How much has information technology contributed to linguistics?

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This paper appeared in
Information technology and scholarly disciplines, Ed. J.T. Coppock,
Proceedings of a British Academy Symposium (1996),
London: The British Academy, 1999, 109-127; also as cmp-lg/9702011.

Abstract

Information technology should have much to offer linguistics, not only through the opportunities offered by large-scale data analysis and the stimulus to develop formal computational models, but through the chance to use language in systems for automatic natural language processing. The paper discusses these possibilities in detail, and then examines the actual work that has been done. It is evident that this has so far been primarily research within a new field, computational linguistics, which is largely motivated by the demands, and interest, of practical processing systems, and that information technology has had rather little influence on linguistics at large. There are different reasons for this, and not all good ones: information technology deserves more attention from linguists.

1 Introduction

There are two potential roles for information technology (IT) in linguistics, just as in other areas: as a means of developing and testing models and as a means of gathering and analysing data. For example, one may use a computer to help make some model of word formation properly specific, and also to gather and analyse some data on word forms. Linguistics thus has the same types of use and benefit for computing as other academic areas, such as archaeology or economics.

IT in linguistics can give both of these a sharper edge. Thus in the lesser case, data analysis, we can use the machine not merely to interpret data but to gather it. In the archaeological case, we can analyse supplied descriptions of pots to hypothesize a typological sequence, say, but the descriptions have to be supplied. Even with such aids as automated image analysis, the human input required is generally large. In the language case, in contrast, if we want to determine lexical fields, we can just pull text off the World Wide Web. We still need humans to supply the classification theory, but one cannot get everything from nothing, and the detailed human work is much less than in the archaeological case.

But much more importantly in relation to modelling, in the language case we can not only use computers to develop and test models, in the normal way. We can apply computers operationally, and hence creatively, for the very same language-using tasks as humans do. For example, if we have a model of speech production, we can build a speech synthesizer which can be attached to an advice system to generate new utterances in response to new inquiries. Again, with a translation system based on some model of translation, we can actually exercise this model, in an especially compelling way, by engaging in translation. But however good our archaeological models of the spread of neolithic agriculture are, they cannot go out and plough up untilled land at the rate of so and so many yards a day,
It is this productive new, i.e. real, application of computational models that makes interaction between IT and linguistics interesting, in the same way that the interaction embodied in biotechnology is. Model validation, with its supporting need for serious data, is a good reason for examining what may be called the technology push from IT into linguistics. But the potentially productive use, in practical applications, for models, and the especially strong validation this implies, means that IT’s technology pull from linguistics can also be assessed for what it has contributed to linguistics.

This is all an exciting idea; and it has stimulated a wholly new research field, Computational Linguistics. But IT has nevertheless had much less influence on linguistics in general than one would expect from the fact that words, the stuff of language, are now the pabulum of the networks and figure more largely in what computers push around than numbers do: computational linguistics remains a quite isolated area within linguistics. Linguistics has also had far less influence than might be expected on task systems that process natural language (in computing the apparently redundant adjective ‘natural’ is necessary to distinguish natural language from programming language). The author believes there are both good and bad reasons for this state of affairs, and will consider these after looking in more detail at specific forms of possible, and actual, interaction between linguistics and IT.

Exclusions

The range of specific areas to examine is large. This paper will exclude two that, however intellectually important to their communities, or practically valuable, are peripheral to its main topic.

One is the whole area labelled ‘computers and the humanities’, when this deals with language data for specific individuals or sources, considered in relation to author attribution or manuscript genealogies, say, or in content analysis as in the study of the way political terms are used in newspapers. This is where all of the utilities exemplified by SGML (Standardised General Markup Language) have a valuable role in supporting scholarship (see e.g. Sperberg-McQueen (1994) on the Text Encoding Initiative); as illustrative titles for applications of this kind we can take such random examples from the ALLC-ACH ’96 Bergen Conference as ‘The Thesaurus of Old English’ database: a research tool for historians of language and culture’; ‘So violent a metaphor.” Adam Smith’s metaphorical language in the Wealth of Nations’; and ‘Book, body and text: the Women Writers Project and problems of text encoding’ (see ALLC-ACH 1996). But we will exclude this type of work as itself on the borderline of linguistics.

The other major excluded area is language teaching. Again, IT already has an established role in this, though far more as a dumb waiter than as an intelligent tutor that continuously adapts the content and presentation of lessons to the individual student. So far, there has been little progress in the development of teaching programs that would de facto constitute a serious test of alternative accounts of grammar or choose among performance models of language processing.

The paper will also only note some ‘place-holding’ points on spoken as opposed to written language.

We will however, for the moment, take the scope and style of linguistics as properly large, and not restrict linguistics as an area of endeavour or discipline to a particular purpose or stance. We will return to the consequences of contemporary attitudes to these later.

