

5 Cryptography (mgk25)

- (a) (i) One way to use a secure hash function  $H$  to form a message-authentication code is the construct  $\text{Mac}_K(M) = H(K\|M)$ . What problem with that approach does the HMAC construct solve? [4 marks]
- (ii) Why does the HMAC construct pad the key? [2 marks]
- (b) Your opponent has started using *HomeBrew*, a new block cipher  $C = E_K(M)$  that they invented last week. It uses a 96-bit key  $K = K_1\|\dots\|K_{12}$ , where each of the 12 bytes  $K_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq 12$ ) is used as an 8-bit subkey in one of the 12 rounds that apply a keyed permutation  $f$ :

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R0 := M
for i := 1 to 12
    Ri := fKi(Ri-1)
C := R12
    
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Describe an attack to find  $K$  for this type of block cipher that is practical for an adversary with a computer fast enough to execute such a block cipher around  $2^{50}$  times and that can store and lookup around  $2^{50}$  keys and messages.

[6 marks]

- (c) Your colleague has proposed the following digital signature algorithm. Let  $(\mathbb{G}, q, g)$  be system-wide choices of a cyclic group  $\mathbb{G}$  of prime order  $q$  with generator  $g$  such that the discrete logarithm problem in  $\mathbb{G}$  is computationally infeasible. Further let  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  be a collision-resistant hash function. Pick a secret key  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  uniformly at random and let  $(y, r)$  with  $y := g^x \in \mathbb{G}$  and  $r := H(g^{H(x)})$  be the corresponding public key.

Then use as the signature of message  $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$  the value  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  found by solving

$$H(x) \cdot s \equiv x \cdot r + H(m) \pmod{q}$$

for  $s = [H(x)]^{-1} \cdot [x \cdot r + H(m)]$ . (Here  $a^{-1}$  denotes the multiplicative inverse of finite-field element  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ . Your colleague considers  $\mathbb{P}(s = 0)$  negligible.)

The recipient, given  $(\mathbb{G}, q, g, H), (y, r), (m, s)$  verifies that signature by checking the equation

$$H\left(y^{r \cdot s^{-1}} g^{H(m) \cdot s^{-1}}\right) = r$$

Show that this signature scheme does not provide existential unforgeability.

[8 marks]