traces are simple to record because operation is slow, sequential and there are only a few power pins. Mangard et al. [130] provide a comprehensive introduction to power analysis techniques for smartcards. Power analysis of FPGAs has started receiving increased interest since 2003 with Örs et al. [141] and Standaert et al. [161] examining the possibility of successful attacks. Örs et al. described a power analysis platform for examining a 220 nm Xilinx Virtex device, with a successful SPA attack on an elliptic curve implementation operating in isolation. The research of Standaert et al. on the same FPGA has shown that SPA is not practical for most parallel cryptographic implementations when many concurrent operations are running on a single device. DPA, however, was deemed possible, and within a year Standaert and co-authors [162, 163] demonstrated a potentially successful attack based on statistical correlation techniques against implementations of AES and DES. The investigation showed that the pipelining of the cipher does not protect against DPA since operations are separated into registered states and are thus better observed in the power traces. However, an unrolled implementation where each round is implemented on its own for faster throughput, was shown to measurably increase the efforts of a would-be attacker. This is because all encryption/decryption rounds are run concurrently and, with the key unknown, the contribution to the power trace is effectively random noise that cannot be predicted and easily modeled and removed. In practical scenarios the cryptographic operation is but one of many concurrent operations running on the FPGA, each contributing its own “noise”. In 2006, Standaert et al. [164] analyzed the power signature of isolated pipelined structures on a 180 nm Spartan-II FPGA, improved their previous results from [162], and confirmed some of the results of Shang et al. [154]. They also concluded that pre-charging buses with random values to mask transitions makes analysis harder, at the expense of resources and throughput, but should not be relied on as a single countermeasure.

Obviously, if operations that depend on secret data have the same power signature as ones that do not, power analysis becomes harder. Achieving this, however, is incredibly challenging and the subject of extensive research. Standaert et al. [165]
provide a survey of current defenses against power analysis attacks; namely, time randomization, noise addition, masking, and dynamic and differential logic, with the conclusion that no single solution can eliminate the susceptibility of implementations to power analysis attacks. Messerges [136] also surveys the weaknesses of power analysis countermeasures. Tiri and Verbauwhede [171] proposed an FPGA-specific countermeasure called wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL) synthesis. Using differential logic and pre-charging of the gates, this method increases the resistance to DPA by making power dissipation independent of logic transitions with the disadvantage of increasing circuit size and lowering the operating frequency. This would make a power analysis attack harder, though in practice, uncontrolled manufacturing variations prevent the interconnects from perfectly matching each other so there will always exist some measurable variability (we will see how these variations can be put to good use in Section 2.3.5).

It is important to evaluate the effective threat from power analysis and how it may be incorporated into a threat model. Below are a few obstacles to consider regarding the practicality of power analysis in real-world applications.

- **Isolation of target function.** As already mentioned, for obtaining a correlation with a model, an attacker must remove the noise contributed by concurrent processes from the sample. Using higher-order analysis this would possible, but could be beyond what some attackers are willing to invest in. As a defense, a somewhat costly defense would be to implement an identical cryptographic function operating in parallel with a different key to inject what will effectively be random noise. Depending on the circuit size, WDDL may be a cheaper alternative.

- **Obtaining high signal-to-noise-ratio samples.** With today’s FPGAs operating at over 500 MHz, acquiring samples may not be as easy as with smartcards, so more advanced techniques than the traditional small value resistor may be required. Reducing the operating frequency may not be possible due to detection circuits. One example is an embedded clock manager set to a particular range of frequencies\(^{10}\). The attacker must also be able to isolate the signal from the noise contributed by surrounding devices through the shared ground and power supply. Countermeasures may be a detection circuit for clock and temperature tampering.

- **Probe BGA packages on dense multilayer circuit boards.** All high-end FPGAs – with low-end ones quickly following – have a flip-chip ball grid array (BGA)

---

\(^{10}\)For example, digital clock managers (DCM) in Xilinx FPGAs have two operating modes for high and low input/output frequencies, so the lower threshold can be in the few hundred MHz (120–550 MHz, depending on multiplier setting [186, DS202, t50]).
package, the largest having nearly 2000 balls. These physically prevent easy access to pins and signal paths while the device is still soldered onto the board. Relatively cheap mechanical and electrical mechanisms can be added to printed circuit boards to make an attack more expensive; for example, sensitive signals between devices can be routed in internal printed circuit layers, perhaps sandwiched between sensor mesh layers, or encased in a tamper proof enclosure (read more on this in Chapter 3).

Additionally, for newer FPGAs, the attacker will need to deal with devices manufactured at sub-90 nm technologies, and unlike smartcards that have a simple and standardized interface for power and data, each system is different in the way it interfaces with the FPGA. Recently, researchers have started using the SASEBO FPGA side-channel analysis platform [138], which is available with recent FPGAs. SASEBO eliminates high engineering costs and, more importantly, provides a common platform on which results can be reproduced.

2.2.4.2 Electromagnetic emanation analysis

Electromagnetic analysis (EMA) relies on detecting data-dependent electromagnetic fields caused by current changes during execution of a function. These fields can be measured outside of the device using carefully tuned antennas, even without removing its packaging. Compromising emanations were known to military organizations since at least the 1960s, and have been used in electronic espionage since; Kuhn [114] provides the history and evolution of such attacks and describes practical experiments for eavesdropping on computer displays.

Using electromagnetic analysis (EMA) to attack integrated circuits has only started to receive attention from academia since the late 1990s. In the rump session of Eurocrypt 2000 Quisquater and Samyde introduced the terms simple and differential electromagnetic attacks, SEMA and DEMA, as the EM analysis equivalents to power consumption analysis. In a later paper they described their techniques and

| Easy access. | While FPGA power analysis research is vital, we should always put it in the context of an application. With a cheap commercial product, designers may only be concerned if extracting keys is trivial; the chances that they will invest in adding additional circuitry required for a DPA countermeasure are low. On the other hand, a high-security application should have many layers of protection (some logical and some physical) so these designers may also not be keen on spending transistors on such defenses, when there are much better understood ways for preventing access to systems. The intersection of these considerations is embodied in smartcards, which aim to be both high-security devices and cheap. |

38
initial results from analyzing microcontrollers [147]. At about the same time, Gandolfi et al. [68] demonstrated EM analysis on three cryptographic implementations in microcontrollers. Their results show that if set-up correctly, EMA attacks can be more efficient and produce better signal-to-noise ratios than power analysis. In a comprehensive analysis Agrawal et al. [3, 4] analyze smartcards and observe that there are two kinds of emanations, “direct”, which are caused by current flowing along interconnects, and “unintended”, caused by electrical and magnetic coupling between wires and components. The authors used these emanations to obtain better results than their application of power analysis techniques. Electromagnetic attacks can have two advantages over power analysis: firstly, the attack can be localized to a particular portion of the chip, and secondly, it can be executed in the device’s original setting.

Carlier et al. [31] have reported the first EM analysis of an AES implementation on a 130 nm Altera Cyclone FPGA. Their “square electromagnetic attack” is based on the square attack [41], which is more efficient than brute force for six rounds or less of AES. This chosen plaintext attack fixes all but one byte of the input and observes the propagation of this byte’s bits throughout the round functions. The authors were successful in obtaining key bits by placing an antenna close to the FPGA and using DEMA techniques; they were also able to distinguish relevant signals from the noise produced by parallel processes.

De Mulder et al. [45, 46] have reported a successful attack against a special implementation of an elliptic curve algorithm on a 220 nm Xilinx Virtex 800 FPGA. They used SEMA to observe key-dependent conditional branching, and DEMA statistical techniques against an improved algorithmic implementation. It is interesting to note that localization considerations were taken into account and that the FPGA was operating at a very low frequency of 300 kHz. As with the power analysis reports, these implementations ran in isolation, making the attack environment ideal for the attackers.

**Pin distribution.** An interesting aspect that may affect both power and electromagnetic analysis attacks, and is yet to be explored, is the distribution of ground and power pins in new BGA packages. The arrangement of power and ground pins in flip-chip packages (more on this in Section 2.2.5) has also changed over time for better signal integrity and electromagnetic compliance. Traditionally, ground pins were concentrated at the center of the package with power pins in batches around this center cluster. Today, packages have power pins spread across the grid array closer to signal pins so return paths are short and less inductive. It would be interesting to see if this improves or worsens EM attacks.
2.2.4.3 Timing analysis

Conditional branching, memory accesses, and algorithmic operations often depend on key state in cryptographic implementations; if an attacker can observe these differences through measuring execution time, he will be able to discover key bits. The standard example is comparing for a correct password one character at a time. Noting the different processing time between a match and a mismatch an attacker can determine the password in just a few attempts. Kocher [110] and Dhem et al. [48] have shown how practical these attacks can be against microcontroller implementations of cryptographic algorithms.

Observing timing variations through power traces might not be as effective with FPGAs because, unlike microcontrollers, processes can run concurrently. However, timing can be observed through memory accesses and other interfaces with external devices. The designer can prevent information leaking through timing variations by making sure that sensitive operations require the same number of clock cycles to complete; by adding timing randomization to operations; or, by using internal memory.

2.2.5 Invasive and semi-invasive attacks

Invasive attacks physically probe and alter the target device in order to extract secret information. The process involves de-packaging the device and removing the passivation layer that protects the metal interconnects from oxidation. This can be done using chemicals or, for greater precision, with a laser cutter that creates a hole for inserting probes. This requires a microprobing station that lets the attacker accurately control the probes, position the die, and observe it with a microscope. A more expensive and precise tool is the focused ion beam (FIB), which is required for small feature size ICs. Using accelerated particle beams that interact with gases close to the die, the FIB is able to create incisions at the nanometer scale, deposit metal connections and take high resolution images of the target. This lets an attacker either read data from buses or alter functionality. Kömmerling and Kuhn [112] and Skorobogatov [157] detail the process of invasive attacks on microcontrollers and Soden et al. [159] provide an excellent survey of failure analysis techniques used by device manufactures, the same ones that may be used by attackers.

Shrinking feature sizes, integrated circuit complexity, and the destructive nature make invasive attacks expensive. Further, flip-chip packaging used for many of today’s FPGAs prevents easy access to interconnect (see Figure 2.6). Flip-chip packages mount the die face down, close to the package’s pins in order to reduce inductance and allow finer “pitch” for greater densities of pins/balls. Older wire-bond packages had the die facing up, with wires connecting the die to pins, which were easier to probe. Currently, there are no published reports on a successful
Figure 2.6: A wire-bond package is shown on the left where the die faces up with wires bonded connecting it to the solder balls through a substrate; in the flip-chip package on the right the down-facing die has “bumps” used to connect it to the circuit board substrate using solder balls.

invasive attack against a volatile FPGA.

Semi-invasive attacks require the removal of the device’s packaging, leaving the passivation layer intact, while the rest of the analysis is done using techniques such as imaging and thermal analysis. This class of attacks were introduced by Skorobogatov [157] and covers the gap between the non-invasive and invasive types. Semi-invasive attacks are cheaper than invasive ones since they typically do not require expensive equipment or extensive knowledge of the chip; Skorobogatov has applied these attacks on devices fabricated with 250 nm and larger manufacturing technologies. As with invasive attacks, I am not aware of successful applications of these techniques on recent FPGAs.

2.2.5.1 Data remanence

Exploiting data remanence can be considered a semi-invasive technique, where the attacker relies on the retention (or evidence) of previously stored state in storage media or RAM cells after power loss, and even after data has been overwritten. Ionic contamination, hot-carrier effects, and electromigration, for example, can “impress” the stored state over time. Gutmann [79, 80] covers remanence of magnetic media and RAM at length. High voltages or low temperatures can cause RAM to retain the previous state from microseconds to minutes after power is removed depending on the extremities of the conditions. In 2002, Skorobogatov [156] tested eight SRAM devices (manufactured at 250 nm technology and larger feature-size), all showing remanence of up to a few seconds at sufficiently low temperatures. In 2008, Halderman et al. [82] demonstrated similar remanence in DRAM, where despite the requirement for refreshing, memory modules retained state for up to an hour when cooled to $-196^\circ\text{C}$ with liquid nitrogen. They were able to extract software disk encryption keys stored in DRAM this way, violating the implicit, and false, assumption that data is erased instantly with power loss.

The work most relevant to FPGAs is Tuan et al. [174] who measured the remanence of 90 nm FPGA memory cells. The authors point out that previous data taken for SRAM devices do not apply to FPGA SRAM cells. Firstly, because they stem from older technologies with less leakage current, which affects charge and dis-
charge characteristics. And secondly, because FPGA SRAM cells are built, laid out and arranged differently than commodity SRAM chips; even within the same device there are several types of SRAM cells that are powered differently. The experiment was done by continuously reading back the FPGA content and recording the change in state of every SRAM cell at −40°C, 0°C and 25°C for both floating or grounded power rails. The authors found an asymmetry in remanence rates between cells that are initially set to 1 (shorter) and those set to 0 (longer) due to the asymmetric arrangement of the five-transistor cell. Cells were classified into two categories, logic and interconnect; the state of logic cells (i.e., ‘1’ or ‘0’) are evenly distributed, whereas only about 10–20% of interconnect cells are set to 1 for any design. The two types of cells are also powered by different internal supplies. The results show that interconnect cells retain state longer than logic cells: 40 seconds for interconnect and 1 second for logic at −40°C (worst case) for 20% of data to be lost when power rails are left floating. However, if power rails are grounded, 20% of data is gone in under 1 ms. One way to limit the window of remanence is to sense the die’s temperature and shut down if it falls below a given threshold. This can be done internally (for example, by using the Virtex-5 “system monitor” [186, UG192]) or externally with an appropriate sensor inside a tamper resistant enclosure. Additionally, as a response to tampering, on every power down, or on reconfiguration, SRAM power rails should be actively grounded briefly rather than left floating.

2.2.6 Others

In cryptography, brute force search means attempting all possible key values to search for a valid output. It can also mean exhaustion of all possible logic inputs to a device in order, for example, to make a finite state machine reach an undefined state or discover the combination to enter the device’s “test mode”. Another form of brute force attack is the gradual variation of the voltage input and other environmental conditions, rather than variation of logic states. Brute force is sometimes associated with black-box attacks that attempt to exhaust all input combinations and record the outputs in order to reverse engineer the device’s complete operation, or create a new design that mimics it. Considering the stored state, complexity, and size of current FPGAs, this type of attack is not likely to be practical or economic for reverse engineering the FPGA’s entire functionality [185]. That said, if a subset of the functionality is targeted that can be interfaced with directly through the I/O pins, brute forcing can be fruitful, perhaps in combination with other attacks. For critical functions, therefore, randomization may be useful. Christiansen [36] suggests adding “decoy circuits” to the design to increase the effort of an attacker. The cost is high, though: seven times LUT usage and twice the amount of power, in addition to requiring more I/Os and design time.


**Crippling attacks** either subvert a system to perform malicious functions or completely bring it offline, similar to denial-of-service attacks on networked servers and devices. The absence of robust integrity preserving mechanisms for bitstreams, such as authentication, enables anyone to program an FPGA if they have access to it. In the case where bitstream encryption is used (see Section 2.3.1) confidentiality is provided, but may not be sufficient, as an adversary can still re-program the device with an invalid bitstream and bring the system off-line. An extreme crippling scenario is described by Hadžić et al. [81] where an FPGA is permanently damaged due to induced contention by using invalid bitstreams, and we will discuss this further in Section 2.3.2 on configuration authenticitiy.

**Fault injection** or **glitch attacks** can cause devices to perform operations in unintended order or get them into a compromised state such that secret data is leaked. This is done by altering the input clock, creating momentary over- or under-shoots to the supplied voltage, electrical fields applied with probing needles, light flashes applied to depackaged ICs, etc. As an example, if a conditional branch is skipped by the CPU due to a clock glitch some commands will not be executed; a voltage surge or trough can cause registers to keep their state. If a power glitch is applied at the right time, the number of rounds of an encryption algorithm may be reduced; Anderson and Kuhn [13] demonstrate how glitches and fault injections were used to attack microcontrollers.

**Ionizing radiation** can also cause configuration memory cells to change state, and thus change circuit behavior. If the affected circuit is part of a security function, then protection mechanisms can be disabled, provided that radiation can be accurately (and consistently) focused on particular areas of the IC. FPGAs have been tested while exposed to ambient radiation and accelerated particle beams for measuring their susceptibility to *single event upsets* (SEUs)\(^{11}\), which may affect configuration behavior [92, 125]. Maingot et al. [128] have also exposed FPGAs to laser shots and analyzed the fault patterns. Some volatile FPGAs now have an internal function that detects SEUs in the background as the design operated in user logic [7, AN357] [186, AN714]. This is done by periodically comparing a calculated CRC or Hamming syndrome to a pre-computed one, alerting the user logic on discrepancy (so the developer can decide what action to take). **Triple modular redundancy** (TMR) is another solution, where all logic is triplicated and majority voters detect radiation-induced logic faults; TMR is primarily used in space applications where radiation faults are more frequent. Many applications that use TMR also periodically “scrub” FPGA configuration and data to restore it to a known state to recover from SEUs that may have occurred. These technique could be adopted to protect against

---

\(^{11}\)“Radiation-induced errors in microelectronic circuits caused when charged particles lose energy by ionizing the medium through which they pass, leaving behind a wake of electron-hole pairs” [137].
malicious radiation attacks. Finally, for protecting cryptographic implementations against fault attacks and side channel analysis, Mentens et al. [135] propose to use partial dynamic reconfiguration to randomly change the physical location of design modules.

2.3 Defenses

2.3.1 Configuration Confidentiality

The idea of encrypting configuration content for programmable devices was first suggested in a 1992 patent by Austin [18]. Actel’s 60RS device family was the first to encrypt configurations, though the implementation is a good example of poor key distribution. Actel programed the same key into all devices (preventing reverse engineering, not cloning), and the same key was also stored in every instance of the software, so attackers only needed to reverse engineer the code, rather than use invasive techniques [102]. In 2000, Xilinx added a hard-core Triple-DES bitstream decryptor to their Virtex-II family, which allowed developers to store their own keys in internally battery-backed RAM. Bitstream encryption is now a standard function in high-end FPGAs, and works as follows.

After generating the plaintext bitstream, the user defines a key and the software encrypts the configuration payload of the bitstream. The user then “programs” this same key into dedicated memory in the FPGA. A command in the bitstream header instructs the configuration logic to pass all configuration data through the hard-core decryptor before the configuration memory cells are programmed. Some FPGAs (such as Altera’s Stratix II/III) can be set to always perform decryption, regardless of header commands, which prevents the loading of bitstreams not encrypted with the correct key.

There are two on-chip key-storage techniques for bitstream decryption: volatile and non-volatile. Using volatile storage, keys are kept in low-power SRAM cells, powered by an external battery attached to a dedicated pin. The advantages of volatile key storage are that it allows quick clearing the keys in response to tampering even when the device is not powered, and also complicating attacks by forcing attackers to constantly power the device. Security-conscious designers find these attributes appealing, as it makes conformance to standards, such as the U.S. government’s FIPS 140-2 [139], easier and in general provides higher levels of security than non-volatile key storage. The battery requirement is generally seen as a disadvantage because it takes up PCB space (especially if a battery holder is required), may have higher failure rate than other components, and may require replacement in devices with a long shelf or use periods.

With non-volatile memory key storage, keys are permanently embedded in the
device using fuses, laser programming, Flash, or EEPROM. This type of key storage combined with the latest CMOS technology is a recent development, as it introduces a non-standard manufacturing step that impacts yield and reliability. Embedded keys have the advantage of not requiring a battery and the cost of bitstream encryption is included in the FPGA’s price (if key management costs are ignored). For these reasons, this approach appeals to cost-conscious designers over the battery option. Embedded keys can also help prevent run-on-fraud as the keys can be programmed into the device at a trusted facility before being shipped to a third party for system assembly and testing.

Key management is the process of key generation and distribution (transport) for and to communicating parties, either prior to or after initiating contact. NIST’s FIPS 800-57 [139], Recommendation for key management, remarks that “key management is often an afterthought in the cryptographic development process. As a result, cryptographic subsystems too often fail to support the key management functionality and protocols that are necessary to provide adequate security[, . . .] key management planning should begin during the initial conceptual/development stages of the cryptographic development life cycle”. As the security of the system should rely on the secrecy of keys, their management infrastructure is as important as the choice of cryptographic algorithm or protocol. The logistics of keeping keys secret while stored, transported and updated, along with adequate access controls, amounts to a non-trivial cost that must be incorporated into the overall cost of a defense strategy; at the least, procedures for key management should be defined. It is also quite possible that the total cost of a defense strategy could exceed the loss due to theft. Unfortunately, we see very little discussion of key management in the FPGA security literature when new security schemes are being proposed.

Up to now we have discussed existing solutions for encrypting configurations, though other schemes have been proposed. Kean [102] suggested that embedded keys (programmed by FPGA vendors, foundries, or system developers) be used such that the FPGA itself can encrypt and decrypt the bitstream without the key ever leaving the FPGA. As outlined in Figure 2.7, the first stage happens in a trusted facility where the plaintext bitstream is encrypted by the FPGA using its embedded key $K_{CL}$, and then stored in NVM. While the system is deployed in the field, the bitstream is decrypted with the same embedded key using a hard-core decryptor that is part of the configuration logic.

Kean [102] also made the observation that it may be sufficient to only slightly increase the price of cloning and suggested embedding fixed keys in the photo masks (artwork) that are used in the FPGA manufacturing process: “Suppose there were five possible keys and FPGA’s were supplied with no markings indicating which key was in a particular FPGA. The design owner can use any FPGA since the FPGA
Figure 2.7: Kean’s bitstreams protection scheme: in a trusted facility the plaintext bitstream is encrypted using a key embedded in the configuration logic ($K_{\text{CL}}$) and is stored in a NVM device. In the field, the bitstream is decrypted on power-up and configures the user logic. The advantage of this scheme is that the key need not leave the device.

will create an encrypted bitstream itself based on whatever internal key it contains. However, a pirate using a naive approach would have to buy, on average, five FPGA’s in order to find one which would load a particular pirated design.”

Bossuet et al. [24] propose a scheme where an embedded key is accessible to the user logic and uses partial reconfiguration to encrypt and decrypt bitstreams, as follows. A bitstream containing an implementation of a developer-chosen cipher is loaded onto the FPGA and used to encrypt the primary application bitstream using an embedded key (in the configuration logic). This encrypted bitstream is then stored in a NVM device. On the same NVM, a matching decryption bitstream is stored and used for decrypting the encrypted bitstream in the field (configuration is done using partial reconfiguration). The critical security flaw of this scheme is that the key is accessible to the user logic, so anyone can read it out and decrypt the bitstreams. For this scheme to work, a more complicated key access control mechanism needs to be implemented in the hard-wired configuration logic.

2.3.2 Configuration authenticity

In cryptography, authenticity provides recipients of data the assurance of knowing the sender’s identity and that the data has not been manipulated. Authentication can be achieved using asymmetric cryptography, hash-based MACs [139, FIPS 198], and symmetric block ciphers in particular modes of operation [139, SP800-38A]. More recent constructs called authenticated encryption (AE) [23] try to efficiently provide both confidentiality and authenticity with a single key. In this category, Galois counter mode (GCM) [139, SP800-38D] seems to be a popular choice today.
Encrypting configuration files protects against cloning and reverse engineering in transit independently of the FPGA, while authentication guarantees the correct and intended operation of the bitstream while it is running on the FPGA. Parelkar [144, 145] suggested the use of authenticated encryption for protecting FPGA bitstreams and concluded that the dual-pass Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode [186, SP800-38C] is the best choice. Later, Parelkar and Gaj [146] also described an implementation of EAX [21], suggesting it be used for bitstream authentication. But their discussions of bitstream authentication’s benefits were very brief, and the constraints bounding a solution were not thoroughly investigated.

In early 2007 I provided the following analysis of the problem [50], and motivated the addition of authentication to the hard-coded configuration logic of the FPGA. My approach was to provide a convincing case such that FPGA vendors may be persuaded that such addition is a worth-while investment for them.

I proposed that authentication can allow source code audit under some constraints (such as supply chain control). Many manufacturers do not make their source code publicly available, so consumers have no way of knowing what their devices’ firmware is actually doing. For some this may not be a problem, though for some applications source code transparency is critical. Figure 2.8 shows a hypothetical code audit process I proposed that is enabled using authentication (without encryption) for a voting machine application. A municipal “voting authority” ordered voting machines from “Honest Voting Machines” (HVM). Both sides are interested in allowing the voting authority to examine the HDL code so that they can be sure that the audited version is indeed the one operating on the FPGA at voting time. However, HVM are adamant that only their authorized code is run on their voting machines. HVM starts by programming a unique authentication key into a dedicated key store inside of the FPGA. The source HDL is then sent to the voting authority, and optionally also published online for voters to examine.

“In general, authentication is more important than encryption” conclude Ferguson and Schneier [63, p116]. That is, impersonation can be more devastating than just being able to eavesdrop on communications. This makes sense for FPGA configurations as well: being able to configure an FPGA with a malicious bitstream can be more harmful than just being able to reverse engineer it. Consider an FPGA-based banking hardware security module (HSM) where bitstreams can be remotely updated. An attacker learning how the module works by reverse engineering the bitstream may be able to create a competing product or even find exploitable vulnerabilities. On the other hand, if the attacker can also configure the HSM’s FPGA with a modified bitstream, he could clandestinely control and observe all traffic (i.e., credit card PINs, personal details, etc.)
Figure 2.8: HDL source code audit scheme [50]. Bitstream authentication can enable code audit by having the end user compile the HDL code he audited himself. This way, the HDL can be public but only run if the correct MAC is supplied by the manufacturer.

HVM compiles the HDL into a bitstream, generates its MAC using the FPGA’s authentication key, and delivers the MAC to the voting authority.

The voting authority then audits the code to see that there are no biases, backdoors, or other behaviors that may alter election results; it is prevented from modifying the code because it will produce a different bitstream without a corresponding MAC. Once satisfied, the voting authority compiles the code into a bitstream identical to the one used by HVM to compute the MAC. In order for the exact bitstream to be produced at both sides, the same software version and settings (i.e., cost tables, optimization efforts, etc.) must be used. Since the bitstream was compiled locally, the voting authority is assured that the audited HDL resulted in the bitstream it programs into the FPGA before the elections. Finally, the FPGA must only accept encrypted bitstreams.

Bitstream authentication also solves bit manipulation of encrypted bitstreams, as is possible with CBC and counter modes of operation, for example. Relying on linear error correction and detection codes, such as cyclic redundancy (CRC), for integrity is not satisfactory because they can be forged such that manipulation is not detected [166]. (Currently, CRC is used to prevent bitstreams that were accidentally corrupted in transmission from being activated so short circuits do not occur.)

Hadžić et al. [81] examined the implications of malicious tampering of bitstreams. Currents from circuit shorts may cause the device to exceed its thermal tolerance, permanently damaging it. A random-content bitstream may potentially create con-
siderable contention and is relatively simple to construct (if it is made to be accepted by the FPGA). Hadžić et al. have proposed several system-level solutions to protect against the issues they raise, but have not considered authentication, which can solve all of them.

I propose a generic composition scheme for decryption and authentication of bitstreams, shown in Figure 2.9 [50]. I eliminated asymmetric cryptography for their relative high cost in circuit size (for the required throughput), and also authenticated encryption because a good solution would enable the encryption and authentication to be separate (so to enable code audit and key distribution versatility, for example)\(^\text{12}\). In Chapter 4, I will present an AES implementation architecture for processing concurrent bitstreams in different modes, as suggested above. Although it is not an ASIC implementation, as would be required for integration into the configuration logic of FPGAs, it does demonstrate the novel use of resources for multi-stream processing. In Chapter 3, bitstream authentication is considered for enhancing the security properties of remote configuration updates.

2.3.3 Design theft deterrents

FPGA vendors offer a few cloning deterrents that rely on the bitstream encoding secrecy to obfuscate secrets. Indeed, they are not cryptographically secure but may increase the cost of cloning to a level sufficient to some cost-conscious designers, and intended mostly for low-end devices that do not decrypt bitstreams.