Structure

We will start by considering what IT can in principle (but also soberly) offer linguistics. We will then assess how far linguists have exploited IT in practice. Finally, we will try to explain the present state of affairs. The focus is on the contribution of IT to linguistics, so we shall not attempt a systematic treatment of the work done, in natural language processing (NLP), by those who do not think of themselves as linguists, as opposed to engineers, or consider, in detail, the influence of linguistics on this work. We will, however, refer to both of these as this is necessary to round out my main argument.
We have identified two main roles for IT in linguistics: data gathering and modelling. Of course these come together when corpus data is used to test some theory. However there are in general marked differences between those who cut the corn and those who sharpen the sickles. We shall therefore consider first work with data, and then the development of theory.

2 IT possibilities

Data work

Data, or corpus, work is a natural arena for IT: computers can so rapidly and painlessly match, sort, count and so forth vast volumes of material; and as these are increasingly text that is already machine-readable, so there is no data-entry effort for the linguist, IT would appear now to have much to offer. The points below refer primarily to natural, independently-produced text rather than to elicited data, though they also apply to the latter; and automatic manipulation of data can also of course be useful for material marked up by the linguist.

Corpus work is of value at three levels: observational, derivational, and validatory. In the first, observational, case corpora - even processed as simply as by concordance routines - can usefully display language phenomena, both recording and drawing attention to them. This was one of the earliest uses of IT for linguistic study, and remains important though as corpora get larger it becomes harder to digest the concordance information.

Even at this level, however, there is the important issue of corpus coverage versus representativeness. While one obvious use of corpora is as a basis for grammars (Stubbs 1996), they have become increasingly important for lexicographers (see e.g. Thomas and Short 1996). Here, while one function is to capture at least one example of every configuration, word or word sense (especially the last), another has been to display the relative frequency of lexical usage (of value, for example, in building dictionaries for teaching). In both cases, however, the issue of corpus representativeness arises (Biber 1994, Summers 1996). What is the corpus supposed to represent? And how do we know it is so representative?

There is a presumption, for some, that a large enough mass of miscellaneous material taken from newspapers and so forth will be representative of common, regular, or mainstream phenomena. However it is more usual, as with the British National Corpus (Burnard 1995), to develop some set of selection criteria that draw on conventional or intuitively acceptable notions of genre, and to gather samples of each. But this is a far from scientific or rigorous basis for claims of proper status for the resulting linguistic facts.

At the same time, while even a simple concordance can be useful, IT makes it possible to apply ‘low-level’ linguistic processing of an uncontroversial but helpful kind, for example lemmatization, tagging of syntactic categories, labelling of local syntactic constituents (e.g. noun or verb group) and even some marking of word senses (referring to some set of dictionary senses). Garside, Leech and Sampson (1987) and Black, Garside and Leech (1993) illustrate both the possibilities and the important contribution the University of Lancaster group has made here. (It should be noted, however, that the opportunities for analogous automatic processing of speech data, presuming the ability to recognize and transcribe speech with reasonable accuracy, are currently much more limited.)

The second, derivative level of corpus use is potentially much more interesting, but is also more challenging. It is foreshadowed by the collection, even at the first level, of simple frequency statistics, but is aimed at a much more thorough analysis of data to derive patterns automatically: lexical collocations, subcategorization behaviour, terminological structure, even grammar induction (Charniak 1993). Such analysis presupposes first, some intuitive notion of the type of structure that may be present in the data as the basis for choosing both the primitive attributes of the data and the specification for the formal model of what is to be automatically sought; and second, the actual algorithm for discovering model instances in the data, as indicated, for instance, by Gale, Church and Yarowsky (1994). The problems here are challenging and are well illustrated by the attempt to establish lexical fields objectively, by computation on data, rather
than by introspection supported by data inspection. Thus what features of word behaviour in text are to be taken as the primitives for entity description? What measures adopted to establish similarity of behaviour both between a pair of words and, more importantly, over a set of words to define a field, i.e. a semantic class? What operational procedure will be applied to deliver and assess candidate classes? Cashing in the notion of lexical field requires a whole formally and fully defined discovery procedure, not to mention also some reasonable and possibly automatic way of evaluating the definitions applied as interpretations of the initial intuitive notion and, indeed, as justifications for the intuition itself.

The potential value of IT for information extraction from large-scale data processing is obvious. But the difficulties involved, already indicated for the determination of lexical fields, are yet more evident in the idea of deriving the genres, even just for written discourse, of a language community by operations on a (very) large neutral corpus, say the entire annual intake of a major copyright repository. Genre is a function of many language factors - lexical, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic (communicative context and purpose) and, also, actual subject matter; so both specifying and applying the primitive attributes through which discourse sets will be differentiated, and hence genres defined, is clearly no simple matter. The example however also illustrates the range of useful outputs such a process can in principle deliver the linguist: not merely indicative sets of actual discourses, but higher-order genre definitions based on class membership (by analogy with centroid vectors), as well as genre labelling for words in the lexicon.

