Distributed systems
Lecture 8: PubSub; Security; NASD/AFS/Coda

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Last time

- Looked at replication in distributed systems
- **Strong consistency:**
  - Approximately as if only one copy of object
  - Requires considerable coordination on updates
  - Transactional consistency & quorum systems
- **Weak consistency:**
  - Allow clients to potentially read stale values
  - Some guarantees can be provided (FIFO, eventual, session), but at additional cost to availability
- Amazon/Google case studies: Dynamo, MapReduce, BigTable, Spanner.
Publish-subscribe (PubSub)

- Get more flexibility with publish-subscribe:
  - Publishers advertise and publish events
  - Subscribers register interest in topics (i.e. properties of events)
  - Event-service notifies subscribers of relevant published events
- Similar to reliable multicast, without ordering focus:
  - Asynchronous structure
  - Allows one-to-many communication
  - Dynamic membership: publishers/subscribers joining/leaving
- Sometimes described as content-centric networking
  - Engages not just hosts, but also network routers
  - Focus is on data, not network messaging
  - Reliability and persistency part of the programming model
- In effect the model being implemented by many Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) such as Akami, Netflix

Publish-subscribe: pros and cons

- PubSub useful for ‘ad hoc’ systems such as embedded systems or sensor networks:
  - Client(s) can ‘listen’ for occasional events
  - Don’t need to define semantics of entire system in advance (e.g. what to do if get event <X>)
  - Promoted in recent research for higher-level applications
- Leads to natural “reactive” programming:
  - When <X>, <Y> occur then do <Z>
  - Event-driven systems like Apama can help understand business processes in real-time
- But:
  - Can be awkward to use if application doesn’t fit
  - And difficult to make perform well...
Distributed-system security

• Distributed systems span administrative domains
• Natural to extend authentication, access control, audit, to distributed system, but can we:
  – Distribute local notions of a user over many machines?
  – Enforce system-wide properties such as personal data privacy?
  – Allow systems operated by different parties to interact safely?
  – Not require that networks be safe from monitoring/tampering?
  – Tolerate compromise a subset of nodes in the system?
  – Provide reliable service to most users even when under attack?
  – Accept and tolerate nation-state actors as adversaries?
• For a system to offer secure services, it must be secure
  – Trusted Computing Base (TCB) – minimum software (or hardware) required for a system to be secure
  – Deploy compartmentalization-style sandboxing structures

Access control

• Distributed systems may want to allow access to resources based on a security policy
• As with local systems, three key concepts:
  – Identification: who you are (e.g. user name)
  – Authentication: proving who you are (e.g. password)
  – Authorization: determining what you can do
• Can consider authority to cover actions an authenticated subject may perform on objects
  – Access Matrix = set of rows, one per subject, where each column holds allowed operations on some object
Recall: Access-Control Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Object₁</th>
<th>Object₂</th>
<th>Object₃</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>User₁</td>
<td>+read</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User₂</td>
<td>+read +write</td>
<td>+read</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group₁</td>
<td>-read</td>
<td></td>
<td>+read +write</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- \( A(i,j) \)
  - Rows represent principals (sometimes groups)
  - Columns represent objects
  - \( A(i,j) \) contain access rights of row \( i \) on object \( j \)

- Access matrix is typically large & sparse:
  - Just keep non-NULL entries by column or by row

- Tricky questions
  - How do you name/authenticate users, and who can administer groups?
  - How do you compose conflicting access-control rules (e.g., user1 +read but group1 –read)?
  - What consistency properties do access control, groups, and users require?