\(^{12}\text{One of my criteria was that a mode is “approved” by some authority in order for it to be adoptable by FPGA vendors. Since the paper’s publication, GCM and GMAC [139, SP800-38D] were published by NIST, and meet this and other criteria.}\)
In 2000, Kessner [106] proposed an FPGA bitstream theft deterrent using a “cryptographically secure variation on a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)” (i.e., stream cipher): a user logic application computes a bit-string and compares its output to a string sent by a complex programmable logic device (CPLD) that performed the same operation. This lets the application inside of the FPGA “know” that it is mounted on the “right” circuit board. More recently, Altera [7, WP M2DSGN] and Xilinx [186, AN780] proposed very similar challenge-response cloning deterrents, shown in Figure 2.10. The user logic application shares a key $K_{UL}$ with a processor that is placed beside it on the printed circuit board. The FPGA sends a challenge produced by a true random number generator to the processor and both MAC it (using cipher-based MAC, HMAC, etc.) The processor sends the result back to the FPGA for comparison; if the results match, the application is enabled. For secure implementation, developers need to be careful such that the random number generator is not easily influenced by temperature and voltage variations, as well as consider the potential compromise from readback difference, replay and relay attacks, as we will discuss in Chapter 6.

In the Spartan-3A device family, Xilinx offers “Device DNA”, a non-volatile, factory-set, user-logic accessible, 55-bit unique number [186, UG332, p241]. Xilinx suggests using this number as a “key” for deterrents that use an external device in similar, or less secure, ways than the ones described above. Since the serial number is no secret – it can be read by anyone who configures the FPGA – Xilinx proposes that the attacker’s challenge would be to discover the algorithm used for processing this number [186, WP266], which goes against Kerckhoffs’ principles [105].

These schemes rely on the continued secrecy of bitstream encoding for security, which can provide an incremental challenge to would-be attackers when active...
measures are not available. We discussed the issues of bitstream reversal in Section 2.2.1; unfortunately, we cannot quantify how much protection such schemes actually provide, and how long this type of protection can last.

2.3.4 Watermarking and fingerprinting

A digital watermark, placed into digital content by its owner, is a hard-to-remove evidence of ownership that is unnoticeable to an observer; it ties the content to its creator, owner, or the tool that produced it. A fingerprint is a watermark that is varied for individual copies, and can be used for identifying individual authorized users of the content. For example, watermarks can be encoded as human-inaudible frequencies in audio files, or in the least significant bits of images that affect content below the sensitivity threshold of human vision. The original content, therefore, is altered but in ways that are unnoticeable to the user. Ideally, watermarks should be easy to insert using the software development flow; not affect correct functionality; use as little resources possible; be unforgeable and hard to remove; and be sufficiently robust so they can be used as evidence of theft. Kahng et al. [100] provide the fundamentals of watermarking techniques for integrated circuits and FPGA design marking; Abdel-Hamid et al. [1] provide a good survey and analysis of watermarking techniques in general.

Watermarks can be inserted at three stages of the FPGA design flow: HDL, netlist, or bitstream. HDL watermarks can work for system developers marking their own designs, but not for externally integrated cores because those marks can be easily removed. Watermarks in encrypted netlists may work for protecting such external cores, though the software needs to support an encrypted development flow in a way that cannot be circumvented. In both HDL- or netlist-level watermarks, the tool chain must allow the watermark to be preserved throughout the process of generating a bitstream. Bitstream-level insertion can only be performed by the system developer; otherwise, bitstreams would require post-processing by the cores vendor who had no control over the design flow. This is logistically cumbersome, but may also be impossible without the ability to reverse engineer portion of the bitstream.

Lach et al. [118] address FPGA bitstream watermarking and fingerprinting for design protection, suggesting embedding content or functions into unused LUTs (“additive-based” marking). To avoid an “elimination attack” by colluding recipients of the same design with differing marks, the authors suggest varying placement for every bitstream instance. A possible attack against this scheme is to remove LUT content from unencrypted bitstreams while checking that the design still works correctly, iteratively removing identifying marks; “masking attacks” are also possible by inserting random content into all LUTs that are not used. Lach et al. [119]
later improved the technique by splitting the watermark into smaller pieces such that masking attacks are harder. Building on the constraint-based ideas of Kahng et al. [100], Jain et al. [95] propose placing-and-routing a portion of a completed design to incorporate design-specific timing constraints as watermarks. This produces a unique bitstream that can be regenerated given the original HDL and constraints in order to show ownership. This may work for a complete design rather than the more desirable marking of individual cores, because a core vendor cannot enforce constraints through a netlist such that they always produce the same bitstream portion when multiple cores are combined together by the system developer. Le and Desmedt [121] describe possible attacks on the schemes of Kahng et al. [100] and Lach et al. [118, 119]; however, the ones relating to LUT-based marks will require reverse engineering the bitstream, at least partially, so are not as straightforward as it first seems.

Ziener et al. [191] propose using the LUT content extracted from netlists as a watermark. Then, LUT content is extracted from a suspected copied bitstream to statistically determine if an unlicensed core is present; since the LUTs are part of the functional design, removing them may make the design not work, so it resists elimination and masking attacks. Ziener and Teich [190] propose using LUT-based signatures that can be measured through power analysis after an external trigger.

Watermarks are a reactive mechanism and as such do not actually prevent theft, but may serve as initial evidence in court or trigger further investigation. However, while it would make a hard case for a criminal to claim that he independently arrived at an identical copy of artwork such as a photographs or song, it is quite possible that engineers independently produce very similar code, ones that may falsely trigger the statistical threshold for fraud in watermarking schemes. (This is especially true since synthesis tools interpret different HDL descriptions to produce similar netlists.) Thus, watermarking schemes must be robust enough such that the probability of this happening is very low. On top of that, reactive mechanisms are only useful where ownership rights are enforced, further reducing their usefulness. As counterfeit hardware tends to come from countries where this is not the case, these mechanisms are less appealing compared to active ones.

Lastly, some watermarking techniques rely on the continued secrecy of bitstream encoding, opening them to various manipulation attacks that may prevent them from being used as conclusive evidence in court (more in box on the next page). If the attacker encrypts the original plaintext watermarked bitstream, the detection and proof is made more difficult, if possible at all. For all the reasons above, watermarking may only be useful when it can be conveniently applied and verified, but as part of an overall active defense mechanism. This will serve as a deterrent and help protect the watermark from tampering, but also provide evidence that the infringer
had to actively attack the system in order to remove it.

2.3.5 Physical unclonable functions

Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) extract unique strings from the physical properties of objects. Pappu [142] and Pappu et al. [143] introduced physical one-way functions where the scatter pattern from a laser beam passing through, or reflected from, a block of epoxy is converted into a bit string unique to that block. Buchanan et al. [28] use the microscopic arrangement of paper fiber as an identifier, which turns out to be very reliable, even after moderate physical abuse. Since the PUF’s output is physically coupled to the item, and is supposed to be unique, it may be suitable for authentication.

Silicon PUFs (SPUF) were introduced by Gassend et al. [69], Lee et al. [122], and Lim et al. [126], and rely on uncontrollable variability of integrated circuit manufacturing. An “arbiter PUF” is shown in Figure 2.11, where identically designed delay lines are routed through multiplexers that are controlled by a challenge vector. A signal edge is split to propagate both routes according to the multiplexers’ setting until it reaches the sampling register. The response is determined by which signal arrives first. All possible paths are designed and laid out to have the same propagation delay, but because integrated circuit fabrication introduces minute uncontrollable path variations, each instance of the entire structure can be different, so giving a different result. If $m$ of the structures shown in Figure 2.11 are replicated, challenge

---

**Watermarking in the real world.** Anderson [10, ch22.4] puts the legal value of watermarking in the context of the real world. He observes that intellectual property lawyers “almost never” have a problem proving ownership using standard documents and contracts, and that they do not need to resort to technical means, which end up confusing the jury anyway. Another observation is that key management should be done with care if keys are to be disclosed in court, so they do not compromise many other marks.

On a related note for the last point, in June 2009 a U.K. judge ruled in favor of Halifax Bank after one of its customers sued them for money he lost to “phantom withdrawals”. The bank could have provided a cryptographic key to prove that its customer was at fault, but instead claimed that they cannot derive the key again, and that disclosing it in court may compromise other systems (both claims seem to be technically incorrect, by the way). The case was won by the bank providing an undocumented log sheet pointing to a few digits that implicate the cardholder without being required to produce more concrete evidence, such as a cryptographic key.

---


*b http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/halifax-log.pdf*
Figure 2.11: “Arbiter PUF” [126]. A signal’s rising edge is split to propagate through multiplexers controlled by a challenge vector. The result depends on which of the two edges arrives first. The routes are designed to be identical, though uncontrollable manufacturing variability causes them to have minute variations in length.

vectors of size $n$ controlling the multiplexers, provide $2^n$ challenges-response pairs of size $m$. Results from an implementation of a delay-based PUF variation are reported by Majzoobi et al. [129].

Suh and Devadas [167] also suggested the “ring oscillator PUF” where many identical free-running ring oscillators are used to produce unique bitstrings based on slight delay variations between the oscillators’ inverters. Tuyls et al. [175] have developed a “coating PUF” which is applied to the surface of a die such that the coating’s unique dielectric distribution can be measured capacitively from within the device to extract a key and detect invasive tampering. Guajardo et al. [75] and Holcomb et al. [88] propose using the initial state of SRAM cells as a source of entropy. This works because manufacturing variability and environmental conditions cause SRAM cells to initialize to one of the two states on power-up if they are not actively driven to any particular one. Guajardo et al. reported that large SRAM blocks within some FPGAs\(^\text{13}\) can be used for establishing unique keys that may be used for design protection. Holcomb et al. similarly showed that SRAM device behavior can be used for RFID token authentication or for random number generation. (Note that the goals of PUFs and TRNGs are different: the former needs to produce consistent results, while the latter is required to be a source of high entropy.)

Ideal PUFs – that is, ones that function as pseudorandom number generators seeded from strings derived from the physical properties of a circuit – can be very attractive for the following reasons: creating a model for faking them is hard; derived keys “exist” on demand; invasive tampering may permanently alter PUF output; cryptographic keys do not need to be programmed into, or ever leave, the device;

\(^\text{13}\)Oddly, the authors do not specify which FPGA they used, and make rather general claims about their solution’s applicability to all FPGAs. Since current Xilinx FPGAs initialize BRAM state in the bitstream, it is likely that they have used the large M-RAM blocks inside of some Altera FPGAs (only available in Stratix or Stratix II), which are not initialized on configuration [7, Stratix II Handbook, Volume 2, p32].
they are scalable; and finally, they may work with existing FPGAs.

2.3.5.1 Secure processor-code distribution

Some FPGA families incorporate hard-coded embedded sequential processors, while many others support “soft” processors, such as the Altera Nios and Xilinx MicroBlaze, which are implemented in user logic. The code for these processors can be written in a high-level language such as C, with the compiled code stored in embedded RAM such that it can be updated without full reconfiguration. Simpson and Schaumont [155] suggest using PUFs for installing and updating proprietary compiled code\textsuperscript{14} that does not belong to the system developer. Their proposed protocol authenticates and decrypts code based on keys derived from challenge-response pairs collected from an embedded PUF, as described in Section 2.3.5. For each FPGA, the FPGA vendor records a large number of challenge-response pairs from the “PUF extractor” design running on the FPGA and enrolls those, and the FPGA’s unique identifier, with a trusted party. Then, cores vendors enroll their compiled code, together with a unique identifier, with the trusted party. Through several cryptographic exchanges between the principals, the compiled code is encrypted such that it can only be decrypted and used by FPGAs that can reproduce the correct PUF response given a particular challenge vector. The scope to which this scheme applies is limited to the secure distribution of compiled code for embedded processors and does not apply to cores that use the FPGA’s other user logic resources. Guajardo et al. [75] suggest enhancements to this protocol (but does not increase its scope) and also describe an implemented PUF, as discussed in the previous section, which was originally only simulated by Simpson and Schaumont.

2.3.5.2 PUFs and the FPGA usage model

In order to be practically used as part of a cryptographic application, PUF instantiations must harness sufficient entropy and produce responses consistently across temperature and voltage variations. In addition, the probability of more than a single device producing the same response to a given challenge should be demonstratively low enough such that a search for matching devices is impractical. Despite not being able to verify any of the results reported in the literature so far (see more on reproducibility in Chapter 5), let us now assume that they can be made to work reliably on FPGAs and consider how they can be used in practice.

The “PUF extractor” circuit needs to be loaded onto the FPGA through the ordinary configuration interface. If this initial bitstream is not encrypted, security mechanisms can be circumvented (as we discussed in Section 2.2.1). I call this the

\textsuperscript{14}Simpson and Schaumont [155] and Guajardo et al. [75] use the terms “software” and “IP” interchangeably, which can be confusing and misleading; I use “compiled (C) code” for clarity.
“initial configuration problem” – if the initial bitstream is not trusted (i.e., can be reverse engineered, manipulated, downgraded, etc.), then nothing can be truly trusted beyond that point. As a solution, we may be tempted to suggest that PUF extractor bitstreams be encrypted and authenticated (as discussed in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). But if they are, we may realize that if a remote server already knows the appropriate keys, then PUFs provide little additional value, especially given the high logistical and resource overhead (i.e., online cryptographic exchanges and logic resources for the extractor).

An example for a rather contrived FPGA PUF application is Majzoobi et al. [129, p20]. An FPGA is used as an authentication token, similar to a smartcard, so when the “owner” sends a correct PIN to a remote server, the server remotely programs the FPGA with a PUF extractor bitstream, and uses prerecorded challenge-response pairs to authenticate the FPGA. When the session is done, somehow, the remote server is able to force the FPGA to erase itself. This simple mechanism is vulnerable to a range of attacks (some of which are identified by the authors): replay, readback, man-in-the-middle, reverse engineering, denial-of-service, etc. One solution the authors propose is to encrypt the bitstream. However, if the server already knows the encryption key embedded in the configuration logic, there are many other ways to perform an authentication session without a PUF (one is detailed in Chapter 3). Another example is Guajardo et al. [75] who describe an FPGA “IP protection” scheme using PUFs, but only dedicate a single sentence to the procedure of how the FPGA may be configured remotely, and the implications of the FPGA usage model; this description is too short to be meaningful.

I am aware of two companies that commercially develop PUF-based products, Verayo and Intrinsic ID\textsuperscript{15}, which spun out of MIT and Philips, respectively. Their focus seems to be on PUFs for ASICs and RFID devices (as indicated on their websites, April 2009). Both also briefly mention that their technology can be used with FPGAs (“soft PUF”) for IP protection, but do not provide any further information. To conclude, I have yet to come across a description of a PUF usage model for design protection that provides a satisfying security analysis, or make a convincing case to justify the overheads over other solutions. There may be better ways for achieving similar design protection goals more practically and reliably.

2.3.6 EVOLVABLE HARDWARE

Modeled after biological evolution, mutated circuits are evaluated based on their “fitness” scores in an iterative process to achieve desired functionality. Fitness of a circuit, or portions of it, indicate the degree to which it meets the specifications. Obviously, reconfigurable devices are a convenient platform for implementing such

\textsuperscript{15}\url{http://www.verayo.com/} and \url{http://www.intrinsic-id.com/}
circuits and they are used in this field quite extensively [73, 152, 153, 168].

The appeal of evolved circuits is that they significantly differ from conventional ones, and can quickly adapt to new and unexpected conditions. Thompson and Layzell [169] described “the most bizarre, mysterious” evolved circuit implemented on a Xilinx XC6216 FPGA. The circuit was meant to distinguish between 1 kHz or 10 kHz input clocks without having a clock of its own. It worked, but remarkably, the exact way in which the circuit achieved this functionality could not be fully explained. The research suggests that the correct functionality is specific to the physical attributes of the individual FPGA it ran on – the same circuit (i.e., bitstream) did not function correctly on other FPGAs of the same size and family. If this can be reliably replicated, it means that we may be able to use evolvable circuits to derive bitstrings that are unique to individual devices, similarly to PUFs. In a patent, Donlin and Trimberger [49] suggest doing just that for bitstream protection.

Security based on evolvable circuits may suffer from similar issues discussed above for PUFs, and be also problematic in the context of reproducible research as discussed in Chapter 5.

2.3.7 Isolation

Some applications require that functions implemented on the same device be physically isolated such that sensitive data does not leak between them. This is sometimes known as “red-black separation” where plaintext (red) is separated from ciphertext (black) in the same system. Huffmire et al. [90] propose “moats” to isolate cores and “drawbridges” macros to connect them so individual cores within a multi-core FPGA design are adequately isolated. The cores are separated by unrouted columns and rows, and may only communicate through pre-defined connections defined as a macro. The authors describe a set of tools for bitstream-level verification of the separation after the moats have been inserted in an ordinary design flow. The moats are created by prohibiting PAR from placing logic or routes in specified rows and columns that surround the functional block (the granularity of moats is a CLB). Each CLB has a routing box that can route to 1, 2, 8 or 16 CLBs away with some routings that span the whole chip, so depending on the moat’s width, certain route lengths must also be prohibited from use such that the moats are not “bridged” by the tools.

Similarly, and likely preceding the research of Huffmire et al., McLean and Moore [131] reported a collaboration between Xilinx and the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) that yielded a set of tools and macros for isolation in the Virtex-4 family of FPGAs. The analysis showed that a single CLB column “fence” is sufficient to provide adequate isolation; connections between isolated functions was done with pre-defined “bus macros”. Interestingly, the NSA-Xilinx report re-
veals that the Virtex-4 FPGA has gone though NSA analysis and was deemed secure for red-black applications. Additionally, it discusses an internal “security monitor”, but does not go into implementation details. A Xilinx patent also describes active (i.e., real-time detection) circuits that monitor separation policy violation between isolated cores [57].

Brouchier et al. [26] propose a method for bridging the CLB separation by using a covert channel they call “thermocommunication”. The communication is done through temperature modulation using ring oscillators, one for transmitting and another for receiving data. The transmitter needs to be covertly inserted into a high-security module (“red”) such that a receiver in a low-security module (“black”) can demodulate, thus violating the multi-level security policy. The authors demonstrated this to work on a Xilinx Spartan-3 for 1 bit/s throughput. The receiver requires 200 slices, which is probably big enough to be detected by close inspection, though given that this is the low-security module, perhaps that is unlikely. The transmitter’s size is not specified, though it is potentially smaller. The only problems that remain are operational: how does one insert a Trojan circuit into an NSA module without being detected, how and when are the circuits activated, and how is the leaked data transmitted out? (Anderson et al. [9, p8] call these problems “location, preparation, trigger, and control”.)

2.4 Conclusion

Since the late 1990s we have seen volatile FPGAs advance from simple logic devices to large, complex, “systems on a chip”; designing with these devices requires specialization and substantial investment. This chapter has aimed to capture the current state for the “FPGA security” field and provide the foundations for future discussions and for following chapters. In 2001, Kean [102] summarized: “Lack of design security has long been the skeleton lurking in the closet of the SRAM FPGA industry.” As we have seen, there are still many open problems and items to explore for enhancing the security of FPGAs and designs made for them.
Chapter 3

Secure remote reconfiguration

Networked FPGA-based systems gain functional flexibility if remote configuration updates are possible. Despite FPGAs having had the potential for “field reprogrammability” since they became available, methods for performing secure field updates over public networks have not been explored. The question of how to secure updates against malicious interference may seem easily answered at first glance: many existing cryptographic authentication protocols protect the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of transactions, such as overwriting a file in a remote computer. Those can be easily applied if the FPGA is merely a peripheral device in a larger system and the remote update of its configuration bitstream is handled entirely by software running on the system’s main processor. In this work, however, we consider the cases where a separate main processor is not present or is untrustworthy, and where only the FPGA and the applications it is running are responsible for securing updates.

Two properties of volatile FPGAs are problematic under these conditions: they lack sufficient memory for storing more than a single configuration at one time, and they retain no configuration state between power-cycles. These properties, in turn, have two main implications. Firstly, FPGAs have no notion of the “freshness” of received configuration data, so they have no mechanism for rejecting revoked configuration content. Secondly, unless a trusted path is established with devices around the FPGA (such as non-volatile memory), they have no temporary memory to store the bitstream while it is being authenticated or decrypted before being loaded into configuration memory. In other words, merely initiating a reconfiguration will destroy the current state.

The primary observation we make is that the FPGA user logic can be used to perform security operations on the bitstream before it is stored in external non-volatile memory (NVM) and loaded into the FPGA’s configuration memory cells. We then rely on system-level properties, such as tamper proofing and remote attestation, to compensate for the lack of cryptographic capabilities and non-volatile memory in
Figure 3.1: An update server (US) installs a new bitstream in a system’s NVM over an insecure channel by passing it through “update logic” in the FPGA’s user logic (UL). After reset, the hard-wired configuration logic (CL) loads the new bitstream. (Other parameters in this figure are described in Table 3.1.)

the FPGA configuration logic. Our solution does not require that FPGA vendors add any hard-wired circuits to their devices’ configuration logic, and therefore can be implemented with existing devices.

We first list our assumptions (Section 3.1.1) and then present our secure remote update protocol from the FPGA and server point of view (Sections 3.1.2 and 3.2), which meets the following goals as far as possible: no additions to the configuration logic; use of user logic; maintenance of bitstream confidentiality and authenticity (Section 3.3); prevention of denial-of-service attacks; no reliance on bitstream-encoding obscurity; and, finally, prevention of replay of older, revoked bitstream versions. We then outline a more robust variant of the protocol for systems where the NVM can hold multiple configuration files (Section 3.4). Finally, we discuss the security properties of our protocol (Section 3.5), its implementation considerations (Section 3.6), and place it into the context of related work (Section 3.7).

3.1 Update logic

Our secure update protocol defines an interactive exchange between an update server (US), the entity in charge of distributing new bitstreams to FPGA systems in the field, and update logic, the receiving end, implemented in the user logic (UL) of each FPGA (Figure 3.1). Bitstreams are loaded into configuration memory cells by the configuration logic (CL), which is hard-wired into the device by the FPGA vendor (this means that the system developer has no influence over the functionality it provides). A list of notations, parameters, and commands used throughout the chapter are summarized in Table 3.1.
Global variables and constants

- $K_{UL}$: user logic key
- $K_{CL}$: configuration logic key
- $B$: $b$-bit buffer for a bitstream block
- $L$: number of blocks $B$ per configuration bitstream
- $M_i, M'_i$: MAC values
- $C$: command code
- $R$: reply message buffer

Server FPGA | Local parameters
---|---
$F_e$ | $F$: FPGA (or remote system) identifier
$V_e$ | $V$: bitstream version identifier
$V_{NVM}$ | version identifier of bitstream stored in NVM
$V_u$ | version identifier of uploaded bitstream
$N_{NVM}$ | NVM counter value (nonce)
$N_{US}$ | nonce generated by update server
$N_{max}$ | upper bound for $N_{NVM}$ in each protocol run

Server FPGA | Commands / variables
---|---
GetStatus | RespondStatus for initiating updates and remote attestation
Update | UpdateConfirm commands used for the update process
UpdateFinal | UpdateFail
Reset | ResetConfirm FPGA confirmation before executing a self reset

Table 3.1: Legend for parameters and commands used in the protocols.

3.1.1 **Assumptions**

We require a unique, non-secret, FPGA identifier $F$, which the authentication process will use to ensure that messages cannot be forwarded to other FPGAs. If an embedded device ID is available (such as “Device DNA” [186, WP266] in some Xilinx FPGAs), then that can be used. Alternatively, at the cost of having to change this parameter for every instance of the bitstream intended for a different FPGA, it can also be embedded into the bitstream itself.

We require a message-authentication function $\text{MAC}_{K_{UL}}$ and (for some cases) a block cipher function $E_{K_{UL}}$ implemented in user logic, both of which we assume to resist cryptanalytic attacks. (Even if we use both notationally with the same key, we note that it is prudent practice not to use the same key for different purposes and would in practice use separate derived keys for each function.) The secret key $K_{UL}$ is stored in the bitstream. It should be unique to each device, so that its compromise or successful extraction from one device does not help in attacking others.

Device-specific keys can be managed in several ways. For example, $K_{UL}$ can be independently generated and stored in a device database by the update server. Or, it could notionally be calculated as $K_{UL} = E_{K_M}(F)$ from the device identifier $F$ using a master key $K_M$ known only to the update server (consult NIST Special Publication
800-108 [139] for secure implementation of key derivation functions using pseudorandom functions). As a third example, \( F \) could contain a public-key certificate that the update server uses to securely exchange the secret key \( K_{UL} \) with the update logic. Where the configuration logic also holds a secret key for bitstream processing, \( K_{CL} \), it could be stored in battery-backed volatile or in non-volatile memory, as long as it cannot be discovered, for example, through physical attacks or side channel analysis.

We assume that each FPGA of a given type and size normally loads only bitstreams of fixed length \( L \times b \) bits, where \( b \) bits is the capacity of a memory block \( B \). \( B \) is a buffer used by the update logic to store incoming bitstream portions before writing them to the NVM device. The size \( b \) must be large enough to guarantee that the FPGA configuration logic will not load a bitstream from NVM if a block of size \( b \) bits is missing. This is normally ensured if any checksum that the FPGA configuration logic verifies is entirely contained in the last \( b \) bits of the loaded bitstream.

The system needs to be online on demand for both update and/or remote attestation. Our protocol handles both malicious and accidental (transmission errors, packet losses, etc.) corruption of data. However, it merely aborts and restarts the entire session if it detects a violation of data integrity, rather than trying to retransmit individual lost data packets. Therefore, for best performance on unreliable channels, it should be run over an error-correcting protocol layer (TCP, for example), which does not have to be implemented inside the security boundary. We assume that the high-level protocol either supports record boundaries for data packets, or is augmented with a robust way for identifying them.

3.1.2 Protocol

We first focus our discussion on the FPGA side, as this is the half of the protocol that runs on the more constrained device. It supports a number of different policies that an update server might choose to implement, as discussed in Section 3.2. Algorithm 1 shows the implementation of the update-logic side of our protocol, which forms a part of the application that resides in the FPGA user logic.

In addition to the unique FPGA identifier \( F \), the update logic also contains, as compiled-in constants, the version identifier \( V \neq 0 \) of the application bitstream of which it is a part, and a secret key \( K_{UL} \) that is only known to the update server and update logic.

Each protocol session starts with an initial “GetStatus” message from the update server and a “RespondStatus” reply from the update logic in the FPGA. This exchange serves two functions. Firstly, both parties exchange numbers that are only ever used once (“nonces”, e.g. counters, timestamps, random numbers). Their re-
Algorithm 1 Update-logic state machine: FPGA

1: \( V_{\text{NVM}} := V \)
2: \( \text{Receive}(C, V_e, F_e, N_{\text{max}}, N_{\text{US}}, M_0) \)
3: \( \text{if } C \neq \text{“GetStatus” then goto 2} \)
4: \( \text{ReadNVM}_{\text{N}}(N_{\text{NVM}}) \)
5: \( S := [M_0 = \text{MAC}_{\text{KUL}}(C, V_e, F_e, N_{\text{max}}, N_{\text{US}})] \wedge (V_e = V) \wedge (F_e = F) \wedge (N_{\text{NVM}} < N_{\text{max}}) \)
6: \( \text{if } S \text{ then} \)
7: \( N_{\text{NVM}} := N_{\text{NVM}} + 1 \)
8: \( \text{WriteNVM}_{\text{N}}(N_{\text{NVM}}) \)
9: \( \text{end if} \)
10: \( M_1 := \text{MAC}_{\text{KUL}}(\text{“RespondStatus”}, V, F, N_{\text{NVM}}, V_{\text{NVM}}, M_0) \)
11: \( \text{Send}(\text{“RespondStatus”}, V, F, N_{\text{NVM}}, V_{\text{NVM}}, M_1) \)
12: \( \text{if } \neg S \text{ then goto 2} \)
13: \( \text{Receive}(C, M'_0) \)
14: \( \text{if } M'_0 \neq \text{MAC}_{\text{KUL}}(C, M_1) \text{ then goto 2} \)
15: \( \text{if } C = \text{“Update” then} \)
16: \( V_{\text{NVM}} := 0 \)
17: \( \text{for } i := 1 \text{ to } L \text{ do} \)
18: \( \text{WriteNVM}_{\text{B[i]}}(0) \)
19: \( \text{end for} \)
20: \( \text{for } i := 1 \text{ to } L \text{ do} \)
21: \( \text{Receive}(B_i) \)
22: \( M'_i := \text{MAC}_{\text{KUL}}(B_i, M'_{i-1}) \)
23: \( \text{if } i < L \text{ then} \)
24: \( \text{WriteNVM}_{\text{B[i]}}(B_i) \)
25: \( \text{end if} \)
26: \( \text{end for} \)
27: \( \text{Receive}(\text{“UpdateFinal”}, V_u, M_2) \)
28: \( \text{if } M_2 = \text{MAC}_{\text{KUL}}(\text{“UpdateFinal”}, V_u, M'_L) \text{ then} \)
29: \( \text{WriteNVM}_{\text{B[L]}}(B_L) \)
30: \( V_{\text{NVM}} := V_u \)
31: \( R := (\text{“UpdateConfirm”}) \)
32: \( \text{else} \)
33: \( R := (\text{“UpdateFail”}) \)
34: \( \text{end if} \)
35: \( M_3 := \text{MAC}_{\text{KUL}}(R, M_2) \)
36: \( \text{Send}(R, M_3) \)
37: \( \text{else if } C = \text{“Reset” then} \)
38: \( M_2 := \text{MAC}_{\text{KUL}}(\text{“ResetConfirm”}, M'_0) \)
39: \( \text{Send}(\text{“ResetConfirm”}, M_2) \)
40: \( \text{ResetFPGA()} \)
41: \( \text{end if} \)
42: \( \text{goto 2} \)
ception is cryptographically confirmed by the other party in subsequent messages. Such challenge-response round trips enable each party to verify the freshness of any subsequent data packet received, and thus protect against replay attacks. The nonce $N_{\text{US}}$, generated by the update server, must be an unpredictable random number that has a negligible chance of ever repeating. This makes it infeasible for attackers to create a dictionary of FPGA replies. The nonce $N_{\text{NVM}}$ contributed by the update logic is a monotonic counter maintained in NVM (avoiding the difficulties of implementing a reliable and trusted source of randomness or time within the security boundary). To protect this counter against attempts to overflow it, and also to protect against attempts to wear out NVM that only lasts a limited number of write cycles, the update logic will only increment it when authorized to do so by the update server. For this reason, the update server includes in the “GetStatus” message an upper bound $N_{\text{max}}$ (of the same unsigned integer type as $N_{\text{NVM}}$) beyond which the NVM counter must not be incremented in response to this message. The protocol cannot proceed past the “RespondStatus” message unless the NVM counter is incremented.

