

# Capsicum: practical capabilities for UNIX

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## Abstract

Capsicum is a lightweight operating system capability and sandbox framework planned for inclusion in FreeBSD 9. Capsicum extends, rather than replaces, UNIX APIs, providing new kernel primitives (sandboxed *capability mode* and *capabilities*) and a userspace sandbox API. These tools support compartmentalisation of monolithic UNIX applications into logical applications, an increasingly common goal supported poorly by discretionary and mandatory access control. We demonstrate our approach by adapting core FreeBSD utilities and Google's Chromium web browser to use Capsicum primitives, and compare the complexity and robustness of Capsicum with other sandboxing techniques.

## 1 Introduction

Capsicum is an API that brings capabilities to UNIX. Capabilities are unforgeable tokens of authority, and have long been the province of research operating systems such as PSOS [16] and EROS [23]. UNIX systems have less fine-grained access control than capability systems, but are very widely deployed. By adding capability primitives to standard UNIX APIs, Capsicum gives application authors a realistic adoption path for one of the ideals of OS security: least-privilege operation. We validate our approach through an open source prototype of Capsicum built on (and now planned for inclusion in) FreeBSD 9.

Today, many popular security-critical applications have been decomposed into parts with different privilege requirements, in order to limit the impact of a single vulnerability by exposing only limited privileges to more risky code. Privilege separation [17], or *compartmentalisation*, is a pattern that has been adopted for applications such as OpenSSH, Apple's SecurityServer, and, more recently, Google's Chromium web browser. Compartmentalisation is enforced using various access control techniques, but only with significant programmer effort and

significant technical limitations: current OS facilities are simply not designed for this purpose.

The access control systems in conventional (non-capability-oriented) operating systems are *Discretionary Access Control* (DAC) and *Mandatory Access Control* (MAC). DAC was designed to protect users from each other: the owner of an object (such as a file) can specify *permissions* for it, which are checked by the OS when the object is accessed. MAC was designed to enforce system policies: system administrators specify policies (e.g. "users cleared to Secret may not read Top Secret documents"), which are checked via run-time hooks inserted into many places in the operating system's kernel.

Neither of these systems was designed to address the case of a single application processing many types of information on behalf of one user. For instance, a modern web browser must parse HTML, scripting languages, images and video from many untrusted sources, but because it acts with the full power of the user, has access to all his or her resources (such implicit access is known as ambient authority).

In order to protect user data from malicious JavaScript, Flash, etc., the Chromium web browser is decomposed into several OS processes. Some of these processes handle content from untrusted sources, but their access to user data is restricted using DAC or MAC mechanism (the process is *sandboxed*).

These mechanisms vary by platform, but all require a significant amount of programmer effort (from hundreds of lines of code or policy to, in one case, 22,000 lines of C++) and, sometimes, elevated privilege to bootstrap them. Our analysis shows significant vulnerabilities in all of these sandbox models due to inherent flaws or incorrect use (see Section 5).

Capsicum addresses these problems by introducing new (and complementary) security primitives to support compartmentalisation: *capability mode* and *capabilities*. Capsicum capabilities should not be confused with operating system privileges, occasionally referred to as ca-




Figure 1: Capsicum helps applications self-compartmentalise.

pabilities in the OS literature. Capsicum capabilities are an extension of UNIX file descriptors, and reflect rights on specific objects, such as files or sockets. Capabilities may be delegated from process to process in a granular way in the same manner as other file descriptor types: via inheritance or message-passing. Operating system privilege, on the other hand, refers to exemption from access control or integrity properties granted to processes (perhaps assigned via a role system), such as the right to override DAC permissions or load kernel modules. A fine-grained privilege policy supplements, but does not replace, a capability system such as Capsicum. Likewise, DAC and MAC can be valuable components of a system security policy, but are inadequate in addressing the goal of application privilege separation.

We have modified several applications, including base FreeBSD utilities and Chromium, to use Capsicum primitives. No special privilege is required, and code changes are minimal: the `tcpdump` utility, plagued with security vulnerabilities in the past, can be sandboxed with Capsicum in around ten lines of code, and Chromium can have OS-supported sandboxing in just 100 lines.

In addition to being more secure and easier to use than other sandboxing techniques, Capsicum performs well: unlike pure capability systems where system calls necessarily employ message passing, Capsicum’s capability-aware system calls are just a few percent slower than their UNIX counterparts, and the `gzip` utility incurs a constant-time penalty of 2.4 ms for the security of a Capsicum sandbox (see Section 6).

## 2 Capsicum design

Capsicum is designed to blend capabilities with UNIX. This approach achieves many of the benefits of least-privilege operation, while preserving existing UNIX APIs and performance, and presents application authors with an adoption path for capability-oriented design.

Capsicum extends, rather than replaces, standard UNIX APIs by adding kernel-level primitives (a sandboxed *capability mode*, *capabilities* and others) and userspace support code (*libcapsicum* and a *capability-aware run-time linker*). Together, these extensions support application *compartmentalisation*, the decomposition of monolithic application code into components that will run in independent sandboxes to form *logical applications*, as shown in Figure 1.

Capsicum requires application modification to exploit new security functionality, but this may be done gradually, rather than requiring a wholesale conversion to a pure capability model. Developers can select the changes that maximise positive security impact while minimising unacceptable performance costs; where Capsicum replaces existing sandbox technology, a performance improvement may even be seen.

This model requires a number of pragmatic design choices, not least the decision to eschew micro-kernel architecture and migration to pure message-passing. While applications may adopt a message-passing approach, and indeed will need to do so to fully utilise the Capsicum architecture, we provide “fast paths” in the form of direct system call manipulation of kernel objects through delegated file descriptors. This allows native UNIX performance for file system I/O, network access, and other critical operations, while leaving the door open to techniques such as message-passing system calls for cases where that proves desirable.

### 2.1 Capability mode

Capability mode is a process credential flag set by a new system call, `cap_enter`; once set, the flag is inherited by all descendent processes, and cannot be cleared. Processes in capability mode are denied access to global namespaces such as the filesystem and PID namespaces (see Figure 2). In addition to these namespaces, there

are several system management interfaces that must be protected to maintain UNIX process isolation. These interfaces include `/dev` device nodes that allow physical memory or PCI bus access, some `ioctl` operations on sockets, and management interfaces such as `reboot` and `kldload`, which loads kernel modules.

Access to system calls in capability mode is also restricted: some system calls requiring global namespace access are unavailable, while others are constrained. For instance, `sysctl` can be used to query process-local information such as address space layout, but also to monitor a system's network connections. We have constrained `sysctl` by explicitly marking  $\approx 30$  of 3000 parameters as permitted in capability mode; all others are denied.