The third level, theory validation, is where the two areas of IT utility for linguistics overlap. IT in principle offers great opportunities here, through making it possible to evaluate a theory of some linguistic phenomenon in a systematic, i.e. objective and comprehensive, way against some natural corpus. But what does it mean to test a theory against a corpus, informatively and unequivocally? If we have some theory of the nature of syntactic or semantic representation, we can check it for propriety and coverage using a corpus, by seeing whether we can provide representations for all the sentences in the corpus. However such a test, as in other cases, is only a negative one. If processing succeeds, it tells us that our theory holds for this data, but not that it is the only possible or best theory. The obvious problems for theory evaluation are thus on the one hand the adequacy of the corpus, and on the other the explanatory adequacy of the theory. Taking these points further, natural corpora may be dilute, with a low incidence of test instances (e.g. occurrences of rare word senses for a model of sense selection); ambiguous, offering only very weak support for a theory because there are many alternative accounts of some phenomenon (e.g. sense selection either through lexical collocation or world knowledge), and opaque, too rich to allow sufficiently discriminating testing on some submodel through the interaction effects between phenomena (e.g. syntax and lexicon).

More importantly, using IT to validate a theory against a corpus requires an automatic procedure for theory application, the major issue for the research into models considered in the next section.

The points just made have referred to the analysis of running text data. But there is also one important, special kind of corpus to which increasing attention is being paid, namely that represented by a lexicon. A lexicon may be viewed as providing second-order data about language use, rather than the first-order data given by ordinary discourse. While the information supplied by a dictionary has the disadvantage that it embodies the lexicographer’s biases, it has the advantage of providing highly concentrated information, often in a relatively systematic way that reflects the application of a special-purpose sublanguage. Exploiting this information may involve demanding conversions from typesetting tapes, as well as the further regularization required to develop a so-called lexical database. But it is then in principle possible to derive a higher-level classificatory structure over words from the bottom-level entries. Early ideas here are illustrated by Sparck Jones (1964/1986), more recent by Boguraev and Briscoe (1989). Of course corpus analysis for text and lexicon can be brought together, for example to select a domain sub-lexicon, which may be linked with the syntactic and semantic preferences of a domain grammar that is grounded in the text corpus.
Model research

The importance of IT for linguistic theory goes far beyond the stimulus to model formation that browsing over volumes of data may provide and even, though this is not to imply that such evaluation is not of critical importance, beyond the testing of a theory against a corpus. This is because, as mentioned earlier, computing offers not only a natural context for the development and expression of formal linguistic theories; it also places the most demanding, because of necessity principled, requirements on theory, through theory application in systems for implementing language-using tasks. This is not to imply that useful systems cannot be built without theory, or at any rate without careful and rigorous theory as opposed to some ad hoc application of some plausible general idea. But the fact that NLP systems, for language interpretation or generation for some purpose, can be built is both a challenge for, and a constraint on, those concerned with linguistic theory.

There are indeed several specific benefits for linguistics from IT here.

In relation to IT as a stimulus to formal model development, the most extreme position is that the style of formal language theory that computer science has also stimulated and enriched is the right kind of apparatus for the formal characterization of natural languages (see for example Gamut 1991). This is a complicated matter because programming languages gain their special power from eschewing the ambiguity that characterizes natural language. However as computing systems have become more complex, computer science theory has been obliged to seek a subtler and richer expressivity (for example in capturing temporal phenomena), and thus might possibly provide the means for characterising our language without damaging over-simplification. The crux here is thus whether computer science offers well-founded ways of applying the computational metaphor now common, in both vulgar and philosophical parlance, for human activities including the use of language.

This still leaves open, however, both competence and performance-oriented approaches. Thus taking language production as an example, we can have both a formal, computational, competence theory characterising a syntactic model that would hopefully generate all and only the syntactically legitimate sentences of a language. Or we can have a formal, computational performance theory intended to model the way humans actually go about producing syntactically acceptable strings. Such a theory could indeed in principle encompass performance in the behavioural limit by including e.g. mechanisms for restarting sentences under certain production conditions. Thus because computation is essentially about actually, as opposed to possibly, doing things, it invites an attack on flowing rather than frozen language. Dowty, Karttunen and Zwicky (1985) and Sowa (1984) illustrate the wide range of possibilities for such performance modelling.

The business of processing naturally leads to the second level of IT relevance for linguistics, that associated with building IT systems for tasks. The point here is that such systems are not just ones capable of exercising language-using functions, for instance interpreting and answering a question, responding to a command, endorsing a statement, i.e. systems with the necessary bottom-level capabilities for language use. Even here such systems have taken a critical step beyond the treatment of language as a matter of words and sentences, and an ability to handle forms like interrogatives or imperatives as defining sentence types. The absolutely minimal level of functionality is represented by what may be called ‘checking’ responses, for example to some question by noting that it is a question asking whether X or not, or to a statement by offering a paraphrase. It is possible to view such a form of model evaluation as purely linguistic and without any real invocation of communicative purpose or utterance context, but with the advantage that the model evaluation involved does not depend on inspecting model-internal representational structures (for example parse trees, logical forms) for plausibility, a very dubious way of validating representations of language form or meaning.