The second purpose of the initial exchange is to ensure that both parties agree on values of $F$ and $V$. The update server sends its expected values $V_{\text{e}}$ and $F_{\text{e}}$, and the update logic will not proceed beyond the “RespondStatus” message unless these values match its own $V$ and $F$. This ensures that an attacker cannot reuse any “GetStatus” message intended for one particular FPGA chip $F$ and installed bitstream version $V$ on any other such combination. The update server might know $V$ and $F$ already from a database that holds the state of all fielded systems. If this information is not available, the update server can gain it in a prior “GetStatus”/“RespondStatus” exchange, because both values are reported and authenticated in the “RespondStatus” reply.

All protocol messages are authenticated using a message-authentication code (MAC) computed with the shared secret key $K_{\text{UL}}$. This is done in order to ensure that an attacker cannot generate any message that has not been issued by the update server or update logic. In addition, with the exception of the initial “GetStatus” message, the calculation of the MAC for each message in a protocol session incorporates not only all data bits of the message, but also the MAC of the previously received message. This way, each MAC ensures at any step of the protocol that both parties agree not only on the content of the current message, but also on the content of the entire protocol session so far. This mechanism makes it unnecessary to repeat in messages any data (nonces, version identifiers, etc.) that has been previously transmitted, because their values are implicitly carried forward in each message by the MAC chain. Note that in the presentation of Algorithm 1, $M$, $M'$ and $B$ are registers, not arrays, and their indices merely indicate different values.
that they store during the execution of one protocol session. The indices of NVM read and write commands (e.g., WriteNVM\(_{B[i]}\) and ReadNVM\(_{N}\)) indicate addresses.

Any “GetStatus” request results in a “RespondStatus” reply, even without a correct MAC \(M_0\). This is to allow update servers to query \(F\) even before knowing which \(K_{UL}\) to apply. However, an incorrect “GetStatus” MAC will prevent the session from proceeding beyond the “RespondStatus” reply. This means that anyone can easily query the bitstream version identifier \(V\) from the device. If this is of concern because, for example, it might allow an attacker to quickly scan for vulnerable old versions in the field, then the value \(V\) used in the protocol can be an individually encrypted version of the actual version number \(\hat{V}\), as in \(V = E_{K_{UL}}(\hat{V})\). Whether this option is used or not does not affect the update-logic implementation of the protocol, which treats \(V\) just as an opaque identifier bitstring.

The protocol can only proceed beyond the “RespondStatus” message if the update-logic nonce has been incremented and both sides agree on which FPGA and bitstream version is being updated. If the update server decides to proceed, it will continue the session with a command that instructs the update logic either to begin programming a new bitstream into NVM (“Update”), or to reset the FPGA and reload the bitstream from NVM (“Reset”). The MAC \(M'_0\) of this command will depend on the MAC \(M_1\) of the preceding “RespondStatus” message, which in turn depends on the freshly incremented user-logic nonce \(N_{NVM}\), as well as \(V\) and \(F\). Therefore, the verification of \(M'_0\) ensures the user-logic of both the authenticity and the freshness of this command, and the same applies to all MAC verifications in the rest of the session.

The successful authentication of the “Update” command leads to erasing the entire bitstream from the NVM. From this point on, until all blocks \(B_1\) to \(B_L\) have been written, the NVM will not contain a valid bitstream. Therefore, there is no benefit in authenticating each received bitstream data block \(B_i\) individually before writing it into NVM. Instead, we postpone the writing of the last bitstream block \(B_L\) into NVM until the “UpdateFinal” command MAC \(M'_L\) that covers the entire bitstream has been verified. This step is finally confirmed by the update logic in an “UpdateConfirm” – or in case of failure, “UpdateFail” – message.

If no messages were lost, the update server will receive an authenticated confirmation. “UpdateConfirm” indicates that the “Update” command has been processed, and its MAC \(M_3\) confirms each received data byte, as well as the old and new version identifiers, FPGA ID, nonces, and any other data exchanged during the session. The “ResetConfirm” command can only confirm that the reset of the FPGA is about to take place; any attestation of the successful completion of the reset must be left to the new bitstream.
3.1.3 Recovery from errors

Since a system that can store only a single bitstream in its NVM must not be reset before all blocks of the bitstream have been uploaded, our protocol also provides an authenticated status indicator $V_{NVM}$ intended to help recover from protocol sessions that were aborted due to loss or corruption of messages. After a successful reset, the update logic sets $V_{NVM} := V$ to indicate the version identifier of the bitstream stored in NVM. Before the process of erasing and rewriting the NVM begins, it sets $V_{NVM}$ to the reserved value 0, to indicate the absence of a valid bitstream in NVM. With message “UpdateFinal”, after the last block $B_L$ has been written, the update logic receives from the update server the version identifier $V_u$ of the bitstream that has just been uploaded into NVM, and sets register $V_{NVM}$ accordingly. Should the update session be aborted for any reason, then the update server can always initiate a new session with a new “GetStatus”/“RespondStatus” exchange. The update server will learn from the $V_{NVM}$ value in the “RespondStatus” message the current status of the NVM: whether the old bitstream is still intact, the new bitstream has been uploaded completely, or it contains no valid bitstream. The update server can then decide whether to attempt a new upload or perform a reset.

3.2 Update server routines

**Algorithm 2** Server-side update routine $\text{UpdateServer}$

1. $F_e := \text{Get(“FPGA/system ID”)}$ or ‘0’ if unknown
2. $V_e := \text{Get(“current version”, } F_e )$ or ‘0’ if unknown
3. $K_{UL} := \text{Get(“update logic key”, } F_e, V_e )$ or ‘0’ if unknown
4. $N_{max} := \text{Get(“} N_{NVM} \text{”, } F_e )$ or ‘0’ if unknown
5. $\text{task} := \text{“updateAndReset”}$
6. $\text{Handshake}$
7. $\text{while } K_{UL} = 0 \text{ do}$
8. $\text{EstablishKey}$
9. $\text{end while}$
10. $\text{loop}$
11. $\text{UpdateOrReset}$
12. $\text{end loop}$

**Algorithm 3** Server: subroutine $\text{Handshake}$

1. $\text{Generate}(NUS)$
2. $M_0 = \text{MAC}_{K_{UL}}(\text{“GetStatus”}, V_e, F_e, N_{max}, NUS)$
3. $\text{Send(“GetStatus”, } V_e, F_e, N_{max}, NUS, M_0 )$
4. $\text{Receive(“RespondStatus”, } V, F, N_{NVM}, V_{NVM}, M_1 )$
Algorithm 4 Server-side: EstablishKey

1: Save($F_e$, $V_e$)
2: if ($F_e = 0$) then $F_e := F$
3: if ($V_e = 0$) then $V_e := V$
4: $K_{UL} := \text{Get(“update logic key”, } F_e, V_e) \text{ or ‘0’ if unknown}$
5: $\text{MACOK} := [M_1 = \text{MAC}_{K_{UL}}(“RespondStatus”, V, F, N_{NVM}, V_{NVM}, M_0)]$
6: if ($\neg\text{MACOK}$) then
7: $K_{UL} := 0$
8: Restore($F_e$, $V_e$)
9: Handshake
10: end if

Algorithm 2 describes one possible implementation of the update server routine for performing a bitstream update followed by an authenticated reset command. Algorithms 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 describe the Handshake, EstablishKey, UpdateOrReset, Update, and ResetFPGA subroutines, respectively.

Before describing these routines, we point out their general properties and the assumptions we make: all variables are global; there are no concurrent updates from multiple update servers; “Warn”, “Abort”, and “Done” report all variables (including MACs); each “Receive” also has a timeout counter to indicate possible dropped messages in either direction; encryption keys have a non-zero value; the database is updated with new values on successful updates; and, any loop will abort after $n$ tries.

Algorithm 2, the main routine, starts by retrieving parameters from its database. If the “Get” operation returns a null, or there is no database, variables are assigned the value ‘0’. The task that we follow in the description is “updateAndReset”, though “resetOnly” and “updateOnly” are also possible with the same routines. Then, the Handshake routine is called, which simply generates a nonce $N_{US}$, sends a computed MAC $M_0$ and listed parameters to the update logic, and finally, receives response $M_1$.

In cases where the system or FPGA identifier $F$ was unknown at the start, the appropriate key needs to be established. Based on the parameters received by Handshake, the EstablishKey routine either retrieves a key from the database or generates it from a master key. To confirm that this is indeed the correct key for system $F$, an exchange of authenticated messages is performed using the Handshake routine. Transmission errors would cause the routine to fail and repeated until the response MAC and parameters are correct.

Once $K_{UL}$ has been established, UpdateOrReset is called within a loop. This serves to get the FPGA update logic to enter a state for receiving a new bitstream or a reset command. Lines 1 to 18 of Algorithm 5 attempt to replicate a “true” state of variable $S$ in line 5 of Algorithm 1, by checking all communicated variables.
Algorithm 5 Server-side: UpdateOrReset

1. \( \text{MACOK} := [M_1 = \text{MAC}_{K_{UL}}(\text{"RespondStatus"}, V, F, N_{NVM}, V_{NVM}, M_0)] \)
2. while \( \neg \text{MACOK} \lor (F \neq F_e) \lor (V \neq V_e) \lor (N_{NVM} \geq N_{max}) \) do
3. if MACOK then
4. if \( F \neq F_e \) then
5. Abort("FPGA/system ID and key mismatch")
6. end if
7. if \( V \neq V_e \) then
8. Warn("version mismatch")
9. \( V_e := V \)
10. end if
11. if \( N_{NVM} \geq N_{max} \) then
12. \( N_{max} := N_{NVM} + 1 \)
13. end if
14. end if
15. Handshake
16. MACOK := [\( M_1 = \text{MAC}_{K_{UL}}(\text{"RespondStatus"}, V, F, N_{NVM}, V_{NVM}, M_0)] \]
17. end while
18. if \textit{task} = “resetOnly” then
19. ResetFPGA
20. if MACOK then
21. Done
22. end if
23. else if \textit{task} = “updateOnly” \lor \textit{task} = “updateAndReset” then
24. \( V_u := \text{Get("new version", } F_e, V_e) \) or ‘0’ if unknown
25. if \( V_u = 0 \) then Done
26. if \( V_{NVM} = V_u \) then
27. if \textit{task} = “updateOnly” then
28. Done
29. else
30. ResetFPGA
31. \( V_e := V_{NVM} \)
32. end if
33. else
34. Update
35. if \( R := "\text{UpdateConfirm}" \land \textit{task} = "\text{updateOnly}" \) then Done
36. end if
37. end if
38. \( N_{max} := N_{max} + 1 \)
39. Handshake

68
Algorithm 6 Server: subroutine Update

1: $M'_0 := \text{MAC}_{K_{UL}}(\text{"Update"}, M_1)$
2: Send(\text{"Update"}, $M'_0$)
3: for $i := 1$ to $L$ do
4: $M'_i := \text{MAC}_{K_{UL}}(B_i, M'_{i-1})$
5: Send($B_i$)
6: end for
7: $M_2 := (\text{"UpdateFinal"}, V_u, M'_L)$
8: Send($V_u, M_2$)
9: Receive($R, M_3$)
10: MacOK := [($M_3 = \text{MAC}_{K_{UL}}(R, M_2)) \land R = \text{"UpdateConfirm"}]$

Algorithm 7 Server: subroutine ResetFPGA

1: $M'_0 := \text{MAC}_{K_{UL}}(\text{"Reset"}, M_1)$
2: Send(\text{"Reset"}, $M'_0$)
3: Receive(\text{"ResetConfirm"}, $M_2$)
4: MacOK := [$M_2 = \text{MAC}_{K_{UL}}(\text{"ResetConfirm"}, M'_0)$]

The protocol aborts if there is a mismatch for $F$, but only a warning is issued if $V$ is incorrect so to allow bitstream updates even if the database is not synchronized to the currently operating design. If the value of $N_{\max}$ is not high enough, it is incremented.

Lines 19–40 perform an update or reset, according to the value of task. If only a reset is needed, the ResetFPGA is called and the process ends. Otherwise, the routine checks if an update is needed by comparing $V_{\text{NVM}}$ to $V_u$. The process either ends if an update is not required, or Update is called to perform the bitstream update; the routine corresponds to the messages expected by lines 13 to 35 of Algorithm 1. Notice that we do not check the MAC $M_3$ in this implementation since the subsequent Handshake (line 39 of Algorithm 5) will indicate the success of the update. MAC $M_3$ should be checked if there is a need to distinguish between an update or the update we have just performed.

3.2.1 Offline operation

We have described an interactive server–FPGA run of the protocol, though it could also be operated offline. Devices that are not normally online but still need to be occasionally attended, such as electricity meters, parking meters, or vending machines, can have their configuration updated as part of regular maintenance. This works by having a technician carry a small electronic token capable of communicating with the FPGA (e.g., through USB, RS232, TCP, etc.) and have sufficient non-volatile storage for at least one bitstream and pre-computed MACs. (This token can be a USB stick with a programmable micro controller, for example.) If we
Figure 3.2: Scenarios for different configuration logic (CL) capabilities.

assume that the actual and expected values of $N_{NVM}$ are the same, the update server can pre-compute a complete protocol run and load it onto the token. Then, when a technician inserts the token into the FPGA system it behaves just like a server, but instead of computing MACs it sends and compares to stored ones. When the update is complete, the token performs a handshake (with $N_{max} = 0$) and stores the “RespondStatus” message and MAC $M_1$ so the server can verify it and synchronize itself to the status of the FPGA system. Note that since the token is not required to compute MACs it can be a simple device, but more importantly, it is not required to store any secret keys.

In the case where $N_{NVM}$ may not be synchronized, the update server may choose to pre-compute several protocol runs for values of $N_{NVM}$ between the lowest expected value of $N_{NVM}$ and $N_{max}$. This simply means that the token is now required to have additional storage for these MACs$^1$.

3.3 Authenticity and confidentiality

As we discussed in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, some FPGAs can decrypt bitstreams in their configuration logic, using embedded (or battery-backed) keys, while others

$^1$With task := “updateAndReset”, Algorithm 2 generates six MACs ($M_0, M_0', M_2, M_0, M_0'$) and the update logic five MACs ($M_1, M_1, M_3, M_1, M_2$). The update logic MACs can be stored for debug purposes, as well as two additional MACs ($M_0, M_1$) for another call of Handshake.
lack this capability; we have also discussed proposals for bitstream authentication in Section 2.3.2. Our protocol can be used with FPGAs that support any combination of these functions, as shown in Figure 3.2, provided that the user logic compensates for those functions that are missing.

For confidentiality, bitstreams should always be transmitted encrypted between the update server and update logic. Where the configuration logic is able to decrypt a bitstream while loading it from NVM, the update server can encrypt the bitstream under a secret key $K_{CL}$ shared with the configuration logic, leaving the update logic and NVM merely handling ciphertext. If the configuration logic cannot decrypt, the update server has to encrypt the bitstream under a key derived from $K_{UL}$ and the user logic has to decrypt each block $B_i$ before writing it to NVM (using some standard file encryption method, such as cipher-block chaining). If the configuration logic also supports authentication, the requirements above do not change; the authentication performed by the update logic is still necessary to prevent denial-of-service attacks that attempt unauthorized overwriting of NVM content. As before, the last buffered block $B_L$ must contain the MAC of the bitstream that the configuration logic will verify, such that the bitstream will not load without the successful verification of $M_2$.

### 3.4 Multiple NVM slots

NVM devices that provide only a single memory location (“slot”) for storing a bitstream can seriously limit the reliability of the system. There will be no valid bitstream stored in the NVM from when the update logic starts erasing the NVM until it has completed writing the new bitstream. A malicious or accidental interruption, such as a power failure or a long delay in the transmission of the remaining bitstream, can leave the system in an unrecoverable state. Such single-slot systems are, therefore, only advisable where loss of communications or power is unlikely, such as with local updates with a secure and reliable power source.

Otherwise, the NVM should provide at least two slots, such that it can hold both the old and the new bitstream simultaneously. The FPGA configuration logic will then have to scan through these NVM slots until it encounters a valid bitstream. It will start loading a bitstream from the first slot. If the bitstream is invalid (i.e., has an incorrect checksum or MAC), it will load another bitstream from the next slot, continuing until all slots have been tried or a valid one has been found. The additional slot is then used during the update as a temporary store, in order to preserve the currently operating design in case of an update failure. The role of the two slots – upload area and operating bitstream store – alternate between updates, depending on how multiple slots are supported by the configuration logic.
The update process may be modified as follows. At manufacturing, slot 1 is loaded with an initial design whose update logic can only write new bitstreams into the address space of slot 2. Before the $V_{NVM} := V_u$ changeover is made (line 30 of Algorithm 1), the update logic erases slot 1, which then allows the configuration logic to find the new bitstream in slot 2 at the next power-up. The new bitstream, now in slot 2, will write its next bitstream into slot 1, and erases slot 2 when that update is complete, and so on. If an update is aborted by reset, one slot may contain a partially uploaded bitstream. If this is slot 1, the configuration logic will fail to find a correct checksum there and move on to load the old bitstream from slot 2, from where the update process can then be restarted\(^2\). If the partial content is in slot 2, then the configuration logic will never get there because the bitstream in slot 1 will be loaded first.

If the configuration logic tells the update logic which slot it came from (through status registers), then the user logic can simply pick the respective other slot and there is no need to compile a unique bitstream for each slot. If not, then the update server must ensure, through remote attestation, that each newly updated bitstream is compiled to write the next bitstream to the respective other slot. This might be aided by encoding in $V$ which slot a bitstream was intended for. A third slot may store a fallback bitstream that is never overwritten, and only loaded if something goes wrong during the NVM write process without the update logic noticing (e.g. data corruption between the FPGA and the NVM). This could leave both slot 1 and 2 without a valid bitstream and cause the fallback bitstream to be loaded from slot 3. Alternatively, the FPGA may always load, as a first configuration, a bootloader bitstream that controls which slot the next bitstream is loaded from.

Recent FPGAs, such as Virtex-5 [186, UG191 ch8, “Fallback MultiBoot”] or LatticeECP2/M [120, TN1148, “SPIm Mode”], implement a multi-slot scan in the configuration logic. Some, including Stratix IV [7, SIV51010-2.0, “Remote System Upgrade Mode”] or Virtex-5 [186, UG191 ch8, “IPROG Reconfiguration”], provide a “(re)load bitstream from address X” command register, or bitstream command, so that a user-designed bootloader bitstream can implement a multi-slot scan and checksum verification (but such a bootloader itself cannot necessarily be updated remotely).

Figure 3.3 shows how this can work with a Virtex-5 FPGA. Starting at address 0, the configuration logic processes a short header and then encounters an address

\(^{2}\)An update can be aborted in various places, so as described, a simple scan may not always work. We have experimented with a Virtex-5 FPGA to test if it can load a complete bitstream that is stored after an incomplete one in NVM. It failed. We think that this is because the internal configuration state machine may not be able to recover from abrupt de-synchronization of configuration data. It would be helpful if FPGA vendors provided a reliable way to do that, perhaps by using re-synchronization words that are placed in between bitstream slots, and are never changed during the update process.
Figure 3.3: Memory map for the NVM with two bitstream slots. When the configuration logic encounters the IPROG command it jumps to address WBSTAR to search for a new bitstream. This mechanism allows the update logic to change the content of WBSTAR so bitstreams from any slot are loaded on power-up. The $N_{\text{NVM}}$ nonce is stored at the top address of the NVM so it does not interfere with the loading of bitstreams.

assignment into the WBSTAR register followed by a “goto” command, IPROG. This causes the configuration logic to jump to that address and continue searching for a bitstream there. SLOT_1_ADDR and SLOT_2_ADDR are compiled-in parameters in the update logic, so when an update starts it can read the content of WBSTAR from the NVM and know from which slot it was loaded from. It now knows to which slot the new bitstream should be written to as well, and after a successful update the content of address WBSTAR_ADDR is updated with the start address of the new bitstream’s slot. During the write of the address to NVM, the system will not be able to recover if power is lost because the configuration logic will not be able to load a valid bitstream. A possible solution is to use a bootloader that checks the NVM for valid bitstreams (using CRC, for example, and knowledge of the bitstream size) before issuing the WBSTAR command. A more expensive alternative for FPGAs without such multi-slot support is to include a configuration manager device, such as SystemAce [186, DS080] or a non-volatile PLD, inside of the security boundary.
3.5 Analysis

Algorithm 1 alone cannot prevent the configuration logic from loading old bitstreams from NVM. In order to maintain our security objective of preventing attackers from operating older and outdated FPGA configurations, we also need to rely on either tamper proofing or binding the provision of online services to remote attestation. With Algorithm 1, if attackers can either feed the FPGA with $N_{NVM}$ values of previously recorded sessions, or have access to its configuration port, they can replay older bitstreams. Therefore, these interfaces must be protected: the FPGA, NVM and the interface between them (configuration and read/write) must be contained within a tamper-proof enclosure. Manufacturing effective tamper-proof enclosures can be challenging [58, 158], although there are now a number of strong off-the-shelf solutions available\(^3\), such as tamper-sensing membranes and security supervisor chips that trigger zeroization of keys stored in battery-backed SRAM when penetrated.

That said, protection against highly capable attackers is not necessary for all applications. Sometimes, it may suffice to deter attackers by using ball-grid array packages and routing security-critical signals entirely in internal printed circuit board layers (“stripline”) without accessible vias (“buried”); some passive components can even be embedded or created between internal printed circuit board layers [39, ch21]. Some manufacturers may not be concerned if a few of their systems are maliciously downgraded with great effort in a laboratory environment, as long as the financial damage of the attack remains limited and it is impractical to scale it up by creating a commercial low-cost kit that allows everyone to repeat the attack with ease. For example, in consumer electronics, an attractive attack cannot require risky precision drilling into a printed circuit board or de-soldering a fine-pitch ball-grid array, especially for relatively expensive consumer products. New stacked-die products, where the NVM is attached to the top of the FPGA die inside the same package (such as the Xilinx Spartan-3AN family [186, UG331]) also make tamper proofing easier.

In some applications, the device’s only use is to provide a service by interacting with a central server. For those types of products, the provision of the service can be made conditional to a periodic successful remote attestation of the currently operating bitstream, in order to render the device inoperable unless it has an up-to-date bitstream loaded in the NVM. A remote attestation facility can give the service provider assurances of configuration authenticity even where no tamper proofing exists, though the system must be periodically online (set-top boxes are a good example).

---

\(^3\)One example of a circuit board enclosure is the “GORE Tamper Respondent Surface Enclosure”, though we have not personally evaluated its security claims.


74
If the bitstream is kept in NVM encrypted under an FPGA-specific key ($K_{CL}$), then neither bitstream reverse engineering nor cloning will be possible, even if the tamper proofing of the NVM link fails. We already assume that such ciphertext can be observed in transit between the update server and update logic. If the plaintext bitstream is kept in NVM, because the configuration logic lacks decryption capability, we rely on NVM tamper-resistance to protect against cloning and the risk of bitstream reverse engineering. We have already discussed the risk of merely relying on the obscurity of the bitstream’s syntax for security in Chapter 2.2.1.

Finally, the protocol itself cannot protect the system from attackers that are able to drop network packets or sever the link between the update server and FPGA update logic, though it can rely on watchdog timers for detecting such tampering. It is also possible for attackers to delay packets for a denial-of-service attack. For example, the “Reset” command from the server to the FPGA can be delayed so as to cause systems to become unavailable at a critical time (reconfiguration plus the time it takes for a system to become available can take seconds or even minutes). Simultaneous reset of large number of systems can also overwhelm a central server with network traffic$^4$. In order to protect against these attacks, the update logic may need to have a timer starting at the completion of a bitstream update. If a reset command does not arrive after a given time, the reset is self induced.


**Tamper proofing challenges.** When I discovered that I could circumvent the most popular PIN entry devices (PEDs) used in the UK with a paper clip [58], the manufacturers and banks claimed that the attack cannot be industrialized and that it was too sophisticated. In a private communication I told them they were wrong in their assessment. A few months later Anup Patel was convicted of tampering with a large number of PEDs$^a$, and criminals were caught pretending to be service engineers in an Irish supermarket in order to tamper with or replace PEDs$^b$; several petrol station attendants were also prosecuted for allowing tampered PEDs to be installed during their shift$^c$. The lesson is that we have to make sure to correctly evaluate both the security of the system, but also the environment in which it will be used.

$^a$“‘Catch me if you can,’ said student behind biggest chip and PIN fraud”, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article5034185.ece

$^b$“9,000 credit cards illegally copied in scam on stores”, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2008/0819/1218868120438.html

3.6 Implementation considerations

Figure 3.4 shows one possible implementation of the update protocol in user logic; this can be implemented in “logic”, or using a soft- or hard-core embedded processor. FPGA implementations for receiving bitstreams and writing them to an external non-volatile memory already exist [186, AN441], so are outside the scope of this chapter. Instead, we will discuss the aspects that affect the security of an implementation.

3.6.1 Parameter sizes

As the NVM counter $N_{\text{NVM}}$ is well protected against overflow attacks by the $N_{\text{max}}$ parameter (controlled by the update server), a size of 32 bits appears to be more than sufficient for most applications. Since an attacker can keep asking for a response for any value of $N_{\text{US}}$, it should be large enough to make the creation of a dictionary of responses that can be replayed impractical. For instance, using a uniformly distributed 64 bit word for $N_{\text{US}}$ will ensure that an attacker who performs $10^3$ queries per second will fill less than $10^{-7}$ of the dictionary within a decade. MAC values $(M, M')$ of 64 bit length provide an equally generous safety margin to brute-force upload attempts. Other fields’ sizes ($V, F, \text{CMD}$) depend on the application.

In Section 3.1.1 we defined $B$ as the minimum size of bitstream portion that when absent would cause the configuration logic not to load the bitstream. Implicitly, it also meant that $B$ is the size of the buffer for storing the last block $B_L$, before authenticating the entire bitstream. In practice, however, the size of the buffer can
be larger than $B$, limited only by the availability of embedded RAM in user logic. Other considerations may be the smallest block size that can be written efficiently into NVM, and the block size of the MAC’s compression function (some NVM devices allow block-writes that are faster than writing into individual addresses separately). A simple way to implement the buffer is to use a BlockRAM-based FIFO connected to the communication interface (or decryptor output) on one port, and the NVM interface on the other.

Assuming CMAC [139, SP800-38B] as the MAC function, we should also consider the “message span” of the MAC key – the maximum amount of blocks that can be processed with any one key with negligible chance of collisions. Assuming that each update is followed by a reset, $N_{NVM}$ allows up to $2^{31}$ updates when $N_{max}$ is incremented by one. The largest Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA is the LX330 with $82,696,192$ bitstream bits [186, UG191, v3.6 t1-4]; conservatively, allowing for future larger FPGAs, let us assume a size of $2^{27}$ bits. Thus, each update may consist of up to $2^{20}$ 128-bit input blocks (plus a negligible number of authenticated commands). The CMAC specification recommends that no more than $2^{48}$ blocks be processed with a single key [139, SP800-38B, p13], which, for our application means $2^{48}/2^{20} = 2^{28}$ bitstream updates. It follows that under the (very conservative) conditions above, a re-key of $K_{UL}$ should occur before the $N_{NVM}$ is exhausted. Re-keying is easy with our protocol, as each new updated bitstream can contain a new $K_{UL}$.