The system calls which require constraints are `sysctl`, `shm_open`, which is permitted to create *anonymous memory objects*, but not named ones, and the `openat` family of system calls. These calls already accept a file descriptor argument as the directory to perform the open, rename, etc. relative to; in capability mode, they are constrained so that they can only operate on objects “under” this descriptor. For instance, if file descriptor 4 is a capability allowing access to `/lib`, then `openat(4, "libc.so.7")` will succeed, whereas `openat(4, "../etc/passwd")` and `openat(4, "/etc/passwd")` will not.

## 2.2 Capabilities

The most critical choice in adding capability support to a UNIX system is the relationship between capabilities and file descriptors. Some systems, such as Mach/BSD, have maintained entirely independent notions: Mac OS X provides each task with both indexed capabilities (ports) and file descriptors. Separating these concerns is logical, as Mach ports have different semantics from file descriptors; however, confusing results can arise for application developers dealing with both Mach and BSD APIs, and we wanted to reuse existing APIs as much as possible. As a result, we chose to extend the file descriptor abstraction, and introduce a new file descriptor type, the capability, to wrap and protect raw file descriptors.

File descriptors already have some properties of capabilities: they are unforgeable tokens of authority, and can be inherited by a child process or passed between processes that share an IPC channel. Unlike “pure” capabilities, however, they confer very broad rights: even if a file descriptor is read-only, operations on meta-data such as `fchmod` are permitted. In the Capsicum model, we restrict these operations by wrapping the descriptor in a capability and permitting only authorised operations via the capability, as shown in Figure 3.

The `cap_new` system call creates a new capability given an existing file descriptor and a mask of rights;

if the original descriptor is a capability, the requested rights must be a subset of the original rights. Capability rights are checked by `fget`, the in-kernel code for converting file descriptor arguments to system calls into in-kernel references, giving us confidence that no paths exist to access file descriptors without capability checks. Capability file descriptors, as with most others in the system, may be inherited across `fork` and `exec`, as well as passed via UNIX domain sockets.

There are roughly 60 possible mask rights on each capability, striking a balance between message-passing (two rights: send and receive), and MAC systems (hundreds of access control checks). We selected rights to align with logical methods on file descriptors: system calls implementing semantically identical operations require the same rights, and some calls may require multiple rights. For example, `pread` (read to memory) and `preadv` (read to a memory vector) both require `CAP_READ` in a capability's rights mask, and `read` (read bytes using the file offset) requires `CAP_READ | CAP_SEEK` in a capability's rights mask.

Capabilities can wrap any type of file descriptor including directories, which can then be passed as arguments to `openat` and related system calls. The `*at` system calls begin relative lookups for file operations with the directory descriptor; we disallow some cases when a capability is passed: absolute paths, paths containing “.” components, and `AT_FDCWD`, which requests a lookup relative to the current working directory. With these constraints, directory capabilities delegate file system namespace subsets, as shown in Figure 4. This allows sandboxed processes to access multiple files in a directory (such as the library path) without the performance overhead or complexity of proxying each file open via IPC to a process with ambient authority.

The “.” restriction is a conservative design, and prevents a subtle problem similar to historic `chroot` vulnerabilities. A single directory capability that only enforces containment by preventing “.” lookup on the root of a subtree operates correctly; however, two colluding sandboxes (or a single sandbox with two capabilities) can race to actively rearrange a tree so that the check always succeeds, allowing escape from a delegated subset. It is possible to imagine less conservative solutions, such as preventing upward renames that could introduce exploitable cycles during lookup, or additional synchronisation; these strike us as more risky tactics, and we have selected the simplest solution, at some cost to flexibility.

Many past security extensions have composed poorly with UNIX security leading to vulnerabilities; thus, we disallow privilege elevation via `fexecve` using `setuid` and `setgid` binaries in capability mode. This restriction does not prevent `setuid` binaries from using sandboxes.

Namespace	Description
Process ID (PID)	UNIX processes are identified by unique IDs. PIDs are returned by <code>fork</code> and used for signal delivery, debugging, monitoring, and status collection.
File paths	UNIX files exist in a global, hierarchical namespace, which is protected by discretionary and mandatory access control.
NFS file handles	The NFS client and server identify files and directories on the wire using a flat, global file handle namespace. They are also exposed to processes to support the lock manager daemon and optimise local file access.
File system ID	File system IDs supplement paths to mount points, and are used for forceable unmount when there is no valid path to the mount point.
Protocol addresses	Protocol families use socket addresses to name local and foreign endpoints. These exist in global namespaces, such as IPv4 addresses and ports, or the file system namespace for local domain sockets.
Sysctl MIB	The <code>sysctl</code> management interface uses numbered and named entries, used to get or set system information, such as process lists and tuning parameters.
System V IPC	System V IPC message queues, semaphores, and shared memory segments exist in a flat, global integer namespace.
POSIX IPC	POSIX defines similar semaphore, message queue, and shared memory APIs, with an undefined namespace: on some systems, these are mapped into the file system; on others they are simply a flat global namespaces.
System clocks	UNIX systems provide multiple interfaces for querying and manipulating one or more system clocks or timers.
Jails	The management namespace for FreeBSD-based virtualised environments.
CPU sets	A global namespace for affinity policies assigned to processes and threads.

Figure 2: Global namespaces in the FreeBSD operating kernel

## 2.3 Run-time environment

Even with Capsicum’s kernel primitives, creating sandboxes without leaking undesired resources via file descriptors, memory mappings, or memory contents is difficult. `libcapsicum` therefore provides an API for starting scrubbed sandbox processes, and explicit delegation APIs to assign rights to sandboxes. `libcapsicum` cuts off the sandbox’s access to global namespaces via `cap_enter`, but also closes file descriptors not positively identified for delegation, and flushes the address space via `fexecve`. Sandbox creation returns a UNIX domain socket that applications can use for inter-process communication (IPC) between host and sandbox; it can also be used to grant additional rights as the sandbox runs.

## 3 Capsicum implementation

### 3.1 Kernel changes

Many system call and capability constraints are applied at the point of implementation of kernel services, rather than by simply filtering system calls. The advantage of this approach is that a single constraint, such as the blocking of access to the global file system namespace, can be implemented in one place, `namei`, which is re-

sponsible for processing all path lookups. For example, one might not have expected the `fexecve` call to cause global namespace access, since it takes a file descriptor as its argument rather than a path for the binary to execute. However, the file passed by file descriptor specifies its run-time linker via a path embedded in the binary, which the kernel will then open and execute.

Similarly, capability rights are checked by the kernel function `fget`, which converts a numeric descriptor into a `struct file` reference. We have added a new `rights` argument, allowing callers to declare what capability rights are required to perform the current operation. If the file descriptor is a raw UNIX descriptor, or wrapped by a capability with sufficient rights, the operation succeeds. Otherwise, `ENOTCAPABLE` is returned. Changing the signature of `fget` allows us to use the compiler to detect missed code paths, providing greater assurance that all cases have been handled.

One less trivial global namespace to handle is the process ID (PID) namespace, which is used for process creation, signalling, debugging and exit status, critical operations for a logical application. Another problem for logical applications is that libraries cannot create and manage worker processes without interfering with process management in the application itself—unexpected




Figure 3: Capabilities “wrap” normal file descriptors, masking the set of permitted methods.




