

# Confidentiality in *Circus*

Based on the work of Michael J. Banks

Jeremy L. Jacob

DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE, THE UNIVERSITY *of* York

23 January 2013

# Headlines

- ▶ Integrated notation to express confidentiality & functionality. (Functionality is a lower limit on information flow; confidentiality is an upper limit.)
- ▶ Inconsistency handled by **miracles**.
- ▶ Single notion of refinement.

## Secondary headlines

- ▶ Confidentiality annotations integrated into *Circus*.
- ▶ Semantics in Hoare & He's UTP.
- ▶ Semantics based on standard *Circus* semantics.

# Intellectual ancestry

A very partial list

**Confidentiality** Goguen & Meseguer; Jacob; Morgan; Mantel.

**Functionality** Dijkstra; Morgan; Hoare & He; Woodcock, Cavalcanti, Oliveira.

## Trivial example

A one-shot buffer that protects the parity of the input

Key: original *Circus*; addition to *Circus*.

```

channel  $h, \ell : \mathbb{N}$ 
process  $CMD \hat{=} \mathbf{begin}$ 
  state  $S \hat{=} [v : \mathbb{N}]$ 
   $Init \hat{=} [S' | v' = 0]$  — initialisation
   $C \hat{=} \langle \{\ell\} : v \in \mathit{Odd} \iff \tilde{v} \notin \mathit{Odd} \rangle$  — confidentiality annotation
   $H \hat{=} h?n \rightarrow v := n?$  — action
   $L \hat{=} \ell!2 * (v \div 2) \rightarrow \mathit{Stop}$  — action
  •  $\langle \{\ell\} : \mathit{Init}; H \rangle; C; \langle \{\ell\} : L \rangle$  — behaviour
end
  
```

$C$ : “If  $v \in \mathit{Odd}$  then communication on channels in  $\{\ell\}$  cannot allow  $v \notin \mathit{Odd}$  to be ruled out, and *vice versa*.”

$\{\ell\}$  ‘sees program counter’ between blocks and own actions within blocks.

## Trivial example

A one-shot buffer that simultaneously leaks and protects the parity of the input

Key: original *Circus*; addition to *Circus*.

```

channel  $h, \ell : \mathbb{N}$ 
process  $CMD \hat{=} \mathbf{begin}$ 
  state  $S \hat{=} [v : \mathbb{N}]$ 
   $Init \hat{=} [S' | v' = 0]$  — initialisation
   $C \hat{=} \langle \{ \ell \} : v \in Odd \iff \tilde{v} \notin Odd \rangle$  — confidentiality annotation
   $H \hat{=} h?n \rightarrow v := n?$  — action
   $L \hat{=} \ell!v \rightarrow Stop$  — action, inconsistent with  $C$ 
  •  $\langle \{ \ell \} : Init; H \rangle; C; \langle \{ \ell \} : L \rangle$  — behaviour
end

```

This specification is only implementable by a **miracle**, because it encodes inconsistent requirements.

## An analogy for miracles

Consider  $\mathbb{N}$ -valued expressions composed of  $\mathbb{N}$  constants, addition and **partial** subtraction.

An instance such as  $(4 - 5) + 7$  has a value, but contains an undefined term.

Three possibilities:

- ▶ Do nothing.

$(4 - 5) + 7$  is lost to us as a legal expression.

- ▶ Invent theory of rearrangement.

Separate into added and subtracted terms; sum each; then  $(x, y)$  with  $x < y$  is inconsistent, otherwise compute  $x - y$ .

$(4 - 5) + 7 \rightsquigarrow (4 + 7, 5) \rightsquigarrow (11, 5) \rightsquigarrow 6$ .

- ▶ Totalise.

Introduce special values to represent the result of subtracting a bigger number from a smaller number. If final result is -ve, then inconsistent, otherwise OK.

$(4 - 5) + 7 = (-1) + 7 = 6$ .