The practical limit for the number of updates, however, is likely to be imposed by the storage media. Typical NOR Flash, for example, is rated for 100 K or 1 M write cycles (Intel StrataFlash P30 [91] and Spansion S29CD/L are examples). If this limit is of concern we suggest allocating multiple storage addresses for $N_{NVM}$, so its range is split (e.g. every $2^{16}$ increments). The update logic will need to be able to determine which address to use according to the value of $N_{NVM}$ when it is read as part of the protocol execution. System developers may also want to create additional storage slots for when certain amount of updates is exceeded. This could be done with a large NVM that can store multiple bitstream, though it should be done with caution in order to avoid the system being left without a valid bitstream, as we discussed in Section 3.4.

### 3.7 Related work

The Xilinx “Internet Reconfigurable Logic” initiative from the late 1990s discussed the potential of remote updates and how they can be performed, though the program was short lived [186, AN412]. Remote reconfiguration using embedded processors has also been proposed [186, AN441]. A patent by Trimberger and Conn [173](http://www.spansion.com/datasheets/S29CD-J_CL-J_00_B3_e.pdf)
describes a remote update through a modem, an FPGA controller (in addition to the main FPGA) and “shadow PROMs” for recovery from failed writes. Altera describes how field updates can be performed for Stratix and Cyclone devices using a soft processor in the user logic and a hard logic interface using a non-volatile memory device, with the ability to revert to a “factory bitstream” stored in the NVM [7, UG SII52008, SIII51012, SIV51010, CIII51012]. However, the security aspects of remote update are not considered in any of the above.

Castillo et al. [32] propose a mechanism based on an OpenRISC1200 processor implemented in the user logic, together with an RSA engine for remote configuration on every start-up. However, the cryptographic key on which its security depends is obfuscated in a non-encrypted bitstream stored in the local NVM. Fong et al. [66] propose a security controller based on the Blowfish cipher for encryption and CRC for data correctness. Attached to a “Media Interface”, the FPGA is able to receive updates that are programmed into the configuration logic through the internal configuration port. The authors point out the possible vulnerabilities of their scheme: key obfuscation within the bootstrap bitstream, and more significantly, lack of data authentication with freshness, which opens the system to replay attacks. Both the above schemes require an online connection at start-up to receive the operating bitstream/design, while ours performs a secure remote update once, stores the bitstream locally, and programs the FPGA at start-up without online connectivity.

Replay attacks despite bitstream encryption and authentication were described in my previous work [51, p21], where I suggested adding a non-volatile counter as a nonce for bitstream authentication, or remote attestation in user logic as countermeasures. Motivated by this, Badrignans et al. [20] proposed additions to the hard-coded configuration logic in order to prevent replay of old bitstreams. They use a nonce in the authentication process, in addition to a mechanism for alerting the developer of its failure. Our solution of using user-logic resources instead of adding hard-wired configuration logic functionality is more flexible: our update logic can also update itself in the field. More importantly, our approach can be used with existing FPGAs, although it can equally benefit from additional security features in future ones. We also discuss denial-of-service attacks and failed updates, describe how the system can recover, and specify the detailed behavior of our update logic in a way that is ready for implementation.

3.8 Conclusions

We have proposed a secure remote update protocol that maintains the confidentiality, integrity and freshness of bitstreams to the extent possible. In contrast to other
proposals, our solution requires no additions to the configuration logic of existing FPGAs and uses the user logic for most security functions. The required cryptographic primitives consume some user-logic resources, but they can be reused by the main application. Even local attackers can be deterred from restoring old and outdated bitstreams, which the update server may want to suppress (e.g., due to known vulnerabilities), by tamper proofing the NVM connection.

The update logic proposed here can be implemented either in software on a soft processor, or as a logic circuit. The design and presentation of our protocol was influenced by our experience with an ongoing logic-circuit implementation on a Virtex-5 evaluation board, using the publicly available AES design described in Chapter 4.

Possible extensions for the protocol presented here include role- and identity-based access control (beyond the current single role of “update server”), as well as receiving online partial configuration content at start-up, to be programmed into memory cells using an internal configuration port.
Chapter 4

AES in spare logic

4.1 Introduction

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [139, FIPS-197] is a widely used block cipher with a rich implementation literature for both software and hardware. Most AES implementations for reconfigurable devices, however, are based on traditional configurable logic such as flip-flops and lookup tables (LUTs). Here, we focus on new embedded functions inside of the Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA [186, UG190], such as large dual-ported RAMs and digital signal processing (DSP) blocks [186, UG193] with the goal of minimizing the use of registers and LUTs so that those may be used for other functions. Our designs are best suited for applications where most of the traditional user logic is used by other functions, yet embedded memory and DSP blocks are still available. Moreover, our design principles may be suitable for transfer to other course-grain logic devices which consist of multi-core processing units connected to local memory\(^1\). We also focus on the use of embedded functional blocks that have dedicated routing paths between them. By using these dedicated paths, we implicitly predefine the relative placement of our AES modules and thus relax the constraints on the router.

We present three different architectures which are optimized for three application scenarios. An eight-stage pipeline module (AES32), based on a combination of two 36-Kibit\(^2\) BlockRAM (BRAM) and four digital signal processing (DSP) blocks, that outputs a single 32-bit column of an AES round each cycle. For higher throughput, AES32 is replicated four times for a full AES round with a 128-bit datapath (AES128). For a fully unrolled version (AES128U), AES128 is replicated ten times, achieving a throughput of over 50 Gbit/s. We also describe a separate circuit for pre-computing

---

\(^1\)One example is the Tilera TILE64 processor family, \url{http://www.tilera.com/}

\(^2\)The unit kibibit, or Kibit for short, equals 2\(^10\) bits, and is used to avoid the ambiguity of kbit and Kbit. (See “Definitions of the SI units: The binary prefixes”, \url{http://physics.nist.gov/cuu/Units/binary.html})
round keys, which can be combined with all three implementations, and report results from an implementation of the CMAC and CTR modes of operation.

HDL source code and simulation testbenches for the three AES variants and the CMAC mode of operation are freely available under the “Simplified BSD License”\textsuperscript{3} from the following URL. We make it available for reuse, evaluation, and reproduction of the results reported herein:

http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sd410/aes2/ (version 1.0)

4.2 Prior work

Many hardware implementations of AES have been described for FPGAs, ASICs and software since the U.S. NIST standardized it in 2001. Some are straightforward implementations of a single AES round or loop-unrolled, pipelined architectures for FPGAs that use large amounts of user logic [61, 97, 149, 160]. In particular, the AES $8 \times 8$ S-boxes were mostly implemented in user logic lookup tables (LUT). For example, Standaert et al. [160] report using 144 4-input-LUTs (4-LUT) for a single S-box implementation, so using 2,304 LUTs ($144 \times 16$) for a single AES round. More advanced approaches [33, 35, 132, 160] use embedded memory in FPGAs, but since capacities were limited in older FPGAs, the majority of implementations only mapped the $8 \times 8$ S-box into the memory while all other AES operations (ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey) were implemented with flip-flops and LUTs.

Reviewing all published AES implementations for FPGAs and ASICs is outside the scope of this chapter (we refer the interested reader to Järvinen [96]), so we will only examine the ones that are closely relevant to the work presented here. We categorize implementations according to performance, resource consumption, and datapath widths.

Resource optimized: AES implementations designed for area efficiency are mostly based on an 8-bit datapath and use shared resources for key expansion and round computations. An example is Good and Benaissa [72] which requires 124 Xilinx Spartan-II 15(-6) slices and two BRAMs of a for 0.0022 Gbit/s encryption throughput. Small implementations with 32-bit datapath also exist: the AES implementation of Chodowiec and Gaj [35] on a Xilinx Spartan-II 30(-6) consumes 222 slices and 3 embedded Block RAMs for a 0.166 Gbit/s encryption rate. A similar concept was implemented by Rouvroy et al. [148] on a Xilinx Spartan-3 50(-4) with 163 slices and a throughput of 0.208 Gbit/s. Fischer and Drutarovský [65] reported an AES implementation on an Altera ACEX 1K100(-1) FPGA using the

\textsuperscript{3}“Open Source Initiative OSI – The BSD License: Licensing”, http://www.opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php

82
32-bit T-table technique, which we use as well. Their encryptor/decryptor provides a throughput of 0.212 Gbit/s using 12 embedded memory blocks and 2,923 “logical elements” (a combination of one flip-flop and one lookup table).

**Balanced:** Balanced designs focus on area-time efficiency. In most cases, hardware for handling a single round of AES with a 32- or 128-bit datapath is iteratively used to compute the required total number of AES rounds (depending on the key size). Fischer and Drutarovský [65] reported a fast T-table implementation for a single round on an Altera APEX 1K400(-1) requiring 86 embedded memory blocks and 845 logical elements for a throughput of 0.750 Gbit/s. Standaert et al. [160] presented a faster AES round design implemented with 2,257 slices of a Xilinx Virtex-E 3200(-8) for 2.008 Gbit/s throughput. Bulens et al. [30] showed an AES design that takes advantage of the slice structure and 6-input LUTs of the Virtex-5 without using embedded RAM or DSP blocks. Other Virtex-5 designs are currently only available from commercial companies, such as Algotronix [5] and Heliontech [86, v2.3.3], though implementation details are limited.

**High throughput:** Architectures for achieving maximum throughput usually pipeline and unroll the rounds. McLoone and McCanny [132] discuss an AES-128 implementation on a Xilinx Virtex-E 812(-8) and use 2,457 CLBs and 226 block memories for an encryption rate of 12 Gbit/s. Hodjat and Verbauwhede [87] report an AES-128 implementation with 21.54 Gbit/s throughput using 5,177 slices and 84 BRAMs on a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro 20(-7) FPGA. Järvinen et al. [97] discusses a high throughput AES without BRAM use on a Xilinx Virtex-II 2000(-5), at the cost of additional CLBs: their design consumes 10,750 slices and provides an encryption rate of 17.8 Gbit/s. Finally, Chaves et al. [33] implements a 34 Gbit/s T-table based AES with 3,513 Virtex-II Pro 20(-7) slices and 80 BRAMs.

To our knowledge, only few implementations have transferred the software architecture based on the T-table to FPGAs [33, 65, 148]. However, due to the large tables and the restricted memory capacities on those devices, certain functionality still needs to be encoded in user logic (e.g., the multiplication elimination required by the last AES round). We provide three implementations that address each of the design categories mentioned above – low logic resource usage, area-time efficient, and high-throughput. Our contribution is the first T-table-based AES implementation that efficiently uses device-specific features, thus minimizing the need for generic logic elements. In addition, to our knowledge, our contribution is unique in that it is the first FPGA implementation of cryptographic function that contains complete source code at publication time, allowing replication of results and reuse (comparison and reproducibility of FPGA designs is discussed in Chapter 5).
4.3 Implementation

Intended for 32-bit architectures, AES can be implemented as a combination of lookup (T-tables) and XOR operations; Appendix B provides the mathematical background for this method, as do Daemen and Rijmen [42, s4.2] and Gladman [71]. Now we show how to adapt this software-oriented approach into modern reconfigurable hardware devices in order to achieve high throughput for modest amount of resources. We use dual-ported 36-Kibit BRAMs, which have independent address and data buses for the same stored content, and DSP embedded blocks, which allow implementation of timing- or resource-critical functions, such as arithmetic operations on integers or Boolean expressions, that would otherwise be considerably slower or resource demanding if implemented with traditional logic elements.

DSP blocks were introduced in the Virtex-4 family of FPGAs to perform $18 \times 18$ bit integer multiplication along with a 48-bit accumulator, though they were limited to 24-bit bit-wise logic operations. 48-bit bit-wise logic operations were added in Virtex-5, and can run at up to 550 MHz, the maximum frequency rating of the device. The internal datapath of the DSP block is 48 bits wide, except for integer multiplication. The Virtex-5 DSP blocks come in pairs that span the height of five configurable logic blocks (CLB); additional pairs can be efficiently cascaded using dedicated paths to adjacent DSP tiles. A single dual-ported 36-Kibit BRAM also spans the height of five CLBs and matches the height of the pair of DSP blocks, with a fast datapath between them. Our initial observation was that the 8- to 32-bit lookup followed by a 32-bit XOR AES operation perfectly matched this architectural alignment. Based on these primitives, we developed the AES32 module that outputs one 32-bit AES column every clock cycle (as specified by Equation B.1 in Appendix B). We have designed it such that it allows efficient placement and routing of components so it can operate at the maximum device frequency of 550 MHz.

4.3.1 AES32 Module

We began with the structure shown in Figure 4.1. Since each column requires all four T-table lookups, together with their last-round T-table counterparts, that meant needing to fit eight 8-Kibit T-tables in a single 36-Kibit dual-port RAM. For a simpler implementation we opted against “reversing” the MixColumns operation for the last round, and searched for a solution that would enable us to fit all tables into a single BRAM. We realized that our design can use the fact that all T-tables are byte-wise transpositions of each other, such that cyclical byte shifting the BRAM output for T-table $T_0$ produces $T_1$, $T_2$ and $T_3$. Thus, in order to use the entire BRAM, we can store $T_0$ and $T_2$ together with their last round counterparts $T'_0$ and $T'_2$. Using a single byte circular right rotation $(a, b, c, d) \rightarrow (d, a, b, c)$, $T_0$ becomes $T_1$, and $T_2$ becomes $T_3$ and the same for the last round T-tables. In hardware, this
Figure 4.1: Each dual ported BRAM (functioning as a ROM) contains four T-tables, two for the first nine rounds, and two for the last one. Each DSP block performs a 32-bit bit-wise XOR operation. After passing through the four DSP blocks, column results are fed back as the input to the next round.

A full AES operation is implemented by adding feedback scheduling in the datapath. Combined with BRAM lookups, we assigned a cascade of DSP blocks to perform the four XOR operations required for computing the AES column output according to Equation B.1. For feeding in the corresponding \( a_{i,j} \) for the lookup into the BRAM, we added a sequence of three 8-bit loadable shift registers and an input multiplexer for each column. These 24-bit registers are loaded in sequence,
Figure 4.2: The AES32 iterative round (without control logic). Plaintext is chosen as the initial input, then output data is fed back through 8-bit shift registers for a complete AES encryption. Pipeline stage numbers are shown circled. Stage 3 is the output of the multiplexer choosing between non-shifted data or an 8-bit cyclical right-shift or \( T_0 \) and \( T_2 \), which are turned into \( T_1 \) and \( T_3 \), respectively.

This construct has eight pipeline stages with the following operations (numbers in parenthesis correspond to circled numbers in Figure 4.2): lookup (1), where the 8-bit to 32-bit T-table lookup is performed within the BRAM; register (2) is the BRAM output register; transform (3), where \( T_0 \) and \( T_2 \) are optionally shifted into \( T_1 \) and \( T_3 \), respectively; DSP input register (4); and \( \oplus \) (5–8), the XOR operation. Four processing columns \( C_{[0..3]} \) are staggered as shown in Figure 4.2. As previously mentioned, the pipeline stages within the shaded areas are part of the BRAM or DSP blocks, not user logic flip-flops.

Table 4.1 shows the processing of the first plaintext input, and computation of
Table 4.1: The top part of the table shows the input of plaintext and the operation of the DSPs. DSP₀ performs a 32-bit XOR on the input \( P_{[0..3]} \) and the main key \( K_{[0..3]} \); the output \( X_{[0..3]} \) propagates unchanged through the other DSP blocks. The bottom table shows \( X_{[0..3]} \) being processed for an AES round. The stages are: table lookup (TLU); table output register (TOR); T-table shift (TS); DSP input register (DIR); and, DSP XOR \( \oplus \). The outputs \( E_{[0..3]} \) are used as input to the next round, and so on. The gray inputs and outputs show the second input block that is possible. (The overlap between the two parts is shown by dotted lines).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>cyc</th>
<th>ptext</th>
<th>key</th>
<th>fback</th>
<th>DSP₀</th>
<th>DSP₁</th>
<th>DSP₂</th>
<th>DSP₃</th>
<th>out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>( P_{[0]} )</td>
<td>( K_{[0]} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>( P_{[1]} )</td>
<td>( K_{[1]} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>( P_{[2]} )</td>
<td>( K_{[2]} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>( P_{[3]} )</td>
<td>( K_{[3]} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>( P_{2[0]} )</td>
<td>( K_{2[0]} )</td>
<td>( X₀ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( X₀ )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>( P_{2[1]} )</td>
<td>( K_{2[1]} )</td>
<td>( X₁ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( X₁ )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>( P_{2[2]} )</td>
<td>( K_{2[2]} )</td>
<td>( X₂ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( TLU )</td>
<td>( X₂ )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>( P_{2[3]} )</td>
<td>( K_{2[3]} )</td>
<td>( X₃ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( X₃ )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>( K_{0[0]} )</td>
<td>( X₂₀ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>( K_{0[1]} )</td>
<td>( X₂₁ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>( K_{0[2]} )</td>
<td>( X₂₂ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>( K_{0[3]} )</td>
<td>( X₂₃ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>( K_{2[0]} )</td>
<td>( E₀ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>( K_{2[1]} )</td>
<td>( E₁ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>( K_{2[2]} )</td>
<td>( E₂ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>( K_{2[3]} )</td>
<td>( E₃ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>( K_{1[0]} )</td>
<td>( E₂₀ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>( K_{1[1]} )</td>
<td>( E₂₁ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>( K_{1[2]} )</td>
<td>( E₂₂ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>( K_{1[3]} )</td>
<td>( E₂₃ )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
<td>( \oplus )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first round. The input is operated on as four 32-bit words, each XOR’d with the main key by DSP₀. The output of the operation, \( X_{[0..3]} \), propagates through the other DSPs without change (by resetting their A:B inputs to ‘0’). Each of these 32-bit outputs is then used as feedback to the columns: \( X₀ \) for the feedback registers of Col₀, \( X₁ \) for Col₁, and so on. The Verilog code for the exact feedback network is shown in Figure 4.3, and Equation B.1 defines the order. \( E_{[0..3]} \) are the outputs of the first round, which are fed back for the second round, and so on. The grayed inputs and outputs in Table 4.1 show the second independent 128-bit input that
module aes32_dsp_8p_fb_con (
    input wire CLK,
    input wire [31:00] DIN, // feedback input
    input wire [01:00] CTRL, // column control
    output wire [31:00] DOUT);

    reg [23:00] c0,c1,c2,c3;
    wire [07:00] c0_out, c0_1, c0_2;
    wire [07:00] c1_out, c1_1, c1_2;
    wire [07:00] c2_out, c2_1, c2_2;
    wire [07:00] c3_out, c3_1, c3_2;

    assign DOUT = {c0_out, c1_out, c2_out, c3_out};

    assign c0_out = (CTRL[1:0] == 2'b00) ? DIN[31:24] : c0[07:00];
    assign c0_1 = (CTRL[1:0] == 2'b00) ? DIN[07:00] : c0[15:08];
    assign c0_2 = (CTRL[1:0] == 2'b00) ? DIN[15:08] : c0[23:16];

    assign c1_out = (CTRL[1:0] == 2'b01) ? DIN[23:16] : c1[07:00];
    assign c1_1 = (CTRL[1:0] == 2'b01) ? DIN[31:24] : c1[15:08];
    assign c1_2 = (CTRL[1:0] == 2'b01) ? DIN[07:00] : c1[23:16];

    assign c2_out = (CTRL[1:0] == 2'b10) ? DIN[15:08] : c2[07:00];
    assign c2_2 = (CTRL[1:0] == 2'b10) ? DIN[07:00] : c2[23:16];

    assign c3_out = (CTRL[1:0] == 2'b11) ? DIN[07:00] : c3[07:00];
    assign c3_1 = (CTRL[1:0] == 2'b11) ? DIN[15:08] : c3[15:08];

    always @(posedge CLK) begin
        c0 <= {DIN[23:16], c0_2, c0_1};
        c1 <= {DIN[15:08], c1_2, c1_1};
        c2 <= {DIN[07:00], c2_2, c2_1};
        c3 <= {DIN[31:24], c3_2, c3_1};
    end

endmodule

Figure 4.3: Verilog code for the AES32 feedback network.

can be used with the same circuit; that is, for each column entry there is another operation performed for the second input.

Finally, we also tried a different datapath using the same basic structure, but instead of feeding the output of each DSP to the one on its right, the data is fed back into the same DSP, and then XOR’d with the new T-table input. This, however, requires the input of a key to each DSP block, extra control logic, dynamic change of DSP operating modes, and a 32-bit 4:1 mux to choose between the output of each DSP for the feedback schedule. All those introduced additional delays when routed, so performance was poorer than the alternative previously described.

4.3.2 AES128 and AES128U Modules

AES32 can be replicated four times for a 128-bit datapath: for each instance, the feedback network is replaced with 8-, 16-, and 24-bit registers for columns 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The first of four instances is shown in Figure 4.4: one byte is fed back to the same instance while three bytes are distributed to the other three instances; Verilog code for the feedback schedule shown in Figure 4.5. The latency of this
Figure 4.4: Four instances of this structure perform a full AES round (AES128). Except for the input to $C_0$, each column receives the input from the other three instances. The T-tables are static so the shifting of the BRAMs' outputs is fixed. The feedback network is described in Figure 4.5.

The circuit is the same as AES32, but allows us to interleave eight 128-bit inputs at any given time. This is possible because of the eight pipeline stages, where each of the four instances receives a 32-bit input every clock cycle. In contrast to AES32, the T-tables can be static so the 32-bit 2:1 multiplexers are no longer required. This simplifies the datapath between the BRAMs and DSPs since the shifting can be fixed in routing. The control logic is simple as well, only requiring a 3-bit counter and a 1-bit control signal to choose the last round T-tables.

Finally, the natural thing to do was to implement a fully unrolled AES design to achieve maximum throughput. Ten instances of AES128 are connected for an 80-stage pipeline using 80 BRAMs and 160 DSP blocks. This design does not require any dynamic control logic and produces 128 bits of output every clock cycle. The initial XOR of the input block with the main key is performed in LUTs, though it can be done by adding one to four DSP blocks (the number will affect the latency). Note that for AES128U, the main key and sub-keys were statically encoded in the design, so did not require additional 128 I/O pins.
module aes128_dsp_fb_con (
    input CLK,
    input [127:00] DIN,
    output [127:00] DOUT);

reg [07:00] e0_c1, e1_c1, e2_c1, e3_c1;
reg [15:00] e0_c2, e1_c2, e2_c2, e3_c2;
reg [23:00] e0_c3, e1_c3, e2_c3, e3_c3;

assign DOUT[127:96] = {DIN[127:120], e0_c1[07:00], e0_c2[15:08],
assign DOUT[095:64] = {DIN[95:88], e1_c1[07:00], e1_c2[15:08],
assign DOUT[063:32] = {DIN[63:56], e2_c1[07:00], e2_c2[15:08],
assign DOUT[031:00] = {DIN[31:24], e3_c1[07:00], e3_c2[15:08],

always @(posedge CLK) begin
    e0_c1 <= DIN[87:80];
    e1_c1 <= DIN[55:48];
    e2_c1 <= DIN[23:16];
    e3_c1 <= DIN[119:112];
    e0_c2 <= {e0_c2[07:00],DIN[47:40]};
    e1_c2 <= {e1_c2[07:00],DIN[15:08]};
    e2_c2 <= {e2_c2[07:00],DIN[111:104]};
    e3_c2 <= {e3_c2[07:00],DIN[79:72]};
    e0_c3 <= {e0_c3[15:00],DIN[07:00]};
    e1_c3 <= {e1_c3[15:00],DIN[103:96]};
    e2_c3 <= {e2_c3[15:00],DIN[71:64]};
    e3_c3 <= {e3_c3[15:00],DIN[39:32]};
end
endmodule

Figure 4.5: Verilog code for the AES128 feedback network.

4.3.3 Decryption

Decryption lookup tables (I-tables) are different from the ones for encryption. Again, we can use the fact that each T-table can be converted into any other by circular shifting the appropriate number of bytes. For AES32, this requires replacing the 32-bit 2:1 mux at the output of the BRAM with a 4:1 mux such that all possible byte shifting is possible, and loading the BRAMs with $T_i$, $T'_i$, $I_i$ and $I'_i$. Alternatively, the content of the BRAMs can be dynamically reconfigured with the decryption or encryption tables; this can be done from an external source, or even from within the FPGA using the internal configuration access port (ICAP) [186, UG191] with a storage BRAM to reload content through the BRAM data input port. For AES128 we can store $T_0$, $T'_0$, $I_0$ and $I'_0$ and shift by routing, so both decryption and encryption can be supported in the same circuit.

An implementation of the decryption circuit and a simulation testbench are also available at the URL above. Two modifications to the inputs are required, however. Firstly, input columns 3 and 1 are swapped, as defined in Section B.1 (output columns are swapped as well), and secondly, the key schedule needs to perform the inverse of MixColumns on the subkeys of subkeys 1 to 9.
Figure 4.6: Block diagram of key expansion implementation. The S-boxes, round constants and 32-bit subkeys are stored in the dual-port BRAM connected to an 8-bit datapath. Unused memory in the BRAM is used to encode 32-bit instructions for the state machine.

### 4.3.4 Key expansion

A dual-ported BRAM stores the expanded 32-bit subkeys (44 words for AES-128), the round constants (10 32-bit values) and S-box entries with 8 bits each. A block diagram of the implementation is shown in Figure 4.6: port A of the BRAM is 32 bits wide and feeds the subkeys to the AES module, while port B is configured for 8-bit data I/O. With an 8-bit multiplexer, register and XOR connected to port B data output, this circuit can compute the full key expansion (described in Section B.2).

The key expansion circuit requires a complex state machine whose control logic is likely to become the critical path, so we encode it in the spare storage of a BRAM. Recall that the BRAM provides 36-Kibits of memory of which 1,408 to 1,920 bits are required for subkeys (for AES-128 and AES-256, respectively), 2,048 bits for S-box entries and 80 bits for round constants, so the BRAM is not completely full. Therefore, to save user logic resources, all memory addresses and control logic signals are encoded as 32-bit instructions and stored in the unused part of the BRAM. This method also ensures constant and uniform signal propagation for all control signals since they do not need to be generated by combinatorial logic.

### 4.4 Results

Our designs target a Virtex-5 SX50T\(^4\) (FF1136 package) FPGA at its fastest speed grade (-3) using the ISE 10.1i.03 implementation flow with Xilinx Synthesis Technology (XST). We used Mentor Graphics ModelSim 6.2g for both behavioral and post place-and-route simulation, under nominal conditions for core voltage (0.95 V)

\(^4\)We chose the SX50T because it is the smallest that can accommodate all three variants of our design; this makes our reporting consistent. Note that while the SX35T has enough logic resources, it has insufficient number of I/Os.
Table 4.2: Our results, with other related academic and commercial implementations on Virtex-5 devices. Decryption (Dec.) and Key expansion (Key) are included when denoted by •, by ° otherwise. For AES32 and AES128 implementations, decryption can be achieved by adding 32-bit muxes in the datapath between BRAM and DSP. Other Virtex-5 AES implementations are listed for reference, and we do not make a direct comparison to them; see Chapter 5 for a discussion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>design</th>
<th>dec/ key</th>
<th>datapath/ streams</th>
<th>resources</th>
<th>f MHz</th>
<th>perf. Gbit/s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES32</td>
<td>°/°</td>
<td>32/2</td>
<td>107 320 257</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES128</td>
<td>°/°</td>
<td>128/8</td>
<td>259 338 624</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES128U</td>
<td>•/°</td>
<td>128/80</td>
<td>321 738 1,031</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algortronix</td>
<td>°/°</td>
<td>32/2</td>
<td>161 n/a n/a</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helion</td>
<td>°/°</td>
<td>128/1</td>
<td>349 n/a n/a</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>4.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulens et al.</td>
<td>°/°</td>
<td>128/1</td>
<td>400 n/a n/a</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and temperature (85°C), using minimum delay data (netgen option -s min). We did not verify the designs on an actual device, except for the CMAC implementation described in Section 4.5.1.

XFLOW [188, ch25] was used as an implementation wrapper for the ISE flow\(^5\): we used `xst_verilog.opt` for synthesis and `high_effort.opt` as the basis for the implementation, and customizing them for best results (i.e., effort levels, optimization techniques, etc.) We used “multi-pass place-and-route” options `-t 1` (starting seed number) and `-n 100` (the number of seeds to try), and raised the PAR effort to `-o high`, such that each design was implemented using a hundred PAR seeds\(^6\), and the best result is reported here\(^7\). The only constraint given to the tools was for the minimum clock period (NET CLK PERIOD = 1.818 ns, for example). (That is, no other logical function was implemented together with the respective AES module, and no restriction on I/O and resources placement was made.)