But since language is used for communication, IT would seem to have a more substantive role in model testing even at the level of individual functions, e.g. by answering a question rather than by merely reformulating it in some operation defined by purely linguistic relationships. Answering a question appears to imply that a fully adequate interpretation of the question has been attained. Thus we may imagine, for example, some ‘database’ of information to which...
questions may be applied. But such strategies for model evaluation are of surprisingly limited value both because of the constraints imposed by whatever the example data are, and because of the essentially artificial restrictions imposed by the treatment of sentence (utterance) function independent of larger communicative purpose and context. Even the idea of answering questions implies relations between different sentence functions, and models that attempt to account for anaphora, for example, invoke above-sentence discourse. This is evident in both Gazdar and Mellish (1989)’s and Allen (1995)’s treatments of computational processing, for example.

NLP systems are built for such tasks as translation, inquiry, or summarising that go beyond sentence function by requiring accounts of communication and discourse (and therefore typically also have not only to address a range of sentence functions but also themselves subsume different tasks). In general, properly done and not in such limited application domains as to justify wholesale simplification, task systems exercise the ability to determine meaning from text, or to deliver text for meaning. They thus constitute the best form of evaluation for linguistic models. They can do this for the competence-oriented linguist if required. But their real value is in performance modelling: what are the processes of sentence and discourse interpretation or generation? More specifically, if language has ‘components’: morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, the lexicon (and these also above the sentence, in discourse grammars) how do these interact in processing, i.e. what is the processor’s architecture in terms of control flow? How do components impose constraints on one another? Winograd (1972) and Moore (1995) equally show, in different situations and applying rather different ideas, how significant the issue of processor architecture is.

It is possible to address process for single components, for example in whether syntactic parsing is deterministic (Marcus 1980). But if IT offers, in principle, the ‘best’ form of testing for language models because it avoids the danger of pretending that humans can assess objects that are really inaccessible, namely ‘internal’ meaning representations, this is also the toughest form of testing, for two reasons. First, how to evaluate task performance, given this is the means of model assessment: for example, how to rate a summarising system when in general there is no one correct summary of a text? While linguistics makes use of judgement by informants, e.g. (and notoriously) about grammaticality, informant judgements about system performance for complex tasks are much harder to make and much less reliable; but in a disagreeable paradox, human participation with the system in some task, for example in reading a summary in order to determine whether to proceed to the full underlying text, is either too informal at the individual level or too rough when based on many user decisions, to be an informative method of model evaluation. This exacerbates the problem, because task systems are multi-component ones that depend both on individual language facts in the lexicon and on general rules, of assessing the validity of model detail. It should also be recognized that task systems normally require knowledge of the non-linguistic world to operate, so attributing performance behaviour to the properties of the linguistic, as opposed to non-linguistic, elements of the system as a whole can be hard. These challenges and complexities of evaluation are further explored in Sparck Jones and Galliers (1996).

But it is further the case that while task systems can in principle offer a base for the evaluation of linguistic theory, in practice they may be of much more limited value, for two reasons. One is the ‘sublanguage’ problem, where tasks are carried out in particular application domains: this makes them suspect as vehicles for assessing the putatively general models that linguists seek. The other is that practically useful systems, e.g. for translation, can be primarily triumphs of ad hoc provision, with little or only the most undemanding underpinning from models, which makes their contribution to model evaluation suspect unless, as discussed further later, this is taken as a comment on the whole business of language modelling. Nevertheless, the key role that computation offers research on models is in forcing enough specificity on a theory for it to be programmed and operationally applied in autonomous action: humans can rely on hand waving, but machines can’t.
3 IT actualities

Now, having rehearsed the potential utilities of IT generally (and hence also of computer science) for linguistics, we can ask: How far has IT actually had any impact on linguistics? Further, has any impact been direct, through computationally-derived data, or through model validation? Or has it been indirect, through the recognition of computational paradigms? In relation to data this influence would be most clearly shown by a respect for statistics, and in allowing that language-using behaviour may be influenced by frequency. This last may seem an obvious property of language, but acknowledging the computational paradigm brings it into the open. At the theory level, the computational paradigm focusses not so much on rules - a familiar linguistic desideratum - as on rule application. Even when computational work adopts a declarative rather than procedural approach, concern is always with what happens when declarations are executed and so, for example, with compositional effects in sentence interpretation.