Figure 4: Portions of the global filesystem namespace can be delegated to sandboxed processes.

`SIGCHLD` signals are delivered to the application, and unexpected process IDs are returned by `wait`.

Process descriptors address these problems in a manner similar to Mach task ports: creating a process with `pdfork` returns a file descriptor to use for process management tasks, such as monitoring for exit via `poll`. When the process descriptor is closed, the process is terminated, providing a user experience consistent with that of monolithic processes: when a user hits Ctrl-C, or the application segfaults, all processes in the logical application terminate. Termination does not occur if reference cycles exist among processes, suggesting the need for a new “logical application” primitive—see Section 7.

### 3.2 The Capsicum run-time environment

Removing access to global namespaces forces fundamental changes to the UNIX run-time environment.

Even the most basic UNIX operations for starting processes and running programs have been eliminated: `fork` and `exec` both rely on global namespaces. Responsibility for launching a sandbox is shared. `libcapsicum` is invoked by the application, and responsible for forking a new process, gathering together delegated capabilities from both the application and run-time linker, and directly executing the run-time linker, passing the sandbox binary via a capability. ELF headers normally contain a hard-coded path to the run-time linker to be used with the binary. We execute the Capsicum-aware run-time linker directly, eliminating this dependency on the global file system namespace.

Once `rtld-elf-cap` is executing in the new process, it loads and links the binary using libraries loaded via library directory capabilities set up by `libcapsicum`. The `main` function of a program can call `lcs_get` to determine whether it is in a sandbox, retrieve sandbox state,




Figure 5: Process and components involved in creating a new `libcapsicum` sandbox

query creation-time delegated capabilities, and retrieve an IPC handle so that it can process RPCs and receive run-time delegated capabilities. This allows a single binary to execute both inside and outside of a sandbox, diverging behaviour based on its execution environment. This process is illustrated in greater detail in Figure 5.

Once in execution, the application is linked against normal C libraries and has access to much of the traditional C run-time, subject to the availability of system calls that the run-time depends on. An IPC channel, in the form of a UNIX domain socket, is set up automatically by `libcapsicum` to carry RPCs and capabilities delegated after the sandbox starts. Capsicum does not provide or enforce the use of a specific Interface Description Language (IDL), as existing compartmentalised or privilege-separated applications have their own, often hand-coded, RPC marshalling already. Here, our design choice differs from historic capability systems, which universally have selected a specific IDL, such as the Mach Interface Generator (MIG) on Mach.

`libcapsicum`'s `fdlist` (file descriptor list) abstraction allows complex, layered applications to declare capabilities to be passed into sandboxes, in effect providing a sandbox template mechanism. This avoids encoding specific file descriptor numbers into the ABI between applications and their sandbox components, a technique used in Chromium that we felt was likely to lead to programming errors. Of particular concern is hard-coding of file descriptor numbers for specific purposes, when those descriptor numbers may already have been used by other layers of the system. Instead, application and library

components declare process-local names bound to file descriptor numbers before creating the sandbox; matching components in the sandbox can then query those names to retrieve (possibly renumbered) file descriptors.

## 4 Adapting applications to use Capsicum

Adapting applications for use with sandboxing is a non-trivial task, regardless of the framework, as it requires analysing programs to determine their resource dependencies, and adopting a distributed system programming style in which components must use message passing or explicit shared memory rather than relying on a common address space for communication. In Capsicum, programmers have a choice of working directly with capability mode or using `libcapsicum` to create and manage sandboxes, and each model has its merits and costs in terms of development complexity, performance impact, and security:

1. Modify applications to use `cap_enter` directly in order to convert an existing process with ambient privilege into a capability mode process inheriting only specific capabilities via file descriptors and virtual memory mappings. This works well for applications with a simple structure like: open all resources, then process them in an I/O loop, such as programs operating in a UNIX pipeline, or interacting with the network for the purposes of a single connection. The performance overhead will typically be extremely low, as changes consist of encaps-

ulating broad file descriptor rights into capabilities, followed by entering capability mode. We illustrate this approach with `tcpdump`.

2. Use `cap_enter` to reinforce the sandboxes of applications with existing privilege separation or compartmentalisation. These applications have a more complex structure, but are already aware that some access limitations are in place, so have already been designed with file descriptor passing in mind. Refining these sandboxes can significantly improve security in the event of a vulnerability, as we show for `dhclient` and Chromium; the performance and complexity impact of these changes will be low because the application already adopts a message passing approach.
3. Modify the application to use the full `libcapsicum` API, introducing new compartmentalisation or reformulating existing privilege separation. This offers significantly stronger protection, by virtue of flushing capability lists and residual memory from the host environment, but at higher development and run-time costs. Boundaries must be identified in the application such that not only is security improved (i.e., code processing risky data is isolated), but so that resulting performance is sufficiently efficient. We illustrate this technique using modifications to `gzip`.

Compartmentalised application development is, of necessity, distributed application development, with software components running in different processes and communicating via message passing. Distributed debugging is an active area of research, but commodity tools are unsatisfying and difficult to use. While we have not attempted to extend debuggers, such as `gdb`, to better support distributed debugging, we have modified a number of FreeBSD tools to improve support for Capsicum development, and take some comfort in the generally synchronous nature of compartmentalised applications.

The FreeBSD `procstat` command inspects kernel-related state of running processes, including file descriptors, virtual memory mappings, and security credentials. In Capsicum, these resource lists become capability lists, representing the rights available to the process. We have extended `procstat` to show new Capsicum-related information, such as capability rights masks on file descriptors and a flag in process credential listings to indicate capability mode. As a result, developers can directly inspect the capabilities inherited or passed to sandboxes.

When adapting existing software to run in capability mode, identifying capability requirements can be tricky; often the best technique is to discover them through dynamic analysis, identifying missing dependencies by

tracing real-world use. To this end, capability-related failures return a new `errno` value, `ENOTCAPABLE`, distinguishing them from other failures, and system calls such as `open` are blocked in `namei`, rather than the system call boundary, so that paths are shown in FreeBSD's `ktrace` facility, and can be utilised in `DTrace` scripts.

Another common compartmentalised development strategy is to allow the multi-process logical application to be run as a single process for debugging purposes. `libcapsicum` provides an API to query whether sandboxing for the current application or component is enabled by policy, making it easy to enable and disable sandboxing for testing. As RPCs are generally synchronous, the thread stack in the sandbox process is logically an extension of the thread stack in the host process, which makes the distributed debugging task less fraught than it otherwise might appear.

## 4.1 tcpdump

`tcpdump` provides an excellent example of Capsicum primitives offering immediate wins through straightforward changes, but also the subtleties that arise when compartmentalising software not written with that goal in mind. `tcpdump` has a simple model: compile a pattern into a BPF filter, configure a BPF device as an input source, and loop writing captured packets rendered as text. This structure lends itself to sandboxing: resources are acquired early with ambient privilege, and later processing depends only on held capabilities, so can execute in capability mode. The two-line change shown in Figure 6 implements this conversion.

