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\title{Abstracts in Cryptology: 1970s\\ Volume~VIII, Release 1}
\author{Sean A. Irvine\\ Electronic mail: {\tt sirvine@waikato.ac.nz}}
\date{\today}

\begin{document}
\small
\maketitle

\begin{abstract}
This volume of {\sl Abstracts in Cryptology\/} contains references and abstracts for the cryptologic literature for the years 1970 through 1979. Other volumes cover different decades. The purpose of the document is aid the location of relevant cryptologic literature.
\end{abstract}

\subsection*{Preface}

This is Volume~VIII, Release 1, of the {\sl Abstracts in Cryptology.} This release contains approximately one thousand abstracts and references to books, papers, articles, technical reports, letters, and other literature pertaining to cryptology. The core references deal with secrecy, authentication, cryptanalysis, protocol, and so on. Other subjects having some coverage include random number generation, number theory (factoring and primality testing), zero-knowledge proofs, data compression, and complexity theory. I believe that all works referenced are publicly available.

Other volumes covering different decades are also available, but are not as complete as the current volume. Volume~I covers literature prior to 1900, Volume~II covers 1900--1919, Volume~III cover 1920--1929, Volume~IV covers 1930--1939, Volume~V covers 1940--1949, Volume~VI covers 1950--1959, Volume~VII covers 1960--1969, Volume~VIII covers 1970--1979, Volume~IX covers 1980--1989, Volume~X covers 1990--1994, and Volume~XI covers 1995--1999.

I regret that I am unable to supply copies of works referenced, nor can I specify where individual works may be obtained. Most of the books referenced should be available from a university or large public library. Most of the journal articles can be obtained by the interloan services of a library. The technical reports can usually obtained by directly contacting the author or institution concerned. Many of the technical reports from 1985 onwards are available on-line using the World-Wide-Web, gopher, and ftp systems.

Some journals are not covered very well in this release: notable omissions are {\em Cryptologia\/} and the {\em Journal of Cryptology.} If somebody with access to these journals can send me abstracts for the papers in them I will include them in the document for the next release.

If you know of any relevant document not listed here please send me the title, author, and journal or publisher, and if possible send an abstract. I am also happy to receive complete papers.

This document is designed to be printed using the \LaTeX\ typesetting system.

\vspace{1cm}

\noindent Sean Irvine.

\vspace{1cm}

{\obeylines Department of Mathematicss and Statistics
University of Waikato
Private Bag 3105
Hamilton
New Zealand.}

\T {Access Control Mechanisms for a Network Operating System}
\A {Helen M. Wood}
\A {Stephen R. Kimbleton}
\J {Proc. AFIPS National Computer Conference, {\bf 48}}
\D {1979}

\T {Algebraic Codes for Improving the Reliability of Tape Storage}
\A {Elwyn R. Berlekamp}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 44,} National Computer Conf.}
\D {1975}

\T {Algorithmic Unsolvability of Exponential Diophantine Equations with Three Unknowns}
\A {Ju. Matijasevic}
\J {Studies in the Theory of Algorithms and Mathematical Logic {\bf 133,} pp. 69--78}
\D {1979}

\T {An Analog Scrambling Scheme which Does Not Expand Bandwidth, Part I: Discrete Time}
\A {Aaron D. Wyner}
\J {IEEE Trans. on Info. Th. {\bf IT-25,} 4}
\D {1979}
\X {The problem of scrambling a discrete-time analog sequence for the purpose of privacy encoding is studied. A large family of linear orthogonal invertible scrambling transformations is described that result in a {\em negligible expansion of bandwidth\/} and can therefore serve as building blocks in a secure communication system.}

\T {An Analog Scrambling Scheme which Does Not Expand Bandwidth, Part II: Continuous Time}
\A {Aaron D. Wyner}
\J {IEEE Trans. on Info. Th. {\bf IT-25,} 4}
\D {1979}
\X {The techniques developed in Part I for discrete-time analog scrambling are applied to the problem of scrambling band-limited continuous-time signals or waveforms. The idea behind the waveform scrambler is to sample the waveform (which is assumed to be band-limited) at a rate exceeding the Nyquist rate. The resulting sequence of samples is band-limited in the sense of Part I. The discrete-time scrambler described in Part I is applied to this sequence to produce a nearly band-limited scrambled sequence. A scarmbled waveform is formed by modulating the amplitudes of a chain of pulses. This scrambled waveform can be transmitted over a band-limited channel, and the original unscrambled waveform can be recovered at the receiver.}

\T {Analysis of Secret Functions with Application to Computer Cryptography}
\A {Ingemar Ingemarsson}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {In computer cryptography we cannot avoid that data and the corresponding encrypted data can be read by an outside observer. The information contained in these observations may be used to decrypt parts of encrypted data or ultimately to identify the key in the cryptographic transformation. In this paper we have analyzed this situation using the concepts of information theory. The result shows that in most cases it is theoretically possible for an outsider to identify the key after very few observations. As this must be avoided we have to rely on computational complexity in the process of deriving the key. This is achieved by using one-way functions which are practically impossible to invert.}

\T {Application of Cryptography for Data Base Security, the}
\A {Ehud Gudes}
\A {Harvey S. Koch}
\A {Fred A. Stahl}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {The application of cryptographic transformations for the purpose of enhancing the security in data base systems is duscussed. These transformations have been recognized in the past as a valuable protection mechanism but their relation to data base security has not been identified. The major reason is the lack of a suitable data base model for investigating the questions of security and cryptography. A multi-level model of a data base is presented in this paper. This model helps to understand the connection between the data base structure and the cryptographic transformations applied to the data base. It is shown that cryptographic transformations can be applied between the different levels of the data base. Several types of these transformations are identified and the possible ways of using and controlling them are discussed. The multi-level model can provide a useful framework for further research in the area of cryptography and data base security.}

\T {Applications for Multilevel Secure Operating Systems}
\A {John P. L. Woodward}
\J {Proc. AFIPS National Computer Conference, {\bf 48}}
\D {1979}

\T {Are Computers Ready for the Checkless Society?}
\A {Frank Backman}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {Once the furor over the legal and regulatory issues of electronic funds transfer dies down, the data processing industry will find several complications in the development of a system architecture suitable for implementing a nationwide system. Apart from interface difficulties presented by the equipment and software designs of competing manufacturers, there are complications to the control of such a system that appear to merit the attention of the data processing industry. The purpose of this paper is to stimulate the exchange of opinions on how the industry should cope with differences in end-user protocols, different routing techniques, different methods of controlling terminal devices, the value of various communication line disciplines, and the overall management of a nationwide network.}

\T {Are Statistical Databases Secure?}
\A {D. E. Denning}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proc. {\bf 47,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1978}

\T {Bounds on Key Equivocation for Simple Substitution Ciphers}
\A {Rolf J. Blom}
\J {IEEE Trans. on Info. Th., {\bf IT-25,} 1}
\D {1979}
\X {The equivocation of the key for a simple substitution cipher is upper and lower bounded, when the message source is memoryless. The bounds are shown to be exponentially tight. The results are compared with random ciphering. It is observed that the exponential behaviour of the equivocation of the key is not determined by the redundancy in the message source, but by the symbol probabilities which are closest in a certain sense.}

\T {Breaking Substitution Ciphers Using a Relaxation Algorithm}
\A {Shmuel Peleg}
\A {Azriel Rosenfeld}
\J {C ACM {\bf 22,} 11}
\D {1979}
\X {Substitution ciphers are codes in which each letter of the alphabet has one fixed substitute, and the word division do not change. In this paper the problem of breaking substitution ciphers is represented as a probabilistic labeling problem. Every code letter is assigned probabilities of representing plaintext letters. These probabilities are update in parallel for all code letters, using joint letter probabilities. Iterating the updating scheme results in improved estimates that finally lead to breaking the cipher. The method is applied successfully to two examples.}

\T {Centralized Approach to Computer Network Security, a}
\A {Frank R. Heinrich}
\A {David J. Kaufman}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {This paper presents an approach to network security at the system design level. Some basic network concepts and major network security threats are outlined. The design approach is described and a brief security analysis is presented. The proposed network structure incorporates data protection devices called network cryptographic devices and a special-purpose processor, the network security center, to control access in the network.}

\T {Certification of Programs for Secure Information Flow}
\A {Dorothy E. Denning}
\A {Peter J. Denning}
\J {C ACM {\bf 20,} 7}
\D {1977}
\X {This paper presents a certification mechanism for verifying the secure flow of information through a program. Because it exploits the properties of a lattice structure among security classes, the procedure is sufficiently simple that it can easily be included in the analysis phase of most existing compilers. Appropriate semantics are presented and proved correct. An important application is the confinement problem: The mechanism can prove that a program cannot cause supposedly nonconfidential results to depend on confidential input data.}

\T {Ciphertext/Plaintext and Ciphertext/Key Dependence vs. Number of Rounds for the Data Encryption Standard}
\A {C. Meyer}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proc., {\bf 47,} pp. 1119--1126}
\D {1978}

\T {Coding/Decoding for Data Compression and Error Control on Data Links Using
Digital Computers}
\A {H. M. Gates}
\A {R. B. Blizard}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 37,} Fall Joint Computer Conference}
\D {1970}

\T {Combinatorial Inference}
\A {Richard DeMillo}
\A {David Dobkin}
\A {Richard Lipton}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {Complexity of Computations}
\A {Michael O. Rabin}
\J {CACM {\bf 20,} 9}
\D {1977}
\X {The framework for research in the theory of complexity of computations is described, emphasizing the interrelation between seemingly diverse problems and methods. Illustrative examples of practical and theoretical significance are given. Directions for new research are discussed.}

\T {Complexity of Theorem Proving Procedures, the}
\A {S. A. Cook}
\J {Proc. of the 3rd ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, pp. 151--158}
\D {1971}

\T {Comprehensive Security in Data Processing Systems---The State of the Art}
\A {Enrique Grapa}
\J {Technical Report: UIUCDCS-R-75-725, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champagne}
\D {1975}

\T {Computer Abuse Perpetrators and Vulnerabilities of Computer Systems}
\A {Donn B. Parker}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {Analysis of computer abuse experience is valuable in threat and risk studies performed to develop appropriate safeguards in computer use. A profile of computer abuse perpetrators has been developed on the basis of interviews with 17 offenders involved in a total of 15 cases. Common characterisitics, occupations, and modus operandi are documented and analyzed. Computer systems' and user organizations' vulnerabilities that facilitated perpetrators' actions are also described, based on studt of 375 reported cases of abuse. Eight main vulnerable functions and nine main vulnerable functional locations are identified and ranked by incidence of occurrence. Each vulnerability is described by examples in the form of brief case descriptions. Finally, priorities for safeguards are deduced from the results of the study.}

\T {Computer Network Cryptography Engineering}
\A {Harrison R. Burris}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {A definition of system security and a unified description of encryption methods is presented as background. Alternatives for five major computer network design decisions related to the employment of cryptography with the network are discussed in terms of efficiency (security achieved) and cost.}

\T {Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of {\bf NP}-completeness}
\A {M. R. Garey}
\A {D. S. Johnson}
\J {W. H. Freeman and Co., San~Francisco, CA}
\D {1979}

\T {Computer Security}
\A {David K. Hsiao}
\A {Douglas S. Kerr}
\A {Stuart E. Madnick}
\J {Academic Press, NY}
\D {1979}
\X {Privacy and its technical implications on security, operational security,
physical security, hardware security, cryptographic transformations, operatinf
system security, database security.}

\T {Computer Security and Protection Structures}
\A {Bruce J. Walker}
\A {Ian F. Blake}
\J {Dowden, Hutchinson \& Ross, Inc., Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania}
\D {1977}
\X {Threats, fire, water, rioting and bombing, miscellaneous, accidental
threats, magnetism, deliberate threats, countermeasures, data transmission and
cryptography, keys, message integrity, safeguarding files, access control.}

\T {Computer Security---A Survey}
\A {Peter S. Browne}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {With the growing requirements for protection generated by legislation such as the 1974 Privacy Act, the increasing complexity of computer and data communications applications, and increasing awareness regarding computer vulnerabilities, the discipline of computer security is achieving independent recognition. Current data processing literature is a rich source of information. Articles and papers regarding security, design of software protection, operations practices and auditing number in the thousands. Most of them are very narrow in scope or so general that they are of little use. It is important to the data processing professional to be able to sort out the large body of material in order to gain perspective. This paper attempts that by relying on a carefully selected and fully annotated bibliography of 134 items, many of them of interest to the systems analyst or designer. These papers are referenced in the text, which attempts to carefully distinguish between the technical and operational elements of computer security, while providing an overall perspective.}

\T {Constraints: Part I Constraints and Compromise}
\A {Federick C. Furtek}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {Constraints: Part II Constraints and Multilevel Security}
\A {Jonathan K. Millen}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {Control Systems Model of Privacy, a}
\A {John Salasin}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {Concerns about individual privacy, specifically in relation to automated data systems containing personal information, are considered in terms of a feedback control model. This model provides a framework which appears to relate many separate concerns which individuals or groups have expressed about privacy. It also provides a framework which may be suitable for analyzing legislation or regulations promulgated for the protection of privacy. The model may assist in defining needed research on the need for privacy, or on the impact of inadequate protection of privacy. The model posits that data systems pose various ``threats'' to privacy depending on the extent and manner in which the existence of such information systems hinders the ability of individuals or groups to provide feedback to systems which affect them.}

\T {The Cost of Computer Privacy}
\A {Jerome Lobel}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 44,} National Computer Conf.}
\D {1975}

\T {`Cracking' a Random Number Generator}
\A {J. Reeds}
\J {Cryptologia {\bf I,} 1, pp. 20--26}
\D {1977}

\T {Cryptanalysis of the Hagelen Cryptography}
\A {W. G. Barker}
\J {Aegean Park Press}
\D {1977}

\T {Cryptography and Computer Privacy}
\A {Horst Feistel}
\J {Scientific American {\bf 228,} 5}
\D {1973}
\X {Computer systems in general and personal ``data banks'' in particular need protection. This can be achieved by enciphering all material and authenticating the legitimate origin of any command to the computer.}

\T {Cryptography: On the Brink of a Revolution?}
\A {G. B. Kolata}
\J {Science Magazine {\bf 208,} pp. 747--748}
\D {1977}

\T {Cryptography Using Modular Software Elements}
\A {Herbert S. Bright}
\A {Richard L. Enison}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {Protection of information within a computer/communication system can be provided through reversible cryptographic transformation of the information itself into a form that can be returned to usable form only through use of control information known as ``key.'' It is not necessary, in order to achieve access controlm that the encryption algorithms, random number generator, or system organizations be kept secret; in fact, a basic requirement of modern cryptographic technology is that it must be effective although a would-be penetrator is assumed to have full access to all of that information and the facilities and competence to apply it. Only the key can be assumed to be, and must be, physically secure. The building-block approach outlined makes user of pre-programmed software elements for providing all specialized algorithms, including the Proposed Ferderal Data Encryption Standard (DES), together with necessary nonumeric generalized support routines for use with application programs written in conventional procedural higher languages (FORTRAN, COBOL, etc.). Both Strong Algorithm and Long Key methods can be used as required by security-level-vs-cost tradeoff considerations. This method is useful in conjunction with specialized hardware; for testing of programs and hardware; in some cases instead of hardware; and can support multiple-level security applications. The entire scheme, including the Tausworthe-Lweis-Payne bitwise linear recurrence modulo 2 quasirandom number generator, is based irrespective of hardware type on a standardized 64-bit data element.}

\T {Cryptology, Computers, and Common Sense}
\A {G. E. Mellen}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 42,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1973}

\T {Cryptology Goes Public}
\A {David Kahn}
\J {Foreign Affairs, Fall}
\D {1979}

\T {Cryptology in Transition}
\A {Abraham Lempel}
\J {ACM Computing Surveys {\bf 11,} 4, pp. 285--304}
\D {1979}
\X {The emphasis of this survey is on the new concept of public-key
cryptosystems, the recently proposed schemes for their implementation, and the
problem pertaining to cryptocomplexity. Also presented are a brief outline of
classical cryptography, the principles underlying present-day cryptology, and a
short description of the new official Data Encryption Standard.}

\T {Cyclic Redundancy Checking by Program}
\A {P. E. Boudreau}
\A {R. F. Steen}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings {\bf 39,} Fall Joint Computer Conference}
\D {1971}

\T {Data Base System Authorization}
\A {D. Chamberlin}
\A {J. N. Gray}
\A {P. P. Griffiths}
\A {M. Mresse}
\A {I. L. Traiger}
\A {B. W. Wade}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {Data Encryption Gurus: Tuchman and Meyer}
\A {P. Kinnucan}
\J {Cryptologia {\bf II,} 4}
\D {1978}