Overall, though this is an informal judgement (and also an amateur one by a non-linguist), the impact of IT on linguistics as a whole has been light, and more peripheral than substantive. (certainly if the evidence of the linguistics shelves in a major Cambridge bookstore is anything to go by). We will attempt to summarize the relevant work, and identify its salient features, and then seek reasons for the lack of impact and interaction.

Data exploitation

It is clear that natural corpora can supply test data bearing on all of morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and the lexicon, though the processing to extract useful information (and indeed the linguistic knowledge presupposed in this processing) can vary. For example while it is relatively easy for English simply to pick up all the word tokens (though of course also names, misspellings and so forth) in a corpus, this may be rather less useful in e.g. German, where freely formed compounds may have to be deconstructed. Similarly, for those interested in syntax, offloading some of the work of assembling data to the machine depends on bootstrapping via a surface parser, say. But setting this aside, what work under the heading computational data exploitation has actually been done?

Corpus use at the lowest, observational level appears to be spreading - indeed has been referred to as one of the fastest growing areas of linguistics (cf Stubbs 1996), even if it is not yet widespread: it is illustrated, for example, by past uses of the Brown or Lancaster/Oslo-Bergen Corpora, and the use that is beginning, especially by lexicographers, of the British National Corpus (Burnard 1995). It is hard to measure in any precise way how valuable such browsing and observational use of simple word concordance and frequency data is, but the fact that serious publishers are willing to put money behind corpus construction suggests that, at least by such ‘applied’ linguists, corpora are seen as useful, even essential. The range of possible corpus uses for descriptive purposes by linguists in general rather than lexicographers is well-illustrated by e.g. such ALLC-ACH ’96 Conference titles as ‘Collocation and the rhetoric of scientific ideas: corpus linguistics as a methodology of genre analysis’ (ALLC-ACH 1996); and see also Stubbs (1996), Thomas and Short (1996). Corpora of a relatively considered, rather than casually assembled, kind are also becoming increasingly common through the efforts of such organizations as the Linguistic Data Consortium and several European groups. These descriptive uses of corpora have also been taken further, via the application of taggers and parsers (e.g. Garside, Leech and Sampson 1987, Brill 1995), to gather information about syntactic constructions or about words that is dependent on syntactic contexts.

Processing in this way leads naturally to the derivational use of corpora. Corpus processing may, for instance, be exploited to establish preferences between parsing paths for NLP. This use is one example of the increasing interest in exploiting corpora at the derivational level, which also includes analysis for such purposes as establishing selection criteria for word senses and identifying synonym sets. The range, both of techniques and data types, to explore is well shown in Computational Linguistics (1993) and Boguraev and Pustejovsky (1996). Much of this work is restricted to finding pairwise associations between ‘objects’ and has not progressed to full-scale
classification, but is already showing its value. It should also be noted that at both this level and the next, corpus analysis can provide useful information about the lexical and structural properties of particular language worlds e.g. of financial news stories. Equally, derivational work on lexical as well as text corpora is in progress, including work on multilingual databases (Copestake et al. 1995).

Finally, corpora have not only been used observationally or derivationally: they have to some extent been used to validate theory. This is often indirect, in the sense that e.g. corpora have been used to test syntax analysers where evaluation is of the parser used, or of the specific grammar, rather than of the grammar type; but it still constitutes model evaluation. While simply running a parser with grammar against a corpus can be very instructive, performance evaluation may also be done by comparing output with the reference analyses of a ‘treebank’ (Marcus, Santorini and Marcinkiewicz 1993, Black et al. 1996).

Theory development

Turning now to language modelling, and starting with IT as a stimulus to the development of formal theories, there has been work on all aspects of language.

There have been accounts of morphology, as by Kaplan and Kay (1994), and Koskenniemi (1983); views of grammar, with Lexical Functional Grammar (Kaplan and Bresnan 1982), Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (Gazdar et al. 1985), Head Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG) (Pollard and Sag 1994) and Tree Adjoining Grammar (Joshi 1987), where the influence of the computational paradigm is not only in formal definition but in a concern with computability in a real and not merely notional sense; work on semantics covers both lexical aspects - see for example Saint-Dizier and Viegas (1995), and the representation and derivation of semantic structure, say compositionally (e.g. Alshawi 1992). In pragmatics there has also been work on computational implicature (see Cohen, Morgan and Pollack 1990), and computational, because essentially algorithmic, accounts of such discourse phenomena as the use of anaphoric expressions and focussing (e.g. Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein 1995): the emphasis on mechanisms that underlie anaphors and focus, for instance, has helped to throw light on their roles. Computational modelling of the structure of the lexicon is an area of growing interest, extending from the form of individual entries to the (inference-supporting) organization of a lexicon as a whole (Briscoe, Copestake and de Paiva 1993, Pustejovsky 1995).