This significantly improves security, as historically fragile packet-parsing code now executes with reduced privilege. However, further analysis with the `procstat` tool is required to confirm that only desired capabilities are exposed. While there are few surprises, unconstrained access to a user's terminal connotes significant rights, such as access to key presses. A refinement, shown in Figure 7, prevents reading `stdin` while still allowing output. Figure 8 illustrates `procstat` on the resulting process, including capabilities wrapping file descriptors in order to narrow delegated rights.

`ktrace` reveals another problem, `libc` DNS resolver code depends on file system access, but not until after `cap_enter`, leading to denied access and lost functionality, as shown in Figure 9.

This illustrates a subtle problem with sandboxing: highly layered software designs often rely on on-demand initialisation, lowering or avoiding startup costs, and those initialisation points are scattered across many components in system and application code. This is corrected by switching to the lightweight resolver, which sends DNS queries to a local daemon that performs actual res-

```

+     if (cap_enter() < 0)
+         error("cap_enter: %s", pcap_strerror(errno));
+     status = pcap_loop(pd, cnt, callback, pcap_userdata);

```

Figure 6: A two-line change adding capability mode to tcpdump: cap\_enter is called prior to the main libpcap (packet capture) work loop. Access to global file system, IPC, and network namespaces is restricted.

```

+     if (lc_limitfd(STDIN_FILENO, CAP_FSTAT) < 0)
+         error("lc_limitfd: unable to limit STDIN_FILENO");
+     if (lc_limitfd(STDOUT_FILENO, CAP_FSTAT | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE) < 0)
+         error("lc_limitfd: unable to limit STDOUT_FILENO");
+     if (lc_limitfd(STDERR_FILENO, CAP_FSTAT | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE) < 0)
+         error("lc_limitfd: unable to limit STDERR_FILENO");

```

Figure 7: Using lc\_limitfd, tcpdump can further narrow rights delegated by inherited file descriptors, such as limiting permitted operations on STDIN to fstat.

PID	COMM	FD	T	FLAGS	CAPABILITIES	PRO	NAME
1268	tcpdump	0	v	rw-----c	fs	-	/dev/pts/0
1268	tcpdump	1	v	-w-----c	wr,se,fs	-	/dev/null
1268	tcpdump	2	v	-w-----c	wr,se,fs	-	/dev/null
1268	tcpdump	3	v	rw-----	-	-	/dev/bpf

Figure 8: procstat -fC displays capabilities held by a process; FLAGS represents the file open flags, whereas CAPABILITIES represents the capabilities rights mask. In the case of STDIN, only fstat (fs) has been granted.

```

1272 tcpdump CALL open(0x80092477c,O_RDONLY,<unused>0x1b6)
1272 tcpdump NAMI "/etc/resolv.conf"
1272 tcpdump RET connect -1 errno 78 Function not implemented
1272 tcpdump CALL socket(PF_INET,SOCK_DGRAM,IPPROTO_UDP)
1272 tcpdump RET socket 4
1272 tcpdump CALL connect(0x4,0x7fffffff080,0x10)
1272 tcpdump RET connect -1 errno 78 Function not implemented

```

Figure 9: ktrace reveals a problem: DNS resolution depends on file system and TCP/IP namespaces after cap\_enter.

PID	COMM	FD	T	FLAGS	CAPABILITIES	PRO	NAME
18988	dhclient	0	v	rw-----	-	-	/dev/null
18988	dhclient	1	v	rw-----	-	-	/dev/null
18988	dhclient	2	v	rw-----	-	-	/dev/null
18988	dhclient	3	s	rw-----	-	UDD	/var/run/logpriv
18988	dhclient	5	s	rw-----	-	?	
18988	dhclient	6	p	rw-----	-	-	-
18988	dhclient	7	v	-w-----	-	-	/var/db/dhclient.leases
18988	dhclient	8	v	rw-----	-	-	/dev/bpf
18988	dhclient	9	s	rw-----	-	IP?	0.0.0.0:0 0.0.0.0:0

Figure 10: Capabilities held by dhclient before Capsicum changes: several unnecessary rights are present.

olution, addressing both file system and network address namespace concerns. Despite these limitations, this example of capability mode and capability APIs shows that even minor code changes can lead to dramatic security improvements, especially for a critical application with a long history of security problems.

## 4.2 dhclient

FreeBSD ships the OpenBSD DHCP client, which includes privilege separation support. On BSD systems, the DHCP client must run with privilege to open BPF descriptors, create raw sockets, and configure network interfaces. This creates an appealing target for attackers: network code exposed to a complex packet format while running with root privilege. The DHCP client is afforded only weak tools to constrain operation: it starts as the root user, opens the resources its unprivileged component will require (raw socket, BPF descriptor, lease configuration file), forks a process to continue privileged activities (such as network configuration), and then confines the parent process using `chroot` and the `setuid` family of system calls. Despite hardening of the BPF `ioctl` interface to prevent reattachment to another interface or reprogramming the filter, this confinement is weak; `chroot` limits only file system access, and switching credentials offers poor protection against weak or incorrectly configured DAC protections on the `sysctl` and PID namespaces.

Through a similar two-line change to that in `tcpdump`, we can reinforce (or, through a larger change, replace) existing sandboxing with capability mode. This instantly denies access to the previously exposed global namespaces, while permitting continued use of held file descriptors. As there has been no explicit flush of address space, memory, or file descriptors, it is important to analyze what capabilities have been leaked into the sandbox, the key limitation to this approach. Figure 10 shows a `prostat -fC` analysis of the file descriptor array.

The existing `dhclient` code has done an effective job at eliminating directory access, but continues to allow the sandbox direct rights to submit arbitrary log messages to `syslogd`, modify the lease database, and a raw socket on which a broad variety of operations could be performed. The last of these is of particular interest due to `ioctl`; although `dhclient` has given up system privilege, many network socket `ioctls` are defined, allowing access to system information. These are blocked in Capsicum's capability mode.

It is easy to imagine extending existing privilege separation in `dhclient` to use the Capsicum capability facility to further constrain file descriptors inherited in the sandbox environment, for example, by limiting use of the IP raw socket to `send` and `recv`, disallowing `ioctl`.

Use of the `libcapsicum` API would require more significant code changes, but as `dhclient` already adopts a message passing structure to communicate with its components, it would be relatively straight forward, offering better protection against capability and memory leakage. Further migration to message passing would prevent arbitrary log messages or direct unformatted writes to `dhclient.leases.em` by constraining syntax.