## Extending programs with miracles

- ▶ Least upper bound  $P \sqcup Q$  of specifications is partial.
- ▶ Miracles are a way of totalising.
- ▶ Lattice of implementable specifications mirrored to add ‘upper half’.
- ▶ The name of the (alas, impossible to implement) perfect program is  $\top$ ; mirrors the (alas, easily implementable) worst specification,  $\perp$ .
- ▶ “Naked guarded command”:  

$$wp(g \text{ guard } S, P) \iff (g \implies wp(S, P)).$$
 Miraculous if guard  $g$  false.  $\top = \text{false} \rightarrow S$ , for any statement  $S$ .
- ▶ **if  $x < y$  then  $(x \leq y \text{ guard } w := 0)$  else  $w := 1$  fi** same as  
**if  $x < y$  then  $w := 0$  else  $w := 1$  fi** — OK.
- ▶ **if  $x > y$  then  $(x \leq y \text{ guard } w := 0)$  else  $w := 1$  fi** same as  
**if  $x > y$  then  $\top$  else  $w := 1$  fi** — KO.

## Circus

- ▶ A specification language: control flow described in CSP; state transitions in Z.
- ▶ Semantics in UTP.
- ▶ Refinement calculus.

Example: one-shot buffer that zeroes the lowest bit.

<b>channel</b> $h, \ell : \mathbb{N}$	— declarations
<b>process</b> $CMD \hat{=} \mathbf{begin}$	
<b>state</b> $S \hat{=} [v : \mathbb{N}]$	— state components (Z)
$Init \hat{=} [S'   v' = 0]$	— initialisation (Z)
$H \hat{=} h?n \rightarrow [\Delta S; n? : \mathbb{N}   v' = n?]$	— piece of behaviour (CSP/Z)
$L \hat{=} \ell!2 * (v \div 2) \rightarrow Stop$	— piece of behaviour (CSP)
• $Init; H; L$	— overall behaviour (CSP)
<b>end</b>	



# UTP

## A semantic framework

- ▶ UTP uses alphabetised predicates to describe things.  
Particles have a mass-at-rest,  $m$ , and an energy equivalent,  $e$ .  
Sequential programs have value-before  $x$  and value-after  $x'$  for each program variable  $x$ ; and also a special pair  $ok/ok'$  to record program started/finished.
- ▶ Classes of predicates described by “healthiness conditions”, couched as fixed-point constructions of predicate transformers.  
(Predicates describing) particles,  $P$ , satisfy  $P \iff (P \wedge e = m.c^2)$ .  
(Predicates describing) sequential programs,  $P$ , satisfy, among others, **healthiness condition** ‘H1’:  $P \iff (ok \implies P)$  (“values on termination not predicted until programme starts”).

## Circus semantics

- ▶ For each program variable  $x$ , a pair of variables  $x, x'$  in alphabet.
- ▶ Special variables  $ok, ok', wait, wait', tr, tr', ref, ref'$  in alphabet.
- ▶ Predicates that describe *Circus* actions must satisfy the healthiness conditions for **reactive systems**, further restricted by 'CSP' conditions.
- ▶ The refinement lattice is standard for the UTP:

$$P \sqsubseteq Q \iff [Q \implies P].$$

## Example operators

- ▶ Nondeterministic choice:

$$P \sqcap Q \iff P \vee Q$$

- ▶ A coercion,  $[predicate]$ , is a special annotation:

$$[P] \iff Skip \triangleleft P \triangleright \mathbf{miracle}$$

$$\begin{aligned} h := 0 \sqcap h := 1; [h = 0] &\equiv h := 0; [h = 0] \sqcap h := 1; [h = 0] \\ &\equiv h := 0 \sqcap \mathbf{miracle} \\ &\equiv h := 0 \end{aligned}$$

# Confidentiality annotations and blocks

Additions to *Circus* for specifying confidentiality

## CAs

Syntax  $\langle \textit{channelset} : \textit{predicate} \rangle$

Intuition The ‘fogging’ captured in the predicate must be enforced throughout the process about the current state.