In general, IT’s distinctive orientation towards process, discussed earlier, has stimulated both process-oriented views of grammar, as in Shieber (1987), and an enormous amount of work on generic parsing technologies, which can be seen as abstract performance modelling: cf, for example, Gazdar and Mellish (1989) and Allen (1995). One feature of this research has been attempts to capture bidirectionality as an operational rather than purely formal property of grammars. Alongside all of this, and again motivated by computational principles, there has also been effort on generic formalisms for the specification of grammars, e.g. PATR (Shieber 1992), and for the definition of lexical information, as in DATR (Evans and Gazdar 1996).

Some of this work has been done in what may be called an academic spirit and informally evaluated, in the style of mainstream linguistics, by examples. However the implementational philosophy of IT in general has also stimulated an interest in descriptive coverage for the relevant language component, for instance of syntax, and in the objective assessment of an abstract language model by automatic processing with some instantiation of the model, as in sentence parsing with some particular grammar. In this context it is worth noting that the notion of test data can be extended to cover not only natural corpora but also so-called test suites, specifically-constructed data sets designed to optimize on discriminative power and focus in testing. At the same time, grammar construction and testing tools have been developed, as by Carpenter and Penn (1993), and Kaplan and Maxwell (1993).

However the really important point about this work as a whole is that it has been closely tied to work on building systems for NLP tasks, for instance translation or data extraction from text, as illustrated in Grosz, Sparck Jones and Webber (1986) and Pereira and Grosz (1993). The stress to which computational models have been subjected by being adopted for real systems has been
of benefit to theory development; and the business of building task systems, especially for dealing with the interpretation or generation of dialogue or extended text, has led directly to attempts to provide rigorous and detailed accounts of language ‘objects’ and language-using operations in two important areas. These are of dialogue and discourse structure, as in the computational refinement and application of Rhetorical Structure Theory (compare Mann and Thompson 1988 and Moore 1995), and the organization of world knowledge for application in conjunction with purely linguistic information. Building and using discourse models, where text and world interact and where discourse referents including events are characterized, has stimulated significant, concrete work in the computational community on the treatment of important language constructs, namely anaphoric and temporal expressions. The issues that arise here, of how to represent and reason with world knowledge as required for language interpretation or generation have, as Sowa (1984) or Allen (1995) illustrate, to be tackled by any system builder, and thus pervade the NLP literature. But while this area is particularly important because it addresses what is properly a determinant of adequate linguistic theory, it is one in which linguists have generally not been explicitly or specifically interested.

**General observations**

Now when we look carefully at all this actual IT-related work, which is indubitably respectable and informative in itself, there are two significant points about it. The first is that at the intellectually challenging derivational and model validation levels of work with data, and even more in all the research aimed at theory development, this is primarily done by those who label themselves at least as Computational Linguists, and perhaps as Language Engineers: that is by those whose who are either committed even as descriptive or theoretical linguists to a computational perspective or by those engaged in practical NLP. Thus innovative statistical corpus research and lexicon work have been stimulated by operational needs, including those for sublanguage grammars for particular applications. The second is that this work appears to have had little impact on the linguistic community at large, even with the computer only in the role of humble handmaiden. Those giving realistic, or real, computation a role in work on language appear to be a distinct community, neither influencing nor interacting with the larger world of linguistics.

The separation is of course not absolute: thus Cole, Green and Morgan (1995) shows there is some contact between the two sides, some work on morphology, for instance, draws on computational sources (cf e.g. Fraser and Corbett 1995), and HPSG is a fruitful area of mutual influence. However in general, even where there appears to be connectivity, this is either a consequence of the ineluctabilities of language facts or, as in the area of formal semantics, is less attributable to the influence of IT than to pressure from a common higher cultural authority, namely logic. Thus even if Kamp’s Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp 1981, Kamp and Reyle 1989) is of increasing interest to computational linguists and even to those building NLP systems, insofar as linguists also engage with it this because it is part of a tradition, exemplified in the work of Montague and Partee (Partee, ter Meulen and Wall 1990), that has been one common element of linguistics at large. This is indirectly illustrated by the *Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory* (Lappin 1996), which has one computational chapter out of twenty two. At the same time, computational metaphors, for example that of online processing in psycholinguistics, all too often lack substance of the kind needed to write a parsing program or to define an architecture so as to deliver phone-by-phone flow of control in speech understanding.

Why, therefore, since IT in principle offers linguistics so much, has it in practice contributed so little?
4 Analysis

Linguistics’ influence on IT

So far, we have focussed on the contribution by IT to linguistics. As an additional input, in trying to explain why IT appears to have had so little influence on linguistics in general, it is useful to ask whether linguistics has been recognised as relevant by those engaged in computational work in the language area, and in particular has affected those building NLP task systems, for translation, database access and so forth. Of course, anyone building operational systems is bound to use language objects like actual grammars and dictionaries. The question is rather whether practitioners respond to the general style of linguistic research (whatever that is) or adopt specific linguistic theories, for example Chomsky’s, which have dominated linguistics for the last decades.

It might be expected that if linguistic research were to play a significant part in NLP, this would help to promote feedback from NLP into linguistics generally.