\T {Data Encryption Standard}
\A {National Bureau of Standards}
\J {Federal Information Processing Standard, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, FIPS PUB 46, Washington DC}
\D {1977}

\T {Data Security}
\A {Dorothy E. Denning}
\A {Peter J. Denning}
\J {ACM Computing Surveys, {\bf 11,} 3}
\D {1979}
\X {The rising abuse of computation and increasing threat to personal privacy
through data banks have stimulated much interest in the technical safeguards
for data. There are four kinds of safeguards, each related to but dinstinct
from the others. Access controls regulate which users may enter the system and
subsequently which data sets an active user may read or write. Flow controls
regulate the dissemination of values among the data sets accessible to a user.
Inference controls protect statistical databases by preventing questioners from
deducing confidential information by posing carefully designed sequences of
statistical queries and correlating the responses. Statistical data banks are
much less secure than most people believe. Data encryption attempts to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information in transit or in storage.
This paper describes the general nature of controls of each type, the kinds of
problems they can and cannot solve, and their inherent limitations and
weaknesses. The paper is intended for general audience with little background
in the area.}

\T {The Design and Analysis of Computer Algorithms}
\A {A. Aho}
\A {J. Hopcroft}
\A {J. Ullman}
\J {Addison-Wesley}
\D {1974}

\T {Design and Operation of Public-Key Cryptosystems, the}
\A {Eric H. Michelman}
\J {Proc. AFIPS National Computer Conference, {\bf 48}}
\D {1979}

\T {Design Considerations for Cryptography}
\A {C. H. Meyer}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 42,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1973}

\T {Design Considerations for Electronic Funds Transfer Switch System Development}
\A {Joseph P. Mazzetti}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {This paper reviews the EFTS switch concepts and outlines some of the major design considerations involved in its implementation. The EFTS switch permits financial institutions to share customer terminal devices (for example, point-of-sale terminals in a supermarket) by transmitting messages generated at the terminal to the financial institutions holding the customer (and merchant) account. The switch, in addition to message routing, must maintain information for settlement among the financial institutions involved, and generate accounting, audit trial and operational reports. Specifically addressed in the paper are: the financial transactions and terminal devices involved; switch message processing and accounting functions; hardware, software, and network components and alternatives; and security and backup considerayions. The material presented is based on EFTS project work performed by Technology Management Incorporated (TMI) for the Federal Home Loan Bank System.}

\T {Digitalized Signatures}
\A {Michael O. Rabin}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {Digitalized Signatures as Intractable as Factorization}
\A {M. O. Rabin}
\J {Technical Report: MIT/LCS/TR-212}
\D {1979}

\T {Digital Signatures and Public-Key Functions as Intractable as Factorization}
\A {M. O. Rabin}
\J {Technical Report MIT/LCS/TR-212, M.I.T.}
\D {1978}

\T {Early Work on Computers at Bletchley}
\A {I. J. Good}
\J {Annals of the History of Computing {\bf 1,} 1, pp. 38--48}
\D {1979}
\X {Pioneering work on computers was carried out at Bletchley, England, during
World War~II, for the cryptanalysis of the messages enciphered on the German
cryptographic machines, the Enigma and the Geheimschreiber. The work is
discussed and thumbnail sketches of some of the people involved are included.
The acount is written in an autobiographical spirit, but some references to
other sources are given.}

\E {Editor's Overview---Special Section on Data Encryption}
\A {Peter J. Denning}
\J {ACM Computing Surveys {\bf 11,} 4}
\D {1979}

\T {Effective Safeguards For Computer System Integrity}
\A {Norman R. Nielson}
\A {Brian Ruder}
\A {David H. Brandin}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {This paper reports the findings of a project to identify types of computer system integrity safeguards that would have been effective in preventing, detecting, or mitigating the effects of actual reported incidents of computer system integrity violations. More than 350 cases were analyzed and categorized among one of 26 types of violations and among one or more of 34 types of applicable safeguards. Brief definitions are provided for all categories, and distributions of incidents over the various violation categories and over the applicable safeguards are presented. The analysis revealed that most safeguards have a surprisingly narrow range of applicability, whether measured by number of cases or by number of violation categories affected. However, much broader violation coverage is possible through use of combinations of small numbers of safeguards. Directions for further research are discussed, including the need to bevelop measures of violation category importance and to include a consideration o safeguard cost, effectiveness, and operability factors.}

\T {Elements of Cryptanalysis}
\A {W. Friedman}
\J {Aegean Park Press, Laguna Hills, CA}
\D {1976---written much earlier}

\T {Encryption and Secure Computer Networks}
\A {Gerald J. Popek}
\A {Charles S. Kline}
\J {ACM Computing Surveys {\bf 11,} 4}
\D {1979}
\X {There is increasing growth in the number of computer networks in use and in
the kinds of distributed computing applications available on these networks.
This increase, together with concern about privacy, security, and integrity of
information exchange, has created considerable interest in the use of
encryption to protect information in the networks. This survey is directed at
the reader who is knowlegeable about various network designs and who now wishes
to consider incorporating encryption methods into these designs. It is also
directed at developers of encryption algorithms who wish to understand the
characterisitic of such algorithms useful in network applications. Key
management, network encryption protocols, digital signatures, and the utility
of conventional- or public-key encryption methods are each discussed. A case
study of how encryption was integrated into an actual network, the Arpanet,
illustrates many issues present in the design of a network encryption
facility.}

\T {Encryption Protocols, Public Key Algorithms, and Digital Signatures in Computer Networks}
\A {Gerald J. Popek}
\A {Charles S. Kline}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {An Error-Correcting Coding Scheme for Alphanumeric Data}
\A {A. V. Sethi}
\A {V. Rajaraman}
\A {P. S. Kenjale}
\J {Info. Proc. Letters {\bf 7,} 2}
\D {1978}

\T {Evaluation of Rational Functions}
\A {Volker Strassen}
\J {Complexity of Computer Computations, Raymond E. Miller \& James W. Thatcher (eds.), Plenum Press, NY}
\D {1972}
\X {In the first part of this paper the complexity (with respect to multiplication and division) of a general continued fraction and of arbitrary quadratic forms is determined with the help of Pan's method. In the second part some results on avoiding division and on the multiplication of matrices from an algebraic group are reported.}

\T {Exhaustive Cryptanalysis of the NBS Data Encryption Standard}
\A {W. Diffie}
\A {M. E. Hellman}
\J {Computer {\bf 10,} June, pp. 74--84}
\D {1977}

\T {The Existence of Good Cryptosystems for Key Rates Greater than the Message Redundancy}
\A {Shyue-Ching Lu}
\J {IEEE Trans. on Info. Th. {\bf IT-24,} 4}
\D {1979}
\X {A general result related to Shannon's ``random'' cipher result is presented. By using the Fano inequality it is shown that the average probability of correct decryptment of a message digit is bounded away from one when the key rate is greater than the message redundancy for a given class of cryptosystems.}

\T {An Extension of the Shannon Theory Approach to Cryptography}
\A {M. E. Hellman}
\J {IEEE Trans. on Info. Th., {\bf IT-23,} pp. 289--294}
\D {1977}
\X {Shannon's information-theoretic approach to cryptography is reviewed and extended. It is shown that Shannon's random cipher model is conservative in that a random chosen cipher is essentially the worst possible. This is in constrast with error-correcting codes where a randomly chosen code is essentially the best possible. The concepts of matching a cipher to a language and of the trade-off between local and global uncertainty are also developed.}

\T {A Fast Monte-Carlo Test for Primality}
\A {R. Solovay}
\A {V. Strassen}
\J {SIAM J. on Computing {\bf 6,} 1, pp. 84--85}
\D {1977}
\J {{\em errata in\/} SIAM J. on Computing {\bf 7,} p. 118}
\D {1978}
\X {Let $n$ be an odd integer. Take a random number $a$ from a uniform
distribution on the set $\{1,2,\ldots,n-1\}.$ If $a$ and $n$ are relatively
prime, compute the residue $\epsilon\equiv a^{(n-1)/2}(\mod n),$ where
$-1\le\epsilon<n-2,$ and the Jacobi symbol $\delta=(a/n).$ If
$\epsilon=\delta,$ decide that $n$ is prime. If either $\gcd(a,n)>1$ of
$\epsilon\ne\delta$ decide that $n$ is composite. Obviously, if $n$ is prime,
the decision made will be correct. We will show, below, that for composite $n$
the probability of incorrect decision is $\le1/2.$ The number of multiprecision
operations needed for the whole procedure is $<6\log_2 n.$ $m$-fold repetition
using independent random numbers yields a Monte-Carlo test for primality with
error probabilities $0$ (if $n$ is prime) and $<2^{-m}$ (if $n$ is composite)
and with multiprecision arithmetic cost $<6m\log_2n.$}

\T {FIPS Publication 46: Announcing the Data Encryption Standard}
\A {NBS}
\D {1977}

\T {The Formulary Model for Flexible Privacy and Access Controls}
\A {L. J. Hoffman}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings {\bf 39,} Fall Joint Computer Conference}
\D {1971}

\T {Foundations of a Provably Secure Operating System (PSOS), the}
\A {Richard J. Feiertag}
\A {Peter G. Neumann}
\J {Proc. AFIPS National Computer Conference, {\bf 48}}
\D {1979}

\T {The Foundations of Secure Computation}
\A {Richard A. DeMillo}
\A {David Dobkin}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {A Generating Function for Entropy}
\A {A. A. Sekey}
\J {Info. Proc. Letters {\bf 4,} 2}
\D {1975}

\T {A Gray Code for Set Partitions}
\A {R. Kaye}
\J {Info. Proc. Letters {\bf 5,} 6}
\D {1976}

\T {Hiding Information and Signatures In Trapdoor Knapsacks}
\A {R. C. Merkle}
\A {M. E. Hellman}
\J {IEEE Trans. on Info. Th. {\bf IT-24,} pp. 525--530}
\D {1978}
\X {The knapsack problem is an NP-complete combinatorial problem that is strongly believed to be computationally difficult to solve unless one possesses ``trapdoor information'' used in the design of the problem are dominstrated. Because only the designer can easily solve problems, others can send him information hidden in the solution to the problems without fear that an eavesdropper will be able to extract the information. This approach differs from usual cryptographic systems in that a secret key is not needed. Conversely, only the designer can generate signatures for messages, but anyone can easily check their authenticity.}

\T {A Homophonic Cipher for Computational Cryptography}
\A {Fred A. Stahl}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 42,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1973}

\T {How Do We Best Control The Flow Of Electronic Information Across Sovereign Borders?}
\A {Peter Safirstein}
\J {Proc. AFIPS National Computer Conference, {\bf 48}}
\D {1979}

\T {How to Break the Lu-Lee (COMSAT) Public-Key Cryptosystem}
\A {L. M. Adleman}
\A {R. L. Rivest}
\J {MIT Laboratory for Computer Science}
\D {1979}

\T {How to Protect Data with Ciphers that are Really Hard to Break}
\A {P. Geffe}
\J {Electronics {\bf 46,} 1, pp. 99--101}
\D {1973}

\T {How to Share a Secret}
\A {Adi Shamir}
\J {C ACM {\bf 22,} 11}
\D {1979}
\X {In this paper we show how to divide data $D$ into $n$ pieces in such a way
that $D$ is easily reconstructable from any $k$ pieces, but even complete
knowledge of $k-1$ pieces reveals absolutely no information about $D.$ This
technique enables the construction of robust key management schemes for
cryptographic systems that can function securely and reliably even when
misfortunes destroy half the pieces and security breaches expose all but one of
the remaining pieces.}

\T {Huffman Coding in Bit-Vector Compression}
\A {M. Jakobsson}
\J {Info. Proc. Letters {\bf 7,} 6}
\D {1978}

\T {Human and Organizational Implications of Computer Privacy}
\A {Jerry M. Rosenberg}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {The computer was created to serve man. With increasing reason serious questions are being raised pertaining to the potential misuse of the computer. Specifically, the issue of privacy has come to the public's attention as cherished liberties and psychological needs are gradually being eroded as the technology of the computer expands. Recent discoveries have shown how men desiring power can utilize data for their own benefit, leaving the person intruded upon withlittle recourse, or for that matter, any knowledge of the invasion into his private world. This paper identifies the many implications of loss of privacy on man's ego, dignity and general ability to cope with these forces. Failure to possess privacy can lead to withdrawal, loss of productivity, lack of confidence, physiological deterioration and other conditions of mental and physical decline. A significant portion of this paper details the protections that can be incorporated, primarily technical, to preseve the balance between the need for society to know and the need of the individual to remain independent. The basic conditions for man's well-being are being tested along with the foundations of our governmental traditions.}

\T {Implementing Pubic-Key Scheme}
\A {S. Berkovitz}
\A {J. Kowalchuk}
\A {B. Schanning}
\J {IEEE Commun. Magazine {\bf 17,} 3, pp.~2--3}
\D {1979}

\T {An Improved Algorithm for Computing Logarithms Over {\bf GF$(p)$} and its Cryptographic Significance}
\A {S. Pohlig}
\A {M. E. Hellman}
\J {IEEE Trans. on Info. Theory, {\bf IT-24,} pp. 106--110}
\D {1978}
\X {A cryptographic system is described which is secure if and only if computing logarithms over $GF(p)$ is infeasible. Previously published algorithms for computing this function require $O(p^{1/2})$ complexity in both time and space. An improved algorithm us derived which requires $O(\log^2p)$ complexity if $p-1$ has only small prime factors. Such values of $p$ must be avoided in the cryptosystem. Constructive uses for the new algorithm are also described.}

\T {Incomputability}
\A {C. A. R. Hoare}
\A {D. C. S. Allison}
\J {ACM Computing Surveys {\bf 4,} 3}
\D {1972}
\X {Russell's logical paradox, formulated in terms of English adjectives, is
considered as a convenient starting point for this discussion of
incomputablility. It is shown to be impossible, under a wide variety of
circumstances, to program a function which will determine whether another
function written in the same programming language will terminate. The theory of
types is introduced in an attempt to evade the paradox. Finally, it is shown
that any language containing conditionals and recusive function definitions,
which is powerful enough to program its own interpreter, cannot be used to
program its own {\em terminates\/} function.}

\T {Information Theory and Privacy in Data Banks}
\A {I. S. Reed}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 42,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1973}

\T {Information Transistion in Sequential Programs}
\A {Ellis Cohen}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {Insuring Confidentiality of Individual Records in Data Storage and
Retrieval for Statistical Purposes}
\A {M. H. Hansen}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings {\bf 39,} Fall Joint Computer Conference}
\D {1971}

\T {Insuring Individual's Privacy from Statistical Data Base Users}
\A {Mohammed Inam ul Haq}
\A {Gerald Popek}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 44,} National Computer Conf.}
\D {1975}

\T {Intentional Resolution of Privacy Protection in Database Systems}
\A {Naftaly Minsky}
\J {CACM {\bf 19,} 3}
\D {1976}
\X {Traditionally, privacy protection in database systems is understood to be
the control over what information a given user can get from a database. This
paper is concerned with another, independent, dimension of privacy protection,
the control over what a user is allowed to do with a piece of information
supplied to him by the database. The ability to condition the supply of
information on its intended use is called here ``intentional resolution'' of
privacy protection. The practical importance of intentional resolution is
demonstrated by several examples, and its realization is discussed. It is shown
that intentinal resolution can be achieved, but that it involves a radical
change from the traditional approach to the process of user-database
interaction. In particular, it appears to be necessary for the database to
impose a certain amount of control over the internal behaviour of users'
programs which interact with it. A model for user-database interaction which
admits such a control is developed.}

\T {Intercept: The Enigma War}
\A {J. Garlinski}
\J {J. M. Dent \& Sons, Ltd., London, England}
\D {1979}

\T {Introduction to Number Theory}
\A {W. W. Adams}
\A {L. J. Goldstein}
\J {Prentice-Hall}
\D {1976}

\T {Issues and Answers---Data Security and Personal Privacy}
\A {James A. Case}
\A {Willis Ware}
\A {Douglas Metz}
\A {William Fenwick}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 44,} National Computer Conf.}
\D {1975}

\T {KSOS---Computer Network Applications}
\A {M. A. Padilpsky}
\A {K. J. Biba}
\A {R. B. Neely}
\J {Proc. AFIPS National Computer Conference, {\bf 48}}
\D {1979}

