Some of the exercises require the implementation of short programs. The model answers use Perl (see Part IB Unix Tools course), but you can use any language you prefer, as long as it supports an arbitrary-length integer type and offers a SHA-1 function. Include both your source code and the required output into your answers.

Before starting any programming exercise, first estimate how many minutes the solution will take you. Please include in your answers both this estimate, as well as the actual time you required.

**Exercise 1:** Explain the purpose of the collision-resistance requirement for the hash function used in a digital signature scheme.

**Exercise 2:** Your colleagues urgently need a collision-resistant hash function. Their code contains already an existing implementation of ECBC-MAC, using a block cipher with 256-bit block size. Therefore, they suggest to use ECBC-MAC with fixed keys $K_1 = K_2 = 0^l$ as a hash function. Show that this construction is not even pre-image resistant.

**Exercise 3:** Show how the DES block cipher can be used to build a 64-bit hash function. How difficult is it to find collisions for your construct?

**Exercise 4:** A one-time password authentication system generates 6-character passwords formed using only the set of 64 characters ‘a-zA-Z0-9,’. The first of these passwords is hashed with SHA-1, the resulting hash value is truncated to the first 36 bits, which are then used to form the next password.

(a) After approximately how many passwords is there a better than 50% probability that this hash chain has formed a cycle (i.e., passwords start to recur)?

(b) Write a subroutine `genpasswd` that accepts a password, and then generates a new 6-character password based on the first 36 bits of the SHA-1 hash value of the input password. Chose a programming language that offers a SHA-1 implementation in its standard library.
(c) Write a subroutine that finds two different input passwords that lead to a collision in genpasswd, i.e. in the first 36 bits of SHA-1, and provide an example such a collision. How many passwords did your program have to generate to find a first collision, and in what run-time?

One example collision:

```
$ perl -e 'use Digest::SHA qw(sha1_hex);while(@ARGV)
{print sha1_hex(shift @ARGV),"\n"}' f7KNL4 EBP37l ee2109291564192a7372f4caa2477af1646bb593 ee2109291ee27e1d3ee028c21cefc5d55312a383
```

(d) Like part (c), but this time your program must operate in a small amount of memory (i.e., the memory it requires must not grow with the number of passwords generated so far). Compare the number of passwords generated and the execution time with part (c).

**Exercise 5:** Use Euclid’s algorithm to calculate gcd(36, 24).

**Exercise 6:** The following Perl program implements a non-recursive form of the Euclidean algorithm:

```
#!/usr/bin/perl
use bigint; # use arbitrary-length integer type

sub gcd {
    my ($a0, $b0) = @_;# ini
    my ( $a, $b) = @_;# ini

    while (1) {
        my $q = $a / $b;
        if ($a == $b * $q) {
            print "gcd($a0,$b0) = $b\n";
            return $b;
        }
        ($a, $b) = ($b, $a-$b*$q);
    }
}

gcd(2250,360);
```

Modify it, such that it implements a non-recursive form of the extended Euclidean algorithm. To do so, first define two additional local variables that record how $a$ and $b$ can be represented as linear combinations of their initial values $a0$ and $b0$, by maintaining the following invariant:

```
my ($aa, $ab) = (1, 0);
my ($ba, $bb) = (0, 1);
```

such that $a = a0 * aa + b0 * ab$ and $b = a0 * ba + b0 * bb$. The program then becomes:

```
#! /usr/bin/perl
use bigint; # use arbitrary-length integer type

sub gcd {
    my ($a0, $b0) = @_;# ini
    my ( $a, $b) = @_;# ini

    while (1) {
        my $q = $a / $b;
        if ($a == $b * $q) {
            print "gcd($a0,$b0) = $b\n";
            return $b;
        }
        ($a, $b) = ($b, $a-$b*$q);
    }
}

gcd(2250,360);
```
(a) Extend the final 2-tuple assignment \((a, b) = (b, a-b*q)\); into a 6-tuple assignment \((a, a_a, a_b, b, b_a, b_b) = (b, \ldots )\); that maintains the above invariant.

(b) Extend the print and return statements to output the gcd result also as a linear combination of the input values.

(c) If your function is called with \(\text{egcd}(2250,360)\) it should output

\[\text{gcd}(2250,360) = 90 = 2250 \cdot 1 + 360 \cdot -6\]

What is the output of your function if called with the following values?

\[\text{gcd}(733810016255931844845,1187329547587210582322)\]

**Exercise 7:** Show how the following two basic properties of every group \((G, \cdot)\) follow from the group axioms given on slide 55:

(a) The neutral element of any group is unique. In other words: if both \(e\) and \(e'\) are neutral elements of the group, with \(g \cdot e = g = e \cdot g\) and \(g \cdot e' = g = e' \cdot g\) for every group element \(g\), then show that this implies \(e = e'\).

(b) The inverse element of any group element is unique. In other words: if \(e\) is the neutral element of a group and if we have group elements \(g, f, h\) where \(f\) and \(h\) are inverse elements of \(g\), that is \(g \cdot f = e = f \cdot g\) and \(g \cdot h = e = h \cdot g\), show that this implies \(f = h\).

**Exercise 8:** Let \((\mathbb{F}, \boxplus, \boxtimes)\) be a field. The definition of a field requires that \(\boxtimes\) is left-distributive over \(\boxplus\), which means that for any \(a, b, c \in \mathbb{F}\):
\[a \boxtimes (b \boxplus c) = (a \boxtimes b) \boxplus (a \boxtimes c)\]. Show that this requirement implies the right-distributive property \((a \boxplus b) \boxtimes c = (a \boxtimes c) \boxplus (b \boxtimes c)\).