Results are summarized in Table 4.2. AES32, as shown in Figure 4.2, passed timing (post place-and-route) for a frequency of 550 MHz, the maximum frequency rating of the device. The design requires the following resources: 257 flip-flops, 96 (8·3·4) for the input shift registers plus 128 (4·32) for the pipeline stages in between the BRAMs and DSPs, with the rest used for control logic; 320 lookup tables, mostly functioning as multiplexers; and finally, two 36-Kibit dual-port BRAM (32-Kibit used in each) and four DSP48E blocks. Throughput is calculated as follows: given that there are 84 processing cycles (80 for round operations and 4 for input)

\(^5\)XFLOW is an ISE tool; a typical command is: `xflow -p xc5vsx50tff1136-3 -synth xst_verilog.opt -implement high_effort.opt -config bitgen.opt <design>.v` where the option files are pre-defined, but can be edited for custom settings.

\(^6\)These are called “cost tables” by Xilinx, and they introduce variability to the PAR process so designs meet their timing goals; we discuss these in Chapter 5.

\(^7\)Results that exceeded the maximum frequency rating of the FPGA (550 MHz) were capped to that frequency; in some cases, the best results are outliers, and we will discuss this at length in Chapter 5.
operating at 550 MHz and 256 bits of state in the pipeline stages, $550 \cdot 10^6 \cdot 256 / 84 = 1.67 \text{ Gbit/s}$ of throughput is achieved. This assumes that the pipeline stages are always full, meaning that the module is processing two 128-bit inputs at any given time; if only one input is processed, throughput is halved. As mentioned, the eight stages allow interleaving of two inputs, though the designer can remove stages in order to reduce resources (the pipeline registers between the BRAMs and DSPs consume the most logic resources; others are part of the embedded primitive). This, of course, may reduce performance, so there is a trade-off that needs to be evaluated according to target performance.

The maximum operating frequency for AES128 is also 550 MHz, which requires 624 flip-flops, 338 lookup tables, 8 36-Kbit BRAMs (32-Kbit used in each), and 16 DSP48E blocks. The latency of 84 clock cycles is the same as the previous design, though now we maintain state of $128 \cdot 8 = 1024$ bits for a throughput of $550 \cdot 10^6 \cdot 8 \cdot 128 / 84 = 6.7 \text{ Gbit/s}$ when processing eight input blocks. As with AES32, pipeline stages can be removed to minimize the use of logic resources if they are required for other functions at the expense of throughput.

Finally, the AES128U implementation produces 128 bits of output every clock cycle once the initial latency is complete. We have experimented with eliminating the pipeline stage between the BRAM and DSP to see if it adversely affects performance; this will save us 5,120 registers. We found that the performance degradation is low, with the added benefit of having an initial latency of only 70 clock cycles instead of 80 (in principle, this could also be done also for AES128, but then only seven streams can be processed concurrently). The resulting throughput is $413 \cdot 10^6 \cdot 128 = 52.8 \text{ Gbit/s}$. This design operates at a maximum frequency of over 413 MHz and uses 1,031 flip-flops, 738 lookup tables, 80 36-Kbit BRAMs (only 16-Kbit in each for either encryption or decryption, or 32-Kbit for both), and 160 DSP48E blocks. The design only uses 3.2% and 2.3% of flip-flops and LUTs of the SX50T, respectively, though 60% of BRAMs and 55% of DSP48Es are used.

The reported results are based on the assumption that the set of subkeys are externally provided through the I/O (AES32 and AES128), or are statically encoded in the design (AES128U). Where all subkeys are generated internally, these modules can be augmented with a key expansion stage pre-computing all subkeys and stor-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key expansion</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>f (MHz)</th>
<th>Cycles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES-128</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-192</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-256</td>
<td>732</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Implementation results for the AES key expansion design. Most state machine control logic has been encoded into a BRAM to save logic resources.
Figure 4.7: CMAC mode of operation. The choice of $K_1$ or $K_2$ is determined by if $M_n$ is a complete block or not.

...ing them in a dedicated BRAM. As discussed in Section 4.3.4, the key expansion circuit is optimized for a small footprint and allows operation at the maximum device frequency of 550 MHz. The complexity of the state machine, which is the most expensive part in terms of logic, is mostly hidden within the encoded 32-bit instructions stored in the BRAM. Hence, since only a small stub of the state machine is implemented in logic, the overall resource consumption of the full key expansion is only 1 BRAM, 55 LUTs and 41 flip-flops. Table 4.3 summarizes these results, with support for key sizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits.

4.5 Extensions

We have discussed three pipelined architectures for AES that support simultaneous encryption of 2, 8, and 80 128-bit input blocks in electronic codebook (ECB) mode. We now consider other block-cipher modes of operation that use AES encryption as a building block and fit well into our design architecture.

4.5.1 Message authentication: CMAC

Besides encryption, the CBC mode can be used to produce a message authentication code (CBC-MAC) by simply discarding all ciphertext blocks except the last one. CBC-MAC is known to be vulnerable to message extension attacks where the length of the message is not fixed or checked. To deal with these shortcomings, NIST has defined the CMAC mode [139, 800-38B], where a derivative of the key is applied before the last AES invocation; the basic CMAC construct is shown in Figure 4.7.

CMAC’s last AES invocation is unique in that it requires an extra XOR of one of two keys, $K_1$ or $K_2$, with $M_n \oplus C_{n-1}$. If the entire message divides evenly into $n$ blocks, then $K_1$ is used, otherwise $M_n$ is appended with a predetermined suffix to create a complete block, and $K_2$ is used. Although we do not consider
Figure 4.8: Additions made to AES32 for CMAC operation. Three 32-bit registers are added in order to keep the output in between AES invocations and are XOR’d with the next plaintext block and initial key of the first round. The input “key” is expected to receive all AES subkeys and \( K_1/K_2 \) at the appropriate time; their generation and the message block padding are not part of the design.

In the implementation, we provide the generation description of \( K_1 \) and \( K_2 \) for completeness:

\[
K_1 = \text{MSB}(L) \ ? (L \ll 1) \oplus R : (L \ll 1)
\]
\[
K_2 = \text{MSB}(K_1) \ ? (K_1 \ll 1) \oplus R : (K_1 \ll 1),
\]

where \( L = E_k(0^{128}) \) (an AES encryption of the zero vector under the main key), and \( R = 0^{120}10000111 \); MSB indicates “most significant bit”.

Our implementation is shown in Figure 4.8. The inputs to the design are plaintext blocks \( M_1 \ldots n \), keys, and feedback, which is the output of column three. As with AES32, the feedback is used as input to the four columns between round iterations, though now it is also fed back as the input for subsequent AES invocations. First, plaintext \( M_1 \) is sent through the two multiplexers and XOR’d with the main AES key; the result is propagated through the rest of the DSP blocks while their \( A : B \) inputs are held at reset. The output is then fed back to the top input registers and ten AES rounds are performed using the round keys as described in Section 4.3.1.
The ciphertext output $C_1$ is then XOR’d with $M_2$ before another invocation of AES occurs. Prior to the last invocation of AES an extra feedback cycle is performed for the $K_1$ or $K_2$ XOR operation.

Notice that in Figure 4.8 the delayed feedback is used as an input to two 32-bit multiplexers. The reason for this is that the feedback needs to be XOR’d with both the key and the plaintext, as in the last AES invocation, $((C_{n-1} \oplus M_n) \oplus K_{1/2}) \oplus K_{AES}$. In addition to the input muxes, three 32-bit registers keep the state of the output feedback as the pipeline stages are being cleared.

As before, two independent streams can be interleaved. If the same input is used for both streams, a MAC and CBC/ECB output can be generated concurrently. If decryption is added to the design with the required additional shifts, as discussed in Section 4.3.3, then decryption and MAC-generation can be performed in the same run. The only difference is that for encryption and decryption $K_1$ and $K_2$ will need to be set to zero, and intermediate values of $C_i$ are output, while they are not when producing a MAC. (Remember that for security, MAC and ciphertext should not be produced using the same key.)

We have optimized the implementation for maximal use of the pipeline stages. First, the initial XOR of the key and plaintext message is performed, and the first output for feedback appears after six cycles (two for input registers and four to propagate through the DSP48E blocks). Then, 80 additional cycles complete the first AES invocation. $K_{AES} \oplus (C_{n-1} \oplus M_n)$ requires 16 cycles (eight for each XOR) with two additional pipeline cycles at the end. Thus, for $N$ input blocks (if the message is empty then $N = 1$), a MAC is produced every

$$(6 + 80) + (N - 2)(16 + 80) + (16 + 8 + 80) + 2 = 96 \cdot N$$

cycles. For example, for $N = 4$ a MAC is computed every 384 cycles.

The design achieves a maximum frequency of 511 MHz (under the the same implementation conditions as the other variants) and requires 357 registers, 457 LUTs (in 205 slices) that include input registers for data and keys; as before, the design uses two 36 KB dual-ported BRAMs and four DSP48Es, and was simulated at both the behavioral and post place-and-route stages. The throughput is dependent on $N$ and with 511 MHz operation comes to $511 \cdot 10^6 \cdot 256/96/N$, so for $N = 1$, 1.362 Gbit/s for two interleaved streams.

### 4.5.2 CTR and CCM modes

Our modules can be used with other modes of operation. Counter mode [139, 800-38A] requires a fast counter of up to 128 bits in width. The carry propagation delay of such a wide counter implemented in user logic will limit performance, so a cascade of DSP blocks is used instead (shown in Figure 4.9). Virtex-5 devices support
Figure 4.9: CTR mode circuit that is compatible with all three AES modules. Three adjacent DSP blocks build a 128-bit adder to increment an integer counter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Perf. (MHz)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>slices</td>
<td>LUT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES32_XOR</td>
<td>212 (1.98)</td>
<td>448 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES128_XOR</td>
<td>624 (2.40)</td>
<td>850 (2.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES128U_XOR</td>
<td>3,775 (11.76)</td>
<td>5,121 (6.94)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4: Results when DSPs are replaced with logic (on an SX50T) under the same conditions as for the results reported in Table 4.2. Numbers in parenthesis indicate increase multiplier from DSP-based design.

the generation of wide, parallel adders using dedicated carry signals CARRYCAS-COUT and CARRYCASCIN that can be used to ripple carries through adjacent DSP blocks. For a 128-bit counter, three adjacent DSP blocks in accumulation mode are connected – each can add operands of up to 48 bits. Since carry propagation between DSPs occurs on clock edges, alignment using output registers is required. An implementation of this counter operates at 550 MHz.

In a similar way that CMAC was implemented, the counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) authenticated encryption mode [139, 800-38C] can be implemented. This requires two AES operations to be performed in parallel – one for encrypting or decrypting data and another for creating or verifying a MAC. Thus, with an additional encryption counter, it is possible to adapt our modules to provide CCM authenticated encryption for 1, 4, or 40 individual streams of data.

4.5.3 Replacing DSPs with CLBs

Our design can be modified so that it can be implemented on other architectures. To do this, the DSP 32-bit bit-wise XOR and internal pipeline registers were replaced with traditional user logic (AES32_XOR, AES128_XOR, AES128U_XOR). The results are shown in Table 4.4 (simulation and implementation conditions remain the same, and
the source code is available at the above URL). Performance is comparable\(^8\) to the DSP versions due to the pipelined nature of the designs and also because the place and route process is less constrained by not needing to meet the timing imposed by DSP placement. As expected, flip-flop and LUT usage has increased.

We maintain that under our assumed constraint of scarcity of logic resources, for which our original designs was meant for, any increase may be a disadvantage. While the logic-only design is more like the previous implementations discussed in Section 4.2, it also makes our designs more portable. We also recognize that the DSPs themselves are underutilized, as they can perform much more than wide bitwise operations (we do not use the multiplier, for example). But again, we assumed that these DSPs were not used in the first place. Any FPGA resource that is not used is a loss because the system developer paid for it either way; we simply provide fast AES designs that may fit these unused resources.

### 4.6 Conclusions

We have presented new ways for performing AES operations at high throughput using on-chip RAM and DSP blocks with comparatively low use of traditional user logic such as flip-flops and lookup tables. We have also described and implemented the CMAC and CTR modes of operation, and a compact key expansion function for pre-computing keys. The source code for all the three AES variants and CMAC mode is publicly available so that they can be used in further research, and provide readers with the ability to reproduce our reported results.

While our results appear to be good, they are admittedly misleading, as the throughput we – and perhaps other researchers – report will not be achieved in practice when the modules are used as part of a bigger system. There are several reasons for this, all discussed in the next chapter.

---

\(^8\)As we shall see in Chapter 5, AES128U\_XOR may perform noticeably better than AES128U\_DSP if the clock frequency constraint is set to a higher value. The upper bound for this constraint is determined by the tools, which warn if it is set to an unachievable value. For consistency, both versions were executed with the same constraint of 435 MHz.
Chapter 5

The meaning and reproducibility of FPGA results

In this chapter, we discuss the significant performance variability of FPGA designs, and question the reproducibility of, and comparability with, other published results. Throughput, a popular measure of performance, is a function of many factors, including not only the HDL design itself, but also tool versions, implementation options, device architecture, and in particular, how connected modules constrain the design. Throughput alone neither specifies the optimization goal of every design, nor is such a single figure of merit a fair measure with which to compare, even where it was the optimization goal.

The peer-review process expects that new contributions be compared with previously published work. But doing so in a fair, meaningful and reproducible way is challenging. We first describe a few simple and easy to reproduce experiments that demonstrate the problem: the substantial variability of commonly reported and compared figures of merit, such as throughput or maximum clock frequency, under seemingly trivial changes to the build environment (Section 5.1). We then discuss what we consider to be good practice in reporting and comparing the performance of FPGA implementations and practices that we believe should be avoided, or at least treated with caution (Section 5.2). We hope that this discussion will help both authors and reviewers of future FPGA implementations avoid some of the most common pitfalls when comparing results. As a research community, we have to recognize the importance of reproducibility as seriously as any other experimental discipline. See Section 5.4 for some related work.

In spite of our other recommendations on how to report performance results, we conclude that there ultimately is no substitute for releasing the full source code and build environment of an implementation, so that other researchers can exactly reproduce measurements in practice, and rerun them on newer platforms, where applicable. If we care about reproducible research, we have to treat the source
files of the implementation as the primary scholarly contribution, and can count explanatory papers and measurement results only as a form of advertisement for the former.

5.1 Demonstration experiments

Since AES implementation has been a particularly active research area in recent years, we use the AES128 implementation from Chapter 4 as a demonstration example. As far as we are aware, of all the many academic publications describing an FPGA implementation of a cryptographic function to date, Drimer et al. [56] was the first, and is so far the only, publication to provide a URL in the body of the text for downloading both the source HDL and instructions for reproducing the reported results\(^1\). Source code and test benches for simulation and reimplementation of all experiments in this chapter are available at:

\[ \text{http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sd410/aes2/ (version 1.0)} \]

We run each example design with 100 different place-and-route (PAR) seeds\(^2\), thus providing different weights for constraints, placement starting points and other factors that affect timing (more in text box on the next page). PAR seeds are used by developers to help them make their designs achieve specific target frequency performance, but here we use them to illustrate how small perturbations in the PAR start conditions (also leading to routing changes) affect the performance of a design, especially when it is “unconstrained”, by which we mean that there are no other circuit elements competing for available resources. (We do constrain the design by setting a performance target for the clock frequency; note that different targets produce varying allocation of logic resources.) We report each run’s “best case achievable” frequency given by the timing analyzer, and ignore routes from I/Os for timing.

5.1.1 Application context

Cryptographic primitives, such as AES, are usually part of a bigger design, and are rarely used in isolation. Most FPGA implementations in the literature, however, are reported as unconstrained, stand-alone modules. They lack the context of the application in which they will be used. If a small module occupies a large device, the tools have more freedom to use the shortest routes available, and so perform

\(^1\)The closest contender was a 2002 technical report by Weaver and Wawrzynek [182] who provided AES code, though we found this no longer available.

\(^2\)Xilinx calls these “cost tables” that can be activated by adding the \(-t\) 1 and \(-n\) 100 switches when executing \texttt{par}. Our experiments show that results for each cost table are consistent so that reproducibility is possible if the same source code is implemented with the same settings.
better. As more logic needs to be packed into a given resource area, available routing and resource options become scarce, making it difficult to achieve the same performance. The tools are then forced to use less efficient routes, increasing the delay on the critical path. Therefore, “maximum frequency” results from unconstrained implementations are useful in a limited way. They indicate the maximum frequency a module can achieve under the most favorable circumstances, not the one it will achieve in practice, when embedded into a real application.

Now we demonstrate how implementation conditions affect both the “maximum frequency” a design can achieve, and the significant variation of results from different seed runs. We have implemented AES128 in two ways. The first is unconstrained (same as for the results reported in Chapter 4), and the second is where four AES128 instances are chained (Figure 5.1). Both designs were implemented for a Virtex-5 LX110-3 and SX50T-3 FPGAs. The SX50T has 288 DSP blocks and 132 BRAMs [186, DS100, t1] so both designs fit easily. The LX110, however, has only 64 DSPs and 128 BRAMs, so the DSPs become a scarce resource depriving the place-and-route algorithm from flexibility otherwise available for a single-instance

---

**Cost tables?** The exact ways in which synthesis and PAR algorithms work in commercial tools are often opaque to the user; “cost tables” are a numeric abstraction of various placement tweaks the tools make when the engineer tells them to try harder to achieve better performance. It seems that this technique in the Xilinx tools originated from NeoCAD\(^a\) (who were later bought by Xilinx), and while today’s guides are not forthcoming with information\(^b\), older guides were slightly more revealing. A user guide\(^c\) for version 3.1i of the Xilinx tools (circa 1999) elaborates and specifies that

- On average, design speed from an arbitrary multiple pass place and route will vary plus or minus 5% to 10% from the median design speed across all cost tables. About 1/3 of the cost tables will result in speeds within 5% of the median, 1/3 in the 5% to 10% range, and 1/3 in the 10% to 15% range. When comparing performance from the absolute worst cost table to the absolute best, a spread of 25% to 30% is possible.

Kilts [107, s16.9] dedicates a few pages to discuss “placement seeds”, ending with an interesting observation: if one relies on them to meet timing goals, then margins are already too tight, as any slight change to the design may cause it to fail. Thus, this technique should only be used when the design is finalized, and even then, with caution.

\(^a\)[http://www.deepchip.com/posts/0178.html](http://www.deepchip.com/posts/0178.html)


Figure 5.1: Four instances of AES128 are chained to show how results may vary when a single instance is part of a larger design. (Note that this design was not tested for correct operation, as it just serves to demonstrate variability.)

implementation. Implementation conditions and settings are identical to the ones detailed in Section 4.4.

We can make several observations from the results (Figure 5.2). The single instance implementation on an LX110 (1) varies by over 200 MHz, more than a third of the entire range (zero to 550 MHz). The SX50T implementation (3), on the other hand, provides more confidence in a single figure of performance because results are more concentrated. The reason for this is that DSPs are more abundant and concentrated in the SX devices than they are in the LX’s. The difference between the single instance implementation on the two devices (1 and 3) clearly show that the choice of a family member within a class of FPGAs can significantly affect results. When designs are constrained (2 and 4), they perform noticeably worse, but results are more concentrated, providing more confidence in a single figure of performance; we can see that the most constrained design (2) has the least variance. Given these results, which is the most accurate single number that best reflects the effective performance of the design?

The results do not necessarily mean that the design or the development tools are “bad”, but rather that “results may vary” – that is, the “maximum frequency” reported for a single PAR run alone is not a good predictor of how the design will perform under various constraints or conditions. Practically achievable performance depends on many factors not represented in an unconstrained implementation: tool versions, I/O placement constraints, etc. In addition to PAR seeds, there are also “cost tables” for the map process (where resources are allocated for the design according to the target performance that is specified).

Even if this particular example design is not representative of all designs, it serves to show the point. Such dramatic decreases in performance can probably be avoided if designs are constructed more carefully, but the question remains how to demonstrate experimentally that predictable performance was achieved. Reporting the utilization percentage of the device’s resources (or ones available within a partition), and running the design on several device sizes and types of the same family could provide useful information.
Figure 5.2: These histograms show the distribution of the maximum achievable frequency (reported by the timing analysis tool) for place-and-route runs using 100 different PAR seeds. Histograms 1 and 2 are from a single unconstrained implementation and four chained instances on an LX110FF1153-3. Histograms 3 and 4 show the same on an SX50TFF1153-3. And, histogram 5 shows results from a single instance implementation on SX50TFF1153-1 (slowest speed grade).

There are two more ways to better reflect the practical performance of a module. Firstly, careful floorplanning and hand placement of resources into a “relatively placed macro” (RPM) provides consistent implementation by restricting the PAR process. Secondly, we can integrate the cryptographic module to be part of an application that provides the necessary constraints (required throughput, optimization criteria, availability of resources, etc.) Here, it is worth pointing out that incompatible throughput between blocks is wasteful. For example, a 100 MHz soft processor
limiting a high-performance 500 MHz AES module it is attached to usually means that the AES module is wasting resources, as performance correlates to resource-use (pipelining, unrolling, etc.), and dynamic power to frequency. In this case, a better choice would have been to optimize the AES module for 100 MHz operation so it consumes fewer resources, or have different clock domains for the two modules. In real-world applications, decreasing resource use is crucial as it could reduce costs by requiring, for example, a smaller FPGA, which may also decrease circuit board space and static power consumption.

The “speed grade” of a device indicates the maximum frequency rating of particular functions inside the FPGA. For example, Virtex-5 currently has three speed grades: -1 (slowest), -2, and -3 (fastest). Not reporting the target speed grade can lead to misinterpretation of results. To illustrate the importance of this, we ran AES128 for a -3 and -1 SX50T; this is shown in histograms 3 and 5 of Figure 5.2.

Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the results for each of the three implementations reported in Chapter 4, for both the DSP and traditional logic implementations. These histograms provide context to the single best results that were reported, yet it is still unclear which one is the most accurate: best, worst, median, or average? For example, the performance of AES128U_DSP ranges between 290 MHz and 413 MHz with an average of 357 MHz, so maximum throughput can vary significantly. As others,
we reported the best results, though we argue that firstly, designs are unlikely to achieve these results in practice, and secondly, that it is far better to provide results when there is a target performance dictated by the constraints of a larger application. Finally, the results shown in Figure 5.4 show that the significant variability of results is not a property of the DSPs, but of all types of logic.

5.2 Discussion

5.2.1 Source code

All results should be backed up by source code and instructions on how to reproduce them. With access to source code many of the issues we discuss could become moot because anyone can scrutinize the design and extract any information that may be missing from the paper describing it. We think that reproducible and reusable minor work (in scope or originality) may well present a greater contribution to the field than an unverifiable major one. To this end, we propose that conference organizers and journal editors explicitly encourage in calls-for-papers and reviewer guidelines the submission and acceptance of papers that include reports of reproduced research results, which is certainly a worthwhile contribution to the field in its own right. Re-
view forms should include information on the reproducibility of the presented work. The forms should also report the extent to which prior work has been reproduced for the purpose of comparison. Vandewalle et al. [180] defined “degrees” of reproducibility for the signal processing field\(^3\); we propose that the following criteria be added to manuscript review forms where hardware implementations are reported.

5 **Fully reproducible**: complete source code, simulation testbenches, and compilation instructions are available with submission for independent reproduction of results. All implementation conditions are specified.

4 **Fully reproducible later**: authors commit to having complete source code, simulation testbenches, and compilation instructions available for independent reproduction of results at publication time. The commitment should be verified and act as a condition to final paper publication. All implementation conditions are specified.

3 **Limited reproducibility**: (partial) source code is available but requires significant effort to reproduce reported results. All implementation conditions are specified.

2 **Reproducible by redesign**: description of the design is complete and simple enough to reproduce without source code, though this may require significant effort. All implementation conditions are specified.

1 **Unreproducible plus**: description lacks sufficient information for reproducing results given any amount of effort, but implementation report files are available. Or, some implementation conditions are missing.

0 **Unreproducible**: description lacks sufficient information for reproducing results given any amount of effort.

Submitting the source code with the manuscript can be problematic, as it can put the authors at a disadvantage. To avoid this, we propose that authors have the option to commit to public release of the source code upon acceptance and publication. Publication can be in the form of a URL to the source code repository or archive in the body of the publication. The PDF file format, today commonly used for electronic dissemination of research papers, also permits file attachments, which can carry additional material such as raw data and source code. Many scientific

\(^3\)Vandewalle et al. [180] make a distinction between designs that are reproducible using open source software and those that require proprietary software. Unfortunately, there are currently no open source tools for FPGA development, so we cannot make the same distinction. That said, we should acknowledge the difference between freely available proprietary tools (such as the Altera “Web Edition” and Xilinx “WebPACK”) and those which are not (Synplicity, Design Compiler, etc.)
publishers already accept files with related material that they publish and archive alongside the paper\(^4\).

Published source code should include a copyright statement and a license that permits at least the royalty-free evaluation, modification and redistribution of the design for teaching and research purposes. Such a license should be formulated in a manner which aims to not preclude authors receiving royalties for commercial or other non-research applications of the design. Published source code should also include a clear and easy to quote version identifier, to help avoid confusion when improvements are released after a design has already been evaluated in publications. Once a particular version has been quoted in a publication, that version should be preserved even if improved versions are released subsequently.

In cases where releasing code is not possible (commercial implementers, privately funded researchers, proprietary implementation tools) we propose that verbose implementation reports (synthesis, place-and-route, timing, etc.) be provided instead (or in addition at submission time). These reports provide information beyond what may be covered in a paper (complete resources usage, critical paths, implementation constraints) and give an expert examiner more insight into the design without compromising its confidentiality. That said, there is no reason why those who make their work available for scrutiny and reproducibility should not be favored over those who do not (more on this in Section 5.3).

All this is, of course, applicable and desirable for most experimental computing research; the illustrated difficulty and variability of comparing FPGA designs across different build environments make it particularly important in this context.

We think that if the peer-review process rewards submissions that allow results to be reproduced independently by interested readers, the following positive outcomes will follow:

- published source code encourages reuse, modification and reimplementation of the fruits of a research project and thus encourages technology transfer and impact of research;

- published source code encourages other researchers to independently reproduce results, providing more thorough comparison of results under a wider number of platforms and environmental conditions;

\(^4\)Some journals already encourage reproducible research. For example, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security says on its title page: “The Transactions encourages authors to make their publications reproducible by making all information needed to reproduce the presented results available online. This typically requires publishing the code and data used to produce the publication’s figures and tables on a website. It gives other researchers easier access to the work, and facilitates fair comparisons.” http://www.signalprocessingsociety.org/publications/periodicals/forensics/
• published source code allows researchers to better deflect criticism of their designs, as critics now have the opportunity, and can be expected, to demonstrate how to do it better.

• published source code encourages more people to scrutinize the code, as a result of which more mistakes may be found and fixed;

• knowing that the source code will become public encourages sound coding practices (e.g., well formatted, tested, parameterized, and commented code), which may lead to a lower rate of mistakes being made in the first place; and,

• it raises the threshold for publication of FPGA designs.

5.2.2 Optimization goals

When reporting results it is also important to declare what the optimization goals were. Primary optimization goals are: area, throughput, power or a balance between them; designs can also be “parameterisable” allowing them to span more than one category. It is also possible for implementations to have secondary optimization goals relating to a specific situation. For example, the implementation goals of Chapter 4 state throughput as a primary goal, and a secondary goal of minimizing traditional logic resources (LUTs and FFs) at the expense of available Block RAMs and DSPs. Algorithmic properties such as key agility, decryption, encryption or both should be clearly stated, and preferably results from various combinations should be reported. Implementation properties, such as unrolled, pipeline strategy, datapath width, latency, and logic levels, should be spelled out as parameters, and should be pointed out in detailed block diagrams describing the architecture.

As we have seen in previous sections, architectural properties such as FPGA architecture, size, and speed grade, are crucial parameters, and therefore must be reported. Tools used for synthesis, PAR and simulation, including their versions should be specified together with their settings (i.e., optimization strategy, effort, constraints, number of runs).