## 4.3 gzip

The `gzip` command line tool presents an interesting target for conversion for several reasons: it implements risky compression/decompression routines that have suffered past vulnerabilities, it contains no existing compartmentalisation, and it executes with ambient user (rather than system) privileges. Historic UNIX sandboxing techniques, such as `chroot` and ephemeral UIDs are a poor match because of their privilege requirement, but also because (unlike with `dhclient`), there's no expectation that a single sandbox exist—many `gzip` sessions can run independently for many different users, and there can be no assumption that placing them in the same sandbox provides the desired security properties.

The first step is to identify natural fault lines in the application: for example, code that requires ambient privilege (due to opening files or building network connections), and code that performs more risky activities, such as parsing data and managing buffers. In `gzip`, this split is immediately obvious: the main run loop of the application processes command line arguments, identifies streams and objects to perform processing on and send results to, and then feeds them to compress routines that accept input and output file descriptors. This suggests a partitioning in which pairs of descriptors are submitted to a sandbox for processing after the ambient privilege process opens them and performs initial header handling.

We modified `gzip` to use `libcapsicum`, intercepting three core functions and optionally proxying them using RPCs to a sandbox based on policy queried from `libcapsicum`, as shown in Figure 11. Each RPC passes two capabilities, for input and output, to the sandbox, as well as miscellaneous fields such as returned size, original filename, and modification time. By limiting capability rights to a combination of `CAP_READ`, `CAP_WRITE`, and `CAP_SEEK`, a tightly constrained sandbox is created, preventing access to any other files in the file system, or other globally named resources, in the event a vulnerability in compression code is exploited.

These changes add 409 lines (about 16%) to the size of the `gzip` source code, largely to marshal and un-marshal RPCs. In adapting `gzip`, we were initially surprised to see a performance improvement; investigation of this unlikely result revealed that we had failed to propagate the

Function	RPC	Description
<code>gz_compress</code>	<code>PROXIED_GZ_COMPRESS</code>	zlib-based compression
<code>gz_uncompress</code>	<code>PROXIED_GZ_UNCOMPRESS</code>	zlib-based decompression
<code>unbzip2</code>	<code>PROXIED_UNBZIP2</code>	bzip2-based decompression

Figure 11: Three `gzip` functions are proxied via RPC to the sandbox

compression level (a global variable) into the sandbox, leading to the incorrect algorithm selection. This serves as reminder that code not originally written for decomposition requires careful analysis. Oversights such as this one are not caught by the compiler: the variable was correctly defined in both processes, but never propagated.

Compartmentalisation of `gzip` raises an important design question when working with capability mode: the changes were small, but non-trivial: is there a better way to apply sandboxing to applications most frequently used in pipelines? Seaborn has suggested one possibility: a Principle of Least Authority Shell (PLASH), in which the shell runs with ambient privilege and pipeline components are placed in sandboxes by the shell [21]. We have begun to explore this approach on Capsicum, but observe that the design tension exists here as well: `gzip`'s non-pipeline mode performs a number of application-specific operations requiring ambient privilege, and logic like this may be equally (if not more) awkward if placed in the shell. On the other hand, when operating purely in a pipeline, the PLASH approach offers the possibility of near-zero application modification.

Another area we are exploring is library self-compartmentalisation. With this approach, library code sandboxes portions of itself transparently to the host application. This approach motivated a number of our design choices, especially as relates to the process model: masking `SIGCHLD` delivery to the parent when using process descriptors allows libraries to avoid disturbing application state. This approach would allow video codec libraries to sandbox portions of themselves while executing in an unmodified web browser. However, library APIs are often not crafted for sandbox-friendliness: one reason we placed separation in `gzip` rather than `libz` is that `gzip` provided internal APIs based on file descriptors, whereas `libz` provided APIs based on buffers. Forwarding capabilities offers full UNIX I/O performance, whereas the cost of performing RPCs to transfer buffers between processes scales with file size. Likewise, historic vulnerabilities in `libjpeg` have largely centred on callbacks to applications rather than existing in isolation in the library; such callback interfaces require significant changes to run in an RPC environment.

## 4.4 Chromium

Google's Chromium web browser uses a multi-process architecture similar to a Capsicum logical application to improve robustness [18]. In this model, each tab is associated with a *renderer process* that performs the risky and complex task of rendering page contents through page parsing, image rendering, and JavaScript execution. More recent work on Chromium has integrated sandboxing techniques to improve resilience to malicious attacks rather than occasional instability; this has been done in various ways on different supported operating systems, as we will discuss in detail in Section 5.

The FreeBSD port of Chromium did not include sandboxing, and the sandboxing facilities provided as part of the similar Linux and Mac OS X ports bear little resemblance to Capsicum. However, the existing compartmentalisation meant that several critical tasks had already been performed:

- Chromium assumes that processes can be converted into sandboxes that limit new object access
- Certain services were already forwarded to renderers, such as font loading via passed file descriptors
- Shared memory is used to transfer output between renderers and the web browser
- Chromium contains RPC marshalling and passing code in all the required places

The only significant Capsicum change to the FreeBSD port of Chromium was to switch from System V shared memory (permitted in Linux sandboxes) to the POSIX shared memory code used in the Mac OS X port (capability-oriented and permitted in Capsicum's capability mode). Approximately 100 additional lines of code were required to introduce calls to `lc_limitfd` to limit access to file descriptors inherited by and passed to sandbox processes, such as Chromium data `pak` files, `stdio`, and `/dev/random`, font files, and to call `cap_enter`. This compares favourably with the 4.3 million lines of code in the Chromium source tree, but would not have been possible without existing sandbox support in the design. We believe it should be possible, without a significantly larger number of lines of code, to explore using the `libcapsicum` API directly.

Operating system	Model	Line count	Description
Windows	ACLs	22,350	Windows ACLs and SIDs
Linux	chroot	605	setuid root helper sandboxes renderer
Mac OS X	Seatbelt	560	Path-based MAC sandbox
Linux	SELinux	200	Restricted sandbox type enforcement domain
Linux	seccomp	11,301	seccomp and userspace syscall wrapper
FreeBSD	Capsicum	100	Capsicum sandboxing using <code>cap_enter</code>

Figure 12: Sandboxing mechanisms employed by Chromium.

## 5 Comparison of sandboxing technologies

We now compare Capsicum to existing sandbox mechanisms. Chromium provides an ideal context for this comparison, as it employs six sandboxing technologies (see Figure 12). Of these, the two are DAC-based, two MAC-based and two capability-based.

### 5.1 Windows ACLs and SIDs

On Windows, Chromium uses DAC to create sandboxes [18]. The unsuitability of inter-user protections for the intra-user context is demonstrated well: the model is both incomplete and unwieldy. Chromium uses Access Control Lists (ACLs) and Security Identifiers (SIDs) to sandbox renderers on Windows. Chromium creates a modified, reduced privilege, SID, which does not appear in the ACL of any object in the system, in effect running the renderer as an anonymous user.

However, objects which do not support ACLs are not protected by the sandbox. In some cases, additional precautions can be used, such as an alternate, invisible desktop to protect the user’s GUI environment. However, unprotected objects include FAT filesystems on USB sticks and TCP/IP sockets: a sandbox cannot read user files directly, but it may be able to communicate with any server on the Internet or use a configured VPN! USB sticks present a significant concern, as they are frequently used for file sharing, backup, and protection from malware.