On the whole, the influence of linguistics, and especially linguistic theory, on NLP has been slight, other than in the shared area of formal semantics and in some rather particular and local respects where individual pieces of work have been exploited (for example discussions of prepositions). Moreover even if it takes time for linguists’ work to have an impact, as is interestingly shown by the slow spread of long-standing contributions from the Prague School (Hajicova, Skounalova and Sgall 1995), the way Halliday’s Systemic Grammar (Kress 1976) has been applied in sentence and text generation is the exception rather than the rule; and indeed it is arguable that philosophy, in the shape of Grice’s maxims, has had more influence on NLP than linguistics proper. Some of this discontinuity is, regrettably, attributable to ignorance and laziness on the part of those who build systems, fuelled by an assumption that linguists do things so differently there is no point in checking what they say. There is a good deal of what may be labelled ‘wheel rediscovery’ where, after computational practitioners have become alerted to some topic e.g. pragmatics and discourse, have worked on it for a while and had, maybe, some ideas, they have found that the linguists have been there before them and have already made some descriptive or analytic progress which could with advantage be exploited.

However, there are also more respectable reasons why those who might be interested in applying the ideas and findings of linguistics have not done so. One is that these are in fact inapplicable because of fundamental differences of paradigm. This is well illustrated by work done in the past on applying Chomsky’s theories, where attempts to build transformational parsers were misguided and unsuccessful, even if his Theory of Government and Binding has fared a little better (Stabler 1992). The second, which is more likely to affect system developers, is linguists’ ‘selectivity’: it is perfectly legitimate for the linguist to concentrate on some particular feature of language, e.g. tense and aspect, or nominalization and compound nominals, and to offer a potentially valuable account of it, in isolation. But the system builder cannot leave things in such isolation: he must, for instance, treat the parsing of compounds as only one aspect of sentence processing. Yet he often finds that he cannot just plug a linguist’s account of a phenomenon, say compound interpretation, into some slot in his system: it rests either on incompatible presuppositions about the rest of language, or is essentially lonely as a cloud. The third reason is simply that the linguists’ work is not carried through to the level of specificity where it can be taken to provide even the beginnings of a grounding for programs. This is illustrated by Kintsch and van Dijk’s approach to discourse representation (e.g. in van Dijk and Kintsch 1983) where, for all the attraction of their ideas on the formation of ‘summarising’ structures and interest of their experiments with human subjects, there is a huge gaping hole for anyone seeking to exploit, at the level of specificity required for programs, the notions of propositional inference involved. The same holds for any attempt to exploit Sperber and Wilson (1986)’s Theory of Relevance: compare Ballim, Wilks and Barnden (1991), for instance. But these problems also arise in much less obviously challenging areas, for example syntax and the lexicon. Even where an explicitly formal viewpoint has been adopted, the outcome may be more descriptive than analytic, or a mere sketch with voids of raw canvas.

The pragmatics case that Sperber and Wilson represent nevertheless also draws attention to the limits on the potential benefits to be gained from linguistics. Though definitions of the scope
of linguistics vary, linguists generally agree in eschewing the non-linguistic world. Now while practically useful linguistic systems can be built with very little reference to any kind of world, or domain, model of what there is that may be, or is being, talked about, many tasks, of which information inquiry is one, do require such domain models; and providing these is often the hardest part of building useful systems. These domain models require all of: generalizations about the kinds of things there are in this world, particularities about individual entities, and inference capabilities subsuming both the types of reasoning allowed and search procedures for executing these on the knowledge base. The need to engage in reasoning on world knowledge in order to support the interpretation of input discourse, to carry out some consequent task activity, and to provide for the generation of output discourse places particular emphasis on the properties required of meaning representations so that this operational interaction between language and thought can be effected. Those linguists, generally cognitive linguists, willing to push far into this area, and of whom Lakoff and Jackendoff may be taken as instances (e.g., in Jackendoff 1994), nevertheless fail to tackle the issue in a manner, and at a level of detail, appropriate for system builders (even ones willing to undertake a lot of hard work themselves).

This point suggests some of the reasons why, in turn, IT has had so little impact on linguistics.

**IT’s influence on linguistics**

Some of these reasons are good, others are bad. They apply primarily to the more important area of model formation and evaluation.

There are good reasons to do with principle, and also ones to do with practice.

First, at the level of principle, there are genuine (even if ultimately metaphysical) differences of view about the scope of theories about language, and on a narrower view, of the scope of linguistics as opposed to, say, philosophy. Thus some linguists may argue that IT’s concerns with the connection between language processing and reasoning in NLP systems should have no bearing on linguistics, though this is not a reason for rejecting computational linguistics altogether. Second, there may be different views of what may be called the style of linguistics, according to the relative emphasis placed on formal theories of language or on descriptive coverage of languages, even where everyone would like to think that their work has some theoretical underpinning. Certainly there are fashions, with theoretical linguistics currently so dominant that comprehensive description has little status. On this view, while it is the business of theorists to account for linguistic phenomena, this can perfectly well be done by means of critical cases and illustrative examples, supported by sensitive sampling: it is no concern of linguistic theorists to engage in comprehensive grammar or lexicon writing. Again, this attitude differentiates linguistics more from those working on NLP than from all of computational linguistics.