All results should be taken at the post place-and-route stage; “maximum frequency” from synthesis should never be used because it does not take placement and routing into account, and thus tends to be overly optimistic (synthesis reported a maximum frequency of 583 MHz for AES128U vs. the actual 413 MHz, for example). At a minimum, designs should be simulated at target speed at the post place-and-route stage. Post PAR simulation may be better than behavioral simulation, as synthesis may “optimize” logic in a way that is hard to notice without such simulation. When possible, designs should be verified for correctness on the FPGA itself; on-chip test tools, such as “SignalTap” by Altera [7, AN323] and “ChipScope” by Xilinx [186, UG029], can greatly help this process.
5.2.3 Throughput per slice/area

The “throughput per slice/area” (TPS/A) metric was introduced by Elbirt et al. [61, sIIIIE] for evaluating four AES candidates on a single FPGA architecture, which is one of two cases where TPS should be used. The second is where an implementer is showing better packing of the same design into fewer design elements. Despite Elbirt et al. correctly qualifying their metric to their specific evaluation methodology, it has unfortunately become the primary evaluation criterion for FPGA performance, regardless of architecture.

“Slice”, “logic element”, “adaptive logic module” (ALM) and “configuration logic blocks” (CLB) are all semi-artificial bundlings of more primitive resources such as flip-flops and look-up tables. For Xilinx devices, there are a number of slices per CLB, where each slice represents a collection of FFs and LUTs that can be clocked or enabled from a single source. The amount of resources within a “slice” changes with each family: Virtex-II/PRO and Virtex-4 have 2 FFs and 2 4-LUTs, Virtex-5 has 4 FFs and 4 6-LUTs and, Virtex-6 has 4 FFs and 8 6-LUTs. More subtly, Virtex-5 has two types of LUTs (L and M), which differ in capability. There are many such differences that affect the performance of a design. Using bundlings such as “slices” as the basis for a performance metric across architectures leads to meaningless results.

Chaves et al. [33, t3], as one of many examples, use TPS as the primary evaluation criterion even though BRAMs are used in the designs. Omitting the meaningless metric and highlighting the overall lower resource use of their design would have sufficed to show its advantages. More recently, Bulens et al. [30] also use this metric, but rightfully mark table entries of implementations with BRAMs as “not meaningful”, and generally warn the reader about caveats in the comparison and that it should only be regarded as “general intuition”. Similarly, Drimer et al. [56] present a comparison table followed by a long discussion why such tables are often meaningless. These table entries should not have been included in these papers. We suspect, however, that reviewers’ misunderstanding, and by way of tradition, a comparison table, is considered mandatory at the end of the paper, despite having misleading content. The tendency to evaluate designs on a single criterion motivates this type of poor reporting; other aspects of the design should be taken into account, and we discussed those in Section 5.2. As an example, if we naively reported the TPS of AES128U, we would achieve an astonishing 171 Mbit/slice (52 Gbit/s divided by 321 slices) – clearly, an unusable figure in a fair comparison.

Converting Block RAMs into a number of “equivalent” slices for the purpose of comparison (as suggested, for example, by Good and Benaissa [72] and Saggese et al. [149]) is problematic in several ways. Firstly, such a conversion does not take routing into account, which is a scarce resource, so performance may degrade
if the conversion is actually implemented. On the other hand, the re-distribution of resources may give PAR more freedom, leading to better performance. Only a re-implementation of the converted design can give meaningful results. Secondly, BRAMs can be “free” if they are not used, so again, this is an externality that is hard to account for. Thirdly, the Block RAM is not always used entirely (proportion of BRAM usage are rarely reported). Finally, conversions into “slices” are hard to transfer to other embedded functions (DSPs, etc.)

For all these reasons, designs of different architectures should not be compared without careful consideration. We expect newer FPGA families to be more resource-efficient and performance to increase; Moore’s Law is still with us. However, new architectures are not only different in fabrication technology, but have new embedded elements and other enhancements that improve performance. It is quite natural that identical (generically specified) designs can be packed into fewer 6-LUTs than 4-LUTs, and a naive comparison between them is meaningless (unless the purpose is to show how better, or worse, 6-LUTs perform over 4-LUTs). Other embedded functions, such as large RAMs, fast accumulators and multipliers, also change the way in which a design is implemented. In summary, improvements on the basis of architecture alone should be credited to the FPGA vendors’ IC designers, not to the FPGA design implementers, unless resources were used in a novel way.

If code for results reported on older architectures is available, then for a fairer comparison it should be compiled under the same conditions and for the same platform as the new design. That said, this can be hazardous as well, because the design may have been optimized to a particular architecture and will not fare well implemented on another. Some designs that use DSP48E, for example, will not even work on other architectures, so recompilation should be done with care as well.

5.2.4 Other hazards

*Do not convert resources between FPGAs and ASICs.* Historically, FPGAs were primarily used for prototyping ASICs, so comparing the two made sense, even though there was no “conversion rate” that was not also controversial [116]. The regular structure of early FPGAs as simple interconnected arrays of logic cells made this type of comparison plausible. This is no longer the case with today’s FPGAs, which have complex embedded functions that are distributed unevenly, even across the same family of devices. Designing for ASICs and FPGAs is also fundamentally different. With ASICs the designer has complete freedom over design choices, but an FPGA designer is constrained to specific die sizes and capabilities that were deemed by the FPGA vendors to be the most useful for the majority of their customers.

*Be cautious when comparing with commercial implementations.* There are several cores vendors who sell FPGA implementations of cryptographic primitives and
it is tempting to compare academic implementations to theirs. This can be misleading. On the one hand, minimal implementation details are presented as marketing material, and not as a research result, and code is rarely public. On the other hand, cores vendors must face real-world constraints such as power, and are generally more liable, in a business sense, for their advertised results. Thus, since any claims against commercial implementations are unverifiable, we recommend that academic vs. commercial implementation comparison not be made, or only be presented as a reference with appropriate qualifications.

5.3 Possible objections

Export control laws may hinder disclosure of cryptographic implementations in some countries, though it appears that in many cases those do not apply to non-commercial releases [113]. In the United Kingdom, for example, publishing material on a web server is not considered export [10, s24.3.11]; other countries have no export restrictions at all (Brazil, Mexico, for example [113]). While we cannot advocate breaking laws, we cannot accept “export control” as a blanket argument against reproducible research. Thus, only when researchers show that they cannot disclose source code due to restriction by law, then special consideration should apply to accommodate them.

We realize that full disclosure could reduce the commercial value of published work, but think that commercial interests should not interfere with scientific reproducibility. If those interests prevail, researchers can choose to publish unreproducible research at venues with less impact. Our reproducibility evaluation criteria (Section 5.2) should encourage this notion. This may also apply equally well to privately funded research.

Other objections. Some argue\(^a\) that source code disclosure by researchers will both cause loss in value of commercial cores, and reduce the job market for graduates. Superficially, the argument that industry may suffer from open hardware seem to have some merit. On close inspection, however, we find that HDL is only a part of a complete package that includes customization, support, and accountability; none of which are available from academic researchers (unless they get hired). The proposition that graduates who implemented a reproducible and efficient FPGA design are less employable is bizarre; what better way is there to demonstrate skill than show code? In the open source software community, good developers greatly benefit from demonstrating their capabilities by being hired as consultants.

\(^a\)We have received these comments through peer review of an unpublished manuscript describing most of the content of this chapter.
5.4 Related work

This chapter is not the first discussion on the difficulties of comparing FPGA designs. Yan et al. [189] warn that some published results on FPGA architectural questions (e.g., finding the optimal look-up table size) are highly sensitive to experimental assumptions, tools and techniques and that the variability of the results can affect the conclusions. Gaj and Chodowiec [67] and Dandalis et al. [43] tackled the comparison of the AES candidates (arguably, a harder task than comparing the same cipher). Gittins et al. [70] provided a comprehensive analysis and criticism of published FPGA implementation results of AES and SHA, as part of the eSTREAM stream cipher selection process; Gürkaynak and Luethi [78] provided constructive lessons from their experiences comparing candidates for the same competition. Järvinen et al. [98] compared AES and hash function implementations with a discussion on comparability. Järvinen [96, ch5] has been the most recent to comprehensively compare FPGA AES designs, also echoing the concerns over fair comparison previously discussed in Drimer et al. [56, s6]. Finally, Vandewalle et al. [180] have comprehensively discussed reproducible research in the signal processing field and scored 134 papers for their reproducibility. Among many other interesting observations, they found that less than 9% have the source code available. It may be interesting to conduct a similar experiment for FPGA implementations, or perhaps just survey authors for the state and availability of the code that was used for published results.

5.5 Conclusions

Our primary conclusion, namely that the release of easy-to-rebuild source code must become the norm, echoes sentiments that have repeatedly been expressed by researchers in other disciplines. One poignant formulation of Claerbout’s insights on reproducibility is by Buckheit and Donoho [29, s3.1] (emphasis in the original):

An article about computational science in a scientific publication is not the scholarship itself, it is merely advertising of the scholarship. The actual scholarship is the complete software environment which generated the figures.

We concentrated on the implementation of cryptographic primitives on FPGAs, although the discussion may apply to other areas of FPGA implementations and VLSI research. Reproducible results are surely a concern in any experimental field. In ours, the topic becomes particularly timely in the context of competitions for the selection of standard algorithms, such as the upcoming SHA-3\(^5\), where FPGA

\(^{5}\text{NIST, “Cryptographic hash algorithm competition”}, \ http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/}
implementation results start to appear [127] and may significantly influence the choice of finalists. (Similar issues were encountered during the AES competition in the early 2000s; for SHA-3 we anticipate that the candidates’ authors to supply FPGA reference designs in addition to C code [64, s5.2].)

Try as we might, any comparison methodology will eventually be contested as unfair, and be left unused by some or all, and there is no reasonable way to eliminate biases due to asymmetric effort, incompatible architectures, and misrepresentation of results. Our claim is, however, that release of source code is as fair and transparent as we can get. It conforms to the scientific method, and greatly helps the comparison process, even if it may not be perfect.

We are aiming at a moving target. Firstly, because our target platforms are highly flexible, and do not have a standard interface\(^6\) – there are many ways to implement a single design. And secondly, technology advances rapidly and evaluation methodologies tend to remain static\(^7\), due to either high development and maintenance costs, or simply because the core people who developed the methodologies moved on or lost interest. Can we do better?

It may be unavoidable – especially for competitions such as for SHA-3 – to periodically define a number of platforms (i.e., FPGA type, size, speed grade, etc.) and software tool versions and settings (efforts, seeds, etc.) from the main FPGA vendors for which results are expected. A long-term committee – with permanent roles, but temporary members – made of researchers and industry representatives could define these\(^8\). A common HDL interface could be created in which the “module under test” is inserted and implemented, with reasonable assumptions about I/O bandwidth (Chen et al. [34] have proposed and implemented such interface for SHA-3). Results would then be categorized based on the performance for throughput, area, or power, with predefined targets rather than acceptance of “best case achievable” (which can vary significantly, as we have seen). Authors would be required to supply the source code and report results for the common platform and settings (at the least). The module’s HDL will be categorized as “generic” or “architecture-specific” to distinguish between designs that use specific features of the architecture and those that do not (generic designs tend to be more portable, but do not perform as well as architecture specific ones).

We leave further discussion to the community, and hope to actively participate in achieving the goals set in this chapter.

\(^6\)Standard interfaces and “fixed” hardware allow benchmarking methodologies such as “Super-COP” [40] to be developed.

\(^7\)Raphael Njuguna briefly surveys the many FPGA and CAD tool benchmarking methodologies over the past 20 years, “A survey of FPGA benchmarks”,

\(^8\)Industry participation is crucial, as they can shed light on the otherwise opaque operation of their tools. It may also promote a more open approach to EDA tools.
Chapter 6

Distance bounding for wired applications

Relay attacks were possibly first described by Conway [38, p75], explaining how someone who does not know the rules of the game chess could defeat a Grandmaster – by challenging two Grandmasters to a postal chess game and relaying moves between them. While appearing to match the Grandmasters’ skill, the attacker will either win against one, or draw against both. As the above scenario demonstrates, relay attacks can be very simple because they do not require the attacker to understand the “protocol” or modify the content of messages. The sophistication required to launch such attacks is not high, though defending against them can be, as discussed later in this chapter. Successful relay attacks have been demonstrated on deployed systems such as ISO 14443 [83, ch4] [101], and discussed in the context of wireless networks as “wormhole attacks” [89]. Here, we demonstrate how one smartcard payment system is vulnerable, and propose a distance bounding implementation as a defense to protect against it, and be applied to other applications.

6.1 Background

EMV [62], named after its creators, Europay, Mastercard and Visa, is the primary protocol for smartcard debit and credit card payments in Europe, and is known by a variety of different names in the countries where it is deployed (e.g. “Chip and PIN” in the UK). Here, we provide a brief introduction to EMV, and refer the reader to the EMV specifications [62], and Drimer and Murdoch [55], Drimer et al. [58] for a more detailed discussion.

EMV uses ISO 7816 [94] as the basis for the electrical and communication interfaces. The EMV interface uses five of the eight contact pads: ground, power, reset, bi-directional asynchronous serial I/O for data, and a clock of 1 to 5 MHz, supplied by the reader to the card. In their non-volatile memory, smartcards may hold
account details, cryptographic keys, a personal identification number (PIN) and a count of how many consecutive times the PIN has been incorrectly entered\(^1\). Cards capable of asymmetric cryptography can cryptographically sign account details under the card’s private key to perform card authentication. The merchant’s terminal can verify the signature with a public key which is stored on the card along with a certificate signed by the issuer whose key is, in turn, signed by the operator of the payment system network. This method is known as dynamic data authentication (DDA) or the variant, combined data authentication (CDA).

As the merchants are not trusted with the symmetric keys held by the card, which would enable them to produce forgeries, cards that are only capable of symmetric cryptography cannot be reliably authenticated offline. However, the card can still hold a static signature of account details and corresponding certificate chain. The terminal can authenticate the card by checking this signature, known as static data authentication (SDA), but the lack of freshness allows replay attacks to occur.

### 6.2 Relay attack

Desmedt et al. [47] have shown how relay attacks could be applied against a challenge-response payment protocol, in the so called “mafia fraud”. We use this scenario, illustrated in Figure 6.1, where an unsuspecting restaurant patron, Alice, inserts her

\(^1\)Using timing analysis we were able to determine that the card we examined does this correctly. The counter’s reset value is set to the value of minimum attempts (usually ‘3’). For PIN verification, the card first decrements the attempt counter, then checks, and finally, it resets the counter if the PIN verified correctly. If there were any discernible differences between the successful and failed PIN comparison, and the decrement occurred after verification, we would have been able to stop the operation after failure (by powering the card off), and have infinite amount of attempts.
smartcard into a PIN entry device (PED) in order to pay a $20 charge, which is presented to her on the display. The PED looks just like any one of the numerous types of PEDs she has used in the past. This particular PED, however, has had its original circuitry replaced by the waiter, Bob, and instead of being connected to the bank, it is connected to a laptop placed behind the counter. As Alice inserts her card into the counterfeit PED, Bob sends a message to his accomplice, Carol, who is about to pay $2,000 for a diamond ring at Dave’s jewelry shop. Carol inserts a counterfeit card into Dave’s PED, which looks legitimate to Dave, but conceals a wire connected to a laptop in her backpack.

Bob and Carol’s laptops are communicating wirelessly using mobile-phones or some other network. The data to and from Dave’s PED is relayed to the restaurant’s counterfeit PED such that the diamond purchasing transaction is placed on Alice’s card. The PIN entered by Alice is recorded by the counterfeit PED and is sent, via a laptop and wireless headset, to Carol who enters it into the genuine PED when asked. When the transaction is over, the criminals have paid for a diamond ring using Alice’s money, who got her meal for free, but will be surprised to find the $2,000 charge on her bank statement.

Despite the theoretical risk being documented, EMV is vulnerable to the relay attack, as suggested by Anderson et al. [15]. Some believed that engineering difficulties in deployment would make the attack too expensive, or even impossible. The following section will show that equipment to implement the attack is readily available, and costs are within the expected returns of fraud.

6.2.1 Implementation

We chose off-the-shelf components that allowed for fast development rather than miniaturization or cost-effectiveness. The performance requirements were modest, with the main requirement being that our custom hardware fit within the PED.

6.2.1.1 Counterfeit PED

Second hand Chip and PIN PEDs are readily available for purchase online and their sale is not restricted. While some are as cheap as $10, our PED was obtained for $50 from eBay and was ideal for our purposes due to its copious internal space. Even if they were not so readily available, a plausible counterfeit could be made from scratch as it is only necessary that it appears legitimate to untrained cardholders.

Instead of reverse engineering the existing circuit, we stripped most internal hardware except for the keypad and LCD screen, and replaced it with a $200 Xilinx Spartan-3 small factor, USB-controlled, development board. We also kept the

(a) With the exterior intact, the PED’s original internal circuitry was replaced by a small factor FPGA board (left); FPGA based smartcard emulator (right) connected to counterfeit card (front).

(b) Customer view of the PED. Here it is playing Tetris to demonstrate that we have full control of the display and keypad.

Figure 6.2: Photographs of tampered PED and counterfeit card.

original smartcard reader slot, but wired its connections to a $40 Gemalto USB GemPC Twin\(^3\) reader so we could connect it to the laptop. The result is a PED with which we can record keypad strokes, display content on the screen and interact with the inserted smartcard. The PED appears and behaves just like a genuine one to the customer but cannot communicate with the bank or payment network, as it could before it was tampered with.

6.2.1.2 Counterfeit card

At the jeweler's, Carol needs to insert a counterfeit card connected to her laptop into Dave’s PED. We took a genuine Chip and PIN card and ground down the resin-covered wire bonds that connect the chip to the back of the card’s pads. With the pads exposed, using a soldering iron, we ironed into the plastic thin, flat wires to the edge of the card. The card looks authentic from the top side, but was actually wired on the back side, as shown in Figure 6.2. The counterfeit card was then connected through a 1.5 m cable to a $150 Xilinx Spartan-3E FPGA Starter Kit [186, UG230] board to buffer the communications and translate them between the ISO 7816 and RS-232 protocols. Since the FPGA is not 5 V tolerant, we use 390\(\Omega\) resistors on the channels that receive data from the card. For the bi-directional I/O channel, we use the Maxim 1740/1 SIM/smartcard level translator\(^4\), which costs less than $2.

\(^3\)http://www.gemalto.com/products/pc_link_readers/#PC_Twin
\(^4\)http://www.maxim-ic.com/quick_view2.cfm/qv_pk/2174
6.2.1.3 Controlling software

The counterfeit PED and card are controlled by separate laptops via USB and RS-232 interfaces, respectively, using custom software written in Python. The laptops communicate via TCP over IEEE 802.11b wireless, although in principle this could be GSM or another wireless protocol. This introduces significant latency, but far less than would be a problem as the timing critical operations on the counterfeit card are performed by the FPGA.

One complication of selecting an off-the-shelf USB smartcard reader for the counterfeit PED is that it operates at the application protocol data unit (APDU) level and buffers an entire command or response before sending it to the smartcard or the PC. This increases the time between when the genuine PED sends a command and when the response can be sent. Were the counterfeit terminal to incorporate a character-level card reader, the partial command code could be sent to the genuine card and the result examined to determine the direction, but this is not permissible for APDU level transactions. Hence, other than the fact that the controlling software must be told the direction for each of the 14 command codes, the relay attack is protocol-agnostic and could be deployed against any ISO 7816 based system.

6.2.2 Procedure and timing

EMV offers a large variety of options, but the generality of the relay attack allows our implementation to account for them all; for simplicity, we will describe the procedure for the common case in the UK. That is, SDA card authentication (only the static cryptographic signature of the card details is checked), online transaction authorization (the merchant will connect to the issuer to verify that adequate funds are available) and offline plaintext PIN cardholder verification (the PIN entered by the cardholder is sent to the card, unencrypted, and the card will check its correctness).

Transaction authorization is accomplished by the card generating an application cryptogram (AC), which is authenticated by the card’s symmetric key and incorporates transaction details from the terminal, a card transaction counter, and whether the PIN was entered correctly. Thus, the issuing bank can confirm that the genuine card was available and the correct PIN was used.

The protocol can be described in six steps:

Initialization: The card is powered up and returns the answer to reset (ATR).

Then the PED selects one of the card’s possible payment applications.

Read application data: The PED requests card details (account number, name, expiration date, etc.) and verifies the static signature.
Cardholder verification: The cardholder enters the PIN into the merchant’s PED for verification by the card. If correct, the card returns a success code, otherwise the cardholder may try again until the maximum number of PIN attempts have been exceeded.

Generate AC 1: The PED requests an authorization request cryptogram (ARQC) from the card, which is sent to the issuing bank for verification, that then responds with the issuer authentication data.

External authenticate: The PED sends the issuer authentication data to the card.

Generate AC 2: The PED asks the card for a transaction certificate (TC) which the card returns to the PED if, based on the issuer authentication data and other internal state, the transaction is approved. Otherwise, it returns an application authentication cryptogram (AAC), signifying the transaction was denied. The TC is recorded by the merchant to demonstrate that it should receive the funds.

This flow imposes some constraints on the relay attack. Firstly, Alice must insert her card before Carol inserts her counterfeit card in order for initialization and read application data to be performed. Secondly, Alice must enter her PIN before Carol is required to enter it into the genuine PED. Thirdly, Alice must not remove her card until the Generate AC 2 stage has occurred. Thus, the two sides of the radio link must be synchronized, but there is significant leeway as Carol can stall until needing to insert her card.

After that point, the counterfeit card can request extra time from the terminal, before sending the first response, by sending a null procedure byte (0x60). The counterfeit terminal can also delay Alice by pretending to dial-up the bank and waiting for authorization until Carol’s transaction is complete. All timing critical sections, such as sending the ATR in response to de-assertion of reset and the encoding/decoding of bytes sent on the I/O, are implemented on the FPGA to ensure a fast enough response. There are wide timing margins between the command and response, so this is managed in software.

6.2.3 Results

We tested our relay setup with a number of different smartcard readers in order to test its robustness. Firstly, we used a Chip Authentication Program (CAP) reader, which is a one-time-password generator for use in online banking, and implements a subset of the EMV protocol. Specifically, it performs cardholder verification by checking the PIN and requests an application cryptogram, which may be validated.
Our relay setup was able to reliably complete transactions, even when we introduced an extra three seconds of latency between command and response.

The CAP readers we examined use the lower clock frequency range allowed by ISO 7816 (1 MHz to 1.5 MHz) to lower power consumption. We also tested our relay setup with a GemPC Twin reader, which operates at 4 MHz. The card reader was controlled by our own software, which simulates a Chip and PIN transaction. Here, the relay device also worked without any problems and results were identical to when the card was connected directly to the reader.

Finally, we developed a portable version of the equipment, and took this to a merchant with a live Chip and PIN terminal. With the consent of the merchant and cardholder, we executed the relay attack. In addition to the commands and responses being relayed, the counterfeit terminal was connected to a laptop which, through voice-synthesis software, read out the PIN to our “Carol”. The transaction was completed successfully. The first live demonstration of our equipment operating wirelessly between a Cambridge restaurant and book store was shown on the UK consumer rights program BBC Watchdog on 6th February 2007.

6.2.4 Further applications and feasibility

The relay attack is also applicable where “Alice” is not the legitimate card holder, but a thief who has stolen the card and observed the PIN. To frustrate legal investigation and fraud detection measures, criminals commonly use cards in a different country from where they were stolen. Magnetic stripe cards are convenient to use in this way, as the data can be read and sent overseas, to be written on to counterfeit cards. However, chip cards cannot be fully duplicated, so the physical card would need to be mailed, introducing a time window where the cardholder may report the card stolen or lost.

The relay attack can allow criminals to avoid this delay by making the card available online using a card reader and a computer connected to the Internet. The criminal’s accomplice in another country could connect to the card remotely and place transactions with a counterfeit one locally. The timing constraints in this scenario are more relaxed as there is no customer expecting to remove their genuine card. Finally, in certain types of transactions, primarily with unattended terminals, the PIN may not be required, making this attack easier still.

APACS\(^6\), the UK payment association, said at the time we demonstrated the attack that they are unaware of any cases of relay attacks being used against Chip and PIN in the UK \cite{16}. The likely reason is that even though the cost and the technical

\(^5\)We analyze the security properties of these devices, and reversed engineered the protocol they use in Drimer et al. \cite{59}.

\(^6\)In June 2009, the “Association for Payment Clearing Services” re-branded itself to be called the “UK Payment Administration”.

121
expertise that are required for implementing the attack are relatively low, there are
easier ways to defeat the system. Methods such as card counterfeiting/theft, mail
interception, and cardholder impersonation are routinely reported and are more
flexible in deployment.

These security holes are gradually being closed, but card fraud remains a lucrative
industry – in 2008 £610m of fraud was suffered by UK banks\textsuperscript{7}. Criminals will
adapt to the new environment and, to maintain their income, will likely resort to
more technically demanding methods, so now is the time to consider how to prevent
relay attacks for when that time arrives.

6.3 Defenses

The previous section described how feasible it is to deploy relay attacks against Chip
and PIN and other smartcard based authorization systems in practice. Thus, sys-
tem designers must develop mitigation techniques while, for economic consideration,
staying within the deployed EMV framework as much as possible.

6.3.1 Non-solutions

In this section we describe a number of solutions that are possible, or have been
proposed, against our attack and evaluate their overall effectiveness.

*Tamper-resistant terminals.* A pre-requisite of our relay attack is that Alice
will insert her card and enter her PIN into a terminal that relays these details to
the remote attacker. The terminal, therefore, must either be tampered with or be
completely counterfeit, but still acceptable to cardholders. This implies a potential
solution – allow the cardholder to detect malicious terminals so they will refuse to
use them.

This is not feasible. Although terminals do implement internal tamper-responsive
measures, when triggered, they only delete keys and other data without leaving
visible evidence to the cardholder. Tamper-resistant seals could be inspected by
customers, but Johnston et al. \cite{99} have shown that many types of seals can be
trivially bypassed. Better seals could be used, but without training to detect tam-
pering, they too will be ineffective. It seems infeasible, and unjust, to require that
all customers be trained to detect tampering, thus also making them responsible for
ant fraud they did not detect. In addition, time-pressure and awkward placement
of terminals can make it extremely difficult for even the most observant customers
to check for tampering, and act on it.

Even if seals were effective, there are, as of July 2009, 289 “Payment Card
Industry PIN Entry Device” (PCI-PED) approved terminal designs from 99 different

\textsuperscript{7}APACS, “2008 fraud figures announced by APACS”, \url{http://www.apacs.org.uk/09_03_19.htm}
vendors\textsuperscript{8}, so cardholders cannot be expected to identify them all. Were there only one terminal design, the use of counterfeit terminals would have to be prevented, which raises the same problems as tamper-resistant seals. Finally, with the large sums of money netted by criminals from card fraud, fabricating plastic parts is well within their budget.

*Imposing additional timing constraints.* While relay attacks will induce extra delays between commands being sent by the terminal and responses being received, existing smartcard systems are tolerant to very high latencies. We have successfully tested our relay device after introducing a three second delay into transactions, in addition to the inherent delay of our design. This extra round-trip time could be exploited by an attacker 450,000 km away, assuming that signals propagate at the speed of light. Perhaps, then, attacks could be prevented by requiring that cards reply to commands precisely after a fixed delay. Terminals could then confirm that a card responds to commands promptly and will otherwise reject a transaction.

Other than the *generate AC* command, which includes a terminal nonce, the terminal’s behavior is very predictable. So an attacker could preemptively request these details from the genuine card then send them to the counterfeit card where they are buffered for quick response. Thus, the value of latency as a distance measure can only be exploited at the *generate AC* stages. Furthermore, Clulow et al. \cite{37} and Hancke and Kuhn \cite{85} show how wireless distance bounding protocols, based on channels which were not designed for the purpose, can be circumvented. Their analysis applies equally well to wired protocols such as ISO 7816.

To hide the latency introduced by mounting the relay attack, the attacker aims to sample signals early and send signals late, while still maintaining their accuracy. In ISO 7816, cards and terminals are required to sample the signal between the 20\% and 80\% portion of the bit-time and aim to sample at the 50\% point. However, an attacker with sensitive equipment could sample near the beginning, and send their bit late. The attacker then gains 50\% of a bit-width in both directions, which at a 5 MHz clock is 37 µs, or 11 km.

The attacker could also over-clock the genuine card so the responses are returned more quickly. If a DES calculation takes a 100 ms, a 1\% increase would give a 300 km distance advantage. Even if the calculation time was fixed, and only receiving the response from the card could be accelerated, the counterfeit card could preemptively reply with the predictable 11 bytes (2 byte response code, 5 byte *read more command*, 2 byte header and 2 byte counter) each taking 12 bit-widths (start, 8 data bits, stop and 2 bits guard time). At 5 MHz + 1\% this gives the attacker 98 µs, or 29 km.