Many legitimate system calls are also denied to the sandboxed process. These calls are forwarded by the sandbox to a trusted process responsible for filtering and serving them. This forwarding comprises most of the 22,000 lines of code in the Windows sandbox module.

### 5.2 Linux chroot

Chromium’s `suid` sandbox on Linux also attempts to create a privilege-free sandbox using legacy OS access control; the result is similarly porous, with the additional risk that OS privilege is required to create a sandbox.

In this model, access to the filesystem is limited to a directory via `chroot`: the directory becomes the sand-

box’s virtual root directory. Access to other namespaces, including System V shared memory (where the user’s X window server can be contacted) and network access, is unconstrained, and great care must be taken to avoid leaking resources when entering the sandbox.

Furthermore, initiating `chroot` requires a `setuid` binary: a program that runs with full system privilege. While comparable to Capsicum’s capability mode in terms of intent, this model suffers significant sandboxing weakness (for example, permitting full access to the System V shared memory as well as all operations on passed file descriptors), and comes at the cost of an additional `setuid-root` binary that runs with system privilege.

### 5.3 MAC OS X Seatbelt

On Mac OS X, Chromium uses a MAC-based framework for creating sandboxes. This allows Chromium to create a stronger sandbox than is possible with DAC, but the rights that are granted to render processes are still very broad, and security policy must be specified separately from the code that relies on it.

The Mac OS X *Seatbelt* sandbox system allows processes to be constrained according to a LISP-based policy language [1]. It uses the MAC Framework [27] to check application activities; Chromium uses three policies for different components, allowing access to filesystem elements such as font directories while restricting access to the global namespace.

Like other techniques, resources are acquired before constraints are imposed, so care must be taken to avoid leaking resources into the sandbox. Fine-grained filesystem constraints are possible, but other namespaces such as POSIX shared memory, are an all-or-nothing affair. The Seatbelt-based sandbox model is less verbose than other approaches, but like all MAC systems, security policy must be expressed separately from code. This can lead to inconsistencies and vulnerabilities.

### 5.4 SELinux

Chromium’s MAC approach on Linux uses an SELinux Type Enforcement policy [12]. SELinux can be used

for very fine-grained rights assignment, but in practice, broad rights are conferred because fine-grained Type Enforcement policies are difficult to write and maintain. The requirement that an administrator be involved in defining new policy and applying new types to the file system is a significant inflexibility: application policies cannot adapt dynamically, as system privilege is required to reformulate policy and relabel objects.

The Fedora reference policy for Chromium creates a single SELinux dynamic domain, `chrome_sandbox_t`, which is shared by all sandboxes, risking potential interference between sandboxes. This domain is assigned broad rights, such as the ability to read all files in `/etc` and access to the terminal device. These broad policies are easier to craft than fine-grained ones, reducing the impact of the dual-coding problem, but are much less effective, allowing leakage between sandboxes and broad access to resources outside of the sandbox.

In contrast, Capsicum eliminates dual-coding by combining security policy with code in the application. This approach has benefits and drawbacks: while bugs can't arise due to potential inconsistency between policy and code, there is no longer an easily accessible specification of policy to which static analysis can be applied. This reinforces our belief that systems such as Type Enforcement and Capsicum are potentially complementary, serving differing niches in system security.

## 5.5 Linux seccomp

Linux provides an optionally-compiled capability mode-like facility called `seccomp`. Processes in `seccomp` mode are denied access to all system calls except `read`, `write`, and `exit`. At face value, this seems promising, but as OS infrastructure to support applications using `seccomp` is minimal, application writers must go to significant effort to use it.

In order to allow other system calls, Chromium constructs a process in which one thread executes in `seccomp` mode, and another “trusted” thread sharing the same address space has normal system call access. Chromium rewrites `glibc` and other library system call vectors to forward system calls to the trusted thread, where they are filtered in order to prevent access to inappropriate shared memory objects, opening files for write, etc. However, this default policy is, itself, quite weak, as read of any file system object is permitted.

The Chromium `seccomp` sandbox contains over a thousand lines of hand-crafted assembly to set up sandboxing, implement system call forwarding, and craft a basic security policy. Such code is a risky proposition: difficult to write and maintain, with any bugs likely leading to security vulnerabilities. The Capsicum approach is similar to that of `seccomp`, but by offering a richer set

of services to sandboxes, as well as more granular delegation via capabilities, it is easier to use correctly.

## 6 Performance evaluation

Typical operating system security benchmarking is targeted at illustrating zero or near-zero overhead in the hopes of selling general applicability of the resulting technology. Our thrust is slightly different: we know that application authors who have already begun to adopt compartmentalisation are willing to accept significant overheads for mixed security return. Our goal is therefore to accomplish comparable performance with significantly improved security.

We evaluate performance in two ways: first, a set of micro-benchmarks establishing the overhead introduced by Capsicum's capability mode and capability primitives. As we are unable to measure any noticeable performance change in our adapted UNIX applications (`tcpdump` and `dhclient`) due to the extremely low cost of entering capability mode from an existing process, we then turn our attention to the performance of our `libcapsicum-enhanced gzip`.

All performance measurements have been performed on an 8-core Intel Xeon E5320 system running at 1.86GHz with 4GB of RAM, running either an unmodified FreeBSD 8-STABLE distribution synchronised to revision 201781 (2010-01-08) from the FreeBSD Subversion repository, or a synchronised 8-STABLE distribution with our capability enhancements.

### 6.1 System call performance

First, we consider system call performance through micro-benchmarking. Figure 13 summarises these results for various system calls on unmodified FreeBSD, and related capability operations in Capsicum. Figure 14 contains a table of benchmark timings. All micro-benchmarks were run by performing the target operation in a tight loop over an interval of at least 10 seconds, repeating for 10 iterations. Differences were computed using Student's t-test at 95% confidence.

Our first concern is with the performance of capability creation, as compared to raw object creation and the closest UNIX operation, `dup`. We observe moderate, but expected, performance overheads for capability wrapping of existing file descriptors: the `cap_new` syscall is  $50.7\% \pm 0.08\%$  slower than `dup`, or  $539 \pm 0.8\text{ns}$  slower in absolute terms.

Next, we consider the overhead of capability “unwrapping”, which occurs on every descriptor operation. We compare the cost of some simple operations on raw file descriptors, to the same operations on a capability-wrapped version of the same file descriptor: writing a




Figure 13: Capsicum system call performance compared to standard UNIX calls.

single byte to `/dev/null`, reading a single byte from `/dev/zero`; reading 10000 bytes from `/dev/zero`; and performing an `fstat` call on a shared memory file descriptor. In all cases we observe a small overhead of about  $0.06\mu s$  when operating on the capability-wrapped file descriptor. This has the largest relative performance impact on `fstat` (since it does not perform I/O, simply inspecting descriptor state, it should thus experience the highest overhead of any system call which requires unwrapping). Even in this case the overhead is relatively low:  $10.2\% \pm 0.5\%$ .