\T {KSOS---Development Methodology for a Secure Operating System}
\A {T. A. Berson}
\A {G. L. Barksdale, Jr.}
\J {Proc. AFIPS National Computer Conference, {\bf 48}}
\D {1979}

\T {KSOS---The Design of a Secure Operating System}
\A {E. J. McCauley}
\A {P. J. Drongowski}
\J {Proc. AFIPS National Computer Conference, {\bf 48}}
\D {1979}

\T {A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow}
\A {Dorothy E. Denning}
\J {CACM {\bf 19,} 5}
\D {1976}
\X {This paper investigates mechanisms that guarantee secure information flow
in a computer system. These mechanisms are examined within a methematical
framework suitable for formulating the requirements of secure information flow
among security classes. The central component of the model is a lattice
structure derived from the security classes and justified by the semantics of
information flow. The lattice properties permit concise formulations of the
security requirements of different existing systems and facilitate the
construction of mechanisms that enforce security. The model provides a unifying
view of all systems that restrict information flow, enables a classification of
them according to security objectives, and suggests some new approaches. It
also leads to the construction of automatic program certification mechanisms
for verifying the secure flow of information through a program.}

\T {Linear Sieve Algorithm for Finding Prime Numbers, a}
\A {D. Gries}
\J {Technical Report: TR77--313, Cornell University}
\D {1977}

\T {Management and Use of Personal Information Numbers}
\A {American Bankers Association}
\J {Aids from ABA, Catalog no. 207213}
\D {1979}

\T {Mathematical Games: A New Kind of Cipher that Would Take Millions of Years to Break}
\A {Martin Gardner}
\J {Scientific American {\bf 237,} 2}
\D {1977}

\T {The Mathematics of Public-Key Cryptography}
\A {Martin E. Hellman}
\J {Scientific American {\bf 241,} August}
\D {1979}
\X {The search for privacy in an age of electronic communication has given rise
to new methods of encryption. These methods are more practical than older ones
and are mathematically more interesting.}

\T {Medians and Database Security}
\A {Steven P. Reiss}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems}
\A {R. L. Rivest}
\A {A. Shamir}
\A {L. Adleman}
\J {C ACM {\bf 21,} 2}
\D {1978}
\X {An encryption method is presented with the novel property that publicly
revealing an encryption key does not thereby reveal the corresponding
decryption key. This has two important consequences: (1) Couriers or other
secure means are not needed to transmit keys, since a message can be enciphered
using an encryption key publicly revealed by the intended recipient. Only he
can decipher the message, since only he knows the corresponding decryption key.
(2) A message can be ``signed'' using a privately help decryption key. Anyone
can verify this signature using the corresponding publicly revealed encryption
key. Signatures cannot be forged, and a signer cannot later deny the validity
of his signature. This has obvious applications in ``electronic mail'' and
``electronic funds transfer'' systems. A message is encrypted by representing
it as a number $M,$ raising $M$ to a publicly specified power $e,$ then taking
the remainder when the result is divided by the publicly specified product,
$n,$ of two large secret prime numbers $p$ and $q.$ Decryption is similar; only
a different, secret, power $d$ is used, where $e*d\equiv1(\mod(p-1)*(q-1)).$
The security of the system rests in part on the difficulty of factoring the
published divisor, $n.$}

\T {A Microprocessor Selective Encryption Terminal for Privacy Protection}
\A {John H. Carson}
\A {John K. Summers}
\A {James S. {Welch, Jr.}}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 46,} National Computer Conf.}
\D {1977}
\X {This paper reports on an experiment performed by the METREK Division of The
MITRE Corporation from Novemeber 1975 through August 1976. The purpose of the
exterminet was to determine how effectively a low cost microcomputer could
provide privacy protection to a user of a time-shared computer system. The
microprocessor was used to selectively encrypt information entered at the
terminal before transmission to the host computer so that the protected
informatioon never appears in plaintext from at the host computer. The
advantages and disadvantages of theis approach along with the operational
details of the experimental system are presented.}

\T {A Model for Verification of Data Security in Operating Systems}
\A {Gerald J. Popek}
\A {David A. Farber}
\J {CACM {\bf 21,} 9}
\D {1978}
\X {Program verification applied to kernel architectures forms a promising
method for providing uncircumventably secure, shared computer systems. A
precise definition of data security is developed here in terms of a general
model for operating systems. This model is suitable as a basis for verifying
many of those properties of an operating system which are necessary to assure
reliable enforcement of security. The application of this approach to the UCLA
secure operating system is also discussed.}

\T {Modern Methods for Computer Security and Privacy}
\A {Lance J. Hoffman}
\J {Pentice-Hall, NJ}
\D {1977}
\X {Authentication, passwords, authorization, logging, privacy transformations:
traditional methods, privacy transformations: computer-oriented software
methods, privacy transformations: hardware methods, system programs, machine
architecture, statistical data banks, mathematical models, nontechnical areas
of computer security, legal aspects.}

\T {Modular Approach to Computer Security Risk Management, a}
\A {Robert P. Campbell}
\A {Gerald A. Sands}
\J {Proc. AFIPS National Computer Conference, {\bf 48}}
\D {1979}

\T {Monotonic Protection Systems}
\A {M. A. Harrison}
\A {W. L. Ruzzo}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {Monte Carlo Method for Factorization}
\A {J. Pollard}
\J {BIT {\bf 15,} pp. 331--334}
\D {1975}

\T {Multi-Dimensional Security Programs for a Generalized Information Retrieval
System}
\A {J. M. Carroll}
\A {R. Martin}
\A {L. McHardy}
\A {H. Moravee}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings {\bf 39,} Fall Joint Computer Conference}
\D {1971}

\T {Multiuser Cryptographic Techniques}
\A {Whitfield Diffie}
\A {Matin E. Hellman}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {This paper deals with new problems which arise in the application of cryptography to computer communications systems with large numbers of users. Foremost among these is the key distribution problem, We suggest two techniques for dealing with this problem. The first employs current technology and requires subversion of several separate keys distribution nodes to compromise the system's security. Its disadvantage is a high overhead for single message connections. The second technique is still in the conceptual phase, but promises to eliminate completely the need for a secure key distribution channel, by making the sender's keying information public. It is also shown how such a public key cryptosystem would allow the development of an authentication system which generates an unforgeable, message dependent digital signature.}

\T {New Directions in Cryptography}
\A {W. Diffie}
\A {M. E. Hellman}
\J {IEEE Trans. on Info. Theory {\bf IT-22,} pp. 644--654}
\D {1976}
\X {Two kinds of contemporary developments in cryptography are examined. Widening applications of teleprocessing have given rise to a need for new types of cryptographic systems, which minimize the need for secure key distribution channels and supply the equivalent of a written signature. This paper suggests ways to solve these currently open problems. It also discusses how the theories of communication and computation are beginning to provide the tools to solve cryptographic problems of long standing.}

\T {A Note on Cryptography and NP CoNP-P}
\A {G. Brassard}
\A {S. Fortune}
\A {J. Hopcroft}
\J {Technical Report: TR78--338, Cornell University}
\D {1978}

\T {A Note on the Complexity of Cryptography}
\A {G. Brassard}
\J {IEEE Trans. on Info. Theory, {\bf IT-25,} pp. 232--233}
\D {1979}
\X {Evidence is given for the difficulty of an eventual proof of computational security for cryptosystems based on one-way functions, such as the one proposed by Diffie and Hellman. A proof of NP-completeness for the cryptanalytic effort would imply NP=CoNP.}

\T {On Classes of Protection Systems}
\A {Richard J. Lipton}
\A {Timothy A. Budd}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {On Data Banks and Privacy Homomorphisms}
\A {Ronald L. Rivest}
\A {Len Adleman}
\A {Michael L. Dertouzos}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {On Encryption Systems Realized by Finite Transducers}
\A {C. Kelemen}
\A {B. Reusch}
\J {Technical Report: TR76--291, Cornell University}
\D {1976}

\T {One Perspective on the Results about the Decidability of System Safety}
\A {R. S. Fabry}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {On Secrecy Systems with Side Information about the Message Available to a Cryptanalyst}
\A {Shyue-Ching Lu}
\J {IEEE Trans. on Info. Th. {\bf IT-25,} 4}
\D {1979}
\X {The performance of a class of encipherers is examined in the situation where a cryptanalyst has available side information about the message. A set of admissible pairs of distortion and key rate are determined for which good encipherers exist. The concepts of random ciphering and exponential bounding are used.}