\textsuperscript{8}PCI Security Standard Council, “Approved PIN Entry Devices”, \url{https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/ped/pedapprovallist.html}
One EMV-specific problem is that the contents of the payload in the *generate AC* command are specified by the card in the *card risk management data object list* (CDOL). Although the terminal nonce should be at the end of the message in order to achieve maximum resistance to relay attacks, if the CDOL is not signed (as do some of the cards we examined), the attacker could substitute the CDOL for one requesting the challenge near the beginning. Upon receiving the challenge from the terminal, the attacker can then send this to the genuine card. Other than the nonce, the rest of the *generate AC* payload is predictable, so the counterfeit terminal can restore the challenge to the correct place, fill in the other fields and send it to the genuine card. Thus, the genuine card will send the correct response, even before the terminal thinks it has finished sending the command. A payload will be roughly 30 bytes, which at 5 MHz gives 27 ms and a 8 035 km distance advantage.

Nevertheless, eliminating needless tolerance to response latency would decrease the options available to the attacker. If it were possible to roll out this modification to terminals as a software upgrade, it might be expedient to plan for this alteration to be quickly deployed in reaction to actual use of the relay attack. While we have described how this countermeasure could be circumvented, attackers who build and test their system with high latency would be forced to re-architect it if the acceptable latency of deployed terminals were decreased without warning.

### 6.3.2 Procedural improvements

Today, merchants and till operators are accustomed to looking away while customers enter their PIN and seldom handle the card at all, while customers are often advised not to allow anyone but themselves to handle the card because of card skimming. In the case of relay attacks, this assists the criminal, not the honest customer or merchant. If the merchant examined the card, even superficially, he would detect the relay attack, as we implemented it, by spotting the wires. That said, it is not infeasible that an RFID proximity card could be modified to relay data wirelessly to a local receiver and therefore appear to be a genuine one.

A stronger level of protection can be achieved if, after the transaction is complete, the merchant checks not only that the card presented is legitimate, but also that the embossed card number matches the one on the receipt. In the case of the relay attack, the receipt will show the victim’s card number, whereas the counterfeit card will show the a different one. For these to match, the criminal must have appropriate blank cards and an embossing machine, in addition to knowing the victim’s card number in advance.
6.3.3 Hardware alterations

Cardholders may use their own trusted devices as part of the transaction [17]. The *electronic attorney* “man-in-the-middle defense”, suggested by Anderson and Bond [11], is inserted into the terminal’s card slot while the customer inserts their card into the device. The device can display the transaction value as it is parsed from the data sent from the terminal, allowing the customer to verify that she is charged the expected amount. If the customer approves the transaction, she presses a button on the electronic attorney itself, which allows the protocol to proceed. This trusted user interface is necessary, since if a PIN was used as normal, a criminal could place a legitimate transaction first, which is accepted by the customer, but with knowledge of the PIN a subsequent fraudulent one can be placed. Alternatively, one-time-PINs could be used, but at a cost in usability.

Because the cardholder controls the electronic attorney, and it protects the cardholder’s interests, the incentives are properly aligned. Market forces in the business of producing and selling these devices should encourage security improvements. However, this extra device will increase costs, increase complexity and may not be approved of by banking organizations. Additionally, criminals may attempt to discourage their use, either explicitly or by arranging the card slot so the use of an electronic attorney is difficult. A variant of the trusted user interface is to integrate a display into the card itself [19].

Another realization of the trusted user interface for payment applications is to integrate the functionality of a smartcard into the customer’s mobile phone. This can allow communication with the merchant’s terminal using near field communications (NFC) [93]. This approach is already under development and has the advantage of being a customer-controlled device with a large screen and convenient keypad, allowing the merchant’s name and transaction value to be shown and once authorized by the user, entry of the PIN. Wireless communications also ease the risk of a malicious merchant arranging the terminal so that the trusted display device is not visible. Although mobile phones are affordable and ubiquitous, they may still not be secure enough for payment applications if they can be targeted by malware.

6.4 Distance bounding

None of the techniques detailed in Section 6.3.1 are adequate to completely defeat relay attacks. They are either impractical (tamper-resistant terminals), expensive (adding extra hardware) or circumventable (introducing tighter timing constraints and requiring merchants to check card numbers). Due to the lack of a customer-trusted user interface on the card, there is no way to detect a mismatch between the data displayed on the terminal and the data authorized by the card. However,
relay attacks can be foiled if either party can securely establish the position of the card which is authorizing the transaction, relative to the terminal processing it.

Absolute global positioning is infeasible due to the cost and form factor requirements of smartcards being incompatible with GPS, and also because the civilian version is not resistant to spoofing [115]. However, it is possible for the terminal to securely establish a maximum distance bound, by measuring the round-trip-time between it and the smartcard; if this time is too long, an alarm would be triggered and the transaction refused. Despite the check being performed at the merchant end, the incentive-compatibility problem is lessened because the distance verification is performed by the terminal and does not depend on the sales assistant being diligent.

The approach of preventing relay attacks by measuring round-trip-time was first proposed by Beth and Desmedt [22] but Brands and Chaum [25] described the first concrete protocol. Hancke [83] provides a comprehensive analysis of existing distance bounding protocols. The cryptographic exchange in our proposal is based on the Hancke-Kuhn protocol [83, 84], because it requires fewer steps than others, and it is more efficient if there are transmission bit errors compared to Brands-Chaum. However, the Hancke-Kuhn protocol was proposed for ultra-wideband radio (UWB), whereas we require synchronous half-duplex wired transmission.

One characteristic of distance-bounding protocols, unlike most others, is that the physical transmission layer is security-critical and tightly bound to the other layers, so care must be taken when changing the transmission medium. Wired transmission introduces some differences, which must be taken into consideration. Firstly, to avoid circuitry damage or signal corruption, in a wired half duplex transmission, contention (both sides driving the I/O at the same time) must be avoided. Secondly, whereas UWB only permits the transmission of a pulse, a wire allows a signal level to be maintained for an extended period of time. Hence, we may skip the initial distance-estimation stage of the Hancke-Kuhn setup and simplify our implementation; no other modifications to the protocol itself were made.

While in this section we will describe our implementation in terms of EMV, implemented to be compatible with ISO 7816, it should be applicable to any wired, half-duplex synchronous serial communication line.

6.4.1 Protocol

In EMV, only the card authenticates itself to the terminal so we follow this practice. Using the terminology of Hancke-Kuhn, the smartcard is the prover $P$, and the terminal is the verifier $V$. This is also appropriate because the Hancke-Kuhn protocol puts more complexity in the verifier than the prover, and terminals are several orders of magnitude more expensive and capable than the cards. The protocol
Table 6.1: Example of the rapid bit-exchange phase of the distance bounding protocol. For clarity, $x$ is shown instead of the response bits not sent by the prover. The left most bit is sent first.

is described as follows:

Initialization:

$$V \rightarrow P : \quad N_V \in \{0, 1\}^a$$

$$P \rightarrow V : \quad N_P \in \{0, 1\}^a$$

$$P : \quad (R_0^{i}||R_1^{i}) = \text{MAC}_K(N_V, N_P) \in \{0, 1\}^{2b}$$

Rapid bit-exchange($i = 1,...,b$):

$$V \rightarrow P : \quad C_i \in \{0, 1\}$$

$$P \rightarrow V : \quad R_{Ci}^{i} \in \{0, 1\}$$

At the start of the initialization phase, nonces and parameters are exchanged over a reliable data channel, with timing not being critical. $N_V$ and $N_P$ provide freshness to the transaction in order to prevent replay attacks, with the latter preventing a middle-man from running the complete protocol twice between the two phases using the same $N_V$ and complementary $C_i$ and thus, obtain both $R_0^i$ and $R_1^i$. The prover produces a MAC under its key $K$ using a keyed pseudo-random function, the result of which is split into two shift registers, $R_0^i$ and $R_1^i$.

In the timing-critical rapid bit-exchange phase, the maximum distance between the two participants is determined. $V$ sends a cryptographically secure pseudorandom single-bit challenge $C_i$ to $P$, which in turn immediately responds with $R_{Ci}^i$, the next single-bit response, from the corresponding shift register. A transaction of a 32-bit exchange is shown in Table 6.1.

If a symmetric key is used, this will require an online transaction to verify the result because the terminal does not store $K$. If the card has a private/public key pair, a session key can be established and the final challenge-response can also be verified offline. The values $a$ and $b$, the nonce and shift register bit lengths, respectively, are security parameters that are set according to the application and are further discussed in Section 6.4.4.

This exchange succeeds in measuring distance because it necessitates that a
response bit arrive at a certain time after the challenge bit has been sent. When the protocol execution is complete, V’s response register, $R_C^i$, is verified by the terminal or bank to determine if the prover is within the allowed distance for the transaction.

6.4.2 Implementation

ISO 7816, our target application, dictates that the smartcard (prover) is a low resource device, and therefore, should have minimal additions in order to keep costs down; this was our prime constraint. The terminal (verifier), on the other hand, is a capable, expensive device that can accommodate moderate changes and additions without adversely affecting its cost. Of course, the scheme must be secure to all attacks devised by a highly capable adversary that can relay signals at the speed of light, is able to ensure perfect signal integrity, and can clock the smartcard at higher frequencies than it was designed for. We assume, however, that this attacker does not have access to the internal operation of the terminal and that extracting secret material out of the smartcard, or interfering with its security critical functionality, is not economical considering the returns from the fraud.

6.4.3 Circuit elements and signals

For this section refer to Table 6.2 for signal names and their function, Figure 6.4 for the circuit diagram and Figure 6.3 for the signal waveforms.

**Clocks and frequencies.** As opposed to the prover, the verifier may operate at high frequencies. We implemented the protocol such that one clock cycle of the verifier’s operating frequency $f_V$ determines the distance resolution. Since signals cannot travel faster than the speed of light $c$ the upper-bound distance resolution is,
Figure 6.3: Waveforms of a single bit-exchange of the distance bounding protocol. $f_V$ is the verifier’s clock; DRV$_C$ drives the challenge on to I/O; SMPL$_R$ samples the response; CLK$_{V-P}$ is the prover’s clock; I/O$_V$ and I/O$_P$ are versions of the I/O on each side accounting for the propagation delay $t_d$; SMPL$_C$ is the received clock that is used to sample the challenge; and DRV$_R$ drives the response on to the I/O.

Figure 6.4: Simplified diagram of the distance bounding circuit. DRV$_C$ controls when the challenge is put on the I/O line. CLK$_V$ controls the verifier’s circuit; it is divided and is received as SMPL$_C$ at the prover where it is used to sample the challenge. A delay element produces DRV$_R$, which controls when the response is put on the I/O, while at the verifier SMPL$_R$ samples it. The pull-up resistor $R$ is present to pull the I/O line to a stable state when it is not actively driven by either side.

Therefore, $c/f_V$. Thus, $f_V$ should be chosen to be as high as possible. We selected 200 MHz, allowing 1.5 m resolution under ideal conditions for the attacker. The prover’s operating frequency $f_P$ is compatible with any signal frequencies having a high-time greater than $t_q + f_V^{-1} + t_d$, where $t_q$ defines the time between when the challenge is being driven onto the I/O and when the response is sampled by the verifier; $t_d$ is the delay on the transmission line between V and P. In order to be compatible with ISO 7816, which specifies that the smartcard/prover needs to operate at 1–5 MHz, we have chosen that $f_P = f_V/128 \approx 1.56$ MHz.

**Shift registers.** There are four 64-bit shift registers. The challenge shift register
Figure 6.5: The Xilinx XUP board [186, UG069] with a Virtex-II PRO 30 FPGA on which the distance bounding design was implemented. Both verifier and prover reside on the same chip connected only by two same-length transmission lines for I/O and clock. Measurements were taken at exposed I/O vias on the back side of the PCB, as close as possible to I/O pins.

is clocked by CLK\textsubscript{V} and is shifted one clock cycle before it is driven on to the I/O line by DRV\textsubscript{C}. The verifier’s response shift register is also clocked by CLK\textsubscript{V} and is shifted on the rising edge of SMPL\textsubscript{R}. On the prover side, the two response shift registers are clocked and shifted by SMPL\textsubscript{C}.

**Bi-directional I/O.** The verifier and prover communicate using a bi-directional I/O with tri-state buffers at each end. These buffers are controlled by the signals DRV\textsubscript{C} and DRV\textsubscript{R} and are implemented such that only one side drives the I/O line at any given time in order to prevent contention. This is a consequence of adapting the Hancke-Kuhn protocol to a wired medium, and implies that the duration of the challenge must be no longer than necessary, so as to obtain the most accurate distance bound. A pull-up is also present, as with the ISO 7816 specification, to maintain a high state when the line is not driven by either side.

**Timing.** A timing diagram of a single challenge-response exchange is shown in Figure 6.3. The circuit shown in Figure 6.4 was implemented on an FPGA using Verilog (not all control signals are shown for simplicity). Since we used a single chip, the I/O and clock lines were “looped-back” using transmission wires of varying lengths to simulate the distance between the verifier and prover as shown in Figure 6.5.

The first operation is clocking the challenge shift register (not shown), which is driven on to the I/O line by DRV\textsubscript{C} on the following \( f_\text{V} \) clock cycle for a period \( t_n \). \( t_n \) should be made long enough to ensure that the prover can adequately and reliably sample the challenge, and as short as possible to allow the response to be rapidly sent while not causing contention. The clock sent to \( P \), CLK\textsubscript{V→P}, is asserted \( t_m \) after the rising edge of DRV\textsubscript{C}. Both CLK\textsubscript{V→P} and the I/O line have the
same propagation delay $t_d$ and when the clock edge arrives (now called SMPL$_C$), it samples the challenge. The same clock edge also shifts the two response registers, one of which is chosen by a 2:1 multiplexer that is controlled by the sampled challenge. DRV$_R$ is a delayed replica of SMPL$_C$, which is created using a delay element.

The delay $t_p$ allows the response shift register signals to shift and propagate through the multiplexer, preventing the intermediate state of the multiplexer from being leaked. Otherwise, the attacker could discover both responses to the previous challenge in the case where $C_i \neq C_{i-1}$. It should be at least as long as the period from the rising edge of SMPL$_C$ to when the response emerges from the multiplexer’s output. Using placement constraints, we deliberately caused routing delays to adjust $t_p$, which is equal to 3.5 ns$^9$. When DRV$_R$ is asserted, the response is being driven onto the I/O line until the falling edge.

We note that in hindsight, a register placed between the multiplexer choosing the responses and the I/O driver would have been prudent in order to better assure that no leakage occurs if the design is modified (through different placement) or if an attacker is able to influence delays externally.

At the verifier, the response is sampled by SMPL$_R$ after $t_q$ from the assertion of CLK$_{V-P}$. The value of $t_q$ determines the distance bound and should be long enough to account for the propagation delay that the system was designed for (including on-chip and package delays), and short enough to not allow an attacker to be further away than desired, with the minimum value being $t_p + 2t_d$. As an improvement, $t_q$ can be dynamically adjusted between invocations of the protocol allowing the verifier to make decisions based on the measured distance, for example, determine the maximum transaction amount allowed. With a single iteration, the verifier can discover the prover’s maximum distance away, but with multiple iterations, the exact distance can be found with a margin of error equal to the signal propagation time during a single clock cycle of the verifier. SMPL$_R$ may be made to sample on both rising and falling edges of $f_V$, effectively doubling the distance resolution without increasing the frequency of operation (other signals may operate this way for tighter timing margins).

If we assume that an attacker can transmit signals at the speed of light and ignore the real-life implications of sending them over long distances, we can determine the theoretical maximum distance between the verifier and prover. A more realistic attacker will need to overcome signal integrity issues that are inherent to any system. We should not, therefore, make it easy for the attacker by designing with liberal timing constraints, and thus choose the distance $d$ between the verifier and prover to be as short as possible. More importantly, we should carefully design the system to work for that particular distance with very tight margins. For example, the

$^9$This was measured using delay timing given by the “FPGA Editor” utility.
various terminals we have tested were able to transmit/drive a signal through a two meter cable, although the card should at most be a few centimeters away. Weak I/O drivers could be used to degrade the signal when an extension is applied (our I/O drivers are set to 8 mA strength). The value of \( d \) also determines most of the timing parameters of the design, and as we shall see next, the smaller these are, the harder it will be for the attacker to gain an advantage.

### 6.4.4 Possible attacks on distance bounding

Although, following from our previous assumptions, the attacker cannot get access to more than about half the response bits, there are ways he may extend the distance limit before a terminal will detect the relay attack. This section discusses which options are available, and their effectiveness in evading defenses.

**Guessing attack.** Following the initialization phase, the attacker can initiate the bit-exchange phase before the genuine terminal has done so. As the attacker does not know the challenge at this stage, he will, on average, guess 50% of the challenge bits correctly and so receive the correct response for those. For the ones where the challenge was guessed incorrectly, the response is effectively random, so there is still a 50% chance that the response will be correct. Therefore the expected success rate of this technique is 75%.

Since our tests show a negligible error rate, the terminal may reject any response with a single bit that is incorrect. In our prototype, where the response registers are 64 bits each, the attacker will succeed with probability \((\frac{3}{4})^{64} \approx 1 \text{ in } 2^{26}\). The size of the registers is a security parameter that can be increased according to the application, while the nonces assure that the attacker can only guess once.

**Replay.** If the attacker can force the card to perform two protocol runs, with the same nonces used for both, then all bits of the response can be extracted by sending all 1’s on the first iteration and all 0’s on the second. We resist this attack by selecting the protocol variant mentioned by Hancke and Kuhn [84], where the card adds its own nonce. This is cheap to do within EMV since a transaction counter is already required by the rest of the protocol. If this is not desired then provided the card cannot be clocked at twice its intended frequency, the attacker will not be able to extract all bits in time. This assumes that the time between starting the distance bounding protocol, and the earliest time the high-speed stage can start, is greater than the latter’s duration.

**Early bit detection and deferred bit signaling.** The card will not sample the terminal’s challenge until \( t_{m+d} \) after the challenge is placed on the I/O line. This is to allow an inexpensive card to reliably detect the signal but, as Clulow et al. [37] suggest, an attacker could detect the signal immediately. By manipulating the clock provided to the genuine card, and using high-quality signal drivers, the challenge
could be sent to the card with shorter delay.

Similarly, the terminal will wait \( t_q \) between sending the challenge and sampling the response, to allow for the round trip signal propagation time, and wait until the response signal has stabilized. Again, with reduced reliability the response could be sent from the card just before the terminal samples. The attacker, however, cannot do so any earlier than \( t_p \) after the card has sampled the challenge, and the response appears on the I/O.

**Delay-line manipulation.** The card may include the value of \( t_p \) in its signed data, so the attacker cannot make the terminal believe that the value is larger than the card’s specification. However, the attacker might be able to reduce the delay, for example by cooling the card. If it can be reduced to the point that the multiplexer or latch has not settled, then both potential responses may be placed on to the I/O line, violating our assumptions.

However, if the circuit is arranged so that the delay will be reduced only if the reaction of the challenge latch and multiplexer is improved accordingly, the response will still be sent out prematurely. This gives the attacker extra time, so should be prevented. If temperature compensated delay lines are not economic, then they should be as short as possible to reduce this effect.

In fact, in a custom circuit, \( t_p \) may be so small (less than 1 ns), that the terminal could just assume it is zero. This will mean that the terminal will believe all cards are slightly further away than they really are, but will avoid the value of \( t_p \) having to be included in the signed data.

**Combined attacks.** For an attacker to gain a better than 1 in \( 2^{26} \) probability of succeeding in the challenge response protocol, the relay attack must take less than \( t_{m+q} \) time. In practice, an attacker will not be able to sample or drive the I/O line instantaneously and the radio-link transceiver or long wires will introduce latency, so the attacker would need to be much closer than this limit. A production implementation on an ASIC would be able to give better security guarantees and be designed to tighter specifications than were available on the FPGA for our prototype.

### 6.4.5 Results

We have developed a versatile implementation that requires only modest modification to currently deployed designs. Our distance bounding scheme was successfully implemented and tested on an FPGA for 2.0, 1.0, and 0.3 meter transmission lengths, although it can be modified to work for any distance and tailored to any end application. To verify the logical correctness of the design (observing wrong responses, for example) we used the internal logic analyzer “ChipScope” [186, UG029]. Oscilloscope traces of a single bit challenge-response exchange over a 50\( \Omega \), 30 cm printed circuit board transmission line are shown in Figure 6.6; Figure 6.5 shows
(a) I/O trace of a 64-bit exchange with position of (b) indicated by • on the x axis.

(b) Single bit exchange, challenge is 1 and response is 0.

**Figure 6.6:** Oscilloscope trace from the bit-exchange phase of the distance bounding protocol. Delay is introduced by a 30 cm transmission line between the verifier and prover. Timing parameters are $t_n = 10$ ns, $t_m = 5$ ns, $t_p = 8$ ns (including internal and I/O delays). Two values of $t_q$ are shown, one where the bit was correctly received $t_{q\text{pass}} = 20$ ns and one where it was not, $t_{q\text{fail}} = 15$ ns. $t_d$ was measured to be 2.16 ns which over a 30 cm wire corresponds to propagation velocity of $1.4 \times 10^8$ m/s. Note that before the challenge is sent, the trace is slowly rising above ground level; this is the effect of the pull-up resistor as also seen in (a) after the protocol completes. Also, the shown signals were probed at the FPGA I/Os and do not precisely represent when they actually appear inside of it, so in actuality the FPGA will “see” the falling edge shown in (b) slightly after what is represented in the figure.
the FPGA board and experimental setup. In this case, the challenge is 1 and the
response is 0 with indicators where SMPL$_R$ has sampled the response. The first,
after $t_{q_{\text{fail}}} = 15 \text{ ns}$ has sampled too early while the second, $t_{q_{\text{pass}}} = 20 \text{ ns}$, which is
a single period of $f_V$ later, has correctly sampled the 0 as the response. The delay
$t_d = 2.16 \text{ ns}$, can also be seen and is, of course, due to the length of the transmission
line. If the attacker exploited all possible attacks previously discussed and was able
to transmit signals at $c$, he would need to be within approximately 6 m, although
the actual distance would be shorter for a more realistic attacker.

6.4.6 Costs

The FPGA design of both the verifier and prover as shown in Figure 6.4 consumes
37 flip-flops and 93 look-up tables: 64 for logic, 13 route-throughs, and 16 as shift
registers (4 cascaded 16-bit LUTs for each), which is extremely compact. However,
it is difficult to estimate the cost of an ASIC implementation with these figures
as there is no reliable conversion technique between FPGA resource utilization and
ASIC transistor count, especially since the above numbers are for the core functions,
without the supporting circuitry. It is also hard to estimate the cost in currency
because that changes rapidly with time, production volume, fabrication process, and
many other factors, so we will describe it relative to the resources currently used.

As mentioned, we have made every effort to minimize the circuitry that needs to
be added to the smartcard while being more liberal with the terminal, although for
both the additions can be considered minor. For the smartcard, new commands for
initiating the initialization phase need to be added as well as two shift registers and
a state machine for operating the rapid bit-exchange. Considering that smartcards
already have a few thousand memory cells, this can be considered a minor addition,
especially given that they need to operate at the existing low frequencies of 1–5 MHz.
For the initialization phase, existing circuits can be used such as the DES engine
for producing the content of the response registers. The card’s transaction counter
may be used for the nonce $N_p$.

As for the terminals, their internal operating frequency is unknown to us, but
it is unlikely that it is high enough to achieve good distance resolution. Therefore,
a capable processor and some additional components are required, such as a high
quality oscillator. As an alternative to high frequencies, or when designing for very
short distances, delay lines could be used instead of operating on clock edges, as
originally suggested by Hancke and Kuhn [84]. The distance bounding circuitry
would need to be added to the terminal’s main processor, which consists of two shift
registers and slightly more involved control code than the smartcard’s.

We have described the added cost in terms of hardware but the added time per
transaction and the need to communicate with the bank, refused transactions due to
failure, re-issuing cards, and so on, may amount to substantial costs. Only the banks
involved have access to all the necessary information needed to make a reasonable
estimate of these overheads.

6.5 Distance bounding in FPGA applications

Relay attacks can also compromise the security and integrity of FPGA systems. Here, we link the above discussion with the topic of this thesis and point out po-
tential vulnerabilities, and how they may be resisted using the distance bounding
implementation.

Consider the challenge-response deterrents we discussed in Section 2.3.3, where
the FPGA executes an authentication protocol with a processor that is placed near
it on the PCB. This is meant to prevent the bitstream from being used on any other
system that does not contain that specific authentication device. These schemes,
however, do not prevent the challenges from being relayed to a processor far away.
Cloners may be unlikely to go through the trouble of doing this, though designers
of high security modules need to factor this threat into their analysis. For example,
Graf and Athanas [74] describe an FPGA-based security system where users are
authenticated using tamper-proof tokens, though relay attacks are not considered
and are possible. The FPGA and NVM interface in the secure remote update
scheme presented in Chapter 3 is also potentially vulnerable, though an attack will
violate our assumptions when tamper proofing is required; where it is not, remote
attestation makes the threat insignificant.

The configuration process can be protected from relay attacks by adding a dis-
tance bounding functionality to the FPGA configuration logic and the NVM. The
constraints of ISO 7816 are similar for this scenario: the FPGA (verifier) can ac-
commodate the additional circuitry and the performance that is required, while the
NVM (prover) is cheap and simple, but requires little additional circuitry. The in-
terface is similar as well (when the FPGA behaves as the “master”) as serial NVMs
share at least a clock and data line between them. The implementation needs to
be done carefully, however, so configuration content is tied to the distance bound-
ing process. We leave the exploration of integrating distance bounding into the
configuration process to future research.
Chapter 7

Review and outlook

“FPGA security” is still a relatively young field, evolving as new FPGA generations become more capable and their range of applications grows. This dissertation has examined the role of volatile FPGAs in security systems. The core aim was to provide practical security solutions for reconfigurable systems, taking into account the context in which they are used. In review, these were its main contributions:

Chapter 2: comprehensive review of current research in the field. I discussed and commented on the current state of research in the field based on my own experiences and insights. Section 2.3.2 also provided an analysis of and motivation for adding bitstream authentication to FPGA configuration logic.

Chapter 3: flexible protocol for secure remote update of bitstreams over insecure networks. The protocol is versatile and does not require additional circuitry to be integrated into the hard-wired configuration logic – thus, it can be used with existing FPGAs. I anticipate that the protocol will be useful to FPGA applications where unattended remote update is required.

Chapter 4: source code for three AES implementations and CMAC mode of operation. I have created an FPGA implementation of the AES block cipher in an innovative way using embedded blocks (BRAMs and DSPs), minimizing the use of “traditional” logic elements such as flip-flops and lookup tables. As far as I am aware, these are the first FPGA implementations of a cryptographic primitive for which source code was fully released at publication time.

Chapter 5: comparing FPGA implementations should be done with caution. I used FPGA AES designs to demonstrate the significant variability in performance under different implementation conditions, questioning common comparison practices across architectures and implementers. I showed that a single figure of merit, “throughput”, and the comparative unit of “throughput per slice” are mostly meaningless without context or qualification – they can be appropriately
used only under very specific circumstances. I argued that source code availability can enable recompilation of compared designs under similar conditions. I also suggested that common implementation platforms be identified and that results be evaluated based on meeting target performance, rather than “best possible performance”.

Chapter 5: reproducible research in light of variability of FPGA designs. I used experimental evidence to strengthen the argument that an experimental-based publication is simply an advertisement for the source code or experimental work, which is the actual contribution. Together with the availability of source code, I proposed that a reproducibility scale be added to manuscripts’ review process.

Chapter 6: EMV payment system is vulnerable to relay attacks. The demonstration exemplified the ease with which relay attacks can violate distance assumptions made by the designers of security systems. The immediate impact of this demonstration was to allow defrauded cardholders to challenge the banks’ inaccurate assertions regarding the security of the “Chip and PIN” payment system.

Chapter 6: implementation of a secure distance bounding protocol for wired applications. I implemented a wired adaptation of the Hancke-Kuhn distance bounding protocol on an FPGA. Using routing delays, I was able to implement the prover side without a fast clock, thus making the design simple. The design was able to determine that a prover is at most six meters away. While the implementation initially targeted ISO 7816-3, it can be extended to many other wired applications, such as the interface between an FPGA and a configuration storage device.

Appendix A: a way to securely integrate multiple modules into a single FPGA design. I proposed a practical way for integrating design modules from distrusting sources into a single FPGA design, thus enabling the pay-per-use core distribution model. The main advantage of the scheme is that most of the hardware and software support already exists, and few additions to configuration logic are required.