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Access Control Lists (ACLs)

- Keep columns: for each object, keep list of subjects and allowable access
- ACLs stored with objects (e.g. local filesystem)
- Key primitives: get/set
- Like a guest list on the door of a night club
- ACL change should (arguably) immediately grant/deny further access
  - What does this mean for distributed systems?
  - Or even local systems (e.g., UNIX)
Capabilities

- Capabilities are **unforgeable tokens of authority**
  - Keep rows: for each subject S, keep list of objects / allowable accesses
  - Capabilities stored with subjects (e.g. processes)
  - Bit like a key or access card that you carry around
- Key primitive: **delegation**
  - Client can delegate capabilities it holds to other clients (or servers) in the system to act on its behalf
  - Downside: revocation may now be more complex

Access control in distributed systems

- Single systems often have small number of users (**subjects**) and large number of **objects**:
  - E.g. a hundred of users in a Unix system
  - Track subjects (e.g. users) and store ACLs with objects (e.g. files)
- Distributed systems are large & dynamic:
  - Can have huge (and unknown?) number of users
  - Interactions via network; no explicit ‘log in’ or user processes
- Capability model is a more natural fit:
  - Client presents capability with request for operation
  - System only performs operation if capability checks out
  - Avoid synchronous RPCs to check identities/policies
- Not mutually exclusive: ACLs can grant capabilities
- Can’t trust nodes/links: use **cryptography with secret keys**
Cryptographic capabilities

- How can we make capabilities unforgeable?
- Capability server could issue capabilities
  - User presents credentials (e.g., username, password) and requests capabilities representing specific rights
  - E.g. capability server has secret key $k$ and a one-way function $f()$
  - Issues a capability $<\text{ObjID}, \text{access}, f(k, \text{ObjID}, \text{access})>$
  - Simple example is $f(k,o,a) = \text{SHA256}(k\,||\,o\,||\,a)$
- Client transmits capability with request
  - If object server knows $k$, can check operation
- Can use same capability to access many servers
  - And one server can use it on your behalf (e.g., web tier can request objects from storage tier on user’s behalf)
- More mature scheme might use public key crypto (why?)

Distributed capability example: NASD

- **Network-Attached Secure Disks (NASD)** – Gibson, et al 1997 (CMU)
  - Clients access remote directly disks rather than via through servers
  - “File Manager” grants client systems capabilities delegating direct access to objects on network-attached disks – as directed by ACLs
Capabilities: pros and cons

- Relatively simple and pretty scalable
- Allow anonymous access (i.e. server does not need to know identity of client)
  - And hence easily allows delegation
- However this also means:
  - Capabilities can be stolen (unauthorized users)...
  - ... and are difficult to revoke (like someone cutting a copy of your house key)
- Can address these problems by:
  - Having time-limited validity (e.g. 30 seconds)
  - Incorporating version into capability, and storing version with the object: increasing version => revoke all access

Combining ACLs and capabilities

- Recall one problem with ACLs was inability to scale to large number of users (subjects)
- However in practice we may have a small-ish number of authority levels
  - e.g. moderator versus contributor on chat site
- **Role-Based Access Control (RBAC):**
  - Have (small-ish) well-defined number of roles
  - Store ACLs at objects based on roles
  - Allow subjects to enter roles according to some rules
  - Issue capabilities which attest to current role
Role-based access control (RBAC)

- General idea is very powerful
  - Separates { principal $\rightarrow$ role }, { role $\rightarrow$ privilege }
  - Developers of individual services only need to focus on the rights associated with a role
  - Easily handles evolution (e.g. an individual moves from being an undergraduate to an alumnus)
- Possible to have sophisticated rules for role entry:
  - e.g. enter different role according to time of day
  - or entire role hierarchy (1B student $<=$ CST student)
  - or parametric/complex roles (“the doctor who is currently treating you”)

Single-system sign on

- Distributed systems involve many machines
  - Frustrating to have to authenticate to each one!
- Single-system sign-on: security with lower user burden
  - E.g. Kerberos, Microsoft Active Directory let you authenticate to a single domain controller
  - Bootstrap via a password / private key+certificate on smart card
  - Get a session key and a ticket ("= a capability)
  - Ticket is for access to the ticket-granting server (TGS)
  - When wish to e.g. log on to another machine, or access a remote volume, s/w asks TGS for a ticket for that resource
  - Notice: principals might could be users ... or services
- Other wide-area “federated” schemes
  - Multi-realm Kerberos, OpenID, Shibboleth
AFS and Coda

• Two 1990s CMU distributed file systems that helped create our understanding of distributed-system scalability, security, ...
  – AFS: Andrew File System “campus-wide” scalability
  – Coda: Add write replication, weakly connected or fully disconnected operation for mobile clients

• Scale distributed file systems to global scale using a concurrent and distributed-system ideas
  – Developed due to NFS scalability failures
  – RPC, close-to-open semantics, pure and impure names, explicit cache management, security, version vectors, optimistic concurrency, quorums, multicast, ...

The Andrew File System (AFS)

• Carnegie Mellon University (1980s) address performance, scalability, security weaknesses of NFS
• Global-scale distributed filesystem
  – Cells transparently incorporate dozens or hundreds of servers
  – Clients transparently merge namespaces and hide file replication/migration effects
  – Authentication/access control w/Kerberos, distributed group servers
  – Cryptographic protection of all communications
  – Mature non-POSIX filesystem semantics (close-to-open, ACLs)
• Still in use at large institutions today; open sourced as OpenAFS
• Inspiration many aspects of Distributed Computing Environment (DCE), Microsoft’s Distributed File System (DFS), and NFSv4
AFS3 per-cell architecture

- **Client-server** and server-server RPC
- **Ubik** quorum database for authentication, volume location, and group membership
- Namespace partitioned into volumes; e.g., 
  `/afs/cmu.edu/user/rnw/public_html` traverses four volumes
- Unique **VicelDs**: `{CellID, VolumeID, FID}`
- Volume servers allow limited redundancy or higher-performance bulk file I/O:
  - read-write on a single server (`~rnw`)
  - read-only replicas on multiple servers (`/bin`)
- Inter-server snapshotting allows in-use volumes to be migrated transparently (with client help)

Persistent client-side caching in AFS

- AFS implements **persistent caches** on client-side disks
- Vnode operations on remote files are redirected to local **container files** for local I/O performance
- Non-POSIX **close-to-open semantics** allow writes to be sent to the server only on `close()`
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AFS callback promises

- Servers issue **callback promises** on files held in client caches
- When a file server receives a write-*close*() from one client, it issues **callbacks** to invalidate copies in other client caches
- Unlike NFS, no synchronous RPC is required when opening a cached file: if callback is not been broken, cache is fresh
- However, client write-*close*() is synchronous: can’t return until callbacks acknowledged by other clients – why?

The Coda File System

- Developed at Carnegie Mellon University in the 1990s
- Starting point: open-sourced AFS2 from IBM
- Improve **availability**: optimistic replication, offline mode:
  - Improve availability through **read-write replication**
  - Improve performance for **weakly connected clients**
  - Support mobile (sometimes) **fully disconnected clients**
- Exploit network features to improve performance:
  - Multicast RPC to efficiently send RPCs to groups of servers
- Exchange weaker consistency for stronger availability
  - Version vectors for directories, files identify write conflicts
  - Required users to resolve some conflicts ... with mixed results?
- Surprising result: /unplug network to make builds go faster
  - It is faster to journal changes to local disk (offline) and reconcile later than synchronously write to distributed filesystem (online)
Summary (1)

• Distributed systems are everywhere
• Core problems include:
  – Inherently concurrent systems
  – Any machine can fail...
  – ... as can the network (or parts of it)
  – And we have no notion of global time
• Despite this, we can build systems that work
  – Basic interactions are request-response
  – Can build synchronous RPC/RMI on top of this ...
  – Or asynchronous message queues or pub/sub

Summary (2)

• Coordinating actions of larger sets of computers requires higher-level abstractions
  – Process groups and ordered multicast
  – Consensus protocols, and
  – Replication and Consistency
• Various middleware packages (e.g. CORBA, EJB) provide implementations of many of these:
  – But worth knowing what’s going on “under the hood”
• Recent trends towards even higher-level:
  – MapReduce and friends