\T {On Synchronization and Security}
\A {Richard J. Lipton}
\A {Lawrence Snyder}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {On the Encipherment of Search Trees and Random Access Files}
\A {R. Bayer}
\A {J. K. Metzger}
\J {ACM Trans. on Database Systems {\bf 1,} 1, pp.~37--52}
\D {1976}

\T {On the Implementation of Security Measures in Information Systems}
\A {R. W. Conway}
\A {W. L. Maxwell}
\A {H. L. Morgan}
\J {C ACM {\bf 15,} 4}
\D {1972}
\X {The security of an information system may be represented by a model matrix
whose elements are decision rules and whose row and column indices are users
and data items respectively. A set of four functions is used used to access
this matrix at translation and execution time. Distinguishing between data
dependent and data independent decision rules enables one to perform much of
the checking of security only once at translation time rather than repeatedly
at execution time. The model is used to explains ecurity features of several
existing systems, and serves as a framework for a proposal for general security
system implementation within today's languages and operating systems.}

\T {On the Solution of Polynomial Equations Using Continued Fractions}
\A {A. G. Akritas}
\J {Info. Proc. Letters {\bf 9,} 4}
\D {1979}

\T {Operating System Penetration}
\A {Richard R. Linde}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 44,} National Computer Conf.}
\D {1975}

\T {Orderly Enumeration of Nonsingular Binary Matrices Applied to Text
Encryption}
\A {W. H. Payne}
\A {K. L. McMillen}
\J {CACM {\bf 21,} 4}
\D {1978}
\X {Nonsingular binary matrices of order $N,$ i.e., nonsingular over the field
$\{0,1\}$, and an initial segment of the natural numbers are placed in
one-to-one correspondence. Each natural number corresponds to two intermediate
vectors. These vectors are mapped into a nonsingular binary matrix. Examples of
complete enumeration of all $2\times2$ and $3\times3$ nonsingular binary
matrices were produced by mapping the intermediate vectors to the matrices. The
mapping has application to the Vernam encipherment method using pseudorandom
number sequences. A bit string formed from bytes of text of a data encryption
key can be used as a representation of a natural number. This natural number is
transformed to a nonsingular binary matrix. Key leverage is obtained by using
the matrix as a ``seed'' in a shift register sequence pseuorandom sequence
generator.}

\T {An Overwiew of the Theory of Computational Complexity}
\A {J. Hartmanis}
\A {J. E. Hopcroft}
\J {Technical Report: 70--59, Dept. of Computer Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY}
\D {1979}
\X {The purpose of this paper is to outline the thoery of computational complexity which has emerged as a comprehensive theory during the last decade. This theory is concerned with the quantitative aspects of computation and its central theme is the measuring of the difficulty of computing functions. The paper does not attempt to give an exhaustive survey but instead presents the basic concepts, results and tehniques of computational complexity from a new point of view from whichthe ideas are more easily understood and fit together as a coherent whole.}

\T {Password Security: A Case History}
\A {Robert Morris}
\A {Ken Thompson}
\J {C ACM {\bf 22,} 11}
\D {1979}
\X {This paper describes the history of the design of the password security
scheme on a remotely accessed time-sharing system. The present design was the
result of countering observed attempts to penetrate the system. The result is a
compromise between extreme security and ease of use.}

\T {Preventing Software Piracy}
\A {Calvin N. Mooers}
\J {Computer {\bf 10,} 3}
\D {1977}

\T {The Principle of Attenuation of Privileges and its Ramifications}
\A {Naftaly Minsky}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {Privacy and Authentication}
\A {W. Diffie}
\A {M. E. Hellman}
\J {Proc. of the IEEE, {\bf 67,} pp. 397--427}
\D {1979}

\T {Privacy and Security in Data Bank Systems---Measures, Costs, and Protector Intruder Interactions}
\A {R. Turn}
\A {N. Z. Shapiro}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 41,} I, National Computer Conference}
\D {1972}

\T {Privacy and Security in Transnational Data Processing Systems}
\A {Rein Turn}
\J {Proc. AFIPS National Computer Conference, {\bf 48}}
\D {1979}

\T {Privacy, Security, and the Information Processing Industry}
\A {The Ombudsman Committee on Privacy, Los Angeles Chapter}
\J {Association for Computing Machinery}
\D {1976}
\X {Administrative and technological considerations of computer security, legal
considerations of the privacy question, safeguarding privacy: a code of fair
information practices.}

\T {Privacy Transformations for Databank Systems}
\A {Rein Turn}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 42,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1973}

\T {Problem Areas in Computer Security Assessment}
\A {S. Glaseman}
\A {R. Turn}
\A {R. S. Gaines}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 46,} National Computer Conf.}
\D {1977}
\X {An important problem area in providing security in computer systems is to
avoid excessively costly and constraining security practices while providing an
adequate level of security. In addition, there are problems in determining an
appropriate level of investment in techniques and practices which enhance
security and in the measurement of returns on those investments, i.e., to what
degree is security improved by any given technique? The resolution of these
problems depends on the development of a capability for identifying and
evaluating the risks of storing and processing sensitive data in imperfectly
secure comuting environments. This paper provides back-ground information in
security assessment, surveys recent work and the present statis of computer
security assessment, and identifies the research needed to move this field
forward.}

\T {Proprietry Software Protection}
\A {Richard DeMillo}
\A {Richard Lipton}
\A {Leonard McNeil}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {Protection in Operating Systems}
\A {Michael A. Harrison}
\A {Walter L. Ruzzo}
\J {C ACM {\bf 19,} 8}
\D {1976}
\X {A model of protection mechanisms in computing systems is presented and its
appropriateness is argued. The ``safety'' problem for protection systems under
this model is to determine in a given situation whether a subject can acquire a
particular right to an object. In restricted cases, it can be shown that this
problem is decidable, i.e. there is an algorithm to determine whether a system
in a particular configuration is safe. In general, and under surprisingly weak
assumptions, it cannot be decided if a situation is safe. Various implications
of this fact are discussed.}

\T {Protection Mechanism Models: Their Usefulness}
\A {Anita K. Jones}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {The Protection of Privacy and Security in Criminal Offender Record Information Systems}
\A {S. Rothman}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 41,} I, National Computer Conference}
\D {1972}

\T {Public-Key vs. Conventional Key Encryption}
\A {Charles S. Kline}
\A {Gerald J. Popek}
\J {Proc. AFIPS National Computer Conference, {\bf 48}}
\D {1979}

\T {Public Protection and Education with EFT}
\A {Robert H. Long}
\J {CACM {\bf 22,} 12}
\D {1979}
\X {Research has revealed the existence of widespread misinformation and lack
of knowledge about EFT among business and government as well as consumers. As a
result, any effort to stimulate meaningful public participation in decisions on
the introduction of EFT systems will require a coordinated educational effort
of considerable scale. In addition, research has revealed shortcomings in the
present system for defining responsibilities, liabilities, and avenues for
recourse. This article presents several possible alternatives for improving the
current system, but ongoing research is also needed to assure that actions
taken will be responsive to the changing environment and consumer needs.}

\T {Quasi-Random Number Sequences from a Long-Period TLP Generator with Remarks
on Application to Cryptography}
\A {Herbert S. Bright}
\A {Richard L. Enison}
\J {ACM Computing Surveys {\bf 11,} 4}
\D {1979}
\X {The background of the Lehmer linear congruential algorithms that are in
almost universal use for random sequence generation is reviewed; the reasoning
is given for choosing the somewhat different Tausworthe line recurrence (mod 2)
type, using the bit selection algorithm of Lewis and Payne; and the initial
statiscal evalulation is reported on. A review is given of the intuitive
process by which the Tausworthe approach, with a generation primitive trinomial
of Mersenne prime exponent degree, was chosen. A discussion is provided on the
criteria on which conventional statistical test methods are based. Then a
summary of the statisitical tests on short subsequences of one
generator of this type is given. It is proved that such a generator, cycling
from a nonsingular seed matrix, yields a uniform distribution of values over an
entire period. Finally, perturbation procedures for inhibiting sequence
extrapolation and for making sequence memebers nonreproducible are outlined.}