## 6.2 Sandbox creation

Capsicum supports ways to create a sandbox: directly invoking `cap_enter` to convert an existing process into a sandbox, inheriting all current capability lists and memory contents, and the `libcapsicum` sandbox API, which creates a new process with a flushed capability list.

`cap_enter` performs similarly to `chroot`, used by many existing compartmentalised applications to restrict file system access. However, `cap_enter` out-performs `setuid` as it does not need to modify resource limits. As most sandboxes `chroot` and set the UID, entering a capability mode sandbox is roughly twice as fast as a traditional UNIX sandbox. This suggests that the overhead of adding capability mode support to an application with existing compartmentalisation will be negligible, and replacing existing sandboxing with `cap_enter` may even marginally improve performance.

Creating a new sandbox process and replacing its address space using `execve` is an expensive operation. Micro-benchmarks indicate that the cost of `fork` is three orders of magnitude greater than manipulating the process credential, and adding `execve` or even a single in-

stance of message passing increases that cost further. We also found that additional dynamically linked library dependencies (`libcapsicum` and its dependency on `libsbbuf`) impose an additional 9% cost to the `fork` syscall, presumably due to the additional virtual memory mappings being copied to the child process. This overhead is not present on `vfork` which we plan to use in `libcapsicum` in the future. Creating, exchanging an RPC with, and destroying a single sandbox (the “sandbox” label in Figure 13(b)) has a cost of about 1.5ms, significantly higher than its subset components.

## 6.3 gzip performance

While the performance cost of `cap_enter` is negligible compared to other activity, the cost of multi-process sandbox creation (already taken by `dhclient` and Chromium due to existing sandboxing) is significant.

To measure the cost of process sandbox creation, we timed `gzip` compressing files of various sizes. Since the additional overheads of sandbox creation are purely at startup, we expect to see a constant-time overhead to the capability-enhanced version of `gzip`, with identical linear scaling of compression performance with input file size. Files were pre-generated on a memory disk by reading a constant-entropy data source: `/dev/zero` for perfectly compressible data, `/dev/random` for perfectly incompressible data, and base 64-encoded `/dev/random` for a moderate high entropy data source, with about 24% compression after gzipping. Using a data source with approximately constant entropy per bit minimises variation in overall `gzip` performance due to changes in compressor performance as files of different sizes are sampled. The list of files was piped to `xargs -n 1 gzip -c > /dev/null`, which sequentially invokes a new `gzip`

Benchmark	Time/operation	Difference	% difference
dup	$1.061 \pm 0.000\mu s$	-	-
cap_new	$1.600 \pm 0.001\mu s$	$0.539 \pm 0.001\mu s$	$50.7\% \pm 0.08\%$
shmfd	$2.385 \pm 0.000\mu s$	-	-
cap_new_shmfd	$4.159 \pm 0.007\mu s$	$1.77 \pm 0.004\mu s$	$74.4\% \pm 0.181\%$
fstat_shmfd	$0.532 \pm 0.001\mu s$	-	-
fstat_cap_shmfd	$0.586 \pm 0.004\mu s$	$0.054 \pm 0.003\mu s$	$10.2\% \pm 0.506\%$
read_1	$0.640 \pm 0.000\mu s$	-	-
cap_read_1	$0.697 \pm 0.001\mu s$	$0.057 \pm 0.001\mu s$	$8.93\% \pm 0.143\%$
read_10000	$1.534 \pm 0.000\mu s$	-	-
cap_read_10000	$1.601 \pm 0.003\mu s$	$0.067 \pm 0.002\mu s$	$4.40\% \pm 0.139\%$
write	$0.576 \pm 0.000\mu s$	-	-
cap_write	$0.634 \pm 0.002\mu s$	$0.058 \pm 0.001\mu s$	$10.0\% \pm 0.241\%$
cap_enter	$1.220 \pm 0.000\mu s$	-	-
getuid	$0.353 \pm 0.001\mu s$	$-0.867 \pm 0.001\mu s$	$-71.0\% \pm 0.067\%$
chroot	$1.214 \pm 0.000\mu s$	$-0.006 \pm 0.000\mu s$	$-0.458\% \pm 0.023\%$
setuid	$1.390 \pm 0.001\mu s$	$0.170 \pm 0.001\mu s$	$14.0\% \pm 0.054\%$
fork	$268.934 \pm 0.319\mu s$	-	-
vfork	$44.548 \pm 0.067\mu s$	$-224.3 \pm 0.217\mu s$	$-83.4\% \pm 0.081\%$
pdfork	$259.359 \pm 0.118\mu s$	$-9.58 \pm 0.324\mu s$	$-3.56\% \pm 0.120\%$
pingpong	$309.387 \pm 1.588\mu s$	$40.5 \pm 1.08\mu s$	$15.0\% \pm 0.400\%$
fork_exec	$811.993 \pm 2.849\mu s$	-	-
vfork_exec	$585.830 \pm 1.635\mu s$	$-226.2 \pm 2.183\mu s$	$-27.9\% \pm 0.269\%$
pdfork_exec	$862.823 \pm 0.554\mu s$	$50.8 \pm 2.83\mu s$	$6.26\% \pm 0.348\%$
sandbox	$1509.258 \pm 3.016\mu s$	$697.3 \pm 2.78\mu s$	$85.9\% \pm 0.339\%$

Figure 14: Micro-benchmark results for various system calls and functions, grouped by category.

compression process with a single file argument, and discards the compressed output. Sufficiently many input files were generated to provide at least 10 seconds of repeated `gzip` invocations, and the overall run-time measured. I/O overhead was minimised by staging files on a memory disk. The use of `xargs` to repeatedly invoke `gzip` provides a tight loop that minimising the time between `xargs`' successive `vfork` and `exec` calls of `gzip`. Each measurement was repeated 5 times and averaged.

Benchmarking `gzip` shows high initial overhead, when compressing single-byte files, but also that the approach in which file descriptors are wrapped in capabilities and delegated rather than using pure message passing, leads to asymptotically identical behaviour as file size increases and run-time cost are dominated by compression workload, which is unaffected by Capsicum. We find that the overhead of launching a sandboxed `gzip` is  $2.37 \pm 0.01$  ms, independent of the type of compression stream. For many workloads, this one-off performance cost is negligible, or can be amortised by passing multiple files to the same `gzip` invocation.

## 7 Future work

Capsicum provides an effective platform for capability work on UNIX platforms. However, further research and

development are required to bring this project to fruition.

We believe further refinement of the Capsicum primitives would be useful. Performance could be improved for sandbox creation, perhaps employing an Capsicum-centric version of the S-thread primitive proposed by Bit-tau. Further, a “logical application” OS construct might




Figure 15: Run time per `gzip` invocation against random data, with varying file sizes; performance of the two versions come within 5% of one another at around a 512K.

improve termination properties.