As practical reasons, it is first the case that much of what computational linguistics, or NLP, has been able to do so far is rather, even very, crude in relation to the observed linguistic data. IT has not been able to capture many of the phenomena, and refined distinctions (lexical, syntactic or semantic), that descriptive linguists have noted and for which theoretical linguists seek (though not necessarily with complete success so far) to account, for example the subtleties of adverbials, or of register. It is also the case that IT has been primarily devoted to English, and otherwise concerned only with major languages including the main European ones, Russian, Japanese and Chinese and, increasingly, Arabic, but has paid no attention to the many languages, ranging from Djerbal to Huichol, that figure in linguistics. Moreover, as at least some NLP systems are rather more hackwork than could be wished, there are cases where linguists genuinely have nothing to learn from the IT side.

It has also to be recognized that the arrogance so characteristic of those connected with IT - the self-defined rulers of the modern world - is not merely irritating in itself, it is thoroughly offensive when joined to ignorance not only of language, but of relevant linguists’ work.

So while IT claims to offer linguistics an intellectual resource, especially through its methodology, it does not appear to demonstrate its value convincingly to the linguistics community.

But the potentialities in IT for linguistics that we presented earlier, and the actualities we have illustrated, are both important enough to suggest that the main reasons for the lack of linguistics
interest in IT, and the lack of computational linguists’ influence on their mainstream colleagues, are due primarily to bad rather than good reasons. Again, these are at both principled and practical levels.

In my view, coverage (as for a complete syntactic grammar), interaction (as between syntax and semantics), process (as in identifying the sense of a word in a sentence), and integration (as in combining morphological, syntactic and lexical evidence in processing operations) are all proper concerns for linguistics, and there is no proper justification for neglecting or excluding them. Not being willing to learn from IT’s fundamental grounding in process, in particular, is placing crippling limits on the power and interest of linguistic theories. Thus the crux in computational language processing is in dealing with the ambiguity - lexical, structural and referential - that is a fundamental feature of language: to interpret linguistic utterances the system must resolve ambiguity, and to generate effective utterances the system must minimise ambiguity. Doing this requires that a system has coverage, manages interaction, and executes process to combine different sorts of information. It is not possible, as is so often the case in the linguistics literature, to focus only on one aspect of language and ignore the others, except as a temporary strategy; nor is it legitimate, as is also so often the case in the linguistics literature, to take for granted that understanding of a sentence or text which it is the whole object of the enterprise to achieve and explain. Again, not taking computational output, delivered by an independent black box, as a superior way of testing a theory seems deliberately unscientific: what better way of evaluating an account of the distinctions between word senses than to see what happens when a translation program uses it? (Indeed, testing by system performance is exciting as well as principled.) But even the specificity required for computation, in itself, is an object lesson for formal theoretical linguists. Those linguists who reject the lessons of computational linguistics and NLP are thus also mistakenly, or wrongly, subverting their own cause.

On the practical side, it is impossible not to conclude that many linguists are techno- and logico-phobes. It is true that understanding logic, formalisms, and computational concepts, requires training to which some may be unwilling to dedicate themselves. But, less defensibly, the business of working out, in the necessary grinding detail, what a program should or does do is so exhausting that it is easier to say that doing it is irrelevant.

Conclusion

It may be that, though it is hard to discern significant IT impact on linguistics outside the area labelled ‘computational linguistics’, IT is now so generally pervasive that it has begun to invade linguistic thinking. But it is doubtful, for example, whether Chomsky’s minimalist programme (Chomsky 1995), which appears to invoke some notions also encountered in computational linguistics, in fact demonstrates there is any material influence from IT.

However, as NLP is forced, by tackling tasks such as interactive inquiry, to address topics like dialogue structure, and automatic speech and language processing continue to make progress, often with surprising success by alien means, as in the use of Hidden Markov Models for speech ‘recognition’, there is much for linguistics to gain from looking both at how computation does things and at what it finds.

It is something of a caricature to see those engaged with computation as crass technocrats for whom the expression “non-computational theory” is an oxymoron, and linguists as toffee-nosed snobs unwilling to inspect the rude mechanicals’ cranks and levers, and a huge chasm between the two. But there is a gap that deserves to be bridged because for linguists, and especially theorists other than those whose metaphysic is resolutely anti-computational in any sense whatever, there is everything to be learnt from appreciating the distinctions between assumed, ideal, and real computation.
Note

I am most grateful to Gerald Gazdar for comments on my draft.

References


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