\T {Random Ciphering Bounds on a Class of Secrecy Systems and Discrete Message Sources}
\A {Shyue-Ching Lu}
\J {IEEE Trans. on Info. Th.}
\D {1979}
\X {The problem of enciphering a stationary finite discrete message so that a cryptanalyst is unlikely to decrypt an intercepted cryptogram is considered. Additive-like instantaneous block (ALIB) encipherers are studied that emply a list of $e^{nr}$ keywords of length $n,$ called the cipher. An ALIB encipherer produces a cryptogram word of length $n$ from a message word and key word of the same length by combining corresponding message letter and key-word letters. Certain technical restrictions are placed on the combining functions. The decipherer uses a decoder which combines a letter from the key word used in enciphering with a letter from the cryptogram to form the a letter of the decoded message. The cryptanalyst also decodes letter by letter with an identical decoder; however, he uses a keyword that is not necessarily that used in enciphering. For a given message source and combiner, the design of the cipher consists in choosing the block length $n,$ the key rate $r,$ and the set $e^{nr}$ key words. These are to be chosen so that $p_w,$ the probability of correct decryptment of a message word, and $p(\Delta),$ the probability that the per letter nonzero Hamming distance between the decrypted message and the true message is smaller than $\Delta,$ are very small for every cryptanalyst. A set of pairs $(\Delta,r)$ for which there exist ciphers with key rate $r$ such that $p_w$ and $p(\Delta)$ can be made arbitraily small for every cryptanalyst is determined using the concepts of random ciphering and exponential bounding.}

\T {Reduction of an Arbitary Diophantine Equation to One in 13 Unknowns}
\A {Yuri {Matijasevi\v c}}
\A {Julia Robinson}
\J {Acta Arithmetica {\bf XXVII,} pp. 521--553}
\D {1975}

\T {Repeated Use of Codes which Detect Deception}
\A {Viiveke {F\.ak}}
\J {IEEE Trans. on Info. Th, {\bf IT-25,} 2}
\D {1979}
\X {A sender $A$ wants to send $N$ messages $x_i,$ $i=1,\ldots,N,$ chosen from a set containing $M$ different possible messages, $M>N,$ to a receiver $B.$ Every $x_i$ has to pass through the hands of a dishonest messenger $C.$ Therefore $A$ and $B$ agree on a mathematical transformation $f$ and a secret parameter, or key $k,$ that will be used to produce the authenticator $y_i=f(x_i,k),$ which is sent together with $x_i.$ The key is chosen at random from a set of $L$ elements. $C$ knows $f$ and can find all elements in the set $G(x_i,y_i)=\{k|f(x_i,k)=y_i\}$ given enough time and computer resources. $C$ wants to change $x_i$ into $x^\prime$ without $B$ suspecting. This means that $C$ must find the new authenticator $y^\prime=f(x^\prime,k).$ Since $G(x_i,y_i)$ can be found for any $(x_i,y_i),$ it is obvious that $C$ will always succeed unless $G(x_i,y_i)$ contains more than one element. Here it is proved that the average probability of success for $C$ is minimized if (a) $G(x_i,y_i)$ contains $L^{(N-1)/N}$ elements and (b) each new known pair $(x_j,y_j)$ will diminish this set of solutions by a factor of $L^{-1/N}.$ The minimum average probability will then be $L^{-1/N}.$}

\T {Results on an Initial Attempt to Cryptanalyze the NBS Data Encryption Standard}
\A {M. E. Hellman}
\A {R. C. Merkle}
\A {R. Schroeppel}
\A {L. Washington}
\A {W. Diffie}
\A {S. Pohlig}
\A {P. Schweitzer}
\J {Technical Report: SEL 76-042, Stanford University}
\D {1976}

\T {A Review of Research on Statistical Data Base Security}
\A {Dorothy E. Denning}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Public Key Cryptosystems Do Not Always Conceal Messages}
\A {G. R. Blakley}
\A {I. Borosh}
\J {Computers \& Mathematics with Applications, {\bf 5}}
\D {1979}

\T {Safeguarding Cryptographic Keys}
\A {G. R. Blakley}
\J {Proc. AFIPS National Computer Conference, {\bf 48}}
\D {1979}

\T {SECURATE---Security Evaluation and Analysis Using Fuzzy Metrics}
\A {Lance J. Hoffman}
\A {Eric H. Michelman}
\A {Don Clements}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proc. {\bf 47,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1978}

\T {Secure Communications Over Insecure Channels}
\A {Ralph C. Merkle}
\J {C ACM {\bf 21,} 4, pp. 294--299}
\D {1978}
\X {According to traditional conceptions of cryptographic security, it is
necessary to transmit a key, by secret means, before encrypted messages can be
sent securely. This paper shows that it is possible to select a key over open
communications channels in such a fashion that communications security can be
maintained. A method is described which forces any enemy to expend an amount of
work which increases as the square of the work required of the two communicants
to select the key. The method provides a logically new kind of protection
against the passive eavesdropper. It suggests that further research on this
topic will be highly rewarding, both in a theoretical and a practical sense.}


\T {Secure Computer Operation With Virtual Machine Partitioning}
\A {Clark Weissman}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 44,} National Computer Conf.}
\D {1975}

\T {Secure Information Storage and Retrieval Using New Results in Cryptography}
\A {K. {Culik II}}
\A {H. A. Maurer}
\J {Info. Proc. Letters {\bf 8,} 4}
\D {1979}

\T {Secure, National System for Electronic Funds Transfer, a}
\A {D. Kaufman}
\A {K. Auerbach}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {This paper presents guidelines for development of a secure national network for elctronic funds transfer. Six security principles are developed. These principlesm together with certain important networking notions, are utilized to evolve a system level design of a secure localized system for electronic funds transfer. This design is then further defined in order to address the various problems involved when local systems are linked to form a national network. It is concluded that national standards are needed in order to prevent proliferation of incompatible local systems.}

\T {Secure Personal Computing in an Insecure Network}
\A {Dorothy E. Denning}
\J {CACM {\bf 22,} 8}
\D {1979}
\X {A mthod for implementing secure personal computing in a network with one or
more central facilities is proposed. The method emplys a public-key encryption
device and hardware keys. Each user is responsible for his own security and
need not rely on the security of the central facility or the communication
links. A user can safely store confidential files in the central facility or
transmit confidential data to other users on the network.}

\T {Security Kernel Validation in Practice}
\A {Jonathan K. Millen}
\J {CACM {\bf 19,} 5}
\D {1976}
\X {A security kernel is a software and hardware mechanism that enforces access
controls within a computer system. The correctness of a security kernel on a
PDP-11/45 is being proved. This paper desribes the technique used to carry out
the first step of the proof: validating a formal specification of the program
with respect to axioms for a secure system.}

\T {Security of Information Processing---Implications for Social Research}
\A {R. F. Boruch}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 41,} I, National Computer Conference}
\D {1972}

\T {Security Retrofit of VM/370, a}
\A {B. D. Gold}
\A {R. R. Linde}
\A {R. J. Peeler}
\A {M. Schaefer}
\A {J. F. Scheid}
\A {P. D. Ward}
\J {Proc. AFIPS National Computer Conference, {\bf 48}}
\D {1979}

\T {Security Risk Assessment in Electronic Data Processing Systems}
\A {Robert H. {Courtney, Jr.}}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 46,} National Computer Conf.}
\D {1977}
\X {Concern for the safety of a data prcoessing facility and the dsata within
it should result in the selection of such security measure, including
insurance, as are apprpriate to bringing the risk within tolerable limites at
the lowest costt. These security measures should be selected on the basis of
the benefit/cost relationships which they afford. This, in turn requires a
quantification of the potential benefits afforded by each security measure or
gorup of measure for comparsion with the cost. Because the benedfit afforded by
the security measure is lessening or elimination of security problems, which is
a risk reduction, we must be able to quantify the risk so as to measure the
benefit afforded by its elimination or diminution. A workable procedure for
doing this is described.}