One of the emerging themes from my research is worth pointing out: “context matters for security”. The literature survey provided a broader context to published results (power analysis and watermarking, for example). The secure remote update protocol analysis factored in the way in which it will be used, and what system-level properties must be maintained for security. Some of these measures are a compromise between security and cost, although only when set in context can such measures reassure the engineer that the level of protection is sufficient. The AES
implementation results were reported in the perspective of constraints and possible variability, rather than as a single figure of merit. The relay attack illustrated that even though smartcard ICs are hard to clone and attack, it is the way in which they are used that compromised the security of the entire system. Much of the discussion in Appendix A about secure core integration is dedicated to usability evaluation of the scheme, rather than to a detailed technical discussion – context provides a measure for usefulness. During my work on security of and for reconfigurable systems and of payment systems, I learned that, for the most part, security is all about context and that it is a mistake to treat a problem in isolation, as it is likely to lead to broken systems.

I see several interesting directions in which the work presented in this dissertation can be taken.

Considering that FPGAs are fast becoming “systems on a chip”, better access control to various parts of the FPGA will become necessary. This will require not only a simple design separation between modules in the same FPGA, but a dedicated controller for key management and authentication. One example application is the ability to have a portion of the FPGA available for end-user programming, while another portion is only updatable by authorized principals (i.e., system developers). The combination of the protocol described in Chapter 3 and integration scheme of Appendix A could be a good starting point.

The secure remote update protocol in Chapter 3 can be extended for partial reconfiguration at start-up time, but careful security analysis is required. For example, what are the properties of the bootloader bitstream, and how are the “missing” bitstream portions sent, or stored locally. The work can be extended to use a broadcasting system using public key cryptography, so as to minimize the number of messages that are specific to individual systems.

The wired distance bounding implementation can be extended for mutual authentication between multiple FPGAs, and the timing margins can be tightened for better distance resolution using additional connections. Another possibility is to continue the work in the RF domain.

I do sincerely hope that the discussion in Chapter 5 about reproducibility and comparability of designs will not go unnoticed. I also hope that the example I set in Chapter 4 by releasing the source code will be followed by others, and that the code and methodology will be used for further research.
Bibliography


[27] M. Bucci, L. Giancane, R. Luzzi, G. Scotti, and A. Trifiletti. Enhancing
power analysis attacks against cryptographic devices. In Circuits and Systems

G. Xiong, D. Atkinson, K. Fenton, D. A. Allwood, and M. T. Bryan. Forgery:


Implementation of the AES-128 on Virtex-5 FPGAs. In Progress in Cryptology

channels of an FPGA implementation of AES. Cryptology ePrint Archive,


based AES co-processor. In Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium,

[34] Z. Chen, S. Morozov, and P. Schaumont. A hardware interface for hashing
eprint.iacr.org/2008/529.pdf

[35] P. Chodowiec and K. Gaj. Very compact FPGA implementation of the AES
algorithm. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems Workshop,

mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA454021&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

[37] J. Clulow, G. P. Hancke, M. G. Kuhn, and T. Moore. So near and yet so far:
distance-bounding attacks in wireless networks. In L. Buttyan, V. Gligor, and
D. Westhoff, editors, Security and Privacy in Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks,
volume 4357 of LNCS, Hamburg, Germany, September 2006. Springer.

186350-6.

143


144


148


Lattice Semiconductor Corp. http://www.latticesemi.com


A. Lesea. Personal communication, January 2006.


Appendix A

Protecting multiple designs in a single configuration

We have discussed the “design distribution problem” in Section 2.1.5 and noted that one of the hardest problems facing the “design reuse” industry is the integration of many cores from multiple distrusting sources into a single FPGA design, and thus enabling a complete “pay-per-use” model. Others have proposed solutions to the “virtual ASSP” problem, limited to protecting designs that occupy an entire FPGA, or solutions that only protect compiled code for a soft or hard embedded processor (Section 2.3.5.1). That is, they do not allow system developers to integrate purchased cores into their own designs while still maintaining their confidentiality. I also made the observation that the further up we go in the development flow (bitstreams being the lowest level), the harder it is to maintain security attributes since more EDA tools and principals become involved in the design process.

Here, I propose a solution that allows integration of cores from multiple sources while maintaining their confidentiality as they are integrated into a single configuration file. The integration is done at the bitstream level such that only the FPGA (that is, the hardware, not the software) decrypts configuration payloads. The proposed scheme requires modest additions and modifications to the configuration logic, and I argue that for cost-conscious developers it may be both practically and economically viable, and that existing EDA tools already support most of the functionality that is required to enable it.

A.1 Single core protection

I base my proposed scheme on the VASSP protection protocol of Güneysu et al. [77], who had the idea of establishing a symmetric encryption key between the FPGA configuration logic (CL) and cores vendor (CV) using an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) exchange and a key derivation function (KDF) [139, 800-56A]. A system
developer (SD) licenses a number of complete FPGA configuration copies, to be used with a set of FPGAs purchased from the FPGA vendor (FV). This allows the cores vendor to “lock” every instance of her core to a particular FPGA and be paid for it individually. The protocol consists of the following operations.

**Setup.** For each FPGA, the FPGA vendor generates a public key pair \((PK_F, SK_F)\) and a “personalization bitstream” (PB) that can perform an ECDH KDF in the user logic. The secret key \(SK_F\) is contained inside of the personalization bitstream, so the FPGA vendor encrypts it with a random symmetric key \(K_F\), programmed into a non-volatile bitstream decryption keystore. The FPGA vendor keeps \(K_F\) and the plaintext personalization bitstream secret, and sends the encrypted version and corresponding public key \(PK_F\) to the system developer (with the FPGA itself).

**Licensing.** The system developer sends the FPGA identifier \(F\) to the cores vendor together with its public key \(PK_F\). The cores vendor generates a public key pair for the FPGA \((PK_{CV}, SK_{CV})\) and computes a symmetric key using ECDH KDF with its secret key and the FPGA’s public key,

\[
K_{CV} = \text{KDF}(SK_{CV}, PK_{FV}, F)
\]

The licensed VASSP is then encrypted using \(K_{CV}\), and sent to the system developer together with \(PK_{CV}\).

**Personalization.** The FPGA’s configuration logic processes the encrypted personalization bitstream using the embedded \(K_F\), and then feeds the cores vendor’s public key \(PK_{CV}\) to the user logic so it internally compute \(K_{CV}\)

\[
K_{CV} = \text{KDF}(SK_{FV}, PK_{CV}, F)
\]

\(K_{CV}\) is then stored in a dedicated non-volatile write-only keystore in the configuration logic. Now, the configuration logic can decrypt the encrypted VASSP bitstream in the same way it is done with existing FPGAs (Section 2.3.1).

### A.2 Protecting multiple cores

#### A.2.1 Outline

My proposed scheme is shown in Figure A.1, and consists of five stages.

**Partitioning.** Each module of the design (e.g., USB, AES, TCP, etc.) is assigned a partition – a confined region of FPGA resources. For communication between modules, standardized interface macros are placed between them, and also assigned a fixed FPGA location. An EDA tool processes this information and pro-
Figure A.1: A “partition file” created by the system developer is distributed to cores vendors. This file is used by all contributors for producing a bitstream portion that corresponds to the part of the FPGA they were assigned to design with. Each bitstream portion contain “goto frame address X” commands for non-contiguous frames, and then each is encrypted under the key established using the ECDH KDF scheme. An assembly tool creates a complete bitstream and inserts commands that instruct the configuration logic which key to use to decrypt the data that follows.

The system developer, and cores vendors who are assigned to develop “external” cores, use the partition file as input to their development flow. For each, the output is a bitstream portion that corresponds to their allocated partition.

Key establishment. Once development is done, a protocol session similar to the one described in Section A.1 is executed between each FPGA (via the system developer) and external cores vendors. This time, however, several $K_{CV}$, designated $K_{CV_i}$, are established instead of only one as with Güneysu et al. Each cores vendor sends the system developer a bitstream portion encrypted under its respective $K_{CV}$ (instead of a complete bitstream as with the original protocol).

Assembly. The system developer uses a software tool to “assemble” together the bitstream portions into a complete configuration file. In between bitstream portions
encrypted under different keys, “use key X” commands instruct the configuration logic which $K_{CV_i}$ key to use for decrypting the configuration data that follows.

**Configuration.** The complete bitstream, containing configuration data under different key domains, is processed by the configuration logic to load the application into the user logic.

## A.3 Detailed Discussion

### A.3.1 General assumptions

The communication between principals should be over secure and authenticated channels for non-repudiation and prevention of man-in-the-middle attacks. Public-key infrastructure (PKI) may be used, and the public key pair issued by the FPGA vendor must be certified under the PKI scheme; this prevents an attacker from easily replacing the original personalization bitstream with a forged one (using the attacker’s own FPGA public key pair) so he can extract $K_{CV}$ before it is written to the keystore. Certified FPGA vendor key pair assures the cores vendor that cores will only operate on FPGAs associated with a particular personalization bitstream and public key pair.

Ideally, bitstreams should be authenticated as discussed in Section 2.3.2, but that depends on if the configuration logic supports it. I also assume that key storage is designed such that physical or side-channel attacks are impractical. Finally, I assume that the implemented cryptographic primitives are computationally secure, resistant to physical and logical attacks, and that mechanisms that protect designs cannot be circumvented. One example for the latter is readback; unless encrypted readback is
supported, it must be disabled so the attacker cannot get the plaintext configuration read out of the FPGA.

A.3.2 Software support

“Partitioning”¹ is required for large designs where several teams work on different blocks, each required to fit their sub-designs into a fixed set of resource boundaries (additionally, HDL hierarchy provides a natural conceptual partitioning of designs). The design flow for combining these modules is called “modular design”, which allows independent development of partitions until “final assembly” where all the modules’ netlists are combined to create a single configuration file. For the scheme described here, the software is required to be able to assign particular FPGA resources to designs made entirely of “black boxes”². The tool should also be able to place standardized “bus macros” for connecting the black boxes’ I/O ports, and assign them to specific FPGA resources. Finally, the tool needs to produce a partition file that can be used as an input to other instances of the tool, each used for the development of a different partition.

For each partition, the development of the cores is performed as usual except that the tools must adhere to the partition’s constraints and connection to bus macros, as specified by the partition file. The output of this flow is a bitstream portion corresponding to each partition, very similar to the one used for partial reconfiguration.

The encryption of partial bitstreams must be done in such a way that allows a tool to combine them into a complete bitstream. Assuming a block cipher is used for encryption/decryption, the process also has to deal with partial input blocks, so a provision for padding with no-ops is required. Before the assembly, commands are inserted so to instruct the configuration logic which key to use in order to decrypt the following partition’s configuration data. Using “goto frame X” commands, which are already part of the encrypted bitstream, the configuration logic knows where to configure each frame.

A.3.3 Loss of optimization and flexibility

Modular design can be straightforward within groups of the same company, though the way I propose using it, there are logistical overheads and some resource allocation inefficiencies. Firstly, I require strict commitment to partitions at an early stage of the design process, with little flexibility thereafter. This means that the system developer must commit to a particular FPGA size early, and that cores vendors must supply accurate resource-use data. The latter is important to get right because

¹Xilinx calls a similar process “initial budgeting”.
²These are instantiations that have defined I/O ports, but are either missing the actual logical definition or the tool cannot read them, because they are encrypted, for example.
inaccuracies will either leave unused resources in the final design, or worse, the core will not fit the allocated resources. And secondly, partition resolution is limited to the fundamental configuration unit, the “frame” (see Section 2.2.1), which may also result in minor resource inefficiency and impose some constraints on the size and “shape” of partitions.

In a typical design flow, HDL hierarchy is flattened for resources and timing optimization. Cross-module optimization will not be possible with my scheme, of course, so resources that would have otherwise been saved will be “lost”. That said, if we assume that modules (from cores vendors) are already as optimized as they can be, further optimization by EDA tools will not result in significantly better performance (in either resource utilization or operating frequency).

A.3.4 Key management

For key establishment, each FPGA is required to have an embedded unique user-logic-readable identifier $F$ to be used as an input the KDF, and storage for multiple $K_{CV_i}$ keys. Preferably, $K_{CV_i}$ are stored in non-volatile keystores that can be written (only) from the user logic and read (only) by the configuration logic. Writing to keystores should be atomic, so all key bits are replaced at once. Allowing partial writes, such as individual bytes, could be used to exhaustively search for the write operation that does not change the behavior of the key and thereby reveal individual key bits. It is also possible to store $K_{CV_i}$ in volatile keystores, but then they need to be established on every power-up. This will increase the amount of configuration storage memory, and configuration time, though it may appeal more to security-conscious designers because then keys are not permanently stored in the device, and can be “zeroized”.

A.3.5 Communication bandwidth

Network bandwidth is important to consider as bitstream portions can be megabytes in size; multiplying that by a large number of FPGAs can amount to the transfer of gigabytes of encrypted data. The protocol exchanges can be made in one lump for

**Existing software support.** Both Xilinx and Altera software tools already support modular design. In tools such as Xilinx PlanAhead [186, UG632], the developer can graphically partition designs, though the facility for generation and acceptance of a “partition definition file” is not quite there yet. Insertion of bus macros and bitstream-level partitioning is already supported by the Xilinx tools for partial reconfiguration. Thus, in terms of software support, it seems that existing tools can already perform many of the functions that are required to enable the proposed scheme.
a batch of FPGAs and data delivered on magnetic or optical media by a courier – as opposed to requiring an online response exchange for each FPGA. The ability to execute the protocol offline also defends against a denial of service attack targeting the cores vendors’ servers.

We can minimize the bandwidth by issuing encrypted tokens to each FPGA instead of the encrypted core. The protocol is used to produce $K_{CV}$, as before, but instead of the cores vendor sending the system developer the encrypted core, it sends a token encrypted using the respective $K_{CV}$, which contains the key $K_{CV'}$ needed to decrypt the bitstream portion. The advantage of this extension is that only tokens are unique to a system, whereas the cores themselves are the same for all systems, encrypted using $K_{CV}$. Of course, $K_{CV'}$ is limited to a particular core from a core vendor and system developer’s FPGA FIDs. This extension reduces bandwidth, but either complicates processing, since the configuration logic is required to decrypt the token before processing each bitstream portion, or twice the amount of key storage is required.

A.3.6 Trust

$K_F$ protects the asymmetric key that is the pivot of the scheme’s security; since it and the personalization bitstream is generated by the FPGA vendor, it is considered a trusted party. Though undesirable, this requirement is not entirely unreasonable, as most system developers already trust the FPGA vendor to provide them with a trustworthy FPGA and EDA tools. An independent trusted party can be established, but would require that FPGAs go through it before being given to the developer.

A crippled version of the core (as a bitstream matching the partition) can be delivered to system developers for integration and testing, though there will be no way for them to check that the core does not contain malicious functions or Trojan horses. Since the core is a black box to the system developer he can only test it using input and output vectors, which will quite possibly not detect any extra functionality. Even if our scheme allows the vendor to test the core as a black box once it is loaded onto the FPGA, the fact that each core is encrypted using a different key requires testing each one, which may be costly.

To what extent is this a problem? We assumed a cost-conscious developer, one that is interested in low cost solutions and is generally trusting (unless the developer is well funded, this is a pre-requisite as there is no way to verify that all EDA and hardware used are trust-worthy). The developer relies on social means such as contracts, agreements and the reputation of the vendor he purchases hardware and software from. One can say that trust has a price; if the developer wanted to verify the core, he would need to pay to see it.
A.3.7 Advantages

With the proposed scheme, the current usage model of FPGAs is unchanged; developers opt-in to it, or otherwise ignore it. FPGA vendors can gradually increase the keystore size with each generation according to adoption of the scheme, and since the key establishment is done in user logic, they do not need to commit to any particular KDF in silicon. The scheme relies on established cryptographic primitives such as Diffie-Hellman key establishment and hash functions. Configuration times are not adversely affected by the addition of key domain switches and addressing if keys are kept in non-volatile keystore; authentication may add to configuration time depending on how it is implemented.

Finally, the scheme makes sure that incentives are in the right place for good security practices. System developers and cores vendors can only compromise their own keys, so they have an interest in keeping them safe. Even though both rely on the keys generated by the FPGA vendor, it has reputation – a valuable asset – to lose, though this may not be enough to make sure keys are kept safe. Therefore, FPGA vendors (or other trusted party) may need to guarantee compensation to those enrolled in the scheme and lost money due to a compromise.
Appendix B

AES implementation background

AES was designed as a substitution-permutation network and uses between 10, 12, or 14 encryption rounds for key length of 128, 196, or 256 bits, respectively, for encrypting or decrypting 128-bit blocks. In a single round, AES operates on all 128 input bits, which are represented as a $4 \times 4$ matrix of bytes. Fundamental operations of the AES are performed based on byte-level field arithmetic over the Galois Field $GF(2^8)$ so operands can be represented as 8-bit vectors. AES has been designed to be efficient in both hardware and software, and is versatile in that it can be made either area-optimized, iterative, and slow, or “unrolled” and fast by parallelizing and pipelining operations.

‘A’ denotes the input block of bytes $a_{i,j}$ in columns $C_j$ and rows $R_i$, where $j$ and $i$ are the respective indices ranging between 0 and 3.

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} a_{0,0} & a_{0,1} & a_{0,2} & a_{0,3} \\ a_{1,0} & a_{1,1} & a_{1,2} & a_{1,3} \\ a_{2,0} & a_{2,1} & a_{2,2} & a_{2,3} \\ a_{3,0} & a_{3,1} & a_{3,2} & a_{3,3} \end{bmatrix}$$

An AES round has four basic operations on $A$:

- **SubBytes**: $A$’s bytes are substituted with non-linear $8 \times 8$ bit S-box values.
- **ShiftRows**: bytes of rows $R_i$ are cyclically left shifted by 0, 1, 2 or 3 positions.
- **MixColumns**: columns $C_j = (a_{0,j}, a_{1,j}, a_{2,j}, a_{3,j})$ are matrix-vector-multiplied by a matrix of constants in $GF(2^8)$.
- **AddRoundKey**: a round key $K_i$ is added to the input using $GF(2^8)$ arithmetic.

The sequence of these four operations define an AES round, and they are iteratively applied for a full encryption or decryption of a single 128-bit input block. The $GF(2^8)$ arithmetic above can be combined into a single complex operation. Daemen and Rijmen [42] define such an approach for software implementations on 32-bit processors with the use of large lookup tables. This approach requires four 8- to
32-bit lookup tables for the four round transformations, each the size of 8-Kibit. We can compute these transformation tables, $T_{k[0..3]}$, in the following way:

\[
T_0[x] = \begin{bmatrix}
S[x] \times 02 \\
\vdots \\
S[x] \times 03
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
T_1[x] = \begin{bmatrix}
S[x] \\
\vdots \\
S[x]
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
T_2[x] = \begin{bmatrix}
S[x] \\
\vdots \\
S[x] \times 03
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
T_3[x] = \begin{bmatrix}
S[x] \\
\vdots \\
S[x] \times 02
\end{bmatrix}
\]

where $S[x]$ denotes a table lookup in the original $8 \times 8$ bit AES S-box (for a more detailed description of this AES optimization see NIST’s FIPS-197 [139]). The last round, however, is unique in that it omits the MixColumns operation, so requires special consideration. There are two ways for computing the last round, either by “reversing” the MixColumns operation from the output of a regular round by another multiplication in $GF(2^8)$, or creating dedicated “last round” T-tables, one per regular T-table. Some implementers, such as Fischer and Drutarovský [65], opted for MixColumn elimination, which is done on-the-fly within the round function. Besides requiring additional logic resources for the decryption, this approach may decrease performance since the “reversing” logic may extend the critical data-path. For this reason, we decided to add dedicated tables for the last round allows us to maintain the same datapath for all rounds and keep as many “computations” within embedded elements of the FPGA; we denote these T-tables as $T'_j$. We can now redefine all transformation steps of a single AES round as

\[
E_j = K_{r[j]} \oplus T_0[a_{0,j}] \oplus T_1[a_{1,(j+1 \mod 4)}] \oplus T_2[a_{2,(j+2 \mod 4)}] \oplus T_3[a_{3,(j+3 \mod 4)}] \quad (B.1)
\]

where $K_{r[j]}$ is a corresponding 32-bit “sub-key” and $E_j$ denotes one of four encrypted output columns of a full round. We now see that based on only four T-table lookups and four XOR operations, a 32-bit column $E_j$ can be computed. To obtain the result of a full round, Equation (B.1) must be performed four times with all 16 bytes.

Input data to an AES encryption can be defined as four 32-bit column vectors

\[
C_j = (a_{0,j}, a_{1,j}, a_{2,j}, a_{3,j})
\]

with the output similarly formatted in column vectors. According to Equation B.1, these input column vectors need to be split into individual bytes since all bytes are required for the computation steps for different $E_j$. For example, for column $C_0 = (a_{0,0}, a_{1,0}, a_{2,0}, a_{3,0})$, the first byte $a_{0,0}$ is part of the computation of $E_0$, the second byte $a_{1,0}$ is used in $E_3$, etc. Since fixed data paths are preferable in hardware implementations, we have rearranged the operands of
the equation to align the bytes according to the input columns $C_j$ when feeding them to the T-table lookup. In this way, we can implement a unified data path for computing all four $E_j$ for a full AES round. Thus, Equation (B.1) becomes

\[
\begin{align*}
E_0 &= K_{r[0]} \oplus T_0(a_{0,0}) \oplus T_1(a_{1,1}) \oplus T_2(a_{2,2}) \oplus T_3(a_{3,3}) = (a'_{0,0}, a'_{1,0}, a'_{2,0}, a'_{3,0}) \\
E_1 &= K_{r[1]} \oplus T_3(a_{3,0}) \oplus T_0(a_{0,1}) \oplus T_1(a_{1,2}) \oplus T_2(a_{2,3}) = (a'_{0,1}, a'_{1,1}, a'_{2,1}, a'_{3,1}) \\
E_2 &= K_{r[2]} \oplus T_2(a_{2,0}) \oplus T_3(a_{3,1}) \oplus T_0(a_{0,2}) \oplus T_1(a_{1,3}) = (a'_{0,2}, a'_{1,2}, a'_{2,2}, a'_{3,2}) \\
E_3 &= K_{r[3]} \oplus T_1(a_{1,0}) \oplus T_2(a_{2,1}) \oplus T_3(a_{3,2}) \oplus T_0(a_{0,3}) = (a'_{0,3}, a'_{1,3}, a'_{2,3}, a'_{3,3})
\end{align*}
\]

where $a_{i,j}$ denotes an input byte, and $a'_{i,j}$ the corresponding output byte after the round transformation. The datapath requires a look-up to all of the four T-tables at the first position of the sequential operations round transformation. The required byte transposition lookups $T_0(a_{0,0}), T_3(a_{3,0}), T_2(a_{2,0})$ and $T_1(a_{1,0})$ (in this order) and the corresponding round key $K_{r[j]}$. Though operations are aligned for the same input column now, it becomes apparent that the bytes of the input column are not processed in canonical order, i.e., bytes need to be swapped for each column $C_j = (a_{0,j}, a_{1,j}, a_{2,j}, a_{3,j})$ first before being fed as input to the next AES round. The required byte transposition is reflected in the following equations (note that the given transpositions are static so that they can be efficiently hardwired):

\[
\begin{align*}
C_0 &= (a'_{0,0}, a'_{3,0}, a'_{2,0}, a'_{1,0}) \\
C_1 &= (a'_{1,1}, a'_{0,1}, a'_{3,1}, a'_{2,1}) \\
C_2 &= (a'_{2,2}, a'_{1,2}, a'_{0,2}, a'_{3,2}) \\
C_3 &= (a'_{3,3}, a'_{2,3}, a'_{1,3}, a'_{0,3})
\end{align*}
\]

(B.2)

### B.1 Decryption

Encryptor and decryption can be supported with the same circuit by only swapping the values of the transformation tables and re-arranging the input. As with Equation (B.1), decryption of columns $D_j$ is governed by the following set of equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
D_0 &= K_{r[0]} \oplus I_0(a_{0,0}) \oplus I_1(a_{1,3}) \oplus I_2(a_{2,2}) \oplus I_3(a_{3,3}) = (a'_{0,0}, a'_{1,0}, a'_{2,0}, a'_{3,0}) \\
D_3 &= K_{r[3]} \oplus I_3(a_{3,0}) \oplus I_0(a_{0,3}) \oplus I_1(a_{1,2}) \oplus I_2(a_{2,1}) = (a'_{0,3}, a'_{1,3}, a'_{2,3}, a'_{3,3}) \\
D_2 &= K_{r[2]} \oplus I_2(a_{2,0}) \oplus I_3(a_{3,3}) \oplus I_0(a_{0,2}) \oplus I_1(a_{1,1}) = (a'_{0,2}, a'_{1,2}, a'_{2,2}, a'_{3,2}) \\
D_1 &= K_{r[1]} \oplus I_1(a_{1,0}) \oplus I_2(a_{2,3}) \oplus I_3(a_{3,2}) \oplus I_0(a_{0,1}) = (a'_{0,1}, a'_{1,1}, a'_{2,1}, a'_{3,1})
\end{align*}
\]

This requires the following inversion tables (I-Tables), where $S^{-1}$ denotes the inverse $8 \times 8$ S-box for the AES decryption:
Figure B.1: Key expansion block diagram for AES-128; from the main key, ten “round keys” are computed.

\[
I_0[x] = \begin{bmatrix}
S^{-1}[x] \times 0E \\
S^{-1}[x] \times 09 \\
S^{-1}[x] \times 0D \\
S^{-1}[x] \times 0B
\end{bmatrix} \quad I_1[x] = \begin{bmatrix}
S^{-1}[x] \times 0B \\
S^{-1}[x] \times 0E \\
S^{-1}[x] \times 09 \\
S^{-1}[x] \times 0D
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
I_2[x] = \begin{bmatrix}
S^{-1}[x] \times 0D \\
S^{-1}[x] \times 0B \\
S^{-1}[x] \times 0E \\
S^{-1}[x] \times 09
\end{bmatrix} \quad I_3[x] = \begin{bmatrix}
S^{-1}[x] \times 09 \\
S^{-1}[x] \times 0D \\
S^{-1}[x] \times 0B \\
S^{-1}[x] \times 0E
\end{bmatrix}
\]

We can see that compared to encryption, the input to the decryption equations is different at two positions for each decrypted column \(D_j\). But instead of changing the datapath from the encryption function, we can change the order in which the columns \(D_j\) are computed so that instead of computing \(E_0, E_1, E_2, E_3\) for encryption, we determine the decryption output in the column sequence \(D_0, D_3, D_2, D_1\).

### B.2 Key expansion

The AES key expansion derives “sub-keys” \(K_r\) (10, 12 and 14 for AES-128, 192, and 256, respectively) from the main key, where \(r\) denotes the round number.

The AES-128 key expansion function is outlined in Figure B.1. The first operation of AES is a 128-bit XOR of the main key \(K_0\) with the 128-bit initial plaintext block. During expansion, each subkey is treated as four individual 32-bit words \(K_r[j]\) for \(j = 0 \ldots 3\). The first word \(K_r[0]\) of each round subkey is transformed using byte-wise rotations and mappings using the same non-linear AES S-boxes. The words corresponding to the indices \(j = 1 \ldots 3\), are XOR’d with the previous subkey words \(K_r[j-1] \oplus K_{(r-1)}[j]\).
# Appendix C

## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>Advanced Encryption Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIC</td>
<td>Application Specific Integrated Circuit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSP</td>
<td>Application Specific Standard Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATR</td>
<td>Answer To Reset (smartcard response to deassertion of reset)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bitstream</td>
<td>FPGA configuration file</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAM</td>
<td>Block Random Access Memory (embedded FPGA primitive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLB</td>
<td>Configurable Logic Block (collection of FPGA primitives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMAC</td>
<td>Cipher-based MAC (block cipher mode of operation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Digital Signal Processor (embedded FPGA primitive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>Electronic Design Automation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMV</td>
<td>Europay Mastercard Visa (smartcard payment framework)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>Flip-Flop (embedded primitive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPGA</td>
<td>Field Programmable Gate Array</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDL</td>
<td>Hardware Description Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAP</td>
<td>Internal Configuration Access Port (FPGA primitive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Intellectual Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibit</td>
<td>kilo binary digit, equals $2^{10}$ bits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUT</td>
<td>Lookup Table (embedded FPGA primitive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Message Authentication Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVM</td>
<td>Non-Volatile Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Place And Route (EDA process)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PED</td>
<td>PIN Entry Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIN</td>
<td>Personal Identification Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUF</td>
<td>Physical Unclonable Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>slice</td>
<td>collection of primitives in Xilinx FPGAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRAM</td>
<td>Static Random Access Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPS</td>
<td>Throughput Per Slice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XOR</td>
<td>exclusive or</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

169