Another area for research is in integrating user interfaces and OS security; Shapiro has proposed that capability-centered window systems are a natural extension to capability operating systems. Improving the mapping of application security constructs into OS sandboxes would also significantly improve the security of Chromium, which currently does not consistently assign web security domains to sandboxes. It is in the context of windowing systems that we have found capability delegation most valuable: by driving delegation with UI behaviors, such as Powerboxes (file dialogues running with ambient authority) and drag-and-drop, Capsicum can support gesture-based access control research.

Finally, it is clear that the single largest problem with Capsicum and other privilege separation approaches is programmability: converting local development into de facto distributed development adds significant complexity to code authoring, debugging, and maintenance. Likewise, aligning security separation with application separation is a key challenge: how does the programmer identify and implement compartmentalisations that offer real security benefits, and determine that they've done so correctly? Further research in these areas is critical if systems such as Capsicum are to be used to mitigate security vulnerabilities through process-based compartmentalisation on a large scale.

## 8 Related work

In 1975, Saltzer and Schroeder documented a vocabulary for operating system security based on on-going work on MULTICS [19]. They described the concepts of capabilities and access control lists, and observed that in practice, systems combine the two approaches in order to offer a blend of control and performance. Thirty-five years of research have explored these and other security concepts, but the themes remain topical.

### 8.1 Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control

The principle of discretionary access control (DAC) is that users control protections on objects they own. While DAC remains relevant in multi-user server environments, the advent of personal computers and mobile phones has revealed its weakness: on a single-user computer, all eggs are in one basket. Section 5.1 demonstrates the difficulty of using DAC for malicious code containment.

Mandatory access control systemically enforces policies representing the interests of system implementers and administrators. Information flow policies tag subjects and objects in the system with confidentiality and integrity labels—fixed rules prevent reads or writes

that allowing information leakage. Multi-Level Security (MLS), formalised as Bell-LaPadula (BLP), protects confidential information from unauthorised release [3]. MLS's logical dual, the Biba integrity policy, implements a similar scheme protecting integrity, and can be used to protect Trusted Computing Bases (TCBs) [4].

MAC policies are robust against the problem of *confused deputies*, authorised individuals or processes who can be tricked into revealing confidential information. In practice, however, these policies are highly inflexible, requiring administrative intervention to change, which precludes browsers creating isolated and ephemeral sandboxes “on demand” for each web site that is visited.

Type Enforcement (TE) in LOCK [20] and, later, SELinux [12] and SEBSD [25], offers greater flexibility by allowing arbitrary labels to be assigned to subjects (domains) and objects (types), and a set of rules to control their interactions. As demonstrated in Section 5.4, requiring administrative intervention and the lack of a facility for ephemeral sandboxes limits applicability for applications such as Chromium: policy, by design, cannot be modified by users or software authors. Extreme granularity of control is under-exploited, or perhaps even discourages, highly granular protection—for example, the Chromium SELinux policy conflates different sandboxes allowing undesirable interference.

### 8.2 Capability systems, micro-kernels, and compartmentalisation

The development of capability systems has been tied to mandatory access control since conception, as capabilities were considered the primitive of choice for mediation in trusted systems. Neumann et al's Provably Secure Operating System (PSOS) [16], and successor LOCK, propose a tight integration of the two models, with the later refinement that MAC allows revocation of capabilities in order to enforce the \*-property [20].

Despite experimental hardware such as Wilkes' CAP computer [28], the eventual dominance of general-purpose virtual memory as the nearest approximation of hardware capabilities lead to exploration of object-capability systems and micro-kernel design. Systems such as Mach [2], and later L4 [11], epitomise this approach, exploring successively greater extraction of historic kernel components into separate tasks. Trusted operating system research built on this trend through projects blending mandatory access control with micro-kernels, such as Trusted Mach [6], DTMach [22] and FLASK [24]. Micro-kernels have, however, been largely rejected by commodity OS vendors in favour of higher-performance monolithic kernels.

MAC has spread, without the benefits of micro-kernel-enforced reference monitors, to commodity UNIX sys-

tems in the form of SELinux [12]. Operating system capabilities, another key security element to micro-kernel systems, have not seen wide deployment; however, research has continued in the form of EROS [23] (now CapROS), inspired by KEYKOS [9].

OpenSSH privilege separation [17] and Privman [10] rekindled interest in micro-kernel-like compartmentalisation projects, such as the Chromium web browser [18] and Capsicum's logical applications. In fact, large application suites compare formidably with the size and complexity of monolithic kernels: the FreeBSD kernel is composed of 3.8 million lines of C, whereas Chromium and WebKit come to a total of 4.1 million lines of C++. How best to decompose monolithic applications remains an open research question; Bittau's Wedge offers a promising avenue of research in automated identification of software boundaries through dynamic analysis [5].

Seaborn and Hand have explored application compartmentalisation on UNIX through capability-centric Plash [21], and Xen [15], respectively. Plash offers an intriguing blend of UNIX semantics with capability security by providing POSIX APIs over capabilities, but is forced to rely on the same weak UNIX primitives analysed in Section 5. Supporting Plash on stronger Capsicum foundations would offer greater application compatibility to Capsicum users. Hand's approach suffers from similar issues to `seccomp`, in that the runtime environment for sandboxes is functionality-poor. Garfinkel's Ostia [7] also considers a delegation-centric approach, but focuses on providing sandboxing as an extension, rather than a core OS facility.

A final branch of capability-centric research is capability programming languages. Java and the JVM have offered a vision of capability-oriented programming: a language run-time in which references and byte code verification don't just provide implementation hiding, but also allow application structure to be mapped directly to protection policies [8]. More specific capability-oriented efforts are E [13], the foundation for Capdesk and the DARPA Browser [26], and Caja, a capability subset of the JavaScript language [14].

## 9 Conclusion

We have described Capsicum, a practical capabilities extension to the POSIX API, and a prototype based on FreeBSD, planned for inclusion in FreeBSD 9.0. Our goal has been to address the needs of application authors who are already experimenting with sandboxing, but find themselves building on sand when it comes to effective containment techniques. We have discussed our design choices, contrasting approaches from research capability systems, as well as commodity access control and sandboxing technologies, but ultimately leading

to a new approach. Capsicum lends itself to adoption by blending immediate security improvements to current applications with the long-term prospects of a more capability-oriented future. We illustrate this through adaptations of widely-used applications, from the simple `gzip` to Google's highly-complex Chromium web browser, showing how firm OS foundations make the job of application writers easier. Finally, security and performance analyses show that improved security is not without cost, but that the point we have selected on a spectrum of possible designs improves on the state of the art.

## 10 Acknowledgments

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## 11 Availability

Capsicum, as well as our extensions to the Chromium web browser are available under a BSD license; more information may be found at:

<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/capsicum/>

A technical report with additional details is forthcoming.

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