\T {Signature Simulation and Certain Cryptographic Codes}
\A {Carl Hammer}
\J {CACM {\bf 14,} 1}
\D {1971}
\X {Three cyphers allegedly authored by Thomas Jefferson Beale in 1822 have
been the subject of intensive study for over 100 years. Generations of
cryptanalysts have expended untold man-years, thus far without success,
attempting to decode them; vast armies of fortune hunters and treasure seekers
have devoted Herculean labours to digging up the rolling hills of Virginia
trying to locate the promised bonanza. The history of pertinent activities
would fill volumes, yet serious students of cryptography have always had
nagging doubts about the cyphers' authenticity. It has been alleged that the
``known solution'' to Cypher Number Two: 115, 73, 24, 818, 37, 52, 49, $\ldots$
(``I have deposited in the County of Bedford about four miles from Buford's in
an excavation or vault...'') with the aid of an unsanitized version of the
Declaration of Indepdence was merely a superb, imaginative, and grandiose hoax
perpetrated ages ago for whatever reasons. Modern computer technology could
obviously perform signautre analysis on the Beale cyphers and could also, in
fact, simulate the process of encoding itself so as to yield new clues and
deeper insights ito their construction. For the benefit of the uninitiated, the
encoding method used in the second cypher employs a specified document whose
words are sought out at random to match the letters of the cleartext or
message. The sequence of numbers corresponding to these matches is then written
down as the final code. While primitive, the process has the advantage of
relative security until the source document becomes known; at that moment the
cypher can be decoded even by second graders. The work now compled with the
help of our UNIVAC 1108 includes numerous analytical studies of the Beale
cyphers and various types of simulations. For example, we have turned the
entire process of simulated encoding by various schmes over to the machine and
analysed the signatures of these synthetic codes; we have also encoded various
messages by hand, using different texts and a variety of methods to obtain
their signatures. These simulations provide convincing evidence that the
signatures are both process and data depedent; they indicate also very strongly
that Mr. Beale's cyphers are for real and that it is merely a matter of time
before someone finds the correct source document and locates the right vault in
the Commonwealth of Virginia.}

\T {Some Cryptographic Techniques for Machine-to-Machine Data Communications}
\A {H. Feistel}
\J {Scientific American {\bf 63,} 11, pp. 1545--1554}
\D {1975}

\T {Some Security Principles and Their Application to Computer Security}
\A {R. Stockton Gaines}
\A {Norman Z. Shapiro}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {The Standard Data Encryption Algorithm}
\A {Harry {Katzan Jr.}}
\J {Petrocelli, NY}
\D {1977}
\X {Introduction to data security, survey of cryptographic techniques for data
protection, overview of the data encryption standard, detailed analysis of the
data encryption algorithm, bitwise walk-through of the standard data encryption
algorithm, formal definition of the data encryption algorithm.}

\T {Statistical Methods in Cryptanalysis}
\A {S. Kullback}
\J {Aegean Park Press}
\D {1976}

\T {A Structured Design of Substitution-Permutation Encryption Network}
\A {John B. Kam}
\A {George I. Davida}
\J {Foundations of Secure Computation, Richard A. DeMillo, David P. Dobkin, Anita K. Jones, Richard J. Lipton (eds.), Academic Press}
\D {1978}

\T {A Subexponential Algorithm for the Discrete Logarithm Problem with Applications to Cryptography}
\A {L. M. Adleman}
\J {Proc. of the IEEE 20th Annual Symp. on Foundantions of Comp. Sc., pp.~55--60}
\D {1979}

\T {Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption}
\A {Gustavus J. Simmons}
\J {ACM Computing Surveys {\bf 11,} 4, pp. 305--330}
\D {1979}
\X {All cryptosystems currently in use are symmetric in the sense that they
require the transmitter and receiver to share, in secret, either the same piece
of information (key) or one of a pair of related keys easily computed from each
other; the key is used in the encryption process to introduce uncertainty to an
unauthorized receiver. Not only is an asymmetric encryption system one in which
the transmitter and receiver key are different, but in addition it is
computationally infeasible to compute at least one from the other. Asymmetric
systems make it possible to authenticate messages whose contents must be
revlead to an opponent or allow a transmitter whose key has been compromised to
communicate in privacy to a receiver whose key had been kept secret---neither
of which is possible using a symmetric cryptosystem. This paper opens with a
brief discussion of encryption principles and then proceeds to a comprehensive
discussion of the asymmetric encryption/decryption channel and its application
in secure communications.}

\T {Theorems of Factorization and Primality Testing}
\A {J. Pollard}
\J {Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc. {\bf 76,} pp. 521--528}
\D {1974}

\T {Time-Sharing Computer Systems (2nd ed.)}
\A {M. V. Wilkes}
\J {Macdonald London and American Elsevier}
\D {1975}
\X {Time sharing, process management, core space management, scheduling, filing
systems.}

\T {Two Papers on the Linearity of Finite Automata}
\A {B. Reusch}
\J {Technical Report: TR76--267, Cornell University}
\D {1976}

\T {UCLA Secure UNIX}
\A {Gerald J. Popek}
\A {Mark Kampe}
\A {Charles S. Kline}
\A {Allen Stoughton}
\A {Michael Urban}
\A {Evelyn J. Walton}
\J {Proc. AFIPS National Computer Conference, {\bf 48}}
\D {1979}

\T {U.K. Privacy White Paper 1975, the}
\A {A. S. Douglas}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings, {\bf 45,} National Computer Conference}
\D {1976}
\X {It is now some years since the formation of the Younger Committee, set up yo study the question of Privacy and its protection as it related to the private sector. The Committee published its report in 1972. Shortly after the Younger Committee was set up, an interdepartmental working party was set up within central Government to study the problem as it related to the public sector. This working party's report has now been issued along witha Government White Paper, which makes specific proposals for action in the computer field. In the meantime other countries, including the U.S., have taken significant steps in the direction of defining Privacy and introducing data protection procedures.}

\T {Unicity Points in Cryptanalysis}
\A {C. A. Deavours}
\J {Cryptologia {\bf 1,} pp. 46--68}
\D {1977}

\T {Universal Classes of Hash Functions}
\A {J. Lawrence Carter}
\A {Mark N. Wegman}
\J {J. of Computer and System Sciences}
\D {1979}
\X {This paper gives an {\em input independent\/} average linear time algorithm for storage and retrieval on keys. The algorithm makes a random choice of hash function from a suitable class of hash functions. Given any sequence of inputs the expected time (averaging over all functions in the class) to store and retrieve elements is linear in the length of the sequence. The number of references to the data base required by the algorithm for any input is extremely close to the theoretical minimum for any possible hash function with randomly distributed inputs. We present three suitable classes of hash functions which also can be evaluated rapidly. The ability to analyze the cost of storage and retrieval without worrying about the distribution of the input allows as collaries improvements on the bounds of several algorithms.}

\T {A Universal Cyclic Division Circuit}
\A {A. W. Maholick}
\A {R. B. Freeman}
\J {AFIPS Conference Proceedings {\bf 39,} Fall Joint Computer Conference}
\D {1971}

\T {The Use of Passwords for Controlling Access to Remote Computer Systems and
Services}
\A {Helen M. Wood}
\J {AFIPS Conf. Proc. {\bf 46,} National Computer Conf.}
\D {1977}
\X {The widespread use of remote computer resources has made the problem of
personal authentication most urgent. This paper examines the use of passwords
for controlled access to these resources. Password techniques, ways of
protecting passwords, and attendant cost considerations are discussed.
Similarities between passwords and data encryption keys are noted and general
recommendations for the use of passwords are presented.}

\T {User Authentication Scheme Not Requiring Secrecy in the Computer, a}
\A {A. Evans}
\A {W. Kantrowitz}
\A {E. Weiss}
\J {C ACM {\bf 17,} pp. 437--442}
\D {1974}

\T {Using Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Computers}
\A {Roger M. Needham}
\A {Michael D. Schroeder}
\J {CACM {\bf 21,} 12}
\D {1978}
\X {Use of encryption to achieve authenticated communication in computer
networks is discussed. Example protocols are presented for the establishment of
authenticated connections, for the management of authenticated mail, and for
signature verification and document integrity guarantee. Both conventional and
public-key encryption algorithms are considered as the basis for protocols.}

\T {Vulnerabilities of EFTs to Intentionally Caused Losses}
\A {Donn B. Parker}
\J {CACM {\bf 22,} 12}
\D {1979}
\X {The hypothesis that consumers are provided greater accuracy and freedom
from error and fraud with electronic funds transfer systems (EFTs) is discussed
in light of the technical capabilities and potential of the computer to protect
against both accidentally and intentionally caused losses. Although the
nomenclature for business crimes remains the same as for manual depository and
other financial service systems---for example, fraud, theft, embezzlement---the
characterisitic of the crimes are new. The changes resulting from the
accelerating use of EFTs and its continual technological advances broaden the
scope of security issues to be examined. Factors such as backup requirements,
regulatory and legislative actions, and economics give rise to the urgency for
immediate research into solutions for emerging EFTs-related vulnerabilities.}

\end{document}