**Exercise 9:**

(a) Convert your implementation of the extended Euclidean algorithm from Exercise 6 into an implementation of a function \(\text{modinv}(a, n)\) that returns \(a^{-1}\) such that \(a a^{-1} \mod n = 1\), or aborts with an error if no such \(a^{-1}\) exists. Verify that it outputs \(\text{modinv}(80651553049393, 1304969544928657) = 80651553049393\) and fails for \(\text{modinv}(4505490,7290036)\).

(b) Which calculation steps of the extended Euclidean algorithm can be dropped for this application?

(c) What is \(\text{modinv}(892302390667940581330701, 1208925819614629174706111)\)?

**Exercise 10:** Use Euler’s theorem to calculate the inverse

(a) \(5^{-1} \mod 7\)

(b) \(5^{-1} \mod 12\)

(c) \(5^{-1} \mod 15\)

**Exercise 11:** Given an abelian group \((G, \cdot)\), let \(\mathbb{H}\) be the set of its quadratic residues, that is \(\mathbb{H} = \{g^2 \mid g \in G\}\). Show that \((\mathbb{H}, \cdot)\) is a subgroup of \((G, \cdot)\).
**Exercise 12:** Implement a function `modexp(g, e, m)` that calculates $g^e \mod m$ using the square-and-multiply algorithm for modular exponentiation. Test your implementation on

$$123456789^{987654321} \mod (2^{80} - 1) = 785446763117418429158664$$

and then use it to calculate

$$(7^{2^{521} - 1} \mod (2^{3217} - 1)) \mod 10^8$$

**Exercise 13:** Let $G(1^\ell)$ be a polynomial-time group generator that outputs an $\ell$-bit prime $p$ and a generator $g$ of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Show that the DDH problem is not hard relative to $G$.

*Hint:* Recall that Euler’s criterion allows efficient detection of quadratic residues.

**Exercise 14:** With RSA encryption, it is common practice to choose $e$ as a small number (e.g., 3, 17, $2^{16} + 1$).

(a) How does this affect the speed of encryption?

(b) If you wanted to make decryption faster, could you simply set $d$ to one of these three values instead?

(c) How else can RSA decryption be calculated more efficiently using the Chinese Remainder Theorem and Fermat’s little theorem?

**Exercise 15:** In the textbook RSA encryption scheme, with $n = pq$ being a product of two different primes and $ed \mod \varphi(n) = 1$, the identity $m^{ed} \mod n = m$, which states that we obtain the same plaintext $m$ after encryption and decryption, is only guaranteed by Euler’s theorem for any $m \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, that is if $\gcd(n, m) = 1$.

(a) Show that it actually also holds for any $m \in \mathbb{Z}_n$. [Hint: CRT]

(b) Conversely, if we instead had chosen $n = p^2$ being the square of a prime number (i.e., $p = q$), show a simple example for the fact that in this case $ed \mod \varphi(n) = 1$ does not imply $m^{ed} \mod n = m$ for all $m \in \mathbb{Z}_n$.

**Exercise 16:** A device vendor uses the DSA signature scheme to digitally sign configuration updates. The system parameters are

- $p = 0x8df2a494492276aa3d25759bb06869cbeac0d83af8d0cf7cbb8324f0d7882e5d0762cf57210eac2e9adac32ab7aac49693dfbf83724c2ec0736ee31c80291$
- $q = 0x773218c737ec8ee993b4f2ded30f48edace915f$
- $g = 0x626027839ea0a13413163a55b4cb500299d5522956cefcb3bff10f399ce2c71cb9de5fa24babf58e5b79521925c9cc42e9f6464b088cc572af53e6d78802$

and the vendor’s public key is

$$y = 0xeb772a91db3b69af90c5da8447733f24270bddd11aac373b26f58ff528ef267894b1e746e3f20b9898ce9e5d641abbbf3e3fa7dedd3264b1b313d7cd569656c$$

The vendor has already signed two messages:

- $H(m_1) = \text{SHA-1}(”Monday”) = 0x932eeb1076c85e522f0e215441fa371e3fd000ac$
- $r_1 = 0x8f4378d1b287778a47c06820640d4bba72f2e5$
- $s_1 = 0x6964dfcfb102249aef907f348f810ca704a4b186$

- $H(m_2) = \text{SHA-1}(”Tuesday”) = 0x42e43b612a5fae57ddf5929f0fb945ae83cbff61$
- $r_2 = 0x8f4378d1b287778a47c06820640d4bba72f2e5$
- $s_2 = 0x25f87cbb380eb4d72449863e65b7667bc968297e$

(a) Calculate $g^s \mod p$. 

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4
(b) Verify that the two signatures are valid under the given public key $y$. (Preferably perform the required calculations using the \texttt{modinv} and \texttt{modexp} routines that you implemented yourself in exercises 9 and 12. Alternatively, download a computer-algebra system, such as Sage or PARI/GP.)

(c) What mistake did the vendor make when generating these two signatures?

(d) Exploit this mistake to reconstruct the secrets $k$ and $x$ used to generate these signatures. [\textit{Hint}: Start by subtracting the two defining equations for $s_1$ and $s_2$ from each other.]

(e) Use this information to falsify a signature for the new message

$$H(m_3) = \text{SHA-1}("\text{Wednesday}") = 0x5656b9b79b0316fc611a9c30d2ffac25228b8371$$

and then verify its correctness against public key $y$. 