Example  $\langle \{l\} : v \in \textit{Odd} \iff \tilde{v} \notin \textit{Odd} \rangle$

## Blocks

Syntax  $\langle \textit{channelset} : \textit{action} \rangle$

Intuition Region in which location of ‘program counter’ cannot be deduced by viewing communications on *channelset*.

Example  $\langle \{l\} : \textit{Init}; H \rangle$

## Confidentiality predicates

- ▶ Relate values of semantic variables with non-repudiable values.
- ▶ May refer to program variables ( $x$ ), plus a ‘fog’ copy ( $\tilde{x}$ ).
- ▶ The value in the semantic variable is the actual value; the possible values of the fog variables may not be ruled out as the actual value by communications on the channels in  $channelset = Low$ .
- ▶ Examples:
  1.  $v \in Odd \implies \tilde{v} \notin Odd$  “if  $v$  odd, then a correct implementation must not allow Low to rule out  $v$  even (but may allow Low to be sure that  $v$  is even)”.
  2.  $v \in Odd \iff \tilde{v} \notin Odd$  “Low may not know the parity of  $v$ .”
  3.  $a < b \implies \tilde{a} \geq \tilde{b}$  “Low may not be sure that  $a$  is below  $b$ .”
  4.  $x + y > 99 \implies \tilde{x} + \tilde{y} \leq 99$  “the state summing to more than 99 is secret.”

## Extended semantics

- ▶ Add a copy of the action to record desired explanations for observations:  $\mathbf{UA} \hat{=} A \wedge A[\tilde{\mathbf{v}}/\mathbf{v}]$ .  
Variables in copy indicated by a tilde.  
( $A[\tilde{\mathbf{v}}/\mathbf{v}]$  is predicate  $A$  but with each variable decorated by a tilde.)
- ▶ Synchronise each copy on  $\mathcal{L}$ 's interface:  $\mathbf{UC}(\mathcal{L}, A) \hat{=} \mathbf{UA} \wedge \mathbf{IL}$   
where

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{IL} \hat{=} ok &= \tilde{ok} \wedge ok' = \tilde{ok}' \wedge wait = \tilde{wait} \wedge wait' = \tilde{wait}' \\ &\wedge (tr' - tr) \upharpoonright \mathcal{L} = (\tilde{tr}' - \tilde{tr}) \upharpoonright \mathcal{L} \\ &\wedge wait' \implies ref' \cap \mathcal{L} = \tilde{ref}' \cap \mathcal{L} \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Each *Circus* operator,  $\_ \oplus \_$  lifted to an operator,  $\_ \hat{\oplus} \_$ , in extended space.

## Semantics of CAs and Blocks

► Blocks:

$$\langle \mathcal{L} : A \rangle \hat{=} \mathbf{UC}(\mathcal{L}, A)$$

Apply ordinary *Circus* rules, then apply **UC**.

Atomic constructs refined by composite:  $\langle A \oplus B \rangle \sqsubseteq \langle A \rangle \hat{\oplus} \langle B \rangle$

► CAs:

$$\langle \mathcal{L} : P \rangle \hat{=} \mathbf{UC}(\mathcal{L}, \text{Skip}) \wedge (ok \wedge \neg wait \implies P)$$

CAs generalise the notion of coercions in extended space.

Main purpose is to desynchronise the two copies of  $A$ . (Extra synchronisation can be added to record extra information known to  $\mathcal{L}$ .)

## Refinement and Verification

- ▶ Proof technique for verifying miraculousness: backward propagation of CAs [c.f weakest precondition].
- ▶ Refinement **same** definition as other UTP-based theories:  
 $P \sqsubseteq Q \hat{=} [Q \implies P]$ .
- ▶ Inconsistent refinement (removing too much fog) gives a miraculous action: avoids so-called ‘refinement paradox’.



## Future work

- ▶ Idioms for writing confidentiality annotations.
- ▶ Pragmatics of refinement and verification, especially route to code.
- ▶ Tools.