Template Attacks on Different Devices

COSADE 2014

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Template Attacks [Chari et al., CHES '02]

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- Extensive evaluation of TA on different devices
 - 4 devices and 5 acquisition campaigns
 - several compression methods
 - several methods to improve attack


- Template Attacks [Chari et al., CHES '02]
- Problems when using different devices
- Extensive evaluation of TA on different devices
 - 4 devices and 5 acquisition campaigns
 - several compression methods
 - several methods to improve attack
- PCA and LDA
 - Guideline for PCA/LDA to make it efficient
 - Method for improving PCA

Template Attacks on DPA contest v4

Participant	Submission date	Key found	Max PGE < 10	Key found (stable)	Max PGE stable < 10	Time/Trace (ms)	Attack type
Liran Lerman Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium	19/09/2013	22	13	22	13	24 ms	Profiling
Amir Moradi RUB, Germany	02/10/2013	174	148	174	148	305 ms	Non Profiling
Tang Ming Wuhan University, China	03/11/2013	763	465	990	482	271 ms	Non Profiling
Frank Schuhmacher Segrids, Germany	26/02/2014	1	1	1	1	5 ms	Profiling
Hideo Shimizu Toshiba Corporation Corporate Research & Development Center, Japan	28/02/2014	1	1	1	1	30 ms	Profiling
Xavier Bodart, Liran Lerman Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgique	06/03/2014	21	17	21	17	400 ms	Profiling


- · Key found: Number of traces needed to find the correct key
- Max PGE < 10: Number of traces for the maximum Partial Guessing Entropy to be below 10
- . Key found (stable): Number of traces needed to find the correct key for good
- Max PGE stable < 10: Number of traces for the maximum Partial Guessing Entropy to be stable below 10
- . Time/Trace: Mean time per trace

Template Attacks – Setup



Template Attacks on Different Devices


Template Attacks – Profiling



 $n_{\rm p} = 1000$ profiling traces per k


m = 2500 samples per trace

Data space – cloud of traces



 \star = trace

Data space – mean vector




★ = trace vector

 \uparrow = mean vector

Template Attacks on Different Devices

Data space – covariance matrix




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


Template Attacks on Different Devices


Data space – individual covariances



Data space – pooled covariance




Template Attacks – Compression




Template Attacks on Different Devices


Select samples




Principal Component Analysis (PCA)




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


$$m = 3$$




U=SVD(B)


Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA)




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Template Attacks – Attack




Template Attacks – Attack

k = 0, 1, 2, ..., 255

Option 1: Multivariate Gaussian Distribution [Chari et al., CHES '02]

$$\mathbf{X} = \{\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{n_{\mathrm{a}}}\}$$

$$d(k \mid \mathbf{X}) = \prod_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{X}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^m |\mathbf{S}|}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}(\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)' \mathbf{S}^{-1}(\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)\right)$$



$$k^* = \operatorname*{arg\,max}_k \operatorname{d}(k \mid \mathbf{X})$$

Template Attacks – Attack


k = 0, 1, 2, ..., 255

Option 2: Mahalanobis Distance or Linear Discriminant [Choudary and Kuhn, CARDIS '13]

$$\mathbf{X} = \{\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{n_{\mathrm{a}}}\}$$


$$d_{\mathrm{MD}}(k \mid \mathbf{X}) = -\frac{1}{2} \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{X}} (\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)' \mathbf{S}^{-1} (\mathbf{x} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k)$$

$$d_{Linear}(k \mid \mathbf{X}) = \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k' \mathbf{S}^{-1} \left(\sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{X}_{k\star}} \mathbf{x} \right) - \frac{n_a}{2} \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k' \mathbf{S}^{-1} \bar{\mathbf{x}}_k$$




$$k^* = \operatorname*{arg\,max}_k \operatorname{d}(k \mid \mathbf{X})$$

TA on same campaign [CARDIS '13]



TA on same campaign [CARDIS '13]



Using different devices in template attack during profiling versus attack phase

- [Renauld et al., Eurocrypt '11]
 - Bad results across different ASIC devices
 - Used 20 different devices
 - Sample selection with 1 to 3 samples
- [Elaabid et al., Journal Crypto Engineering '12]
 - Bad results on same device but different campaigns
 - PCA with 1 principal component

4 different devices (Atmel XMEGA 8-bit μC)

Alpha



Beta

Gamma

Delta

- 4 different devices (Atmel XMEGA 8-bit μC)
- Code same as our CARDIS '13 scenario


```
...
movw r30, r24
ld r8, Z+
ld r9, Z+ <- target
ld r10, Z+
ld r11, Z+
...
```

- 4 different devices (Atmel XMEGA 8-bit μC)
- Code same as our CARDIS '13 scenario
- 5 acquisition campaigns
 - 1 per device
 - 1 additional campaign on one device


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
Standard TA (Meth. 1) same device




Standard TA (Meth. 1) different devices



Profiling on 3 devices (Meth. 2)




Analysis of overall mean vectors




Major problem: low-frequency offset


Overall mean vectors




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
Major problem: low-frequency offset




Overall mean trace (from profiling)




Single trace (from attack)




Low-frequency offset




Shift attack trace with offset






Profile on 3 devices & adapt offset (Meth. 4)




Standard TA works well with LDA



Standard TA works well with LDA


- LDA uses common covariance matrix S_{pooled} in computation of eigenvectors
- S_{pooled} captures noise factors, such as temperature variations
 - Our acquisition campaigns took several hours to complete
- If variation due to noise is similar across campaigns then LDA can be useful

How to select LDA eigenvectors (1)




$$DC(\boldsymbol{u}_j) = u_j^1 + \dots + u_j^m$$


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
How to select LDA eigenvectors (2)



How to select LDA eigenvectors (2)




How to select LDA eigenvectors




Good selection of m was only by chance! We should look at DC component of eigenvectors


Can we improve PCA?




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


Standard TA with PCA and LDA





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


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





- We add random offsets to mean vectors
- This forces DC offset in first eigenvector
 - which should remove DC offset from other eigenvectors, due to orthogonality of eigenvectors




DC offset of PCA eigenvectors: before Method 5




DC offset of PCA eigenvectors: after Method 5





Template Attacks on Different Devices



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- Extensive evaluation of TA on different devices
 - 4 devices, 5 campaigns
 - Tested compression methods: LDA, PCA, 1/3/20/5%-ile sample selection
 - 5 methods to improve TA
- Inter-device differences similar to inter-campaign differences
- Mostly low frequency offset
- Profiling on multiple devices and manipulation of DC offset can help
- But PCA and LDA can work with standard TA
 - Need to look at DC component
- Improved PCA by forcing in a DC eigenvector
- Take away message: compression method matters very much in this case
 - Previous studies may have missed this fact

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Questions

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Co-author: Markus Kuhn markus.kuhn@cl.cam.ac.uk

Security Group Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge